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Abstract	This	thesis	analyses	Tacitus'	account	of	Germany	and	the	Germans	through	a	re-reading	of	all	passages	 in	 the	Tacitean	corpus	set	 in	Germany.	The	 focus	 is	on	the	nature	of	power	exerted	in	spaces	and	by	spaces.	The	aim	is	to	uncover	the	spatial	 themes	 within	 Tacitus’	 work	 and	 offer	 new	 perspectives	 on	 his	treatment	 of	 space	 and	 power.	 Throughout,	 I	 see	 landscape	 as	 a	 powerful	influence	on	those	who	inhabit	it.	That	landscape	can	be	managed	and	altered,	but	is	resistant	to	imperial	power.			
Chapter	 one	discusses	 the	 limits	 of	 violent	 Roman	 repression	 in	 overcoming	the	 landscapes	 and	 people	 of	 Germany	 during	 the	 Batavian	 revolt.	 Chapter	
two	demonstrates	 that	 the	 revolt’s	 ultimate	 demise	 can	 be	 located	 in	 Rome’s	undermining	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 purpose	 and	 identity	 of	 the	 alliance	 created	 by	Civilis.	Chapter	 three	traces	 lexical	and	thematic	similarities	 in	the	discourses	of	Roman	mutineers	on	the	Rhine	in	AD14	and	the	German	rebels	of	AD69-70,	suggesting	 Tacitus	 –	 through	 repetition	 –	 sees	 imperial	 power	 as	 inevitably	producing	 certain	 forms	 of	 resistance	 that	 are	 replicated	 in	 a	 variety	 of	instances	 and	 circumstances,	 whatever	 the	 identities	 involved.	 Chapter	
four	evaluates	Germanicus’	campaigns	 in	Germany	as	assertions	of	power	and	identity	 through	 extreme	 violence.	 I	 also	 show	 the	 difficulties	 of	 maintaining	Roman	 identity	 in	 the	 German	 landscape	 of	 ruin,	 decay	 and	 terror	 through	discussion	of	Caecina’s	and	Agrippina’s	interventions	to	preserve	Roman	spatial	integrity.	Chapter	 five	demonstrates	 the	 recurrence	of	 landscape	and	power’s	prominence	throughout	 the	 later	books	of	 the	Annals,	 through	a	consideration	of	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir’s	 revolt,	 the	 fluctuating	 fates	 of	 the	 Cheruscan	 king	Italicus,	and	the	migrations	of	the	Frisii	and	the	Ampsivarii.	Chapter	six	argues	that	 the	Germania	uses	 history	 and	 the	 landscape	 to	 show	 how	 Germany	 is	ultimately	inaccessible	to	Rome	and	hence	unconquerable.		 	
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Introduction	This	thesis	unpacks	Tacitus’	literary	presentation	of	res	Germanae	by	analysing	the	 role	 played	 by	 the	 place	 (and	 space)	 ‘Germany’	 in	 the	 events	 narrated.	 It	examines	the	author’s	depiction	of	the	lived	experiences	of	Roman	soldiers	and	provincial	 subjects	 in	Germania.	 From	 these	 analyses,	 I	will	 draw	 conclusions	about	 Tacitus’	 historical	 and	 political	 thought	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 Empire	 and	imperial	power.	There	will	be	two	primary	conclusions.	The	first	is	that	Tacitus	consistently	 –	 across	 German	 affairs	 in	 the	Histories,	 Annals	 and	 Germania	 –	represents	 the	 landscapes	 of	 the	 (watery)	 Rhineland	 and	 (forested)	 Germany	across	the	Rhine	as	difficult	to	navigate	by	Rome,	powerful	in	their	resistance	to	Rome,	and	essentially	unconquerable	by	Rome.	This	has	been	noted	in	passing	by	 several	 scholars,	 contradicted	 by	 some,	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Germania,	analysed	 in	 depth	 by	 one,	 but	 this	 is	 the	 first	 study	 to	 cross-compare	 all	 res	
Germanae	 from	 the	 entire	Tacitean	 corpus	 and	gauge	 its	 general	 applicability.	Its	second	conclusion	is	that	Tacitus	describes	the	lived	experiences	of	all	who	were	implicated	in	one	way	or	another	in	the	Roman	Empire	of	the	first	century	AD,	with	very	different	statuses	and	ethnic	identities,	in	terms	so	thematically	–	and	 often	 lexically	 –	 similar	 to	 suggest	 that	 there	 was	 only	 a	 single	 lived	experience	on	offer:	of	being	unhappily	and	irremediably	oppressed	by	imperial	power.	 This	 includes	 Roman	 citizen-soldiers	 no	 less	 than	 tribute-paying	provincials.			In	 focusing	 on	 Germany	 as	 a	 subject	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 the	 present	 work’s	methodology	 departs	 from	 the	most	 prominent	 strand	 of	 thought	 in	 Tacitean	scholarship	of	the	past	few	decades	which	emphasises	the	mirroring	function	of	his	 depiction	 of	 events	 and	 peoples	 abroad.1	It	 shares	 with	 mirroring	 the	concern	 to	 direct	 attention	 away	 from	 trying	 to	 retrieve	 or	 reconstruct	 ‘what	happened’	 but	 differs	 from	mirroring	 in	 retaining	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 examined																																																									1See	O’Gorman	(1993),	135:	‘The	Germania,	as	its	full	title	de	origine	et	situ	
Germanorum	implies,	is	about	Rome.’	See	also	Timpe	(2007)	and	Smith	(2002,	especially	chapters	three	and	four)	on	the	Germania	and	Low		(2013)	on	the	first	hexad	of	the	Annals.	
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subject	 rather	 than	 seeing	 it	 as	 a	 lens	 through	which	 to	 view	 something	 else.	This	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 that	 mirroring	 is	 one	 valid	 approach	 to	 illuminating	 the	complex	 nexus	 of	 ideas	 and	 purposes	 which	 informed	 Tacitus’	 writing.	However,	whatever	our	contemporary	judgment	of	Tacitus’	historical	works	as	works	of	history,	 I	do	not	doubt	 that	he	saw	himself	as	engaged	 in	 the	 task	of	describing	past	events	which	actually	happened	as	well	as	formulating	historical	truths,	 insights	 and	 patterns	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 those	 events,	 which	 on	 occasion	transcended	the	specifics	of	their	individual	circumstances.2		A	first	aspect	of	this	thesis’	contribution	to	scholarship,	therefore,	is	its	focus	on	the	depiction	and	role	of	the	space	‘Germany’	in	every	German	example	from	the	texts.	Even	when	an	emotionally	affective	(sad,	threatening,	etc.)	Germany	is	an	appropriate	setting	for	an	emotionally	significant	event,	as	in	Germanicus’	visit	to	 the	 battlefield	 of	 Teutoburg	 or	 the	 chaos	 of	 the	 Civil	 War	 of	 AD69,	 such	representations	are	not,	or	not	 solely,	vehicles	or	metaphors	 for	 talking	about	things	other	than	Roman	imperialism	and	power.3	In	chapter	one	I	explore	the	complex	 interplay	 of	 natural	 features	 and	 human	 bodies	 in	 a	 game	 of	 power	between	two	opposing	military	forces	in	Tacitus’	representation	of	the	Batavian	revolt	 (Hist.	 4.12-37,	 4.54-79,	 and	 5.5-26).	 The	 episode	 foregrounds	 the	productive,	symbiotic	relationship	between	the	German	rebels	and	their	watery	environment	and	the	relative	weakness	of	Roman	technology	in	the	face	of	this	powerful	 landscape.4	I	 read	 this	 dichotomy	 in	 the	 narrative’s	 depiction	 of	imperialism	 and	 resistance	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 Jane	 Bennett’s	 conception	 of	vibrant	matter,	which	 ‘presents	 individuals	as	 simply	 incapable	of	bearing	 full	
																																																								2In	that	sense,	I	share	the	caution	expressed	in	the	polemics	of	Evans	(2007)	and	Lendon	(2009)	on	reading	historiography,	including	Tacitus,	solely	as	literature.	Though,	in	fairness,	so	does	Low	(2013,	18).	3Cf.	Pagán	(1999),	302:	‘Our	concern	is	not,	however,	to	reconsider	Tacitus'	geography	of	the	lower	Rhine;	it	is	to	examine	the	way	these	two	startling	paragraphs	[describing	Germanicus’	visit	to	the	battlefield	at	Teutoburg]	evoke	the	themes	of	transgression	and	transformation	in	the	Annales.’;	O’Gorman	(1995),	117:	‘the	landscapes	of	Palestine	and	Germany	are	marshaled	as	physical	manifestations	of	the	moral/political/poetical	discourse(s)	of	civil	war.’	4Noted	by	O’Gorman	(1995,	125)	but	again	metaphorically:	‘Civilis	embodies	Roman	civil	war.	It	is	appropriate	therefore	that	his	tribe,	the	Batavi,	are	at	home	with	the	fluid	landscape	of	discord.’	
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responsibility	 for	 their	 effects’.5	The	matrix	 of	 agency	within	which	 all	 human	events	unfold	themselves,	for	which	she	borrows	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	term	of	
assemblage,	 includes	 the	agency	of	nonhuman	material.6	In	Tacitus’	account	of	the	Batavian	revolt,	nonhuman	agency	emerges	most	clearly	in	the	behaviour	of	the	 river	 Rhine	 which	 unexpectedly	 and	 severely	 affects	 Roman	 military	operations	on	two	occasions	(Hist.	4.26	and	5.23).	Given	Tacitus’	 report	of	 the	Roman	soldiers’	fearful	response	to	these,	I	further	explore	the	Roman	religious	context	 in	 which	 such	 fear	 makes	 sense:	 the	 routine	 recognition	 of	 rivers	 as	divine	 entities	 and	 the	 ceremony	 of	 evocatio	by	 which	 Romans	 attempted	 to	entice	 the	 gods	 of	 their	 enemies	 away	 from	 their	 people	 and	 over	 to	 Rome’s	side.	I	simultaneously	propose,	on	the	basis	of	Tacitus’	dismissal	of	the	soldiers’	fear,	a	more	secular	reading	of	landscape	agency	in	Tacitus.	The	Germany	of	the	
Histories	 is	 both	 an	 alien	place,	which	has	 its	 effects	 on	 the	psychology	of	 the	soldiers,	 and	 a	 challenging	 place	 in	 its	 geophysical	 attributes,	 which	 has	 its	effects	on	the	deployment	of	Roman	military	power	and	engineering.			The	assemblage,	in	this	more	neutral,	secular	sense	of	a	variety	of	other	factors	involved	in	Roman	imperialism	alongside	human	agency,	recurs	throughout	the	
Annals,	 most	 explicitly	 in	 the	 Germanicus	 campaigns	 of	 Annals	 1	 and	 2,	discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	 which	 are	 frequently	 frustrated	 by	 impenetrable	forests,	 boggy	 marshes,	 and	 Roman	 disorientation.7	To	 my	 knowledge,	 Maria	Antonietta	 Giua’s	 1988	 monograph	 Contesti	 ambientali	 e	 azione	 umana	 nella	
storiografia	 di	 Tacito	 is	 the	 only	 other	 work	 to	 have	 treated	 at	 length	 the	importance	of	the	Tacitean	landscapes	in	our	readings	of	his	texts.	In	the	third	chapter	of	the	book,	discussing	the	Germanicus	campaigns,	she	challenges		 ‘la	 tradizionale	visione	di	Tacito	come	storico	 interessato	esclusivamente	all’azione	umana.	 In	realtà	quest’ultima	riceve	dall’ambiente	geografico	e	naturale	continui	condizionamenti,	così	che	la	trama	del	resoconto	storico	diventa	più	ricca,	non	 limitata	alla	psicologia	di	 individui	e	di	gruppi,	ma	aperta	ad	una	dinamica	più	complessa.’8																																																									5Bennett	(2010),	37.	6Developed	in	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1980).	7Compare	Low	(2013),	56-65.	8Giua	(1988),	86.	
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	[‘the	 traditional	 vision	 of	 Tacitus	 as	 a	 historian	 interested	 exclusively	 in	human	action.	In	fact,	the	latter	experiences	continuous	influencing	by	the	geographical	and	natural	environment,	so	that	the	texture	of	the	historical	account	becomes	richer,	not	 limited	 to	 the	psychology	of	 individuals	and	groups,	but	open	to	a	more	complex	dynamic.’]		This	 thesis	 offers	 a	 closer	 reading	 of	 the	 text	 than	Giua’s,	 but	 always	 starting	from	 the	 viewpoint	 articulated	 above,	 that	 once	 the	 landscape	 is	 taken	 into	account	 alongside	 human	 action	we	 gain	 a	much	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	events	depicted	and	a	clearer	appreciation	of	the	richness	and	complexity	of	the	Tacitean	text.	At	the	same	time,	I	will	show	that	Tacitus	frequently	nuances,	or	part-undermines,	 the	 environmentally	 deterministic	 position	 which	 connects	Germans	at	home	 in	 the	 landscape	with	success	 (and	unfamiliar	Romans	with	disaster).	On	several	occasions	increased	knowledge	of	the	alien	landscape	can	tip	the	balance	of	the	assemblage	of	agency,	which	directs	events	and	outcomes,	into	 Roman	 victory.	 This	 happens	most	 clearly	 in	 the	 Germanicus	 campaigns,	where,	significantly,	the	knowledge	which	enables	Roman	success	is	borrowed	from	 traitorous	 German	 natives	 (Ann.	 2.12ff	 and	 2.20ff):	 the	 successes	 thus	preclude	 real	 Roman	 understanding	 and	 thereby	 permanence.	 Germanicus	neither	 comes	 to	 understand	 nor	 conquers	 Germany.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	successes	of	Corbulo’s	German	travels	and	his	expulsion	of	the	rebel	Gannascus	(Ann.	11.18-9),	discussed	as	part	of	chapter	 five,	map	neatly	onto	Germanicus’	failures,	 suggesting	 reports	 from	 the	 earlier	 efforts	 inspired	 the	 later	 ones.	Romans’	 own	 knowledge	 could	 optimise	 the	 assemblage	 in	 their	 favour	 too.	Corbulo	at	least	could	learn	from	history.			Even	so,	Tacitus	shows	how	Germany	remained	unconquered	by	Corbulo,	as	it	did	 by	 Germanicus.	 Though	 the	 narrative	 leaves	 unclear	 whether	 Corbulo,	travelling	 through	 Germany	 in	 the	 AD40s,	 found	 the	 decaying	 relics	 of	Germanicus’	 military	 infrastructure,	 chapter	 four	 shows	 that	 Germanicus	himself	in	the	AD10s	encountered	too	many	dilapidated	structures	put	up	by	his	Roman	predecessors	(including	his	father	Drusus)	to	inspire	faith	in	the	reader	that	 his	 own	 interventions	 would	 long	 outlast	 him.	 My	 conclusions	 therefore	diverge	from	Levene’s	on	warfare	in	the	Annals.	He	concludes	that	at	Ann.	2.21,	
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when	Germanicus	has	won	 the	 second	of	his	battles	 against	Arminius’	 troops,	‘Germanicus'	 control	 of	 the	 physical	 landscape	 of	 Germany	 is	 now	 complete.’	Concerning	warfare	in	the	rest	of	the	work,	he	concludes	that			 ‘[i]f	the	Empire	[after	Germanicus’	death	in	the	Annals]	no	longer	involves	grand	wars	and	conquests,	it	is	only	partly	the	fault	of	the	imperial	system.	It	is	no	less	the	result	of	the	success	of	Germanicus,	who	has	made	control	of	the	Empire	all	too	easy.’9			Tacitus’	account	of	the	decades	after	Germanicus’	death	in	the	rest	of	the	Annals	do	not	bear	this	out,	even	if	we	concede	Levene’s	literary	point	–	the	main	thrust	of	his	paper	–	that	battle	scenes	do	become	less	varied	and	lively.	Moreover,	the	
Histories,	whose	narrated	time	 is	AD69-70,	still	show	little	sign	of	 firm	Roman	control	of	even	the	Rhineland	(either	 its	people	or	 its	 landscape)	on	the	Gallic	west	bank	of	the	Rhine,	let	alone	of	Germany	across	the	river.	The	Tacitean	text	consistently	 implies,	 across	 both	works,	 that	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 empire	 into	Germany	across	the	Rhine	is	impossible,	on	the	basis	that	any	military	successes	are	represented	as	relatively	rare,	difficult	to	achieve	and	temporary.		As	a	counterbalance	to	these	representations	of	failure	to	control	the	territory,	the	idea	of	textual	conquest	of	Germany	by	Rome	has	been	advanced	by	scholars	as	one	function	of	Tacitus’	ethnographic	monograph	Germania.10	However,	Zoe	Tan	recently	demonstrated	how	un-illuminating	the	Germania’s	illumination	of	Germany	 actually	 is:	 in	 its	 hodological	 progression	 through	 the	 territory,	increasingly	further	away	from	the	Rhine,	Tacitus	denies	his	reader	the	spatial	referents	necessary	 to	support	any	understanding	of	 the	structure	of	 this	vast	space.11	In	 chapter	 six,	 I	 too	 advance	 arguments	 for	 resisting	 reading	 the	
Germania	as	an	act	of	textual	conquest;	instead	arguing	that	Tacitus,	through	his	frequent	 mention	 of	 internal	 migrations,	 represents	 both	 actual	 and	 textual	conquest	 as	 impossible.	 Not	 only	 can	 the	 Germans	 not	 be	 pinned	 down	 in	reality,	 enabling	 conquest	 and	 then	 emplacement	 by	 Rome,	 but	 they	 cannot																																																									9Levene	(2009),	236–37.	10Esp.	Rives	(2012),	54.	See	also	Low	(2013),	32	n.	42.	11Tan	(2014),	an	extensive	(and	independent)	elaboration	of	a	position	also	articulated	by	Rives	(2011),	166–67.	
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even	be	pinned	down	on	a	map	with	any	certainty.	Timpe	claimed	that	Tacitus	was	not	particularly	 interested	 in	a	 ‘Vermittlung	einer	Raumvorstelling’	 in	 the	
Germania;	I	argue	the	very	different	point	that	the	Tacitean	text	shows	that	such	a	 ‘transmission	 of	 a	 representation	 of	 a	 space’	 cannot	 be	 achieved.12	This	judgment	 is	 textually	 expressed	by	 the	 frequent	mentions	of	 tribal	migrations	outside	the	chapter	explicitly	set	aside	by	Tacitus	to	discuss	them.	The	Germans	of	 the	 Germania	 metaphorically	 overrun	 even	 the	 bounds	 of	 the	 text.	 The	medium,	in	this	case,	reinforces	the	message.	Germany’s	perpetual	state	of	flux	as	 a	 bar	 to	 both	 understanding	 and	 conquest	 is	 complemented	by,	 and	partly	founded	on,	the	absence	of	any	historical	development	since	Tacitus’	report	of	the	Germans’	origin	myths.	In	contrast,	Romans	had	recorded	and	remembered	their	own	historical	development	from	their	mythical	 foundations	–	I	compare	with	both	Livy’s	historical	work	Ab	Urbe	Condita	and	Virgil’s	foundation	epic	the	
Aeneid	–	and	this	historical	practice	helped	to	structure	and	bind	together	into	a	coherent	 unit	 both	 their	 territory	 and	 themselves	 as	 a	 people.	 The	 German	space	 of	 the	 Germania	 has	 no	 such	 coherence,	 and	 nor	 does	 its	 people.	 The	connection	of	the	tribes	he	lists	throughout	the	work	to	the	Ur-tribes	mentioned	at	its	beginning	is	never	traced,	neither	by	Tacitus	himself	nor,	in	the	Germania’s	presentation	of	the	carmina	antiqua	(Ger.	2.1)	which	he	claims	are	their	form	of	
annales,	by	the	Germans	themselves.13	Far	 from	being	 intellectually	conquered	in	 the	 Germania,	 Germany	 and	 its	 people	 emerge	 as	 incomprehensible	 (to	Rome)	and	therefore	unconquerable	(by	Rome).			Moving	from	place	and	power	to	people	and	power,	the	other	main	interest	of	the	present	work	 lies	 in	 its	 focus	on	Tacitus’	ventriloquisation	of	 the	 thoughts	and	 complaints	 of	 those	 experiencing	 the	 consequences	 of	 Roman	 imperial	power	 in	 Germany.	 Scholars	 have	 analysed	 such	 ventriloquised	 discourses	 of	complaint	 before,	 including	 some	 at	 which	 I	 look	 in	 the	 present	 work14,	 and																																																									12Timpe	(2007),	425.	13This	non-tracing	would	remain	a	problem	even	if	one	explained	the	absence	of	historical	development	on	the	dual	grounds,	advanced	by	Rives	(2002,	165)	to	explain	the	absence	of	Roman	history	from	the	Germania,	that	ethnographical	inquiry	is	by	definition	ahistorical	and	that	Romans	considered	characters	as	fixed.	14For	textual	analyses	of	the	Batavian	revolt	and	some	or	all	of	the	speeches	from	it	that	are	discussed	in	the	present	work,	see	Lavan	(2017),	28–29;	Master	(2016),	passim;	
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those	from	other	episodes	in	the	Tacitean	corpus.	15	Some	of	these	analyses	have	drawn	 parallels	 between	 speeches	 in	 the	 manner	 I	 do	 within	 this	 thesis16,	anticipating	 some	 of	 my	 conclusions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 smaller	 or	 different	samples.	 Most	 notably,	 Liebeschuetz	 in	 his	 1966	 discussion	 of	 libertas	 in	 the	
Agricola	 wondered	 ‘whether	 Tacitus	 deliberately	 set	 out	 to	 demonstrate	 the	parallel	 between	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 Caesars	 over	 the	Romans	 and	 of	 the	Romans	over	their	subjects,	thus	applying	a	common	yardstick	to	both’17,	only	to	dismiss	the	 notion	 in	 the	 next	 sentence.	 Aside	 from	 intention,	 however,	 which	 is	impossible	 to	 divine	 two	 thousand	 years	 on,	 the	 present	 work’s	 discourse	analysis	 will	 redefine	 Liebeschuetz’	 notion	 of	 a	 parallelism	 from	 a	 form	 of	mirroring	(provincials	are	oppressed	by	Romans	in	a	way	which	resembles	how	Romans	 are	 oppressed	 by	 the	 emperor)	 into	 a	 general	 condition	 of	 the	principate	regardless	of	location,	citizenship,	emperor,	or	status.	Provincials	and	Romans	 alike	 are	 collectively	 oppressed	 by	 imperial	 power.	 The	main	 textual	support	 for	 this	 interpretation	 comes	 from	 Tacitus’	 presentation	 of	 the	experiences	and	complaints	of	the	mutinous	Roman	legions	of	Annals	1	(1.16-30	and	Ann.	1.31-49)	and	the	rebellious	Batavi	of	Histories	4	in	very	similar	terms,	discussed	 in	 chapter	 three.	Both	 events	occurred	at	 times	when	 the	deaths	of	the	reigning	Julio-Claudian	emperors,	Augustus	in	AD14	and	Nero	in	AD68,	had	severed	 a	 highly	 personalised	 political	 relationship	 between	 ruler	 and	 ruled,																																																																																																																																																														Haynes	(2003),	148–77	esp.	163ff;	Lavan	(2013),	142–47;	Rutherford	(2010,	318–28;	Keitel	(1993);	Isaac	(2004),	140–41,	and	a	pertinent	throwaway	comment	at	Levene	(2009),	226	(‘Civilis	is	able	to	win	not	least	by	dividing	the	‘Romanised’	Gauls	from	the	‘Germanic’	Civilis.’).	For	the	German	speeches	from	the	Annals	which	I	discuss,	see	primarily	Auerbach	(1953),	33-40;	Rancière	(1994),	24-41,	51;	and	Woodman	(2006)	for	the	mutinies	(though	also	Alston	(2017),	Bhatt	(2016)	and	Low	(2016),	unfortunately	published	too	late	to	be	considered	in	the	present	study);	Lavan	(2017),	30–32	and	Low	(2013),	56-64,	208-13	on	Florus	and	Sacrovir;	Low	(2013),	56-64,	222-4	again	on	the	Frisii’s	first	uprising;	and	Haynes	(2003),	170-1	and	Städele	(1985)	on	Boiocalus’	exchange	with	Duvius	Avitus.	15For	Calgacus	in	the	Agricola,	most	notably	Städele	(1985);	Rutherford	(2010),	315–19;	Clarke	(2001)	and	Liebeschuetz	(1966);	for	Boudicca	in	the	Annals,	Lavan	(2013),	147–53	and	Adler	(2011),	119–39.	16See	Adler	(2011),	130–34:	‘Echoes	of	Boudica?	Civilis	condemns	colonialism’	and	134-6:	‘More	echoes	of	Boudica?	Arminius	on	colonialism	as	slavery’,	or	Liebeschuetz’	drawing	connections	(1966,	137),	albeit	again	only	in	passing,	between	the	speeches	in	the	Agricola	and	‘other	freedom	fighters	in	the	Annals	and	Histories’	(the	debate	of	Arminius	and	Flavus	at	Ann.	2.9-10,	Arminius’	speech	at	2.15	and	those	of	Caratacus	at	
Ann.	12.34	and	37	in	one	footnote,	and	Hist.	4.14,	4.17,	and	4.32	in	another).	17Liebeschuetz	(1966),	138.	
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one	 which	 had	 in	 both	 cases	 kept	 discontent	 with	 the	 regime’s	 treatment	 of	them	from	spilling	over	into	violence.			The	immediate	aftermath	of	these	imperial	deaths	will	be	revealed	as	an	‘empty’	site	which	imperial	regime	and	imperial	subject	both	strive	to	occupy	as	quickly	as	 possible,	 ideologically	 and	 practically.	 The	 most	 significant	 of	 these	‘occupations’	is	the	mutineers’	creation	of	a	democratic	tumultus	in	response	to	the	 imperial	 redeployment	 of	 the	 Late	 Republican	 iustitium	 after	 Augustus’	death,	but	 the	Batavians’	violent	 rebellion	 in	 the	absence	of	a	 formal	 iustitium	must	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 comparable	 attempt	 to	 deal	with	 the	 ‘gap’	 left	 by	 imperial	death.	Batavians	 and	Romans	not	only	 act	 but	 also	 at	 times	 talk	 identically	 in	Tacitus’	narrative,	showing	both	groups	as	caring	deeply	about	the	nature	and	tangible	 expression	 of	 their	 relationship	 with	 Rome.	 The	 discourses	 they	employ	 illustrate	 imperial	 Rome’s	 excessive	 assertion	 of	 power	 over	 them,	specifically	 over	 their	 bodies,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Republican	 custom	 and	 law	 (as	idealistically	envisaged).	In	word	as	well	as	deed	in	these	narratives,	the	ghost	of	 the	 Republic	 –	 with	 its	 safeguards	 against	 the	 violation	 of	 the	 non-slave	(citizen)	 body	 and	 the	 rallying	 cry	 of	 libertas	 which	 embodies	 these	safeguards18,	and	of	all	 that	was	lost	with	the	emergence	of	the	principate	–	 is	never	far	away.			Returning	to	Liebeschuetz’s	perceived	parallel,	then,	I	argue	that	the	replication	in	 the	 Tacitean	 text	 of	 these	 similarly	 framed	 circumstances,	 triggers,	 and	protests	across	such	a	large	distance	in	terms	of	ethnicity	and	status	asserts	the	universality	 of	 this	 imperial	 dynamic	 and,	 consequently,	 of	 its	 disregard	 of	people’s	individual	and	group	statuses.	It	is	not	a	structural	relationship	across	three	levels,	with	the	relationship	between	the	top	level	(emperor)	and	middle	level	(Roman	citizens)	being	played	out	between	the	middle	level	(Romans)	and	the	 lower	 level	 (provincials),	 but	 a	 case	 of	 there	 only	 being	 two	 levels:	 the	emperor	and	everyone	else.	I	do	not,	therefore,	follow	Master’s	interpretation	of																																																									18See	Low	(2013),	24-7	for	a	useful	overview	of	fifty	years	of	scholarship	on	libertas	and	Tacitus	up	to	its	point	of	publication,	though	excluding	the	then-recent	Arena	(2012)	whose	line	of	reasoning	has	heavily	influenced	the	argument	in	chapter	three.	
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the	 Batavian	 revolt	 as	 the	 product	 of	 a	 badly	 calibrated	 transactional	 model	between	 Rome	 and	 the	 provincial	 subjects	 on	whom	 it	 relied	 to	maintain	 its	army	 and	 stability19 ,	 because	 this	 suggests,	 first,	 that	 the	 problems	 were	administrative	rather	than	cultural	and	systemic20	and,	secondly,	the	possibility	of	 easy	 recalibration.	 In	 Master’s	 view,	 the	 Batavian	 revolt	 is	 unusual	 and	unrepresentative	 of	 the	 power	 relations	 of	 the	 Roman	 system	 (the	 closest	parallel	 he	 identifies	 is	 the	 incorporation	 of	 the	 Latins	 after	 the	 Social	War).	Instead,	I	read	the	Batavian	revolt	as	one	of	multiple	similar	German	episodes	in	Tacitus.	 These	 collectively	 assert	 a	 general	 and	 widespread	 condition	 of	oppression	 caused	 by	 the	 nature	 and	 functioning	 of	 an	 imperial	 power	 that	respects	no	status	or	limits	and	subordinates	all	to	its	working.21		Two	other	provincial	revolts	in	the	Rhineland	and	their	associated	discourses	of	complaint,	 both	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 five,	 represent	 the	 same	 dynamic	 of	imperial	oppression	as	 the	mutinies	and	 the	Batavian	 revolt,	 even	 if	 the	word	
libertas	 is	 either	 less	prominent	 (Florus	 and	 Sacrovir,	Ann.	3.40-46)	 or	 absent	(the	Frisii’s	 first	uprising	under	Olennius,	Ann.	4.72-74).	Occurring	at	different	times	 and	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 Germany,	 these	 provide	 further	 proof	 of	 the	universality	 of	 the	 collective	 oppression	 of	 those	 under	 imperial	 Rome.	 In	Tacitus’	account	of	the	rebellion	of	Florus	and	Sacrovir,	there	is	even	a	repeat	of	the	 identity-blurring	dynamic	of	 the	mutineers/Batavi	comparison:	Florus	and	his	 troops	 end	 up	 being	 killed	 in	 battle	 for	 airing	 their	 grievances	 (through	speech	 and	 armed	 revolt)	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	 those	 at	Rome	whom	Tacitus	says	harboured	similar	desires	for	regime	change	risked	being	killed	by	Tiberius	if	 they	 ever	 aired	 their	 grievances	 aloud	 (through	 speech).	 Instead	 of	 one	connection	 (the	 mutinies)	 between	 a	 voiced	 Roman	 experience	 of	 imperial	oppression	and	several	provincial	ones,	we	have	two	connections.	The	(implied)	elites	 grumbling	 behind	 Tiberius’	 back	 at	 Rome	 are,	 moreover,	 of	 a	 different	status	 than	 the	 lower-class	 citizen-soldiers	 of	 the	 mutinies,	 thus	 further																																																									19Master	(2016).	20This	view	is	implicitly	advanced	for	Agricola’s	management	of	the	troubles	of	Britain	by	Liebeschuetz	(1966,	136).	21The	conclusion	to	this	thesis	offers	a	very	quick	preliminary	survey	of	other	areas	in	the	Empire	for	which	the	Tacitean	text	asserts	the	same	dynamic,	especially	Britain	(Ann.	14.35);	see	p.	232.	
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reinforcing	 the	disregard	of	 imperial	 oppression	 for	distinctions	of	 status	 and	class,	even	on	the	Roman	side.	In	‘Slaves	to	Rome’,	Lavan	traced	a	gradual	shift,	during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 first	 century	 AD,	 in	 the	 Roman	 discourse	 of	oppositional	 identity	 politics	 from	 defining	 citizens	 against	 non-citizens	 to	Italians	 versus	 everyone	 else22,	 and	 finally,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Caracalla’s	 universal	grant	of	citizenship	in	AD212,	to	emperor	versus	everyone	else.23	My	reading	of	Tacitus	 proposes	 to	 place	 the	 change	 in	 AD14,	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 Tacitus	ventriloquises	 similar	 discourses	 about	 arbitrary	 imperial	 power	 on	 behalf	 of	different	groups	of	Romans	as	well	as	different	groups	of	Germans	 throughout	the	entire	narrated	period	of	the	Tacitean	corpus	(AD14-AD70).		The	significance	of	Tacitus’	accounts	of	these	smaller	episodes	of	revolt	is	now	clear.	 Criticism	has	 been	 leveled	 at	 them	 (specifically	 the	 Batavian	 revolt	 and	that	of	Florus	and	Sacrovir)	and	other	examples	from	Roman	historiography,	for	flattening	real	historical	causes	into	a	standard	set	of	grievances	and	buzzwords	(mostly	 centred	 around	 greed,	 cruelty	 and	 lust)	 which	 prevent	 the	 ancient	historian	 from	 discerning	what	was	 really	 going	 on.24	In	 response,	 this	 thesis	argues	that	the	stylisation	of	these	complaints	across	different	episodes	in	itself	asserts	 a	 pattern	which	Tacitus	 shows	 at	work	 across	 the	 empire	 at	 different	times	 in	 different	 places.	 This	 in	 itself	 is	 a	 valuable	 historical	 insight.	 The	approach	which	sees	patterns	as	indicative	of	historical	processes	and	therefore	very	enlightening	indeed	was	usefully	taken	by	Dyson	in	his	two	analyses	of	the	causes	 of	 native	 revolts	 in	 the	 Roman	 Empire25,	 though	 they	 differ	 from	 the	present	work	in	focus	(he	largely	excludes	discourse,	on	which	I	focus	in	detail)	and	scope	(he	cross-compares	revolts	across	different	parts	of	 the	empire	and	different	authors,	whereas	 I	 focus	on	Germany	within	Tacitus).	His	conclusion	that	 economic	 and	 cultural	 change	were	 the	main	 triggers	 for	 revolt	 is	 partly	upheld	in	my	readings	of	the	Tacitean	text,	especially	of	the	rebellion	of	Florus	and	Sacrovir	 and	 the	Tencteri’s	 participation	 in	 the	Batavian	 revolt,	 but	 these																																																									22Lavan	(2013),	59.	23Ibid.,	111.	24Lavan	(2017),	29;	but	see	Woolf	(2011),	35	for	the	opposite	position	that	‘Tacitus’	revolt	narratives	are	not	completely	stereotyped’.	25Dyson	(1971)	and	Dyson	(1975).	
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factors	too	are	recontextualised	as	the	result	of	the	inherently	and	irreparably	oppressive	nature	of	imperial	power.26			Elsewhere,	Tacitus	reports	a	focus	on	identity	by	provincial	subjects	themselves	which	 is	out	of	 step	with	 this	 equalising	 influence	of	 imperial	 corruption.	The	Batavian	revolt,	which	is	not	‘won’	by	either	side	in	the	conventional	sense	of	a	decisive	 military	 victory,	 dissolves	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Petillius	 Cerialis’	 skilful	manipulation	 of	 identity	 politics	 in	 the	Rhineland,	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 two.27	He	 encourages	 groups	 to	 see	 themselves	 as	 being	 in	 competition	 with	 each	other	 for	 social	 or	 more	 tangible	 goods	 that	 depend	 on	 the	 stability	 of	 the	Roman	Empire	for	their	continued	provision.	In	his	scaremongering	to	the	Gauls	that	Germans	are	only	ever	interested	in	crossing	the	Rhine	to	steal	Gallic	lands,	and	 his	 assertion	 to	 the	 Batavi	 that	 their	 leader	 Civilis	 is	 precisely	 such	 an	opportunist	 transrhenane	 renegade,	 neither	 true	 Batavian	 nor	 Roman,	 he	borrows	ethnic	labels	and	essentialising	stereotypes	to	cloak	his	realpolitik.	The	imperial	 general	 Cerialis	 may	 know	 that	 all	 of	 them	 are	 in	 fact	 similarly	enslaved	 to	 imperial	 Rome,	 but	 they	 have	 reason	 to	 care	 about	 the	 status	differences	 between	 slaves.	 Ethnic	 identities	 are	 both	 meaningful	 and	meaningless	 at	 the	 same	 time	 in	 the	 Rhineland	 of	 the	 first	 century	 AD;	moreover,	its	imperial	context	means	groups	and	individuals	can	choose	to	shift	categories	 or	 be	 re-labelled	 by	 others	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 political	 choices.	 The	Tacitean	text	does	not	devalue	 ideological	attachments	to	certain	 identities,	as	my	 analysis	 of	 the	 Tencteri’s	 exchange	 of	 speech	 with	 the	 Ubii-turned-Agrippinenses	in	this	same	chapter	shows,	but	it	does	show	that	with	the	advent																																																									26Agricola,	despite	being	presented	by	Tacitus	as	comparatively	humane	and	considerate	in	his	conquest	of	Britain,	is	surely	not	a	real	exception	to	the	imperial	governors	and	procurators	disparaged	by	Civilis	(quando	legatum,	gravi	quidem	
comitatu	et	superbo,	cum	imperio	venire?	tradi	se	praefectis	centurionibusque,	Hist.	4.14.13-5),	Florus	and	Sacrovir	(saevitia	ac	superbia	praesidentium,	Ann.	3.40),	and	Boudicca	(Romanorum	cupidines,	Ann.	14.35).	The	comment	that	as	governor	of	Aquitania	he	kept	himself	procul	a	contentione	adversus	procuratores	or	‘far	from	disputes	with	his	procurator’	(Agr.	9)	sounds	to	me	as	if	he	himself	refrained	from	the	impositions	described	elsewhere	but	did	not	prevent	others	from	committing	them.	27Noted	in	passing	by	Levene	(2009,	226)	in	his	treatment	of	warfare	in	the	Annals	(!),	but	not	substantiated	any	further.	Ash	(2009,	97)	grounds	the	revolt’s	fragmentation	in	‘the	arrival	of	multiple	leaders	with	different	aims’	without	reference	to	the	identity	frameworks	used	by	these	leaders	and	applied	to	them	by	Tacitus	in	the	narrative	or	his	ventriloquised	Petillius	Cerialis.	
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of	 Rome	 more	 pragmatic	 considerations	 (whether	 peace	 from	 Rome,	 status	from	 Rome,	 or	 the	 threatening	 presence	 of	 several	 legions)	 informed	 such	positioning.28			Chapter	 five	 considers	 three	 further	 episodes	 which	 do	 not	 neatly	 fit	 the	patterns	outlined	above,	though	there	are	traces	of	similar	preoccupations.	Even	in	taking	the	story	of	Italicus	in	Annals	11	(Ann.	11.16-17)	on	its	own	terms,	as	an	account	of	a	Roman-fostered	German	going	out	to	rule	his	kingdom,	it	is	hard	to	ignore	the	extent	to	which	the	king’s	deposition	and	subsequent	reinvestiture	(to	the	detriment	of	his	people)	invite	comparison	with	Rome’s	past	history.	It	is	most	 straightforwardly	 like	 Low’s	 reading	 of	 the	 foreigners	 in	 Annals	1-6	 as	examples	of	the	corruption	of	foreign	libertas	through	contact	with	Rome,	which	had	long	ago	lost	its	own.29	Thus	Italicus’	story	is	both	a	mirror	of	Rome	and	a	description	of	 the	 consequences	of	Germans	being	pulled	 into	 the	orbit	of	 the	Empire:	 the	 Cherusci	 did	 not	 have	 kings	 before,	 but	 once	 they	 get	 one	(moreover,	one	raised	in	imperial	Rome)	he	oppresses	his	people	as	the	nature	of	 one-man	 rule	 demands.	 Corbulo’s	 establishment	 of	 a	 Republic	 on	 the	northern	periphery	of	the	empire	by	relocating	the	Frisii	(Ann.	11.19)	and	giving	them	a	senate	is	similarly	metaphor	(mirror)	and	fact:	that	the	Republic	cannot	be	 brought	 back	 into	 being,	 even	 so	 far	 from	 Rome,	 speaks	 to	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 imperial	 regime	 had	 entrenched	 itself	 and	 could	 no	 longer	 be	dislodged	anywhere	which	had	had	contact	with	Rome.	Finally,	the	Ampsivarii’s	migration	into	Roman	lands	and	their	expulsion	by	Duvius	Avitus	in	Annals	13	(Ann.	13.53-57)	 looks	back	to	the	Germania’s	concern	with	Germany’s	absence	of	 fixity	 and	 structure,	 as	well	 as	 to	 Germanicus’	 choice	 in	Annals	1	 and	 2	 to	blaze	 a	 trail	 of	 destruction	 through	 an	 uncontrollable	 Germany	 and	 its	population	in	preference	to	letting	them	exist	outside	Roman	control.		
																																																								28Woolf	(2009),	208	talks	about	‘[t]he	incorporation	of	the	Batavi	within	the	empire	on	terms	that	preserved	old	identities	at	the	same	time	as	assigning	new	roles’	as	described	by	Roymans	(2004);	my	thesis	will	approach	the	difficulties	of	such	combinations	of	identity	continuity	and	change	on	the	basis	of	the	Tacitean	text	instead	of	Roymans’	archaeological	remains.	29Low	(2013),	26.	
		 20	
The	 two	over-arching	 themes	 of	 this	 study,	 then,	 are	 the	powerful	 role	 of	 the	German	 landscape	 in	 Tacitus’	 account	 of	 Roman	 imperialist	 endeavours	 in	Germany	 and	 the	 implication	 of	 its	 population	 in	 an	 empire-wide	 collective	oppression	 which	 erases	 all	 other	 distinctions	 of	 identity	 and	 status.	 I	 now	conclude	the	introduction	with	an	overview	of	the	individual	chapters.			
Chapter	 one	discusses	 the	 limits	 of	 violent	 Roman	 repression	 in	 overcoming	the	landscapes	and	people	of	Germany	during	the	Batavian	revolt	of	Histories	4	and	 5.	 After	 examining	 how	 Tacitus	 appears	 to	 establish	 an	 environmentally	deterministic	relationship	which	equates	the	Batavi	with	successful	operations	on	water,	and	Roman	Rhine	navigation	with	disaster,	I	proceed	to	outline	how	his	 account	 subsequently	 nuances	 any	 rigid	 application	 of	 this	 schema.	Landscape	 is	 shown	 to	 be	 a	 powerful	 agent	 in	 the	 struggle,	 but	 also	 to	 be	capable	 of	 being	 neutralised	 by	 Roman	 technology	 so	 that	 Romans	 can	make	headway.	 Those	 spatial	 interventions	 then	 support	 and	 uphold	 structures	 of	power.	 There	 are	 two	 main	 theoretical	 influences	 in	 this	 chapter.	 First,	 Jane	Bennett’s	 Vibrant	 Matter:	 A	 Political	 Ecology	 of	 Things	 (2010)	 stresses	 the	importance	 of	 paying	 attention	 to	 nonhuman	 agency	 in	 our	 interpretation	 of	events	and	the	assignation	of	responsibility	or	blame	to	humans.	Her	work	sees	events	and	outcomes	as	produced	by	an	assemblage,	or	matrix,	of	agency,	and	is	a	useful	lens	through	which	to	interpret	Tacitus’	depiction	of	the	landscape	as	a	serious	player	in	the	Batavian	conflict.	The	second	main	theoretical	framework	borrowed	 is	 from	 Foucault’s	 Discipline	 and	 Punish	 (1995).	 His	 reading	 of	knowledge	 and	 classification	 as	 techniques	 of	 power	 underpins	 my	interpretation	 of	 the	 corrupt	 Batavian	 dilectus	 which	 sparked	 the	 Batavian	revolt	as	 the	human	equivalent	of	Roman	technology’s	spatial	 interventions	to	facilitate	control	–	not	co-option	–	of	the	Rhineland.			
Chapter	 two	traces	 the	 process	 of	 the	 Batavian	 revolt’s	 breakdown	 in	 the	Tacitean	 text.	 It	will	be	 shown	 that	 the	narrative	of	Histories	4	and	5	grounds	this	demise	solidly	in	the	detachment	of	Civilis’	supporters,	Batavian	and	other,	from	 each	 other	 and	 from	 him,	 rather	 than	 in	 any	military	 causes.	 From	 the	moment	 the	 Ubii	 pay	 lip	 service	 to	 their	 Tencteran	 cousins’	 demands	 to	 ‘de-
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Romanise’	themselves,	all	subsequent	speeches	reported	by	Tacitus,	Roman	and	non-Roman,	 contain	 discourses	 of	 separation	 which	 help	 to	 effect,	 whether	intentionally	 or	 not,	 the	 breakup	 of	 Civilis’	 Gallo-German	 alliance.	 These	discourses	 rely	partly	 on	 the	 language	 and	 framework	of	 identity	politics	 and	partly	on	considerations	of	power	and	economics	to	motivate	withdrawal	from	the	 rebellion,	 showing	 how	 the	 advent	 of	 Rome	 into	 the	 Rhineland	 changed	existing	 identities	 and	 (self-)identifications.	 My	 analyses	 of	 Cerialis’	 final	communications	 to	 the	 Transrhenani	 and	 Batavi,	 both	 pragmatic	 and	threatening,	and	the	latter’s	change	of	heart,	have	benefited	from	Frantz	Fanon’s	theorising	on	‘spontaneous’	anti-colonial	uprisings.	Through	my	examination	of	the	 efficacy	 of	 Cerialis’	 speeches	 and	 general	 approach,	 the	 Roman	 general	 is	then	rehabilitated	as	precisely	the	right	general	for	this	part	of	the	world,	rather	than	the	military	failure	he	has	often	been	judged	to	be	in	scholarship.		
Chapter	 three	draws	connections	between	 the	German	rebels	of	 the	Batavian	revolt	and	the	mutinous	Roman	legions	of	Annals	1	in	AD14.	Tacitus	describes	how	 both	 uprisings	 were	 prompted	 and	 facilitated	 by	 imperial	 deaths.	 To	explain	the	role	of	iustitium	in	imperial	death	in	the	mutinies	narrative,	I	engage	with	Giorgio	Agamben’s	theorising	on	states	of	exception	(such	as	the	iustitium)	in	 State	 of	 Exception	 (2005).	 Erich	 Auerbach’s	 Mimesis	 (1953)	 and	 Jacques	Rancière’s	The	Names	of	History:	The	Poetics	 of	Knowledge	 (1994)	will	 inform	my	 discussion	 of	 the	 occasions	 on	 which	 Tacitus	 allows	 discourse	 to	 the	‘common’	 Roman	 legionaries	 who	 do	 not	 ordinarily	 speak	 in	 Latin	historiography.	 I	 further	 build	 on	 Tony	 Woodman’s	 2006	 tracing	 of	 the	metaphor	 of	 madness	 in	 the	 mutinies	 narrative	 by	 explaining	 it	 as	 a	historiographical	tool	to	indicate	Tacitus’	disapproval	of	the	mutinies’	violence	against	 the	 state	 (despite	 the	 ambiguous	 status	 of	 the	 iustitium	as	 a	 factor	 in	promoting	this	violence).	Bakhtin’s	concept	of	the	carnivalesque	from	Rabelais	
and	 his	 World	 (1984)	 is	 tested	 but	 ultimately	 discarded	 as	 a	 fitting	 way	 of	interpreting	the	mutinies’	 ‘mad’	role	reversal.	Tacitus	depicts	neither	madness	nor	carnival	sanctioned	by	the	authorities	as	a	means	of	reconciling	subjects	to	that	authority	for	the	rest	of	the	time.	Instead,	he	understands	but	disapproves	of	both	rebellions,	whose	causes	he	firmly	roots	in	both	cases	in	the	inherently	
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oppressive	 nature	 of	 the	 imperial	 regime	which	 rules	 both	 groups.	 Autocratic	power	 respects	 no	 identity	 or	 status	 distinctions	 in	 its	 treatment	 of	 those	subjected	to	it.			
Chapter	four	analyses	the	spatialisation	in	the	Germanicus	campaigns	of	Annals	1	and	2	 in	 terms	of	 conflicts	between	Roman	and	German	spaces	which	often	occupy	 the	 same	 physical	 territory.	 The	 resulting	 multilayeredness	 of	 the	landscape	 raises	 issues	of	 translation	 and	 comprehension	 for	Romans	moving	through	 a	 Germany	 in	 which	 Roman	 ruins	 superimposed	 on	 the	 otherwise	unknowable	 forests	 are	 the	 only	 available	 structuring	 elements	 to	 help	 them	navigate	 and	 understand	 their	 surroundings.	 The	 combination	 of	 this	 tension	between	spaces,	the	negative	connotations	of	many	of	these	guideposts,	and	the	absence	of	knowledge	of	the	German	underscape	beneath	them	creates	fear	in	the	rank	and	file	when	such	insights	are	absent	or	defective.	In	contrast	to	these	fearful	responses,	I	examine	in	turn	the	very	different	reactions	of	Germanicus	himself,	 his	 wife	 Agrippina	 and	 his	 general	 Caecina	 as	 striving,	 with	 varying	levels	of	success,	to	guard	the	integrity	of	Roman	space	and	indeed	permanently	subordinate	German	space	to	it.	Ultimately,	I	conclude,	the	Tacitean	text	shows	Germany	as	a	place	where	feats	of	conquests	are	both	difficult	and	temporary.	The	 final	 section	 discusses	 the	 raid	 on	 the	 Marsi	 as	 departing	 from	 this	preoccupation	 with	 conflicts	 of	 space,	 instead	 foregrounding	 identity	 as	 its	primary	 concern.	 The	 unthreatening	 Marsi’s	 destruction	 at	 the	 hands	 of	formerly	mutinous	Romans	is	essential	to	the	restoration	of	the	legions’	Roman	identity,	the	breakdown	of	which	Annals	1	showed	to	be	as	much	of	a	threat	to	the	stability	of	the	empire	as	an	unknowable	and	unconquered	Germany.			
Chapter	 five	discusses	how	several	 ‘smaller’	German	revolts	and	events	in	the	
Annals	 (Florus	 and	 Sacrovir,	 the	 Frisii,	 Corbulo’s	 German	 campaigns,	 and	 the	story	of	 Italicus	and	 the	Cherusci)	 further	 support	 the	 conclusions	on	Tacitus’	historical	and	political	thought	on	Empire	and	power	which	were	reached	in	the	previous	 four	 chapters.	 Thematic	 connections	 are	 made	 to	 other	 Tacitean	passages	 but	 also	 to	 other	 authors	 and	 periods	 from	 Roman	 history.	 These	intratextual	and	intertextual	connections	across	space	and	time	further	support	
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the	dynamics	of	 how	 imperial	 power	 and	 resistance	manifest	 and	 repeat.	The	nexus	 of	 connections	 also	 shows	 the	 Tacitean	 text	 does	 not	 deal	 in	 either	essential	categories	of	peoples	and	places	or	discourses	asserting	them	(unless	ventriloquised).	Several	of	these	episodes	again	foreground	the	spaces	in	which	this	power	is	deployed	and	resisted,	and	the	assemblage	returns	as	a	framework	for	explaining	Corbulo’s	(relative)	successes	in	Annals	11	where	Germanicus	in	
Annals	1	and	2	was	shown	to	have	failed.		
Chapter	 six	shows	 that	 several	 textual	 strategies	 in	 the	Germania	conspire	 to	represent	 the	 impossibility	 of	 imposing	 an	 imperial	 geography	 on	 Germany,	both	in	the	shape	of	secure	physical	conquest	and	intellectual	containment.	The	three	main	 strategies	 colluding	 to	depict	 this	 are	 the	pervasive	attestations	of	migrations	within	 the	work	 –	 a	 thematic	 strand	which	has	not	 received	much	attention	 in	 the	 scholarship30	–,	 the	 work’s	 erratic	 engagement	 with	 the	 past	(Rome’s,	Germany’s,	and	their	intersection),	and	the	suppression	of	accounts	of	Rome’s	 partial	 success	 at	 imposing	 an	 imperialist	 geography	 on	 parts	 of	Germany.	 To	 explain	 Germany’s	 fluid	 state	 of	 a	 space	without	 coherence,	 the	
Germania	advances	 the	 Germans’	 absence	 of	 both	 historical	 development	 and	historical	 practice,	 which	 I	 illustrate	 through	 a	 comparison	 with	 Roman	historical	practice	concerning	their	own	mythical	origins.	Some	of	these	spatial	themes	in	the	Germania	(fixity,	emplacement,	migration,	the	difficulty	of	pinning	down	what	and	where	Germans	are)	prefigure	 later	reworkings	 in	 the	Annals.	Thus	 the	 Germania,	 using	 different	 tools,	 conveys	 the	 same	 German	inaccessibility	and	unconquerability	as	the	Tacitean	record	of	German	military	affairs	in	the	historical	works.		 	
																																																								30Though	many	outline	 the	work’s	dual	 structure	and	summarise	 the	purport	of	both	halves,	 the	 third	 of	 Tacitus’	 advertised	 aims	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 part	 two,	 quaeque	
nationes	e	Germania	in	Gallias	commigraverint	[expediam]	is	often	entirely	omitted	from	the	summary;	see	O’Gorman	(1993),	136	and	Thomas	(2009),	60,	despite	reproducing	the	 quotation	 of	 which	 this	 forms	 a	 part	 in	 full	 on	 p.	 62.	 Sallmann	 (1987,	 124)	comments	 on	 the	 difficult	 ‘classification	 of	 those	 tribes	 who,	 since	 Caesar's	 epoch,	engaged	in	restless	raids	and	wanderings	in	the	Rhine-lands’	but	without	reference	to	any	classical	texts.	
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1	 Managing	(in)	Batavia		
Introduction	The	episodes	which	constitute	the	Batavian	rebellion	across	books	4	(chapters	12-37	and	54-79)	and	5	(chapters	14-26)	of	the	Histories	are	characterised	by	a	complex	 interplay	 of	 natural	 features	 and	 human	 bodies	 in	 a	 game	 of	 power	between	two	opposing	military	forces.	This	chapter	will	analyse	what	power	the	narrative	grants	the	Germanic	landscapes	over	their	occupants	(for	example,	by	frustrating	 Roman	 fighting	 tactics	 and	 aiding	 Germanic	 efforts),	 and	 in	 what	ways	 power	 is	 in	 turn	 exercised	 over	 the	 land	 by	 its	 occupants	 –	 by	 these,	 I	mean	both	its	native	inhabitants	and	the	Roman	military.	Finally,	I	will	discuss	the	different	forms	of	landscape	‘appropriation’	presented	by	Tacitus	in	Rome’s	conquest	and	control	of	Batavia,	and	their	role	and	efficacy	in	furthering	Roman	imperialism.31		The	 narrated	 time	 of	 the	 episode	 is	 AD69-70,	 after	 Nero’s	 death	 and	 during	Vespasian’s	struggle	to	emerge	as	the	victor	of	the	civil	war	(which	happened	in	December	AD69).	The	rebellion	is	instigated	by	the	tribe	of	the	Batavi	(Roman	allies	but	not	–	with	a	few	exceptions	–	citizens,	who	lived	by	the	Rhine	estuary	where	it	flows	into	the	North	Sea)	as	a	result	of	a	corruptly	conducted	military	conscription	of	the	tribe	into	the	Roman	army.	Several	other	German	and	even	Gallic	tribes	quickly	join	the	revolt	for	varying	reasons	and	the	rebellion	spreads	until	 it	 covers	 a	 large	 stretch	 of	 territory	 along	 the	 west	 bank	 of	 the	 Rhine,	including	 multiple	 Roman	 army	 camps.	 This	 territory	 itself	 is	 difficult	 to	categorise	neatly:	in	its	military	classification,	it	spanned	the	military	districts	of	Germania	Inferior	and	Superior	on	the	Rhine’s	west	bank	and	the	strip	of	 land	on	the	east	bank	which	had	no	official	status	beyond	the	appellation	Germania	but	 showed	definite	 and	permanent	 traces	 of	Roman	 conquest.	 In	 its	 political																																																									31All	translations	in	this	thesis	are	my	own,	unless	otherwise	specified.	For	the	Latin,	I	have	in	each	case	used	the	Oxford	Classical	Text	of	the	Germania	(Ogilvie	and	Winterbottom	1975),	Histories	(Fisher	1911)	and	Annals	(Fisher	1906).	The	sole	exception	is	Hist.	4.12,	where	the	Teubner	by	Delz,	Heubner,	and	Önnerfors	(1978)	usefully	emends	erat	et	domi	delectus	eques,	praecipuo	nandi	studio,	<quo>	arma	
equosque	retinens	integris	turmis	Rhenum	perrumpere…	to	perrumperet.	
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and	administrative	classification,	all	the	west	bank	activity	occurred	within	the	provinces	 of	 Gallia	 Belgica	 and	 Gallia	 Lugdunensis.32	For	 convenience’s	 sake	 I	will	 refer	 to	 the	 territory	affected	by	 the	 revolt	 simply	as	 the	Rhineland	or	as	Germany,	having	warned	 the	reader	of	 the	complexities	 that	prevent	any	neat	description	 of	 this	 territory.	 The	 Roman	 view	 of	 the	 non-Roman	 peoples	inhabiting	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 Rhine	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 first	 century	 AD	complicates	the	matter	further:	Tacitus	does	not	use	the	ethnic	terminology	of	Gaul	and	German	with	any	 level	of	 consistency	or	 clear	underpinning	 criteria.	Indeed,	 Krebs	 contrasts	 the	 care	 Caesar	 took	 to	 differentiate	 the	 two	 ἔθνη	 in	order	 to	 justify	 the	 limits	 of	 his	 campaigns,	 creating	 essentially	 an	 artificial	construct	bounded	by	Roman	political	considerations,	with	Tacitus’	depiction	in	the	Germania	of	Gauls	and	Germans	as	rather	similar	as	a	result	of	their	similar	climates.33	In	the	Histories	too,	we	have	no	basis	on	which	to	judge	Tacitus’	use	of	the	terms.	Therefore	I	will	name	individual	tribes	when	Tacitus	gives	us	their	name	 but	 will	 refer	 to	 ‘the	 Germans’	 or	 ‘the	 Gallo-German	 alliance’	 when	 he	does	 not.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	my	 argument,	 however,	 the	 inconsistency	 does	not	matter:	my	focus	is	the	setting	in	which	the	conflict	between	Rome	and	the	wider	alliance	takes	place	regardless	of	its	geographical	classification	or	that	of	its	inhabitants.	
Environment	shapes	man:	I	One	way	in	which	the	power	of	the	landscape	finds	expression	in	the	Batavian	rebellion	is	the	dichotomy	between	water-savvy	Batavi	who	are	comfortable	in	their	 riverine	 environment	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 often	 literally	 floundering	
																																																								32Land	from	these	two	Gallic	provinces	was	given	up	to	create	the	two	Germaniae	as	formal	provinces	only	during	the	reign	of	Domitian,	more	than	a	decade	after	the	Batavian	revolt;	see	Millar	(1981),	111–12.	33Krebs	(2011),	205–7.	Nonetheless,	the	Germania	maintains	the	distinction	in	some	of	its	discussions	of	origines:	at	Ger.	28.2	Tacitus	gives	the	Helvetii	as	one	of	several	examples	of	Gauls	who	had	moved	into	Germany	in	the	distant	past,	without	commenting	explicitly	on	whether	the	move	had	transformed	them	into	Germans,	and	at	Ger.	28.4	he	discusses	several	tribes	who	crossed	over	from	Germany	to	inhabit	the	Gallic	bank	of	the	Rhine	but	are	nonetheless	counted	as	(still)	German.	Neither	physical	characteristics	nor	location	can	therefore	be	the	foundations	of	Tacitus’	distinction	between	Gaul	and	German.	See	also	Rives	(1999),	26–27,	‘The	discovery	of	the	Germani’	and	Rives	(2011),	166–7.		
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Romans	on	the	other.34	In	the	two	sections	which	introduce	and	end	the	conflict,	Tacitus	associates	Batavian	success	with	the	aquatic	and	contrasts	it	with	their	struggle	 to	 get	 a	 hold	 on	 land.	 These	 frame	 the	 central,	 urban	 section	 of	 the	rebellion,	set	in	Cologne.			The	 connection	 between	 the	western	 fringes	 of	 the	 known	world	 in	 antiquity	and	 vast,	 awe-inspiring,	 sometimes	 distressing	 amounts	 of	 water,	 had	 been	established	 in	 Greek	 geographical	 writings	 long	 before	 Tacitus. 35 	His	presentation	of	Germany	 in	 the	 two	minor	works	with	a	historical	bent	which	preceded	his	composition	of	the	Histories36,	Agricola	and	Germania,	conforms	to	these	conventions.	The	emphasis	in	these	works	on	the	wet	nature	of	the	areas	of	 Britain	 and	 Germany	 respectively	 (37)	 is	 carried	 through	 into	 the	 Batavian	sections	 of	 the	 Histories,	 but	 this	 time	 not	 to	 produce	 a	 landscape	 that	 is	obstructive	and	inaccessible	to	Rome38,	but	to	characterise	the	stage	on	which	the	Romans	wage	war	as	powerful	and	active.		At	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 his	 narrative	 of	 the	 rebellion,	 Tacitus	 mentions	 the	presence	 of	 Batavian	 auxiliaries	 on	 the	 Gallo-German	 borders	 who	 are	exceptionally	 good	 at	 swimming	 in	 full	 military	 kit,	 including	 taking	 horses	
																																																								34It	is	of	real	interest,	therefore,	that	the	only	other	episode	‘in	which	Romans	are	depicted	as	fighting	foreign	invaders,	rather	than	turning	their	military	skills	on	fellow	citizens’	(Ash	2010b,	143),	that	of	the	raid	against	the	Rhoxolani	in	Moesia,	takes	great	pains	to	reverse	this	environmentally	determinist	narrative	logic	for	the	foreigners:	they	almost	farcically	bungle	a	battle	in	the	snow	on	home	turf	which	the	Romans	win	with	ease.	Ash	(150–55)	argues	the	necessity	of	this	victory	in	the	context	of	the	civil	war	at	that	stage.	O’Gorman	(1995)	notes	the	Batavi’s	affinity	with	their	fluid	landscape	(p.	125	and	127),	but	sees	this	as	poetically	appropriate	to	the	civil	war	of	which	their	revolt	is	an	outcrop:	for	her,	waterscapes	are	the	‘landscape	of	discord’.	35Stewart	(1995),	2–5	on	Britain	and	Clarke	(2001,	95–98),	in	particular,	on	Britain	as	well	as	northwest	Europe	more	broadly.	36See	Birley	(2000),	239–40	and	Levene	(2008),	vii–viii	for	the	dating	of	the	early	works.	37See	Clarke	(2001)	for	the	Agricola;	(Tan	2014)	for	a	discussion	of	the	Germania’s	treatment	of	water.	Its	boundaries	are	set	by	rivers	and	the	Ocean	(Ger.	1.1)	and	Ger.	5.1	explicitly	compares	it	to	Gaul	and	proclaims	the	German	climate	wetter:	Terra	etsi	
aliquanto	specie	differt,	in	universum	tamen	aut	silvis	horrida	aut	paludibus	foeda,	
umidior	qua	Gallias,	ventosior	qua	Noricum	ac	Pannoniam	adspicit.	38See	Tan	(2014).	
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across	rivers.39	The	claim’s	position	in	the	introductory	passage	which	promises	to	set	out	‘id	bellum	quibus	causis	ortum’	(Hist.	4.12.4)	signals	its	importance	to	what	follows.40	In	addition,	they	supply	oarsmen	to	the	Roman	fleet	in	sufficient	numbers	to	obstruct	the	fleet’s	operations	with	disastrous	results	(Hist.	4.16.14-9).			The	 third	 section	 (Hist.	 5.14-26)	 of	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 rebellion	 similarly	contributes	to	setting	up	this	affinity	between	the	Batavi	and	their	waterscapes	and	Rome’s	unsuitability	 to	 them.	Battles	on	marshy	ground	 repeatedly	 cause	great	difficulty	for	Rome	(Hist.	5.15	and	5.18)	while	Civilis	hails	them	as	one	of	the	alliance’s	strongholds	in	his	speech	before	the	final	battle	(campos	madentis	
et	ipsis	gnaros,	paludes	hostibus	noxias,	‘that	the	soggy	fields	were	well	known	to	themselves,	 but	 the	 swamps	 harmful	 to	 the	 enemy’,	 Hist.	 5.17.9-10).	 Later,	Civilis	and	 the	Batavi	 retreat	 to	 the	 island	at	 the	core	of	 their	 territory	on	 the	assumption	that	Rome	lacks	the	skills	to	make	a	similar	crossing	(Hist.	5.19.5-7),	they	destroy	the	obstruction	on	the	Rhine	built	by	Drusus	and	restore	the	free	flow	of	the	river	(Hist.	5.19.7-11),	and	in	the	course	of	fighting	a	losing	cavalry	battle	a	little	later,	Civilis	and	his	Germanic	co-commanders	Julius	Verax,	Julius	Tutor	 and	 Julius	 Classicus	 all	 escape	 by	 water	 (Civilis	 and	 Verax	 swim,	 and	Tutor	and	Classicus	escape	on	small,	nimble	riverboats,	 luntres,	Hist.	5.21.7-9).	Meanwhile,	 the	 Roman	 fleet,	 caught	 unprepared	 but	 in	 any	 case	 supremely	unconfident	 in	 the	 Batavian	 element,	 simply	 look	 on,	 prevented	 from	 action	through	fear	(formido	obstitit,	Hist.	5.21.10-11).		But	 it	 is	 not	 all	 plain	 sailing	 for	 the	 Batavi.	 An	 important	 corollary	 to	 their	facility	with	water	is	a	much	lower	level	of	confidence	and	competency	on	land.	At	Hist.	4.23,	their	siege	of	the	Roman	camp	at	Bonn	founders	because	they	have	no	 skill	 in	 besieging:	 they	manage	 to	 construct	 a	 siege	 engine,	 but	 only	 with	their	Roman	captives’	borrowed	knowledge,	and	even	then	it	is	but	an	informe																																																									39Hist.	4.12.3	(in	Delz,	Heubner,	and	Önnerfors	(1978);	see	n.	31):	erat	et	domi	delectus	
eques,	praecipuo	nandi	studio,	<quo>	arma	equosque	retinens	integris	turmis	Rhenum	
perrumperet.	Noted	by	O’Gorman	(1995,	125)	but	Tacitus	implicates	the	Batavi	much	more	closely	in	their	wet	surroundings	than	her	single	example.	40Interestingly,	what	is	here	a	defining	characteristic	makes	no	appearance	in	the	brief	description	accorded	the	Batavi	in	the	Germania	(Ger.	29).	
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opus	 and	 easily	 destroyed.	 Tacitus	 labels	 the	 engine	 in	 modum	 pontis	 (Hist.	4.23.16),	 suggesting	 that	 the	 water-savvy	 Batavi	 had	 attempted	 to	 transpose	wetland	 techniques	 to	 battle	 on	 land,	 and	 hopelessly	 fail.41	They	 are	 out	 of	place.42	This	 representation	 is	 context-specific	 and	 peculiar	 to	 Tacitus,	 not	 an	instance	of	barbarian	stereotyping.	The	best	point	of	comparison	for	this	part	of	the	world	and	 its	habits	 is	Caesar’s	Gallic	Wars,	 and	 this	 grants	 the	Gauls	 and	Germans	a	traditionally	successful	method	of	besieging	places	(BG	2.6):			
Gallorum	eadem	atque	Belgarum	oppugnatio	est	haec:	ubi	circumiecta	
multitudine	hominum	totis	moenibus	undique	in	murum	lapides	iaci	coepti	
sunt	murusque	defensoribus	nudatus	est,	testudine	facta	portas	succedunt	
murumque	subruunt.	Quod	tum	facile	fiebat.	Nam	cum	tanta	multitudo	
lapides	ac	tela	coicerent,	in	muro	consistendi	potestas	erat	nulli.43		‘The	siege	methods	of	the	Gauls	and	Belgae	are	the	same,	and	as	follows:	when	they	have	surrounded	the	entire	circumference	of	the	city	defences	with	a	mass	of	people,	they	begin	to	throw	stones	at	the	walls	from	all	directions	and	the	wall	is	cleared	of	defenders.	Then	they	march	up	to	the	gates	in	tortoise	formation	and	undermine	the	wall.	Which	at	this	point	[in	the	siege	of	Bibracte]	happened	easily.	For	when	such	a	crowd	throw	a	mix	of	rocks	and	other	projectiles,	there	was	no	way	anyone	could	remain	standing	on	the	wall.’		Caesar’s	 text	was	 the	point	 of	 transmission	 into	Latin	historiography	of	many	
topoi	on	 Gallic	 and	 German	 barbaric	 behaviour	 from	 the	 Greek	 ethnographic	tradition.	The	Tacitean	 type	of	 incompetence	 is	 not	 one	of	 them,	neither	here																																																									41In	addition	to	the	point	about	an	absence	of	water	equalling	an	absence	of	success,	one	might	wonder	whether	in	the	Tacitean	universe	those	bred	so	close	to	a	land	he	describes	as	Germaniam	informem	terris	(Ger.	2)	are	capable	of	engineering	land-based	structures	which	are	anything	other	than	informa?	See	O’Gorman	(1993)	for	a	discussion	of	Germany’s	shapelessness	as	a	defining	feature	in	the	Germania.	42This	gives	rise	to	the	question	whether	Rome	attempted	to	break	such	links	with	the	home	country	by	removing	units	abroad.	Brunt	(1960),	501	argues	that	the	Batavian	cohorts	when	deployed	abroad	continually	caused	trouble,	probably	because	they	were	‘averse	to	campaigning	far	from	the	Rhine’.	But	not	only	does	severing	the	link	with	the	home	country	not	make	them	more	loyal,	therefore,	the	Tacitean	narrative	also	suggests	that	outside	a	suitably	watery	environment	they	may	have	lost	much	of	the	skill	which	made	them	useful	to	Rome.	Intriguingly,	Hist.	2.93’s	adiacente	Tiberi	
Germanorum	Gallorumque	obnoxia	morbis	corpora	fluminis	aviditas	et	aestus	
impatientia	labefecit	(‘In	the	Tiber’s	vicinity,	the	Gauls’	and	Germans’	intolerance	of	the	local	climate	and	their	keenness	on	the	river	weakened	their	bodies,	which	are	prone	to	disease’)	allows	for	the	option	that	it	is	only	the	specific	waterscapes	and	climate	of	Germany	in	which	they	flourish.	43Edition	by	Henderson	(1917).	
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nor	later	on	in	the	Gallic	Wars.44	Only	a	little	later	on	in	the	second	book,	when	the	Gauls	are	faced	with	the	defences	of	a	Roman	camp	as	opposed	to	those	of	a	walled	city,	Caesar	mentions	their	unfamiliarity	with	such	features	as	mantlets,	mounds	 and	 towers,	 and	 reports	 their	decision	 to	 surrender	 rather	 than	 fight	against	these	unfamiliar	constructions	(BG	2.12).	This	position	resembles	that	of	Tacitus’	 ignorant	 Batavi	 and	 their	 opus	 informe.	 In	 the	 next	 book,	 however,	Caesar	 reports	 the	 Aquitanii	 as	 having	 the	 insight	 and	 competence	 to	 tunnel	under	siege	mounds	and	towers	(BG	3.21),	and	in	book	five	he	explicitly	reports	the	Nervii	constructing	turres,	 falces,	 fossa	and	testudines	on	the	Roman	model	outside	 Quintus	 Cicero’s	 winter	 camp,	 having	 learnt	 of	 their	 efficacy	 through	years	 of	 fighting	 and	 of	 their	 construction	 through	 some	 Roman	 prisoners	 of	war	 (BG	 5.42).	 These	 examples	 cumulatively	 prove	 that	 Caesar’s	 Gauls	 and	Germans	are	capable	of	adapting,	or	expanding,	their	range	of	responses	to	their	environment	 when	 this	 is	 changed	 by	 the	 Romans.	 Tacitus’	 presentation	 of	Civilis’	 Gallo-Germanic	 alliance’s	 incompetence	 on	 land	 deviates	 starkly	 from	this	model45,	and	the	inability	to	move	successfully	into	siege	warfare	reinforces	the	 strength	 of	 their	 symbiotic	 relationship	with	 their	waterscapes.	 It	widens	the	gap	between	Romans	as	technologists	and	Batavi	as	‘people	of	(a	particular	kind	of)	nature’,	conforming	to	earlier	patterns	of	thinking	that	set	the	Romans	apart	 as	 extraordinary	 engineers	 (we	 may	 recall	 Josephus’	 manifest	 awe	 at	Titus’	siege	works	outside	Jerusalem	in	book	7	of	the	Jewish	War).	
Environment	shapes	man:	II	That	people	are	‘made’	to	a	large	extent	by	the	environment	in	which	they	dwell	is	corroborated	by	a	contrasting	example	from	the	urban	section	of	the	Batavian	narrative.	The	passage	shows	the	tribe	of	the	Tencteri,	 fighting	on	Civilis’	side,	blaming	the	Ubii’s	 ‘caged’	state	 inside	the	walled	settlement	of	Colonia	Claudia	
																																																								44Krebs	(see	n.	3)	describes	Tacitus’	engagement	with	the	Caesarian	tradition	on	the	representation	of	Germans	and	Gauls	as	‘oppositio	in	imitando’.	The	example	here	cited	from	the	Histories	is,	perhaps,	a	different	manifestation	of	this	same	strategy.	45Not	to	mention	being	oddly	unhistorical:	the	group	had	been	serving	with	the	Roman	army	for	generations,	and	elsewhere	the	Batavi’s	appreciation	of	the	discipline	gained	through	their	service	to	Rome	is	made	clear	(Hist.	4.17.17-19	nunc	easdem	omnium	
partis,	addito	si	quid	militaris	disciplinae	in	castris	Romanorum	viguerit).	
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Ara	 Agrippinensis	 for	 constricting	 their	 German,	 warlike	 character.	 They	demand	that	the	Ubii	tear	down	these	walls	(Hist.	4.64.3-23):		
redisse	vos	in	corpus	nomenque	Germaniae	communibus	deis	et	praecipuo	
deorum	Marti	grates	agimus,	vobisque	gratulamur	quod	tandem	liberi	inter	
liberos	eritis;	nam	ad	hunc	diem	flumina	ac	terram	et	caelum	quodam	modo	
ipsum	clauserant	Romani	ut	conloquia	congressusque	nostros	arcerent,	vel,	
quod	contumeliosius	est	viris	ad	arma	natis,	inermes	ac	prope	nudi	sub	
custode	et	pretio	coiremus.	sed	ut	amicitia	societasque	nostra	in	aeternum	
rata	sint,	postulamus	a	vobis	muros	coloniae,	munimenta	servitii,	detrahatis	
(etiam	fera	animalia,	si	clausa	teneas,	virtutis	obliviscuntur),	Romanos	
omnis	in	finibus	vestris	trucidetis	(haud	facile	libertas	et	domini	miscentur):	
bona	interfectorum	in	medium	cedant,	ne	quis	occulere	quicquam	aut	
segregare	causam	suam	possit.	liceat	nobis	vobisque	utramque	ripam	colere,	
ut	olim	maioribus	nostris:	quo	modo	lucem	diemque	omnibus	hominibus,	ita	
omnis	terras	fortibus	viris	natura	aperuit.	instituta	cultumque	patrium	
resumite,	abruptis	voluptatibus,	quibus	Romani	plus	adversus	subiectos	
quam	armis	valent.	sincerus	et	integer	et	servitutis	oblitus	populus	aut	ex	
aequo	agetis	aut	aliis	imperitabitis.		‘We	render	thanks	to	the	gods	we	have	in	common	and	to	the	chiefest	of	them,	Mars,	that	you	have	returned	to	the	German	fold	and	name,	and	we	congratulate	you	because	you	will	finally	be	free	people	amongst	the	free;	for	up	until	this	day	the	Romans	had	closed	off	the	rivers,	earth	and	in	some	ways	the	sky	itself	so	that	they	could	stop	us	from	talking	and	meeting,	or,	something	even	more	insulting	to	men	born	to	take	up	arms,	so	that	we	could	meet	unarmed	and	practically	naked	only,	under	their	guard	and	for	a	price.	But	so	that	our	friendship	and	alliance	may	be	considered	everlasting,	we	demand	from	you	that	you	tear	down	the	walls	of	this	colony,	the	hallmarks	of	your	slavery	(indeed	even	wild	beasts,	if	you	keep	them	closed	up,	forget	their	fighting	spirit);	that	you	murder	all	Romans	within	your	territory	(freedom	and	masters	do	not	mix	at	all	easily):	the	possessions	of	the	murdered	will	go	into	a	common	pile,	so	that	no	one	can	hide	anything	or	separate	their	own	interests	from	the	rest.	It	will	be	allowed	for	us	as	well	as	for	you	to	inhabit	either	side	of	the	Rhine,	as	once	our	ancestors	did:	in	the	same	way	that	nature	opens	up	the	daylight	to	all	men,	she	opened	up	all	the	lands	of	the	earth	to	brave	men.	Take	up	the	customs	and	habits	of	your	fathers	again,	with	all	indulgences	cast	off	(with	which	the	Romans	achieve	more	against	their	subjects	than	with	arms).	Clean	and	uncontaminated,	as	a	people	no	longer	remembering	slavery,	you	will	either	deal	with	others	on	an	equal	footing	or	actively	rule	over	them.’		From	the	desired	changes	requested	by	 the	Tencteri	–	 to	pull	down	the	walls,	outlaw	owning	private	property	and	let	go	of	Roman	habits	and	Roman	dress	–	we	 can	 gauge	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 Ubii	 were	 perceived	 to	 have	 departed	
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from	the	Germanic	norm	and	turned	their	faces	to	Rome.	The	property	measure	evokes	the	idea	of,	 literally,	res	publica:	 it	is	in	fact	an	extremely	Roman	action	to	take	among	a	portfolio	of	anti-Roman	ones,	questioning	the	possibility	of	how	much	of	a	turn	away	from	Rome’s	influence	this	change	would	achieve.46	But	the	main	thrust	of	the	speech	is	spatial,	blaming	the	Roman	town’s	form	and	access	policy	 for	 the	negative	 effects	 on	 the	Ubii:	 their	 changed	 environment	has	 re-shaped	them,	not	only	through	its	positive	contribution	of	walls	but	through	the	negative	 injunction	 of	 excluding	 the	 Germans	 from	 their	 existing	 relationship	with	 the	 flumina,	 terram,	 caelum	which,	 by	 implication	 in	 the	 speech	 and	 in	conformity	 with	 ancient	 medical	 thought,	 make	 them	 who	 they	 are.47	They	believe	this	so	strongly	that	even	though	the	Ubii	have	already	declared	support	for	 the	 German	 side	 (redisse	vos	…	deis	grates	agimus),	 the	 Tencteri	 feel	 their	return	into	the	fold	cannot	be	complete	without	redesigning	their	Roman	space	back	into	a	German	one,	restoring	their	broken	link	to	the	rivers,	earth	and	sky.	This	environmental	change	would	thus	both	prove	and	sustain	–	perhaps	even	cause	–	the	Ubii’s	restored	allegiance	to	their	German	roots.			The	settlement’s	walls	in	particular	are	picked	on,	as	munimenta	servitii.	Part	of	the	 Tencteri’s	 reason	 for	 doing	 so	 is	 that	 the	 walls	 are	 Roman,	 and	 Roman-
looking	 buildings,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 Germanic	 tradition	 of	 open	 land	surrounding	 habitation.48	They	 are	 thus	 symbolic	 of	 Roman	 oppression.	 But	they	are	also	a	practical	tool	to	serve	this	oppression.	As	well	as	representing	a	cultural	 separation,	 the	 walls	 enforce	 a	 physical	 separation	 between	 the	 Ubii	and	 their	 German	 kinsmen	 (ut	conloquia	congressusque	nostros	arcerent)	with																																																									46Clarke	(2001)	posited	the	fringes	of	the	empire	–	in	her	case,	Britain	–	as	the	only	suitable	theatre	left	in	which	‘old’	Roman	values	could	manifest	themselves.	The	area	peripheral	to	the	Rhine	here	conforms	to	that	pattern.	47The	shaping	influence	on	humans	of	their	environment	was	an	accepted	fact	in	ancient	thought.	Pioneered	in	the	medical	‘Hippocratic’	treatise	Airs,	Waters,	Places	and	embraced	in	historiography	for	the	first	time	by	Herodotus	in	his	Histories,	the	tradition	of	environmental	determinism	treated	as	obvious	and	unexceptionable	the	notion	that	people’s	physiologies	as	well	as	psychologies	were	shaped	by	the	environment	in	which	they	are	born	and	then	raised.	See	Lo	Presti	(2012).	48Cf.	Ger.	16.1:	nullas	Germanorum	populis	urbes	habitari	satis	notum	est,	ne	pati	quidem	
inter	se	iunctas	sedes.	Colunt	discreti	ac	diversi,	ut	fons,	ut	campus,	ut	nemus	placuit.	Vicos	
locant	non	in	nostrum	morem	conexis	et	cohaerentibus	aedificiis:	suam	quisque	domum	
spatio	circumdat,	
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any	 contact	 only	 possible	 with	 the	 permission	 of	 Rome	 and	 accompanied	 by	practical	impositions	such	as	arms	controls	at	the	gates	and	taxes	on	trade	(the	rather	vague	sub	custode	et	pretio	coiremus	is	clarified	by	the	Ubian	response	to	this	 speech	 as	 vectigal	 et	 onera	 commerciorum,	 Hist.	 4.65.13).	 These	arrangements	 of	 walled	 confinement,	 checks	 on	 movement,	 and	 taxation	represent	 Foucauldian	 biopower	 in	 action	 through	 confinement,	 surveillance,	and	 control:	 the	 Tencteri	 rightly	 note	 that	 although	 contact	 under	 these	circumstances	is	still	possible,	it	is	not	by	any	means	the	situation	of	liberi	inter	
liberos	(Hist.	4.64.6)	on	which	they	have	set	their	sights.	The	arrangements	are	Roman	mechanisms	to	control	and	render	less	dangerous	interactions	between	the	 unromanised	Germans	 surrounding	Cologne	 and	 the	Romanised	Ubii	who	inhabit	the	walled	area.49		The	 restraints	 are	 a	 necessary	 precaution.	 Unlike	 in	 Alston’s	 reading	 of	 the	
Agricola,	 in	 which	 all	 British	 space	 is	 revealed	 to	 be	 imperial	 space	 with	 no	alternatives,	 the	 Tencteri’s	 confrontation	 with	 the	 Ubii	 suggests	 the	 country	surrounding	 Cologne	 has	 not	 (yet)	 been	 obliterated	 into	 the	 imperial	 desert	which	 the	Caledonian	Calgacus	equates	with	conquest	 in	 the	Agricola.50	Alston	reads	Calgacus’	speech,	critical	of	empire	and	seeing	a	possibility	of	resistance	to	it,	as	introducing	a	heteroglossia	into	the	narrative:	as	the	opposite	of	unitary	language,	this	ambivalent	position	requires	the	reader	to	decide	whose	reading	of	the	world	is	right:	Calgacus’	or	Tacitus’	or	the	Roman	reader’s,	or	even	that	of	the	 so-called	 imperiti	who	 willingly	 fall	 in	 with	 Agricola’s	 strategy,	 believing	their	 Roman-style	 refinements	 to	 be	 manifestations	 of	 a	 desirable	 kind	 of	
humanitas	 (Agr.	 21).	 The	 Agricola	 ends	 with	 Roman	 victory	 and	 a	 war-torn	Caledonian	 landscape,	 confirming	 that	 Calgacus’	 is	wrong	 and	Tacitus	 is	 right	that	in	imperial	time	there	can	be	only	imperial	space.51	In	the	Cologne	episode,																																																									49Though	we	need	not	read	Roman	spatial	interventions	as	repressive	measures	only.	Cf.	Woolf’s	summary	(2002,	54)	of	Louise	Revell’s	archaeological	work	in	Spain:	‘[it	examines	how	the]	physical	structures	of	Roman	cities	provided	frames	for	repetitive	actions	that	entrenched	and	normalised	particular	views	of	social	order	and	shaped	the	emerging	new	cultural	identities	of	those	who	inhabited	these	cities.’	50Even	if	walled	Cologne	itself	is	on	its	way	to	becoming	Alston’s	flat-packed	Roman	city;	cf.	Alston	(2018),	246.	51Alston	(2018),	240-1.	
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however,	the	tension	between	imperialist	obliteration	of	the	space	‘before’	and	the	 existence	 of	 alternatives	 is	 still	 unresolved.	 Moreover,	 the	 alternatives	 to	imperial	space	in	the	Cologne	episode	are	revealed	by	Tacitus	to	still	be	present	
spatially,	not	 just	psychologically	as	the	detached	refuge	of	those	implicated	in	empire.52	We	may	remember	the	uncontrolled	space	of	the	sacred	grove,	nemus	
sacrum,	 in	 which	 the	 initial	 Batavian	 resistance	 is	 secretly	 organised	 (Hist.	4.14.10)	and	the	Tencteri’s	implication	in	their	speech	that	across	the	river	life	is	 still	 run	on	German	 lines:	 liceat	nobis	vobisque	utramque	ripam	colere	 (Hist.	4.64.16-17)	 is	 an	 attack	on	 the	Roman	 injunction	 against	Germans	 settling	on	the	west,	‘Roman’,	bank	of	the	Rhine,	not	an	acknowledgment	that	those	on	the	further,	east	bank	had	also	succumbed	to	Roman	living.	The	Cologne	episode	is	a	boundary	dispute	between	two	coexisting	modes,	imperial	Roman	artificial	non-space	and	traditional	Germanic	space,	but	its	ultimate	pro-Roman	outcome	does	not	achieve	(or	require)	the	destruction	of	Germany	across	the	Rhine.53		Cologne’s	 contested	 physical	 space	 in	 the	 middle	 section	 of	 the	 Batavian	rebellion	 thus	 complements	 the	 Tacitean	 portrayal	 of	 the	 skilled	 Batavi	 as	shaped	by	their	aquatic	environment	in	the	framing	sections.	It	does	so	through	presenting	 its	 inverse	 situation:	 the	Roman	 urban	 environment	 has	made	 the	Ubii	Roman	 and	urban	 in	nature,	 instead	of	Germanic	 and	 symbiotic	with	 the	forests	 and	 rivers	 that	 surround	 them.	Place	 is	 revealed	 to	have	an	enormous	influence	 on	 physical	 bodies,	 skill	 sets	 and	 identities.	 But	 the	 relationship	between	people	and	place	is	mediated	through	human	agency	instead	of	being	causal,	direct	and	inescapable:	the	Batavi	are	not	born	water-savvy,	nor	are	they																																																									52Alston	(2018),	251–56.	Nor	are	the	Tencteri	who	denounce	the	imperial	present	of	Cologne’s	imperial	space	deprived	of	a	history	by	Tacitus	(cf.	Alston	(2018),	244-6	on	Caledonians	without	history	or	local	mores).	Cologne’s	pre-Roman	past	(redisse;	ut	olim	
maioribus	nostris;	resumite)	is	recognised	in	the	Tencteri’s	speech,	and	consequently	the	utopian	future	is	still	‘present’,	too	(ut	amicitia	societasque	nostra	in	aeternum	rata	
sint;	imperabitis);	cf.	Alston	(2018),	248–49.	53The	Batavian	rebellion	of	course	peters	out	and	Rome	is	able	to	reassert	control.	But	unlike	in	Britain,	which	ended	up	conquered	in	its	entirety	with	Calgacus’	uncomfortable	truths	about	desertification	still	ringing	quietly	through	the	war-torn	landscape,	Roman	control	of	Germany	beyond	the	Rhine	was,	at	this	point	in	time,	erratic.	Later,	part	of	the	territory	did	move	towards	a	state	of	more	formal	occupation	from	Trajan’s	reign	onwards,	with	the	construction	of	a	limes,	of	which	traces	still	survive	in	Baden-Württemberg.	See	Wilson	(2006)	for	an	overview	of	archaeological	work	in	the	area	and	its	chronological	import.	
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born	as	immoral	beings.	It	is	their	choice	to	adapt	and	make	optimal	use	of	their	surroundings	that	allows	the	environment	to	work	its	effects.	In	the	same	way,	it	 is	 the	Ubii’s	 choice	 to	 retain	 their	walls	 and	 decline	 to	 change	 the	 changed	ways	 fostered	 by	 them.	 This	 is	 where	 the	 Tencteri’s	 understanding	 is	incomplete	compared	to	that	of	Agricola:	environment	does	have	the	power	to	change	 man,	 but	 people	 can	 refuse	 as	 well	 as	 choose	 to	 change	 their	environment.	
Environment	shapes	power	and	resistance	But	sometimes	the	human	actors	in	Tacitus	find	themselves	in	a	third	position,	that	of	being	powerless	against	the	forces	exerted	by	their	environment.	Tacitus	grants	the	wetscapes	of	Germanic	Batavia	real	power	in	the	rebellion,	to	shape	and	 limit	 the	options	 for	Rome’s	 exertion	of	power	 as	well	 as	 for	 the	Batavi’s	resistance	 to	Roman	domination.	 It	 is	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 this	 power	 that	 I	 now	turn.		Tacitus’	presentation	of	the	role	of	the	landscape	goes	beyond	simply	creating	a	symbiosis	 between	 the	 Batavi	 and	 their	 homeland	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 Roman	success.	 At	 key	 moments	 in	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 Batavian	 rebellion,	 the	Romans	 suffer	 setbacks	 as	 a	 result	 of	 natural	 phenomena	 presented	 as	more	powerful	 than	 any	 human	 agency	 or	 forward	 planning	 can	 withstand.	 The	Batavian	environment	 fulfills	 the	 role	of	agent	 in	 influencing	events	which	we	customarily	think	of	as	directed	by	humans	alone:			
Sed	discordis	animos	multa	efferabant:	inopia	stipendii	frumentique	et	simul	
dilectum	tributaque	Galliae	aspernantes,	Rhenus	incognita	illi	caelo	siccitate	
vix	navium	patiens,	arti	commeatus,	dispositae	per	omnem	ripam	stationes	
quae	Germanos	vado	arcerent,	eademque	de	causa	minus	frugum	et	plures	
qui	consumerent.	
Hist.	4.26.1-6	‘But	there	were	many	things	to	aggravate	further	minds	which	were	already	at	odds:	insufficient	pay	and	grain,	the	Gallic	provinces	refusing	both	conscription	and	taxation,	the	Rhine	barely	supporting	rivercraft	on	account	of	a	drought	(unusual	in	that	region),	provisions	in	short	supply	and	guard	posts	set	up	along	the	entire	bank	which	barred	the	Germans	from	fords;	therefore	they	had	less	grain	but	more	people	to	consume	it.’		
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The	 Rhine,	 in	 this	 first	 example,	 is	 described	 by	means	 of	 the	 active	 present	participle	 patiens	 –	 giving	 it	 its	 proper	 due	 in	 translation	 makes	 the	 Rhine	actively	 intolerant,	 ‘impatient	 of’,	 ‘not	 suffering’,	 ‘not	 allowing’,	 of	 river	navigation.	Heubner	ad	loc.	 notes	 that	 the	phrase	navium	patiens	 is	 applied	 to	rivers	in	both	Livy	(21.31.10,	to	the	Druentia	or	modern	Durance	in	France)	and	the	 Younger	 Pliny	 (Ep.	 5.6.12,	 to	 the	 Tiber),	 and	 indeed	 the	 Oxford	 Latin	Dictionary	gives	 its	meaning	as	 ‘capable	of	bearing’	 in	 the	case	of	 things	 (OLD	
patiens	1b),	where	in	the	case	of	persons	it	means	‘able	or	willing	to	endure	or	undergo,	 submissive’	 (1a),	 citing	 these	 same	 two	 examples	 and	more,	 though	not	 this	 Tacitean	 example.	 However,	 the	 context	 in	which	 the	 Rhine	 example	occurs	 contains	 two	 other	 such	 ambiguities	 which	 together	 persuasively	support	an	anthropomorphic	reading	(as	well	as	the	river	being	unwilling,	 the	
Galliae	are	scornful,	and	the	sky’s	siccitas	can	mean	thirst	as	well	as	drought).54	The	 result	 of	 the	 river’s	 unwillingness	 is	 the	 successful	 capture	 of	 a	 grain	freighter	by	the	Gallo-German	alliance	(Hist.	4.27.5-6),	who	were	aided	in	their	effort	by	the	river’s	vada,	in	which	the	ship	had	got	stuck.	The	episode	has	far-reaching	consequences,	as	it	is	this	shortage	of	grain	caused	by	the	Rhine’s	‘non-bearing’	 which	 ultimately	 allows	 the	 Batavi	 their	 first	 taste	 of	 land-based	success:	 they	 successfully	 starve	out	 the	Romans	 inside	 the	 camp	at	Vetera	at	
Hist.	4.59-60.		A	 similar	 example	 of	 riverine	 agency	 expressed	 grammatically	 and	 causing	setbacks	for	Rome	occurs	at	Hist.	5.23.14-9,	though	Tacitus	makes	less	of	it	–	no	doubt	because	at	this	point	he	has	made	it	clear	in	other	ways	that	this	area	of	Germany	will	succumb	to	Rome	in	the	end55:			
Cerialis	insulam	Batavorum	hostiliter	populatus	agros	villasque	Civilis	
intactas	nota	arte	ducum	sinebat,	cum	interim	flexu	autumni	et	crebris	per	
aequinoctium	imbribus	superfusus	amnis	palustrem	humilemque	insulam	in																																																									54Levene’s	2008	revision	of	Fyfe	keeps	his	original	1912	translation	of	Rhenus	….	vix	
navium	patiens	as	‘drought…	made	the	river	almost	too	low	for	navigation’,	but		Church	and	Brodribb	(1864)	preserves	anthropomorphic	agency	with	‘the	Rhine	would	hardly	admit	of	navigation’.	55Identity	politics,	economic	and	political	choices	play	a	greater	role	in	the	revolt’s	ultimate	failure;	see	chapter	two	of	this	thesis.	
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faciem	stagni	opplevit.	Nec	classis	aut	commeatus	aderant,	castraque	in	
plano	sita	vi	fluminis	differebantur.		‘After	savagely	laying	to	waste	the	island	of	the	Batavi,	Cerialis	was	using	that	famous	general’s	trick	of	leaving	alone	the	fields	and	estates	belonging	to	Civilis;	in	the	meantime	through	the	change	of	season	and	the	frequent	showers	of	the	autumn	equinox	the	flooded	river	filled	the	swampy	and	low-lying	island	until	it	looked	like	a	lake.	Neither	the	fleet	nor	provisions	were	at	hand,	and	the	camp	situated	on	the	plain	was	smashed	to	pieces	by	the	force	of	the	river.’56		Indeed	 at	 this	 point	 the	 damage	 inflicted	 on	 the	 Romans	 by	 the	 river’s	unexpected	behaviour	so	far	counters	Roman	successes	that	Civilis	claims	(and	Tacitus	 endorses	 the	 claim)	 that	 ‘at	 this	 point	 the	 legions	 could	 have	 been	overcome	by	the	Germans,	had	they	wanted	it’	(Hist.	5.24.1-2).		In	 the	 first	 example,	 Tacitus’	 narration	 offers	 room	 for	 a	 multi-layered	interpretation	 of	 the	 river’s	 agency;	 the	 second	 example,	 as	 we	 will	 see,	 is	compatible	 with	 both	 readings	 but	 less	 explicitly	 associated	 with	 both	 by	Tacitus.	 One	 level	 allows	 the	 power	 of	 the	 landscape	 to	 be	 read	 as	 divinely	animated.	 He	 reports	 that	 the	 Roman	 soldiers	 witnessing	 the	 Rhine	 drought	interpreted	this	occurrence	in	divine	terms57:			
apud	imperitos	prodigii	loco	accipiebatur	ipsa	aquarum	penuria,	tamquam	
nos	amnes	quoque	et	vetera	imperii	munimenta	desererent:	quod	in	pace	
fors	seu	natura,	tunc	fatum	et	ira	dei	vocabatur.	
Hist.	4.26.6-9		‘but	by	the	ignorant	this	dearth	of	water	was	interpreted	as	an	omen,	as	though	the	rivers	along	with	the	other	ancient	strongholds	of	empire	were	deserting	us;	what	in	peacetime	would	have	been	called	coincidence	or	nature	was	then	labelled	fate	and	divine	anger.’	
	
																																																								56Church	&	Brodribb	once	again	keep	the	passive	with	their	translation	of	‘the	river,	swollen	by	the	continual	rains	of	the	season,	overflowed	the	island’,	whereas	Levene	conveys	the	general	sense	but	again	shifts	the	agency	from	river	to	atmospheric	conditions,	with	‘the	heavy	equinoctial	rains	had	set	the	river	in	flood,	covering	the	low-lying	marshy	island	until	it	looked	like	a	lake’.	57I	agree	with	Joseph	(2012,	69)	that	‘the	deus	referred	to	specifically	here	is	the	river	god	of	the	Rhine’.	
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Though	 Tacitus	 as	 author	 distances	 himself	 straightaway	 from	 this	 particular	explanation	for	what	occurred,	this	can	be	no	reason	to	disregard	his	account	of	this	prevalent	opinion	at	the	time.	I	will	here	consider	some	aspects	of	Roman	imperialism	 and	 Roman	 religion	 which	 reveal	 the	 sentiment	 as	 far	 from	nonsensical	 within	 a	 Roman	 context,	 despite	 Tacitus’	 criticisms.	 Romans	recognised	that	natural	elements,	 including	rivers,	 indisputably	had	the	power	to	intervene	quite	drastically	in	the	material	world	on	which	humans	depend	for	their	livelihood.	It	was	only	a	small	step	from	this	recognition	to	treating	them	as	deities,	and	from	this	evidence	of	intervention	and	their	existing	tradition	of	an	anthropomorphised	central	pantheon	 to	anthropomorphising	 these	natural	elements	 too.58	Though	not	as	 frequently	 revered	 in	 inscriptions	as	 springs	or	wells,	 there	are	still	numerous	examples	of	vows	made	to	the	river	Rhine,	and	possibly	 even	 evidence	 for	 a	 sanctuary	 of	 Rhenus	 Pater. 59 	Civilis’	 telling	juxtaposition	 in	 his	 pre-battle	 contio	of	Rhenum	 et	 Germaniae	 deos	 in	 aspectu	(Hist.	 5.17.10-11)	 is	 attested	 almost	 verbatim	 in	 a	 2nd	 century	 AD	 or	 later	inscription	by	a	 legionary	 legate	of	 legio	XXX	Ulpia	stationed	on	the	Rhine	(ILS	9266)	 mentioning	 both	 ancestral	 gods	 and	 Rhine	 as	 part	 of	 a	 sequence	 also	encompassing	Jupiter,	local	gods	of	protection,	and	Ocean:	I.	o.	m.	|	dis	patriis	et	|	
praesidibus	huius	|	loci	Oceanique	|	et	Reno	|	Q.	Marc.	Gallia|nus	leg.	leg.	XXX	U.	v.	|	
pro	salute	sua	|	et	suorum	|	v.	s.	l.	m.60	It	was	dated	to	around	AD220	by	Alföldy61,	though	his	date	 is	questioned	and	potentially	put	 forward	to	some	time	 in	the	2nd	 century	AD	by	Reuter.62	An	 earlier	 date	would	 drastically	 shorten	 the	 gap	between	Civilis’	reported	use	of	this	particular	configuration	of	deities	including	the	Rhine	and	this	real-life	attestation	of	its	use,	and	certainly	between	Tacitus’	time	of	writing	and	the	evidence.	Tacitus’	attribution	of	the	phrase	to	Civilis	in	AD69-70	may	be	simply	a	retrojection	of	a	contemporary	phenomenon,	but	it	is																																																									58‘The	enormous	influence	of	rivers	on	the	lives	of	rural	communities	reminded	men	of	the	divine	power	to	intervene	in	human	affairs	and	the	mutability	of	human	fortune’;	Campbell	(2012),	129.	59Campbell	(2012),	136,	n.	117	(vows:	AE	1969-70.434;	1993.1227;	ILS	3913;	CIL	13.5255,	7790,	7791,	8810,	8811	–	for	ILS	9266	=	CIL	13.8810,	see	next	note)	and	n.	285	(sanctuary).	60ILS	9266.	The	inscription	was	found	at	Vechten	(Fectio)	on	the	Rhine	but	we	know	the	legion	was	stationed	at	Xanten	(Vetera).	It	is	mentioned	by	Campbell	(2012,	138),	but	the	connection	with	Tacitus’	text	is	my	own.	61Alföldy	(1967),	54-5.	62Reuter	(2012),	57.	
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also	possible	that	it	attests	a	practice	of	longer	standing	in	which	soldiers	on	the	Rhine	had	 long	seen	 the	Rhine	as	an	anthropomorphised	divine	agent	 in	 their	lives,	just	like	Jupiter.		Such	religious	feeling	and	ideas	of	divine	assistance	had	had	a	place	 in	Roman	imperialism	 from	 the	early	Republic	onwards.	Ando	 remarked	 that	 ‘insofar	 as	the	peoples	of	the	Mediterranean	each	had	their	own	gods	–	or	were	understood	to	do	so	–	the	confrontation	of	peoples	in	war	implicated	each	party’s	gods’.63	He	offers	the	case	study	of	Republican	evocatio	as	one	way	of	guarding	against	the	potential	 danger	 posed	 by	 the	 opponents’	 gods,	 and	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 this	ceremony	offers	a	key	to	understanding	our	examples	of	riverine	agency	as	well	as	 the	 Roman	 response	 they	 provoked	 with	 those	 called	 imperiti	by	 Tacitus.	
Evocatio	was	a	ritual	in	which	Rome	tried	to	entice	the	patron	deity	of	whatever	city	 they	 were	 trying	 to	 capture	 over	 to	 Rome,	 by	 means	 of	 promises	 of	(presumably	better)	worship	by	Romans.64	By	this	logic,	a	city	abandoned	by	its	gods	 could	 and	 would	 fall	 much	 more	 easily.	 There	 are	 numerous	 issues	surrounding	 the	 historicity	 of	 the	 textual	 evidence	 attesting	 instances	 of	
evocatio65,	but	no	one	disputes	that	Romans	saw	the	line	of	reasoning	that	saw	anthropomorphised	 gods	 changing	 alliance	 in	 this	 way	 as	 plausible.	 Plutarch	reports	without	 any	 caveats	 the	 tale	 that	 people	 claimed	 to	 hear	 sounds	 of	 a	Bacchic	 procession,	 the	 cult	 Antony	 most	 closely	 associated	 with	 himself,	leaving	his	stronghold	of	Alexandria	 in	30BC,	 interpreting	 this	as	a	sign	of	 the	god	deserting	Antony’s	cause.66	Tacitus	reports	a	similar	divine	exodus	from	the	Temple	 at	 Jerusalem	at	 the	 advent	 of	Titus.67	Many	 centuries	 later,	Macrobius	reports	the	words	allegedly	read	out	during	the	evocatio	ceremony	held	outside	the	walls	of	Carthage	in	146BC,	and	much	is	made	of	the	dreadful	effects	hoped	for	 from	 the	 divine	 abandonment	 of	 Rome’s	 opponents,	 suggesting	 that	
																																																								63Ando	(2008),	121.	64For	more	on	evocatio,	see	Gustafsson	(2000).	65Ando	(2008),	128ff.	66Plutarch,	Antony	75.3-4.		67Apertae	repente	delubri	fores	et	audita	maior	humana	vox	excedere	deos;	simul	ingens	
motus	excedentium,	Hist.	5.13.4-6.	
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engendering	 fear	 was	 as	 much	 of	 an	 objective	 as	 enticing	 away	 divine	assistance.68		In	light	of	this	long-standing	association	between	gods	and	imperialism,	Rome’s	concern	 with	 the	 Rhine’s	 behaviour	 becomes	 understandable	 on	 more	 than	simply	 a	 practical	 level:	whether	 an	 actual	 ceremony	 to	 placate	 the	 river	 god	was	 held	 at	 any	 point	 or	 not,	 their	 religiously	 motivated	 fear	 at	 the	 Rhine’s	uncooperativeness	suggests	the	soldiers	operated	under	the	belief	that	the	river	god	had	been	persuaded	to	the	side	and	service	of	Rome,	away	from	its	tutela	of	Germany	 (nos	 amnes	 quoque…	 desererent).	 The	 Rhine’s	 unexpected	 drought,	which	damages	Rome,	can	then	be	read	as	a	change	of	allegiance.	Not	only	has	Rome	lost	the	Rhine	as	divine	ally,	but	it	may	be	back	to	working	for	the	enemy.	The	 river’s	 desertion	 is	 as	worrying	 as	 a	human	ally’s	 desertion	 in	battle:	nos	
amnes	 quoque	 et	 vetera	 imperii	 munimenta	 desererent,	 the	 Roman	 soldiers	complain	(Hist.	4.26.7-8),	including	rivers	(or	Rivers)	in	the	defences	of	empire	which	also	encompassed	Rome’s	legions.69			In	 the	central	section	of	 the	Batavian	revolt	narrative,	 the	German	tribe	of	 the	Tencteri	 complain,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 of	 being	 barred	 from	 the	 flumina	of	Germany	 by	 Rome	 (nam	 ad	 hunc	 diem	 flumina	 ac	 terram	 et	 caelum	 quodam	
modo	ipsum	clauserant	Romani,	‘for	up	until	this	day	the	Romans	had	closed	off	the	 rivers,	 earth	 and	 in	 some	ways	 the	 sky	 itself’,	Hist.	4.64.6-7).	We	 can	now	read	 this	 as	 a	precautionary	 separation	of	 the	 river	 [god]	 from	his	 traditional	worshippers	 as	 well	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 break	 the	 link	 between	 the	 German	environment	and	its	inhabitants	which	makes	Germans	German	(this,	as	we	say,	was	 the	 central	 tenet	 of	 the	Tencteri’s	 identity-focused	 speech	when	 they	 are	trying	 to	 persuade	 the	 Romanised	 Ubii	 to	 break	 away	 from	 Rome).	 Having																																																									68‘…veniamque	a	nobis	peto	ut	vos	populum	civitatemque	Carthaginiensem	deseratis,	loca	
templa	sacra	urbemque	eorum	relinquatis;	absque	his	abdeatis	eique	populo	civitati	
metum	formidinem	oblivionem	iniciatis’,	Macrob.	Saturnalia	3.7-8,	quoted	by	Ando	(2008,	131).	In	Tacitus’	Judaean	example	(see	note	above),	no	general	panic	ensues	([Quae]	pauci	in	metum	trahebant,	Hist.	5.13.6-7)	but	only	because	the	Jews	misinterpreted	this	omen	as	positive.	69Cf.	Haynes	(2003),	162,	a	similar	reading	of	the	river	as	a	foe,	but	with	reference	to	the	passage’s	use	of	‘us’	and	‘them’	to	signal,	in	Haynes’	theory,	moments	of	Roman	insecurity.	
		 40	
established	 the	 complex	 interaction	 between	 nature	 that	 is	 simultaneously	divinity	 and	 inhabitants	who	 are	 simultaneously	worshippers,	we	 can	 further	infer	 from	Tacitus’	drought-related	comment	that	 ‘dispositae	per	omnem	ripam	
stationes	quae	Germanos	vado	arcerent’	(Hist.	4.26.4-5)	that	the	Germans	are	at	risk	of	resuming	their	own	use	of	the	river,	thereby	restoring	the	link	with	the	environment	that	makes	them	powerful	and	thus	threatening	Roman	order,	but	perhaps	 also	 restoring	 their	 religious	 relationship	 with	 the	 river	 as	 their	tutelary	deity,	an	equally	disturbing	prospect.		The	 technologies	of	Roman	religion	are	shown	not	 to	be	sufficient	 to	bind	 the	river	 god	 securely.	 The	 equation	 of	 religious	 pacification	 with	 pacifying	 the	environment	 through	 building	 is	 also	 present	 in	 other	 Latin	 texts,	 roughly	contemporary	 with	 Tacitus.	 Statius	 in	 Silvae	 4.3	 offers	 a	 particularly	 useful	comparison,	celebrating	the	completion	of	the	via	Domitiana	through	Campania.	Starting	with	an	outline	(20-39)	of	the	sorry	state	travellers	 in	this	part	of	the	world	 found	 themselves	 in	 before	 the	 road	 was	 built	 –	 to	 make	 clear	 the	roadmaker’s	 benevolence	 in	 redressing	 that	 situation	 –	 he	 moves	 to	 a	description	 (40-66)	 of	 the	 vast	 amount	 of	 hard	 and	 noisy	 work	 involved,	 to	make	clear	the	roadmaker’s	power.	The	poem	then	finds	its	culmination	in	two	speeches	 by	 ‘supernatural’	 entities,	 suitably	 placed	 to	 act	 as	mouthpieces	 for	proclaiming	 Domitian’s	 literally	 supernatural	 achievement:	 first,	 the	 god	Volturnus	 (67-94),	 now	 shackled	 by	 a	 bridge	 as	 part	 of	 the	 project,	acknowledges	 the	 superior	 force	 of	 Domitian	 the	 emperor-engineer	 over	 his	divinity	(ligasti,	75),	followed	by	the	Sibyl’s	speech,	which	equates	the	builder	of	this	 godlike	 feat	 with	 a	 god	 (hic	 est	 deus,	 128),	 calling	 him	 ‘natura	 melior	
potentiorque’	(135).	The	speech	as	a	whole	combines	the	mundane	elements	of	mastering	 landscapes	 through	 engineering	 within	 a	 religious	 framework.	Though	obviously	intended	to	be	flattering	to	Domitian,	these	were	considered	suitable	 terms	 in	which	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 power	 of	 landscapes	 as	well	 as	 the	power	of	those	who	interfered	with	them	successfully.70	The	realisation	by	the	
																																																								70See	Coleman	(1988),	13-9	and	102-35;	Newlands	(2002),	301–9.	The	villa	poems	operate	on	similar	terms,	e.g.	Silvae	2.2	on	the	villa	of	Pollius	Felix,	esp.	44-5	(locine	
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Roman	 soldiers	 in	 the	 Batavian	 revolt	 that	 their	 power	 to	 control	 the	 Rhine	successfully	is	insufficient,	fills	them	with	fright.		So	much	for	the	conceptual	frameworks	which	may	be	governing	the	rank	and	file’s	 fearful	 response	 to	 the	 flood.	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 Tacitus	 takes	 care	 to	distance	 himself	 from	 this	 view	 by	 calling	 those	 who	 espouse	 it	 imperitos	(ignorant).	By	doing	so,	he	did	not	intend	to	invalidate	divine	anger	as	a	cause	of	events	in	the	human	world71,	nor	the	human	skill	of	interpreting	the	gods’	will.	What	 he	 is	 doing	 at	 this	 point	 is	 impeaching	 the	 soldiers’	 qualifications	 for	making	 such	 pronouncements,	 and	 disagreeing	 with	 their	 judgment	 in	 this	particular	 case.72	Yet	 his	 rationality	 cannot	 advance	 a	 complete	model	 for	 the	perplexing	 occurrence	 of	 the	 unusual	 drought	 which	 frustrates	 Rome’s	imperialist	hold	on	this	incomprehensible,	slippery,	dreadful	Germany,	and	sits	alongside	 the	 gods	 as	 one	 of	 several	 potential	 explanations	 which	 defy	 the	understanding	 of	 the	 humans	 who	 suffer	 its	 consequences.	 As	 readers	 and	scholars,	we	cannot	fill	in	this	gap	in	any	detail,	but	we	can	say	that	on	a	general	level	 the	 text	 proposes	 a	 conception	of	materiality	which,	 even	 if	 not	 divinely	animated,	 is	 active	 as	 opposed	 to	 passive.	 The	 causal	 universe	 in	 which	 the	participants	 in	 the	Batavian	 conflict	 operate	 is	made	up	of	 interactions	which	include	but	are	not	limited	to	the	human.		Such	 a	 way	 of	 looking	 at	 the	 world	 was	 elaborated	 recently	 by	 the	 political	philosopher	Jane	Bennett	 in	Vibrant	Matter	 in	which	she	defines	the	vitality	of	(all)	nonhuman	matter	as	‘the	capacity	of	things	–	edibles,	commodities,	storms,	metals	–	not	only	to	impede	or	block	the	will	and	designs	of	humans	but	also	to	act	 as	 quasi	 agents	 or	 forces	 with	 trajectories,	 propensities,	 or	 tendencies	 of	their	own’.73	Accepting	this,	as	I	do,	as	a	useful	description	of	what	is	going	on	in	Tacitus’	representation	of	the	Batavian	landscape,	amounts	to	ascribing	to	him																																																																																																																																																														
ingenium	an	domini	mirer	prius?)	and	52-3	(his	favit	Natura	locis,	hic	victa	colenti	cessit	
et	ignotos	docilis	mansuevit	in	usus).	71He	explicitly	advances	it	as	a	cause	at	Hist.	1.3.6-11,	2.38.13-14,	and	3.72.1-6;	see	Joseph	(2012),	69-70.	72See	Davies	(2004),	143–225	for	an	analysis	of	divine	will	and	the	correct	interpretation	of	signs	in	Tacitus.	73Bennett	(2010),	viii.	
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the	morally	neutral	recognition	that	humans	are	not	all-powerful74	–	not	even	in	the	endeavour	of	imperialist	conquest,	which	is	traditionally	assumed	to	revolve	mainly	 around	 the	 coercion	 and	 subjugation	of	 one	 set	 of	 humans	by	 another	(and	indeed,	Roman	incompetence	or	unpreparedness	gets	allocated	its	proper	share	 of	 responsibility).75	Without	 spelling	 it	 out	 in	 so	 many	 words,	 Tacitus’	account	 powerfully	 suggests	 that	 successful	 imperialism	 has	 to	 account	 for	more	 than	 simply	 human	 resistance,	 and	 requires	 somehow	 overcoming	 or	obviating	 environmental	 resistance	 on	 a	 thoroughly	 mundane	 level	 which	 is	compatible	with	a	religious	colouring	but	which	is,	at	heart,	extremely	secular.	(It	need	not	be	any	less	frightening	for	all	that.)		Important	 in	 terms	of	Tacitean	 imperialism	at	work	 in	Germany	 is	 that	all	 the	agents	 in	an	assemblage,	as	Bennett	–	applying	to	 the	world	at	 large	Deleuze’s	and	 Guattari’s	 term	 for	 describing	 social	 complexity 76 	–	 describes	 the	confederation	of	human	and	nonhuman	agents	which	govern	events,	interact	in	a	perpetual	struggle.	Only	the	human	agents	are	capable	of	intentional	action	to	influence	the	event’s	outcome,	and	even	then	it	is	not	always	possible	to	predict	the	 effect	 of	 a	 human	 action	 on	 the	whole.	 But	 it	 does	mean	 it	 is	 sometimes	possible	to	force	the	outcome	of	an	event	by	influencing	other	agents	within	the	
assemblage	 in	 some	 way.	 Environmental	 agency	 can	 be	 constrained	 by	mastering	the	elements	(e.g.	by	damming	rivers).	Human	power	can	be	pooled	and	 thus	 increased	 (e.g.	 through	adding	knowledge	of	 the	 local	 territory	 from	Batavian	traitors	to	the	superior	fighting	skills	of	the	Romans,	as	at	Hist.	5.18.7-8)	or,	alternatively,	diminished	by	introducing	new	elements	into	the	status	quo	which	 reduce	 the	 efficacy	 of	 one’s	 opponents	 in	 a	 particular	 assemblage	 of	agents	 (e.g.	 through	 restricting	 the	 Germans’	 access	 to	 the	 Rhine	 whose	practical	use	and	religious	associations	underpin	their	 identity	as	well	as	their	success,	 as	 in	 the	Tencteri’s	 complaint	 to	 their	Ubian	kin	–	 although	 this	 then	goes	 both	 ways,	 as	 with	 the	 Romans’	 panic	 at	 the	 Rhine	 drought).	 The																																																									74‘a	theory	of	vibrant	matter	presents	individuals	as	simply	incapable	of	bearing	full	responsibility	for	their	effects’;	Bennett	(2010),	37.	75e.g.	Hist.	4.15.16-17,	where	unprepared	soldiers	and	camp-followers,	who	should	have	known	better,	are	surprised	by	Brinno’s	attack.	76First	developed	in	Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1980).	
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destruction	or	management	of	the	environment	changes	the	way	in	which	these	
assemblages	operate	and	thereby	also	the	power	dynamics	within	a	region.			Tacitus	thus	follows	the	familiar	path,	long	noted	by	others,	in	creating	tensions	in	 his	 account	which	 he	 leaves	 unresolved,	 allowing	 the	 reader	 to	 form	 their	own	interpretation.	Happily,	however,	 the	dual	readings	advanced	here	on	the	basis	of	the	text	can	coexist	unproblematically.	Whether	we	choose	to	interpret	the	 Rhine’s	 resistance	 to	 Rome	 as	 divinely	 actuated	 or	 the	 more	 secular	‘capacity	 of	 things	 to	 act	 as	 quasi	 agents	with	 propensities	 of	 their	 own’,	 the	concept	 of	 assemblage	accommodates	 both,	 separately	 as	well	 as	 together,	 as	significant	factors	involved	in	determining	the	progress	of	the	Batavian	revolt	in	Tacitus’	account.	Finally,	we	cannot	read	Tacitean	judgment	into	the	complexity	of	 his	 representation	 of	 imperialism.	He	 is	 not	 criticising	Rome’s	 approach	 as	being	somehow	deficient,	or	suggesting	that	they	could	or	should	have	run	their	campaigns,	here	or	elsewhere,	differently	–	the	point	is	that	there	is	a	finite	limit	to	 what	 humans	 can	 effect	 in	 the	 face	 of	 certain	 kinds	 of	 environmental	resistance,	 and	 the	 extreme	 nature	 of	 the	 examples	 of	 landscape	 agency	discussed	 bring	 home	 that	 harshest	 of	 realities	 more	 forcefully	 than	 the	previous	section’s	demonstration	of	the	pervasiveness	of	environmental	factors	in	 less	 spectacular	ways	 such	 as	 a	 positive	 relationship	 of	 symbiosis.	 Reading	the	 Batavian	 landscape	 as	 possessing	 a	 power	 of	 its	 own	 which	 can	 trump	human	power	imbues	Tacitus’	narration	with	a	sense	of	awe	for	the	difficulties	this	 wildly	 unfamiliar	 wet	 environment	 poses	 to	 Roman	 imperialism.	 The	soldiers	may	be	 foolish,	 in	Tacitus’	view,	 for	 thinking	a	god	 is	displeased	with	them	when	suffering	at	the	mercy	of	the	powerful	river	Rhine,	but	they	are	not	foolish	for	being	frightened.	
Power	and	resistance	shape	the	environment	In	this	final	section	I	return	to	spatial	interventions	in	slightly	more	detail.	Just	as	 reading	 the	 Rhine	 examples	 as	 instances	 of	 divine	 abandonment	made	 the	environment	 into	a	powerful	 agent	escaping	Roman	 imperial(ist)	 control	on	a	symbolic,	 psychologically	 disconcerting	 level,	 Bennett’s	 idea	 of	 events	 as	
assemblages	 of	 ‘vibrant	 matter’	 stresses	 that	 Rome’s	 imperialist	 project	
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depended	on	 rendering	passive	 and	 controllable	 a	 landscape	which	possesses	‘active’	powers	of	resistance.	In	the	Batavian	rebellion	of	the	Histories,	however,	good	Roman	imperialism	need	not	destroy	foreign	structures	and	replace	them	with	 a	 ‘one	 size	 fits	 all’	 building	 programme	 as	 in	 Alston’s	 reading	 of	 the	
Agricola.	 But,	 as	we	 saw,	 it	 does	 need	 to	 neutralise	 them	 somehow,	 either	 by	‘binding	them’	to	Rome	symbolically	through	religious	ritual	or	by	constraining	them	physically	(which	can	be	thought	to	subsume	religious	binding,	though	not	vice	versa).		Zoe	Tan	recently	proposed	a	reading	of	 the	Germania’s	Germany	as	so	remote	and	 impenetrable	 to	 either	 intellectual	 or	 physical	 conquest	 that	 even	 actual	Roman	 triumphs	 or	 achievements	 in	 the	 area	 are	 elided	 from	 the	 narrative.77	The	Histories,	 in	contrast,	show	that	 it	 is	possible	to	make	a	mark	on	Germany	despite	the	resistance	of	its	environment.	Tacitus	shows	that	its	geography	can	be	altered	by	means	of	the	application	of	force	onto	it,	making	it	not	a	passive	
force,	but	an	object	in	the	hands	of	others.	Ellen	O’Gorman	notably	wrote	about	Tacitus’	treatment	of	Germany	as	an	object	to	be	manipulated	by	characterising	it	as	‘shapeless’	throughout	the	work.78	In	this	reading,	Tacitus	then	‘shaped’	the	formless	Germania	 through	writing	 about	 it.79	The	Histories,	 again	 in	 contrast,	represent	 instances	 of	 actual	 violent	 interference	 by	 Rome	 in	 the	 Batavian	landscape.			Such	 landscaping	 is	 not	 only	 a	 means	 to	 an	 end	 (that	 of	 establishing	 firmer	physical	control	of	an	area)	but	it	is	both	the	means	and	the	end.	For	every	act	of	Roman	 physical	 appropriation	 of	 frightening	 German	 space	 with	 a	 view	 to	turning	 it	 into	 ‘tame’	Roman	space,	 there	 is	a	 corresponding	Batavo-Germanic	rejection	 of	 these	 acts,	 trying	 to	 reassert	 control	 over	 ‘their’	 landscape.	 The	transrhenane	 Tencteri	 demand	 that	 the	 Romanised	 Ubii	 tear	 down	 their	 city	walls	(Hist.	4.64.11-12).	The	same	holds	for	the	burning	of	all	Roman	camps	on	the	Rhine	by	the	alliance	—	with	the	exception	of	Mogontiacum	and	Vindonissa																																																									77Tan	(2014),	188–92	and	199.	78O’Gorman	(1993),	137-41.	79Though	chapter	six	of	this	thesis	questions	how	much	shape,	clarity	or	fixity	is	in	fact	achieved	by	Tacitus’s	account.	
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—	 reported	 at	 Hist.	 4.61.16-7.	 The	 fact	 that	 Roman	 army	 camps	 were	constructed	along	the	same	basic	lines	all	over	the	world	and	were	not	varied	to	reflect,	 incorporate	 or	 accommodate	 local	 circumstances	 would	 have	 aided	 a	sense	of	familiarity	for	the	Romans	in	Germany.	But	this	was	possible	precisely	because	 they	 would	 have	 stood	 out	 for	 the	 Batavi	 as	 ‘alien’	 in	 their	 ‘home’	landscape;	visually	but	also	mentally,	as	 indications	of	occupation	by	a	 foreign	power.	A	suitably	riverine	example	 is	 the	Elder	Drusus’	 construction	of	a	dam	across	the	Rhine	between	12	and	9BC,	which	facilitated	Roman	naval	traffic	on	the	 Rhine	 for	 both	 supply	 and	 patrolling	 purposes	 by	 regulating	 its	 flow.80	At	
Hist.	5.19.5-11,	Tacitus	records	its	destruction	as	follows:			
[Civilis]	in	insulam	concessit,	gnarus	deesse	navis	efficiendo	ponti,	neque	
exercitum	Romanum	aliter	transmissurum:	quin	et	diruit	molem	a	Druso	
Germanico	factam	Rhenumque	prono	alveo	in	Galliam	ruentem,	disiectis	
quae	morabantur,	effudit.	Sic	velut	abacto	amne	tenuis	alveus	insulam	inter	
Germanosque	continentium	terrarum	speciem	fecerat.		‘Civilis	pulled	back	to	the	island,	knowing	that	there	were	not	enough	ships	to	make	into	a	bridge,	and	that	the	Roman	army	could	not	be	put	across	in	any	other	way;	then	he	also	destroyed	the	dam	made	by	Drusus	Germanicus	and	poured	out	the	Rhine	so	that	it	rushed	towards	Gaul	by	means	of	a	deep	channel,	once	the	obstacles	which	slowed	it	down	had	been	removed.	In	this	way,	with	the	river	diverted	as	it	were,	a	thin	channel	had	created	the	impression	of	continuous	solid	ground	between	the	island	and	the	Germans.’	 	This	implies	that	though	the	Batavian	island	was	situated	in	the	Rhine,	the	flow	of	the	river	was	stronger,	and	thus	the	crossing	more	difficult,	on	the	side	of	the	island	 facing	 the	 Gallic,	 and	 thus	 Roman,	 bank	 of	 the	 Rhine.	 The	 Roman	 dam	redirected	much	of	this	flow	to	the	side	of	the	island	opposite	the	German	shore,	thus	making	the	crossing	to	Germany	more	difficult	and	that	to	Gaul	easier.	 In	this	 sense,	 the	 interference	 brought	 closer	 the	 island	 to	 Rome	 in	 a	 practical	sense	 –	 no	 doubt	 there	 was	 a	 symbolic	 implication	 too,	 that	 the	 Batavi’s	association	with	Rome	ought	 to	pull	 it	 towards	Gaul	more	 than	 towards	 their	German	 cousins,	 and	 the	 dam	 aided	 this.	 By	 restoring	 the	 natural	 flow	 of	 the	river,	 Civilis	 thus	 mentally	 cut	 loose	 the	 Batavian	 island	 once	 more	 from	 its																																																									80Nienhuis	(2008),	34.	
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mooring	 to	 the	 Gallo-Roman	 shore.	 As	 ‘a	 thin	 channel	 had	 created	 the	impression	 of	 continuous	 solid	 ground	 between	 the	 island	 and	 the	 Germans’,	the	Batavian	island	is	now	virtually	attached	to	Germany.81	But	there	is	a	sense	in	which	 the	narrative	 invites	 the	reader	 to	doubt	 the	possibility	of	 return	 for	the	Batavi,	despite	the	setting	free	of	the	river:	the	plain	attaching	them	visually	to	 Germany	 is	 called	 a	 speciem,	 a	 reminder	 that	 there	 was	 still	 a	 channel,	 if	narrower	than	before	his	intervention,	separating	the	two	banks.	Civilis’	power	over	 the	 landscape	 is	 great,	 but	 in	 this	 case	 not	 great	 enough	 to	 achieve	 a	reordering	 of	 his	 environment	 beyond	 restoring	 it	 to	 its	 original	 state.	Eliminating	the	separation	between	Germany	and	the	island	of	the	Batavi	is	not	within	 his	 technological	 capacity,	 nor	 does	 it	 remove	 the	 Batavi	 from	Rome’s	military	 grasp:	 the	 war	 continues,	 and	 Rome	 starts	 to	 build	 a	 bridge	 (Hist.	5.20.13-5),	and	so	Civilis’	gesture	remains	a	statement	and	a	challenge	only.			The	anecdote	highlights	how	both	Romans	and	Civilis	manipulate	the	landscape	to	 express	 and	 occasionally	 achieve	 domination	 and	 allegiance.	 But	 Tacitus	ultimately	uses	it	to	stress	how	the	shaping	power	of	humans	on	the	landscape	is	 in	 constant	 conflict	 with	 the	 landscape’s	 power	 to	 resist	 such	 human	interventions.	 The	 interaction	 of	 these	 two	 forces	 is	 circular	 and	 sometimes	neither	 party	 is	 strong	 enough	 to	 force	 a	 break.	 There	 is,	 further,	 a	 sense	 in	which	 it	 shows	 up	 the	 receptiveness	 of	 space	 to	 human	 intervention	 but	 the	complete	 resistance	 of	 time	 to	 such	 manipulation	 in	 reverse:	 recalling	 the	situation	of	the	Ubii	and	even	the	Tencteri	earlier	on	in	the	conflict,	the	Batavi’s	association	with	Rome	 is	 of	 too	 long	 a	 standing	 and	has	had	 too	profound	 an	effect	on	them	for	physical	removal	to	produce	the	required	reversion	to	their	‘state	of	nature’.		When	 physical	 domination	 fails,	 Tacitus’	 representation	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	control	turns	to	words.	Claims	to	physical	possession	of	Batavia	on	the	basis	of	its	 mental	 appropriation	 is	 the	 dominant	 theme	 of	 the	 final	 confrontation	between	Cerialis	and	Civilis	before	the	Batavian	rebellion	fizzles	out	and	Civilis	surrenders.	Both	sides	base	their	claim	to	possessing	the	very	same	riverbank																																																									81Noted	briefly	by	Pomeroy	(2003,	269).	
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on	historical	grounds.	They	are	radically	separated,	however,	by	the	rhetorical	treatment	Tacitus	gives	them.			Cerialis	 combines	 elements	 traditional	 to	 the	 pre-battle	 contio,	 such	 as	 a	mention	 of	 Rome’s	 long-standing	 military	 glory	 (veterem	 Romani	 nominis	
gloriam,	antiquas	 recentisque	 victorias,	Hist.	5.16.7-8)	 and	 denunciation	 of	 the	enemy	 (perfidum	 ignavum	victum	hostem,	Hist.	5.16.8-9;	qui	 fugam	animis,	 qui	
vulnera	 tergo	 ferant,	 Hist.	 5.16.12).	 Nonetheless,	 his	 speech	 has	 the	 ring	 of	generality	 typical	 of	 imperialist	 powers	 failing	 to	 really	 ‘see’	 the	 specific	characteristics	of	the	situation	and	people	before	him.82		Importantly,	however,	his	 claims	 to	 superiority	 are	 not	 even	 based	 on	 Rome’s	 performance	 in	 the	Batavian	rebellion.	The	only	context-specific	remarks	are	Cerialis’	 reminder	of	his	troops’	previous	rout	of	the	Germans	(at	Hist.	4.78)	and	the	Roman	claim	of	the	riverbank	and	its	local	legionary	camp	(Vetera)	as	‘theirs’	(suam	ripam,	sua	
castra,	Hist.	 5.16.17-18).	 But	 the	 first	 claim	 ignores	 the	 Romans’	 intervening	defeat	 suffered	at	Hist.	5.15,	and	 the	 second	claim	rather	 suffers	 from	 the	 fact	that	Vetera	was	torched	by	Civilis’	troops	at	Hist.	4.60.83	The	rest	of	the	speech	moves	 away	 from	 the	 Rhine	 as	 well	 as	 from	 the	 past	 completely,	 aiming	 to	strengthen	 Roman	 resolve	 here	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 troops’	 achievements	elsewhere:	the	successful	subjection	of	Britain	and	their	role	in	the	accession	of	Galba	 (Hist.	 5.16.13-14).	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 speech,	 Cerialis	 is	 looking	 to	 the	future	 for	motivation	 (the	 dedication	 of	 the	 second	 legion’s	 new	 eagle),	 as	 he	has	run	out	of	not	only	local	references,	but	also	useful	elements	from	the	past,	to	spur	on	his	troops.	The	overall	picture	is	unimpressive.		In	contrast	 to	 the	abstract	concepts	offered	by	Cerialis,	Civilis’	 speech	 is	made	up	of	concrete	elements.	He	bases	 the	German	side’s	parallel	claim	to	military	prowess	firmly	on	the	place	in	which	they	find	themselves:	locum	pugnae	testem	
virtutis	 ciens,	 ‘invoking	 the	 battlefield	 itself	 as	 testifying	 to	 their	 bravery	 in																																																									82A	powerful	characteristic	of	Orientalism	as	described	by	Edward	Said	(cf.	Said	2003,	originally	published	in	1978).	83Shumate	(2006,	116),	drawing	on	the	list	of	tropes	of	modern	colonial	rhetoric	compiled	by	Spurr	(1993),	cites	‘the	inverse	relationship	between	the	rootedness	–	the	reality,	one	might	say	–	of	colonial	power,	and	the	insistence	with	which	that	reality	is	asserted;	in	other	ways	the	tendency	of	the	rhetoric	to	intensify	under	stress.’		
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battle’	 (Hist.	5.17.1-2).	He	 supports	 this	 focus	on	 the	here	 and	now	 first	 of	 all	through	 the	 close	 conjunction	 of	 words	 which	 evoke	 the	 idea	 of	 autopsy	 or	‘seeing	 for	 oneself’,	 such	 as	 testis	 (witness),	 vestigia	 (traces,	 but	 literally	‘footprints’),	oculos	(eyes)	and	obversari	(to	appear	before	one)	in	the	first	two	sentences.	Tacitus’	Roman	readers	would	have	been	familiar	with	autopsy	as	a	historical	 technique,	 and	 moreover	 one	 with	 a	 claim	 to	 fostering	 the	 most	authoritative	 knowledge	 of	 something.84 	Hand	 in	 hand	 with	 this	 focus	 on	autopsy	 goes	 an	 accurate	 description	 of	 their	 present	 surroundings:	 campos	
madentis	 et	 ipsis	 gnaros,	 paludes	 hostibus	 noxias,	 ‘soggy	 fields	 well	 known	 to	them,	 but	 swamps	 harmful	 to	 the	 enemy’.	 Finally,	 an	 invocation	 of	 the	 Rhine	alongside	the	German	gods	takes	care	of	religious	piety	as	well	as	reminding	the	German	 troops	 that	 the	 river	 is	 a	 quasi-divine	 ally	 as	 well	 as	 a	 practical	advantage.	 The	 second	 feature	 of	 Civilis’	 contio	which	 roots	 it	 firmly	 in	 its	context,	in	contrast	with	that	of	Cerialis,	is	its	references	to	the	past,	which	are	both	specific	and	(broadly)	 relevant:	 stare	Germanos	Batavosque	super	vestigia	
gloriae,	 cineres	ossaque	 legionum	calcantis	 (Hist.	5.17.2-3)	 refers	 to	 the	 visible	reminders	 of	 the	 Germans’	 slaugher	 of	 the	 evacuated	 soldiers	 from	 Vetera	 at	
Hist.	4.6085,	 in	connection	with	which	Tacitus	had	indeed	mentioned	no	burial.	The	reminder	allows	Civilis’	troops’	morale	to	peak	before	he	proceeds	to	take	the	 sting	 out	 their	 recent	 defeat	 at	 Trier	 (ne	 terrerentur	vario	Trevirici	proelii	
eventu…	narrated	at	Hist.	4.71),	the	recollection	of	which	could	potentially	have	depressed	their	fighting	spirit	before	battle.			The	 pairing	 of	 the	 two	 speeches	 shows	 both	 sides	 employing	 the	 same	technique	 of	 linking	 possession	 of	 their	 environment	 to	 history,	 but	 shows	Civilis	doing	it	better.	 Imperial	Rome’s	effort	to	mentally	appropriate	Batavian	space	 lags	 well	 behind	 its	 physical	 efforts.	 Underlying	 this	 claim	 is	 the																																																									84See	Marincola	(1997),	61–86	for	a	discussion	of	autopsy.	Herodotus	2.99	is	the	locus	
classicus	for	historiography:	‘Up	to	this	point	I	have	confined	what	I	have	written	to	the	results	of	my	own	direct	observation	and	research,	and	the	views	I	have	formed	from	them;	but	from	now	on	the	basis	of	my	story	will	be	the	accounts	given	to	me	by	the	Egyptians	themselves	–	though	here,	too,	I	shall	put	in	one	or	two	things	which	I	have	seen	with	my	own	eyes.’	(tr.	De	Sélincourt,	rev.	Marincola).	Cf.	discussion	by	Hartog	(1988),	261–69.		85For	which,	at	the	time,	Civilis	rebuked	them	sternly	(Hist.	4.60.14-5).	
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recognition	that	exerting	force	upon	geography	to	change	the	landscape,	such	as	by	damming	a	river,	is	not	only	a	mental	and	physical	assertion	of	domination,	but	 also	 a	 means	 of	 increasing	 it.	 Such	 intervention	 makes	 the	 environment	more	 suited	 to	 receiving,	 upholding,	 and	 furthering	 particular	 structures	 of	power.			But	 in	addition	to	 the	Batavian	destruction	of	such	 inroads	as	Rome	has	made	on	the	Batavian	landscape,	I	contend	that	Tacitus’	representation	of	this	corner	of	Gaul	 and	Germany	 shows	very	 little	 sign	of	permanent	 structures	of	 power	which	 would	 achieve	 pacification	 (or	 Romanisation,	 or	 civilisation,	 or	demilitarisation)	 of	 this	 part	 of	 the	 world,	 as	 opposed	 to	 simply	 keeping	 it	subdued	 by	 means	 of	 violent	 oppression.	 This	 failure	 can	 be	 understood	 in	terms	of	Lefebvre’s	dictum	that	‘(social)	space	is	a	(social)	product’	by	saying	it	both	contained	and	assigned	places	to	 first,	 the	social	relations	of	reproduction	and	secondly	the	relations	of	production,	and	that	in	pre-capitalist	societies	the	interaction	of	these	two	sets	of	relations	constituted	social	reproduction	(‘that	is	to	 say,	 the	 reproduction	 of	 society	 as	 it	 perpetuated	 itself	 generation	 after	generation,	conflict,	 feud,	strife,	crisis	and	war	notwithstanding’).86	The	walled	settlement	at	Cologne	is	a	good	example.	It	is	the	urban	stage	on	which	much	of	the	action	of	the	central	section	of	the	revolt	takes	place	(Hist.	4.54-79)	and	by	this	 urban	 nature	 integral	 to	 the	 environmental	 argument	 about	 spatial	organisation	 and	 resistance.	 Made	 by	 social	 intervention	 (of	 Rome	 in	 Ubian	territory),	it	is	then	formative	of	society	(of	Romanised	Ubii,	who	then	prefer	to	carry	on	that	way).	How	strong	this	link	can	be	is	proved	in	Tacitus	by	the	Ubii’s	preference	 for	 carrying	 on	 that	 way	 rather	 than	 reverting	 to	 their	 original	German	state,	as	 their	 transrhenane	cousins	the	Tencteri	 think	 is	possible	and	desirable.87	But	outside	of	the	Ubian	example	of	Cologne,	the	Batavian	rebellion	as	narrated	by	Tacitus	offers	little	evidence	of	social	reproduction	in	the	Roman	mould:	 although	 the	 camps	 reproduce	 a	 Roman	 environment,	which	makes	 it	difficult	for	the	Romans	to	be	defeated	in	that	environment,	further	inroads	into	Batavian	 (social)	 space	 are	 clearly	 very	 difficult	 to	make:	 they	 still	 have	 their																																																									86Lefebvre	(1991),	32.	87See	chapter	two	for	the	Ubii’s	response.	
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forests	 to	hide	 in	(there	 is	no	 imitation	of	Caesar,	who	occasionally	simply	cut	them	down,	as	at	BG	3.29.1,	or	Caecina	at	Ann.	1.5088),	and	manage	to	undercut	Roman	control	of	their	waterways,	as	we	have	seen.			Both	 of	 the	 elements	 required	 for	 social	 reproduction	 are	 absent.	 The	 social	relations	of	 reproduction	are	portrayed	as	 taking	place	on	strictly	ethnic	 lines	with	 the	Ubii	 the	only	ones	shown	 to	have	 intermarried	with	Romans.	And	as	long	 as	 the	 camps	 are	 islands	 of	 self-sufficient	 Romanity	 implanted	 into	 the	‘alien’	 landscape,	 the	 relations	 of	 production	 are	 also	 conducted	 strictly	 on	Roman	 lines.	 The	 conditions	 for	 (Roman)	 social	 reproduction	 as	 opposed	 to	forcible	subjugation	are	not	fulfilled	in	Tacitus’	Batavian	narrative.	Roman	and	Batavian	worlds	exist	in	parallel	and	in	continual	tension.	Each	side	reproduces	their	own	environment	but	expanding	 into	each	other’s	 territory,	 reproducing	one	 type	 of	 social	 space	 (made	 by	 one	 set	 of	 people)	 in	 another	 (made	 by	 a	different	set	of	people),	is	shown	to	be	difficult	on	the	basis	of	repression	alone.	Cologne’s	 representation	as	 the	sole	 foothold	of	Roman	civilisation	amidst	 the	Batavian	 landscape	 of	 dread	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 historically	 unrealistic,	 as	 is	 the	representation	of	Roman	activity	on	the	Rhine	as	nothing	more	than	a	measure	of	military	control:	patrolling	would	have	made	and	kept	 the	Gallic	river	bank	safe	for	settlers,	including	those	living	in	settlements	near	the	Roman	camps.89	Further,	 intermarriage	 would	 have	 taken	 place	 between	 soldiers	 and	 locals	everywhere,	 not	 just	 in	 Cologne	 (nobiscum	 per	 conubium	 sociatis	 quique	mox	
provenerunt,	Hist.	4.65.10-11).	 But	 not	 even	mercatores	are	mentioned	 in	 the	course	 of	 the	 Batavian	 revolt,	 and	 negotiatores	or	merchants	 only	 once	 (Hist.	4.15.16).	Lixae	are	the	only	category	of	non-soldiers	associated	with	the	Roman	side	 (Hist.	 4.15.16,	 4.20.9,	 4.22.17),	 and	 their	 role	 is	 regrettably	 unclear.	 If	Vishnia	 is	 right,	and	 they	were	 ‘a	 special	paramilitary	squad,	 connected	 to	 the	army	contractually,	whose	main	task	was	not	only	to	capture	inhabitants	in	war	areas,	 as	described	by	Sallust	and	Polybius,	but	also	 to	 take	care	of	 the	newly	
																																																								88I	discuss	the	reason	for	Caecina’s	success	in	the	German	forests	in	this	particular	episode	at	the	end	of	chapter	four.	89For	more	on	this,	see	Allison	(2013).	
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enslaved	 population	 for	 an	 agreed	 upon	 share	 in	 this	 form	 of	 booty’90,	 this	advances	 the	 economic	 argument	 for	 reading	 Rome’s	 activity	 in	 Germany	 as	conducive	to	the	production	of	Roman,	or	at	least	hybrid,	space	and	society	no	further.	In	the	Tacitean	sketch	of	Germany	at	the	time	of	the	Batavian	revolt,	the	limits	of	violent	imperialism	for	building	an	empire	are	revealed.		If	we	look	back	on	the	origins	of	the	Batavian	rebellion,	in	the	dilectus	rejected	by	 the	 local	 population,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 the	 same	 shortsightedness	 is	 at	work	 in	 Tacitus’	 representation	 of	 the	 Roman	 strategy	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	Batavian	population.	Foucault	theorised	on	how	the	ordered	representation	of	a	subject	 is	 equivalent	 to	 establishing	 a	 measure	 of	 control	 over	 it.91	Tacitus	presents	the	Batavian	dilectus	as	an	attempt	by	Rome	to	count	and	manage	adult	Batavian	bodies	and	 therefore	a	means	of	establishing	control	over	 them.	The	first	 book	 of	 Vegetius’	 4th	 century	 AD	 treatise	 De	 Re	 Militari	 describes	 the	selection	 and	 training	 of	 recruits	 to	 the	Roman	army,	 and	may	differ	 from	1st	century	AD	practices	in	some	of	the	detail	but	probably	not	in	the	general	sense.	It	gives	a	clear	impression	of	the	level	of	detail	to	which	the	bodies	of	recruits	were	inspected:		
Sit	ergo	adulescens	Martio	operi	deputandus	uigilantibus	oculis,	erecta	
ceruice,	lato	pectore,	umeris	musculosis,	ualentibus	brachiis,	digitis	
longioribus,	uentre	modicus,	exilior	clunibus,	suris	et	pedibus	non	superflua	
carne	distentis	sed	neruorum	duritia	collectis		
DRM,	1.6.4-592		 ‘Let,	then,	the	young	man	dedicated	to	military	efforts	have	watchful	eyes,	a	straight	neck,	a	broad	chest,	muscular	shoulders,	strong	arms,	long	fingers	and	have	a	moderate	waistline,	slim	buttocks,	with	legs	and	feet	which	are	not	excessively	fleshy	but	well-proportioned	thanks	to	sturdy	tendons.’		That	there	was	a	genuine	(Vitellian)	military	need	underlying	the	dilectus	does	not	 impede	 the	 symbolic	 value	 of	 its	 inspection	 of	 Batavian	 bodies	 as	 a																																																									90Vishnia	(2002),	270.	91Foucault	(1991),	135–69,	‘Docile	bodies’,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	exertion	of	power	through	the	spatial	distribution	of	bodies	through	timetables,	reports,	prescribed	actions	in	specially	designed	spaces,	etc.	92Latin	edition	by	Önnerfors	(1995).	
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statement	of	Roman	power	over	the	Batavi,	and	of	the	rape	which	accompanied	the	 listing	 and	 inspection	 of	 bodies	 (Hist.	5.14.3-7)93	as	 a	 demeaning	 gesture	which	 gives	 the	 lie	 to	 the	 bond	 between	 the	 two	 peoples	 continuing	 to	 be	labelled	one	of	alliance	(neque	enim	societatem,	ut	olim,	Civilis	says	in	his	speech	advising	people	not	to	present	themselves	for	inspection).	The	dilectus	is	thus	a	measure	which	enables	the	Romans	to	control	these	people	and	is	one	of	several	imperial	measures	which	enable	 the	Romans	 to	exert	 authority	over	 land	and	people.	 But	 just	 as	 with	 their	 management	 of	 the	 outlandish	 Batavian	 lands,	their	strategy	for	human	domination	is	shortsighted:	in	Tacitus’	presentation	of	things,	 they	 may	 be	 subjecting	 the	 dreadful	 Batavi,	 but	 they	 are	 not	 making	Romans.	
Conclusion	In	 this	chapter	 I	have	shown	the	pervasiveness	of	 the	environment	 in	Tacitus’	depiction	 of	 the	 rebellion	 through	 tracing	 its	 various	 permutations	 and	 how	these	affect	 the	 conduct	of	 the	 conflict.	As	an	 influence	on	humans,	 it	 is	 a	key	factor	in	fostering	the	Batavi’s	special	skills,	which	are	of	such	use	to	Rome	but	are	also	the	key	to	Germanic	resistance	to	Rome	when	they	decide	to	rebel.	Its	key	importance	is	further	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	its	forcible	suppression	from	outside	is	portrayed	as	causing	the	Ubii’s	shift,	politically	and	ideologically,	towards	identifying	with	Rome	and	its	best	interests.	As	an	influence	on	human	power	 and	 resistance,	 its	 unpredictable,	 devastating	 force	 is	 a	 key	 factor	 in	undermining	the	Roman	soldiers’	religiously	backed	faith	in	the	moral	rectitude	and	 likely	 success	 of	 their	 imperialist	 endeavour	 in	 Batavia.	 It	 also	 frustrates	Roman	 logistical	 efforts	 to	 establish	 enduring	 structures	 of	 surveillance	 and	domination	in	the	area.	Finally,	as	not	only	a	subject	but	also	an	object,	it	suffers	spatial	interventions	into	its	fabric	by	the	humans	that	are	waging	this	war,	with	a	 view	 to	 mastering	 its	 territory	 as	 well	 as	 its	 inhabitants	 and	 setting	 up	structures	 to	 perpetuate	 this	 mastery.	 Alongside	 these	 interventions,	 the	territory	 is	 being	 laid	 claim	 to	 ideologically	 by	 both	 sides	 in	 the	 rhetorical																																																									93iussu	Vitellii	Batavorum	iuventus	ad	dilectum	vocabatur,	quem	suapte	natura	gravem	
onerabant	ministri	avaritia	ac	luxu,	senes	aut	invalidos	conquirendo,	quos	pretio	
dimitterent:	rursus	impubes	et	forma	conspicui	(et	est	plerisque	procera	pueritia)	ad	
stuprum	trahebantur.	
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contest	which	precedes	 the	 final,	 inconclusive	 clash	 of	 arms	 in	 the	 text	 as	we	have	 it.	 Power	 by	 and	 over	 the	 environment	 and	 resistance	 by	 and	 to	 the	environment	 are	 everywhere.	 Understanding	 how	 they	 are	 locked	 in	 a	perpetual	 struggle	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 assemblage	 goes	 a	 long	 way	towards	 explaining	 the	 inconclusive	 nature	 of	 much	 of	 the	 fighting,	 and	 the	conflict’s	 non-military	 final	 resolution.	 The	 question	 of	 why	 Rome	 ultimately	wins,	 or	 alternatively,	why	Civilis	 is	 outplayed	 in	his	 initially	 strong	appeal	 to	‘pan-germanity’	 and	 his	 environmental	 advantage,	 finally	 prompting	 his	surrender,	is	the	focus	of	the	next	chapter.	
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2	 Fragmentation	in	Batavia		
Introduction	The	 previous	 chapter	 showed	 how	 Tacitus’	 Batavian	 environment	 shapes	 its	human	inhabitants	and	their	opportunities	for	exerting	power	and	resistance.	It	also	showed	how	humans,	 in	 their	 turn,	have	some	power	 to	shape	and	resist	their	environment.	Thus	the	Tacitean	narrative	appears	to	establish	a	complex	but	 fundamental	 relationship	 between	 the	 environment	 and	 identity,	 one	 in	which	 ‘natural’	 elements	 point	 towards	 environmental	 determinism,	 but	 also	one	 in	 which	 Roman	 landscape	 engineering	 can	 significantly	 transform	 a	landscape	 and	 ‘cultural’	 landscapes	 (notably	 cities)	 can	 influence	 identity.	Consequently,	 affinity	 and	 familiarity	 with	 the	 landscape	 in	 the	 text	 are	ultimately	 not	 useful	 predictors	 for	 military	 success	 (or,	 as	 this	 chapter	 will	show,	for	identity):	the	Batavian	rebellion	still	fails,	with	the	Tacitean	narrative	breaking	 off	 a	 short	way	 into	 a	 speech	 by	 Julius	 Civilis,	 abandoned	 by	 all	 his	allies,	offering	his	surrender	to	the	Roman	commander	Petillius	Cerialis.		This	 chapter,	 then,	 considers	 how	 we	 might	 account	 for	 the	 ultimate	unsuccessful	collapse	of	the	Batavian	revolt,	given	that	there	is	no	total,	or	even	significant,	military	victory	on	either	side.	It	will	be	shown	that	the	narrative	of	
Histories	 4	 and	 5	 grounds	 this	 demise	 solidly	 in	 the	 detachment	 of	 Civilis’	supporters,	Batavian	and	other,	 from	each	other	and	 from	him,	 rather	 than	 in	any	 military	 causes.	 From	 the	 moment	 the	 Ubii	 pay	 lip	 service	 to	 their	Tencteran	 cousins’	 demands	 to	 ‘de-Romanise’	 themselves,	 all	 subsequent	speeches	 reported	 by	 Tacitus,	 Roman	 and	 non-Roman,	 contain	 discourses	 of	separation	which	 help	 to	 effect,	whether	 intentionally	 or	 not,	 the	 break	 up	 of	Civilis’	pan-German	alliance.94	These	discourses	rely	partly	on	the	language	and																																																									94Noted	in	an	off-hand	comment	by	Levene	(2009,	226;	see	n.	14),	but	see	Ash	(2009,	97)	for	the	view	that	different	groups	with	different	aims	were	responsible	for	the	alliance’s	breakdown.	Interestingly,	Haynes	(2003,	150)	draws	on	similar	terms	of	identity	to	mine	in	her	assessment	of	the	Batavian	revolt’s	position	within	the	Histories:	‘As	he	does	with	the	Jews,	Tacitus	often	examines	the	Batavians	in	terms	of	their	beliefs.	At	a	time	when	Roman	ideology	fluctuates	so	drastically,	everyone	else’s	
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framework	 of	 identity	 politics	 and	 partly	 on	 considerations	 of	 power	 and	economics	to	motivate	withdrawal	from	the	rebellion	(with	the	exception	of	the	rebel	 leaders,	 who	 use	 these	 same	 considerations	 to	 decide	 on	 their	military	strategy).			On	the	side	of	power,	the	speeches	individually	and	together	often	refer	to	past	experience	 of	 Roman	 force	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 threat	 of	 future	 force	believable;	on	the	economic	side,	they	contain	reminders	of	the	benefits	enjoyed	by	 the	audience	as	a	 result	of	Rome’s	 imperialist	presence	and	combine	 these	with	the	threat	of	removing	such	advantages.	This	rhetoric,	further,	may	either	encourage	the	audience	to	weigh	up	these	benefits	for	themselves	or	include	the	speaker’s	assessment	of	this	trade-off	between	the	benefits	of	Roman	rule	and	tribal	 self-determination.	 Often,	 the	 text	makes	 clear	 that	 identity	 is	 linked	 to	considerations	of	economics	and	politics/power,	even	if	the	speakers	appear	to	treat	the	two	sets	of	considerations	separately.	I	argue	that	this	makes	the	text	at	 least	 partly	 an	 exploration	 of	 how	 the	 advent	 of	 imperial	 Rome	 in	 the	Rhineland	radically	changed	how	tribes	constituted	their	identities.	In	whatever	way	 this	 happened	 before,	 the	 appearance	 of	 Rome	 on	 the	 scene	 made	 its	provision	 of	 economic	 goods	 a	 crucial	 factor	 in	 delineating	 groups	 from	 each	other,	 further	 aided	 by	 Rome’s	 threat	 of	 meeting	 violent	 resistance	 to	 this	evolution	with	brutal	force.	At	the	same	time,	the	text	shows	that	old	labels	still	held	some	importance	in	and	of	themselves	despite	their	increasingly	economic	underpinnings.95 	My	 argument	 will	 not	 be	 concerned	 with	 explaining	 why	different	 speeches	 categorise	 people	 as	 Gallic	 or	 German,	 as	 upon	 closer	examination	 the	 concepts	 seem	 to	 hold	 very	 little	water.	 Instead,	 it	 notes	 the	inconsistencies	and	redeployments,	and	explains	them	as	a	feature	of	this	new	imperial	world	in	which	labels	of	identity	shift	meaning	as	the	groups	who	apply	
																																																																																																																																																													represents	the	challenge	to	provide	a	logic	of	differentiation.	The	central	concern	of	the	
Histories	is	the	rhetoric	of	this	differentiation	and	its	evolution	from	chaos,	at	the	death	of	Nero,	to	order,	at	the	accession	of	Vespasian.’	The	latter	part	of	the	quote	indicates	where	our	foci	diverge:	she	focuses	on	the	Civil	War,	I	on	Roman	imperialism.		95See	n.	28.	
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them	 to	 themselves	 and	 others	 shift	 their	 political	 position	 for	 pragmatic	reasons.96		The	 chapter’s	 aims	 are	 to	 trace	 the	 process	 of	 the	 alliance’s	 non-military	breakdown	in	the	Tacitean	text,	to	identify	the	different	mechanisms	on	which	it	relies,	 and	 to	 examine	 what	 the	 results	 could	 reasonably	 be	 said	 to	 indicate	about	 the	 non-violent	 strategies	 which	 supported	 or	 facilitated	 Rome’s	imperialism.	In	the	latter	regard,	my	analyses	of	Cerialis’	final	communications	to	the	Transrhenani	and	Batavi	and	the	latter’s	change	of	heart	have	benefited	from	 Frantz	 Fanon’s	 theorising	 on	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 reasons	 why	uprisings	fail	to	become	sustainable	and	successful	revolutionary	wars.	Through	my	examination	of	 the	efficacy	of	his	 speeches	and	general	approach,	Petillius	Cerialis	 is	 then	 rehabilitated	 as	precisely	 the	 right	 general	 for	 this	 part	 of	 the	world,	 rather	 than	 the	 military	 failure	 he	 has	 often	 been	 judged	 to	 be	 in	scholarship,	 a	 presentation	 which	 Tacitus’	 text	 seems	 to	 encourage	 on	 a	superficial	level.		Finally,	 as	 in	 chapter	one,	 I	will	 name	 individual	 tribes	when	Tacitus	 gives	us	their	name	but	will	refer	 to	 ‘the	Germans’	or	 ‘the	Gallo-German	alliance’	when	he	 does	 not,	 in	 recognition	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Tacitus	 does	 not	 use	 the	 ethnic	terminology	 of	 Gaul	 and	 German	 with	 any	 level	 of	 consistency	 or	 clear	underpinning	criteria.97	
Fragmentation	Tacitus	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 rebellion	 fails	because	Civilis	 eventually	 stands	alone,	having	been	abandoned	by	his	supporters.	The	first	to	detach	themselves	from	the	alliance	are	the	Ubii/Agrippinenses	(Hist.	4.65),	in	response	to	the	Tencteri’s	demands	 (Hist.	 4.64).	 Their	 speech,	 though	 superficially	 acquiescent,	 already	sets	out	a	vision	of	empire	–	identity-wise	and	economic	–	that	is	incompatible	
																																																								96The	introduction	to	Master	(2016)	offers	a	good	overview	of	modern	scholarship	on	ethnic	identity	as	‘socially	constructed	and	instrumental’	(p.	24).	97See	pp.	24-5.	
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with	 the	 Tencteri’s	 thoughts	 on	 Cologne’s	 space	 and	 German	 identity.98	After	that	 the	 Treveri	 return	 to	 loyalty	 after	 a	 speech	 from	 Cerialis	 (Hist.	 4.73-75),	with	which	 the	Trevir	 rebel	 leader	Tutor	appears	 to	engage	 in	his	subsequent	speech	to	the	other	leaders	of	the	revolt,	including	Civilis	(Hist.	4.76).	In	book	5,	the	 Transrhenani	 led	 by	 Veleda	 withdraw	 from	 the	 alliance	 and	 (implicitly)	from	 Roman	 Gaul,	 again	 after	 receiving	 communications	 from	 Cerialis	 (Hist.	5.24).	 Finally	 the	 Batavi	 themselves	 decide	 they	 no	 longer	want	 to	 be	 part	 of	Civilis’	project,	and	Tacitus	provides	his	readers	with	a	report	of	what	they	were	thinking	 (Hist.	5.25).	 Each	 step	 of	 dissociation	 is	 thus	 associated	 with	 either	direct	 speech,	 indirect	 speech	 or	 a	 Tacitean	 account	 of	 motivations	 and	thoughts.	Each	of	these	discourses	provides	us	with	clues	to	understanding	this	dwindling	 support	 as	 based	 on	 considerations	 in	 which	 economic	 goods	 and	power	are	entangled	with	identity	politics.		Significant	work	 has	 already	 been	 done	 on	 the	 speeches	 of	Histories	4.	 Keitel	stressed	 the	mirroring	 of	 the	 Roman	 events	 and	 speeches	 of	 the	 civil	 war	 in	those	 narrated	 for	 Batavia	 and	 along	 the	 Rhine:	 in	 both	 cases,	 the	 dichotomy	between	 libertas	and	 servitus	 is	 the	 crux.99	Rutherford	 expanded	upon	Keitel’s	observations,	mentioning	 ‘factional	 antagonism,	 uncertain	motives,	 fluctuating	loyalties,	 excessive	optimism	 frustrated	by	 inadequate	preparation	or	 support	and	 followed	by	disillusionment	and	 resignation’	 as	 ‘motifs’	 of	both	 the	 revolt	and	the	rest	of	the	civil	war	narrative	in	the	Histories.100	From	both	I	borrow	the	awareness,	 in	 what	 follows,	 that	 the	 speeches	 are	 interconnected.101	From	Rutherford	I	additionally	borrow	the	framework	of	division,	but	as	the	subject	of	investigation	on	its	own	terms.	Finally,	I	supplement	Master’s	reading	of	the	revolt’s	 representations	 of	 identity	 as	 blowing	 up	 the	 reductionist	 binary	 of	Roman/Other102	with	 an	 investigation	 of	 identity	 fragmentation	 on	 the	 non-Roman	side	(which	includes	the	close	realignment	of	the	supposedly	Other	with																																																									98Benario	(1988),	135	saw	the	Treveri’s	defeat	and	submission	(Hist.	4.70ff)	as	‘one	of	the	first	steps	in	the	turning	of	the	devastating	tide':	I	argue	the	Ubii’s	false	acquiescence	here	is	the	first	step.	99Keitel	(1993).	100Rutherford	(2010),	327.	101Keitel	(1993),	51;	Rutherford	(2010),	327–28.	102Master	(2016),	153–57.	
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Rome	and	its	interests).	Yet	my	mission	differs	from	all	of	them	in	reading	the	revolt	 not	 as	 mirror	 of	 and	 for	 Rome103,	 nor	 as	 a	 work	 that	 predominantly	breaks	down	boundaries	 between	Roman	and	Other	 –	 though	 it	 is	 both	 these	things	 –	 but	 as	 a	 historical	 account,	 however	 dramatised	 and	 stylised,	 of	 the	workings	of	Roman	imperialism.		
The	Ubii	and	the	Tencteri	(revisited)	The	 welcoming	 of	 the	 Ubii	 back	 into	 the	 Roman	 fold	 was	 the	 first	 serious	setback	for	Civilis’	forces.	In	the	previous	chapter,	I	argued	that	the	focus	of	the	Tencteri’s	 speech	 was	 their	 conviction	 that	 the	 Ubii	 had	 abandoned	 their	German	identity.	Their	new	state	as	Agrippinenses	was,	 in	the	Tencteri’s	view,	both	 fostered	 by	 and	 expressed	 in	 the	Roman	 spatial	 organisation	 of	 Cologne	and	 the	Roman	 habits	 its	 people	 had	 adopted.	 The	 speech	 thus	 called	 for	 the	restoration	of	Cologne	as	a	supposedly	pure	German	space	and	the	restoration	of	 its	population	 to	 containing	only	pure	German	bodies.104	However,	 at	 three	different	points	 the	speech	refers	 to	more	pragmatic	concerns	amidst	 those	of	identity	and	cultural	change:			
nam	 ad	 hunc	 diem	 flumina	 ac	 terram	 et	 caelum	 quodam	 modo	 ipsum	
clauserant	 Romani	 ut	 conloquia	 congressusque	 nostros	 arcerent,	 vel,	 quod	
contumeliosius	est	viris	ad	arma	natis,	inermes	ac	prope	nudi	sub	custode	et	
pretio	coiremus.	
Hist.	4.54.6-10		‘for	 up	 until	 this	 day	 the	Romans	 had	 closed	 off	 the	 rivers,	 earth	 and	 in	some	 ways	 the	 sky	 itself	 so	 that	 they	 could	 stop	 us	 from	 talking	 and	meeting,	or,	something	even	more	insulting	to	men	born	to	arms,	so	that	we	could	meet	unarmed	and	practically	naked	only,	under	their	guard	and	for	a	price.’																																																											103Haynes	(2003,	156–63)	is	also	concerned	with	identity	in	the	Batavian	revolt,	but	from	a	Roman,	literary,	mirroring	angle	rather	than	focusing,	as	I	do,	on	how	the	text	articulates	German-specific	concerns	and	truth.	See	n.	94.	104See	Isaac	(2004),	140–41	for	an	analysis	of	the	nature	of	their	argument	as	based	on	purity.	The	Germania,	whether	historical	or	not,	presents	a	very	different	picture	of	the	spatial	arrangements	of	the	Germani	in	which	their	lack	of	identity	is	expressed	in	their	lack	of	spatial	coherence;	cf.	chapter	six.	Liebeschuetz	(1966,	138)	briefly	mentions	the	passage	as	a	Tacitean	critique	of	romanisation	[sic],	but	does	not	disentangle	the	mechanisms	described.			
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bona	interfectorum	in	medium	cedant	
Hist.	4.64.15	‘the	possessions	of	the	murdered	will	go	into	a	common	pile’		
sincerus	et	integer	et	servitutis	oblitus	populus	aut	ex	aequo	agetis	aut	aliis	
imperitabitis.	
Hist.	4.64.21-3	‘Clean	and	uncontaminated,	as	a	people	no	longer	remembering	slavery,	you	will	[then]	either	deal	with	others	on	an	equal	footing	or	actively	rule	over	them.’		The	first	complaint	combines	power	and	economics	in	the	compact	phrase	sub	
custode	et	pretio,	making	clear	that	the	Tencteri’s	resentment	originates	at	least	as	much	from	being	impeded	by	Rome	from	free	(in	both	senses)	access	to	the	bubble	 of	 wealth	 enjoyed	 by	 the	 Agrippinenses	 in	 Cologne.	 In	 the	 second	quotation,	 their	 insistence	 on	 reserving	 the	 fruits	 of	 Roman	 Cologne’s	prosperity	 for	 common	 use	 also	 undermines	 the	 identity	 angle:	 unlike	 the	Roman	 walls,	 which	 must	 be	 destroyed,	 these	 goods	 are	 not	 marked	 for	destruction	 as	 tainted	 or	 un-German,	 despite	 their	 origins	 in	 the	 political	 and	economic	 structures	 they	 wish	 to	 destroy.105	Finally,	 their	 closing	 statement	predicting	ex	aequo	agetis	aut	aliis	 imperabitis	envisages	a	 future	 in	which	 the	Tencteri	 are,	 in	 the	worst	 case,	no	 longer	 controlled	by	others	 (in	view	of	 the	preceding	 complaints,	 Rome	 is	 clearly	 implied)	 and,	 in	 the	 best	 case,	 in	 a	position	 to	 control	 others.	 Though	 they	 offer	 this	 vision	 of	 radically	reconfigured	 power	 relations	 to	 the	 Agrippinenses,	 it	 is	 a	 more	 effective	expression	 of	 their	 discontent	with	 their	 own	 economic	 and	 political	 position	than	 it	 is	an	appealing	offer	 to	 the	Agrippinenses,	as	 the	 latter’s	 response	and	subsequent	events	make	clear.		
																																																								105This	paradoxical	attitude	recurs	in	modern	postcolonial	discourse	too.	E.g.	Castle	in	the	introduction	to	the	anthology	Postcolonial	Discourses	(2001,	xii)	commenting	on	‘(…)	the	extent	to	which	resistance	to	empire	is	not	always	as	radical	as	it	seems,	that	it	is	predicated	on	a	principled	complicity,	an	ambivalence	that	is	foundational’	in	the	context	of	Ireland.	
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Tacitus	ventriloquises	 the	Agrippinsenses’	response	to	 the	Tencteri’s	concerns	and	demands	as	follows:106		
quae	prima	libertatis	facultas	data	est,	avidius	quam	cautius	sumpsimus,	ut	
vobis	ceterisque	Germanis,	consanguineis	nostris,	iungeremur.	muros	
civitatis,	congregantibus	se	cum	maxime	Romanorum	exercitibus,	augere	
nobis	quam	diruere	tutius	est.	si	qui	ex	Italia	aut	provinciis	alienigenae	in	
finibus	nostris	fuerant,	eos	bellum	absumpsit	vel	in	suas	quisque	sedis	
refugerunt.	deductis	olim	et	nobiscum	per	conubium	sociatis	quique	mox	
provenerunt	haec	patria	est;	nec	vos	adeo	iniquos	existimamus	ut	interfici	a	
nobis	parentes	fratres	liberos	nostros	velitis.	vectigal	et	onera	
commerciorum	resolvimus:	sint	transitus	incustoditi	sed	diurni	et	inermes,	
donec	nova	et	recentia	iura	vetustate	in	consuetudinem	vertuntur.	arbitrum	
habebimus	Civilem	et	Veledam,	apud	quos	pacta	sancientur.	
Hist.	4.65.4-17		‘The	first	opportunity	of	freedom	which	came	our	way,	we	embraced	with	more	eagerness	than	wisdom,	so	that	we	could	be	joined	to	you	and	the	other	Germans,	our	kinsfolk.	But	the	walls	around	our	community,	now	that	the	armies	of	the	Romans	are	gathering	in	the	greatest	possible	numbers,	it	would	be	safer	to	build	up	further	than	to	throw	down.	If	there	had	been	any	left	within	our	borders	who	were	born	elsewhere,	either	from	Italy	or	the	provinces,	either	the	war	has	already	removed	them	or	they	have	all	sought	refuge	in	their	own	nations.	For	those	who	settled	here	a	long	time	ago	and	are	now	joined	to	us	in	marriage,	and	for	those	who	were	born	since,	this	is	their	fatherland;	nor	do	we	judge	you	to	be	so	unfair	that	you	would	want	our	parents,	brothers	and	children	to	be	murdered	by	us.	The	tax	and	other	burdens	of	trade	we	have	remitted:	let	there	be	unguarded	contact,	but	only	during	the	day	and	unarmed,	until	these	novel	rights	are	converted	into	tradition	by	long	standing.	We	will	have	Civilis	and	Veleda	as	referees,	in	whose	company	these	pacts	will	be	sanctioned.’		 	At	 first	 glance,	 their	 response	 engages	 seriously	 with	 the	 Tencteri’s	 speech.	Their	use	of	consanguineus	to	describe	and	address	the	Tencteri	acknowledges	the	latter’s	appeal	to	a	shared	German	identity,	in	spite	of	their	cultural	change.	The	Agrippinenses	 also	 follow	 the	 anti-Roman	 line	 set	 out	by	 their	 cousins	 in	implying	that	the	Roman	troops	in	the	area	are	a	potential	threat	to	their	safety.	
																																																								106Rutherford	stops	short	of	allowing	this	direct	exchange	of	speeches	to	be	termed	an	
agōn	(Rutherford	2010,	322).	Although	it	is	the	only	pair	of	straightforward	‘petition	and	response’	speeches	out	of	all	those	discussed,	the	traditional	standard	of	meeting	the	opponent’s	arguments	in	agonistic	debate	is	not	really	met.	
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However,	the	rest	of	their	speech	complicates	this	apparent	agreement	with	the	Tencteri’s	sketched	out	worldview.		First	of	all,	the	Ubii	take	issue	with	the	notion	of	externally	influenced	identity	change,	 and	 reply	 that	 their	 identity	 change	 is	written	 into	 their	 very	 bodies,	now	mixed	due	to	intermarriage	with	Romans.	By	anchoring	this	mixed	identity	in	corporeal	 reality,	 they	make	clear	 that	 the	ethnic	 separation	desired	by	 the	Tencteri	cannot	be	achieved,	instead	of	simply	declaring	that	they	would	not	do	it	 even	 if	 possible. 107 	Instead,	 the	 Agrippinsenses	 spuriously	 advance	 the	category	 of	 alienigenae	 as	 people	 who	 do	 not	 belong	 in	 Cologne	 and	 would	therefore	 be	 legitimate	 targets	 for	 the	 Tencteri.	 The	 redefinition	 has	 several	benefits,	despite	 its	 intellectual	dishonesty.	First	of	all,	 it	allows	them	to	avoid	murdering	their	own	Romano-German	families,	whose	bodies	as	we	saw	were	problematic	in	the	purity	schema	advanced	by	the	Tencteri.	Secondly,	it	allows	them	to	show	willing	in	front	of	the	Tencteri,	claiming	they	would	kill	any	such	people	 if	 there	 had	 been	 any	 left	 in	 the	 city,	 without	 antagonising	 Rome	 by	actually	having	to	be	put	to	the	test.	They	can	steer	a	middle	course	between	the	immediate	danger	of	the	Tencteri’s	wrath	if	they	protest	too	much	and	the	more	distant	danger	of	Rome’s	displeasure	 if	 they	did	kill	all	Romans	present	 in	 the	city.	Finally,	it	allows	them	to	uphold	the	validity	of	the	new	identities	that	have	sprung	 up	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Cologne’s	 imperial	 context,	 thereby	 appearing	 to	endorse	 the	 Tencteri’s	 binary	 framework	 of	 German	 or	 Roman	whilst	 in	 fact	sidestepping	it.	The	language	of	identity	is	prevalent	in	both	speeches,	call	and	response,	but	though	the	Agrippinenses	use	the	same	terms,	the	logic	of	purity	on	which	the	Tencteri’s	conception	of	identity	is	founded	is	explicitly	rejected.		
																																																								107Syme	(1958,	453)	talks	about	their	choice	to	remain	a	‘single	and	indivisible	community’.	The	Tacitean	text	does	not	question	the	physical	basis	to	the	Agrippinenses’	self-professed	identity,	but	modern	theories	of	race	are	clear	that	embracing	and	upholding	their	hybridity	in	this	way	is	indeed	a	choice,	not	a	biological	reality	that	is	empirically	traceable.	(Although	the	opposing	argument,	that	race	is	biologically	determined,	is	still	pervasive	in	the	modern	day,	to	the	despair	of	the	philosopher	Kwame	Anthony	Appiah,	as	recently	expressed	in	his	2016	BBC	Reith	Lectures.)	See	the	introduction	to	Master	(2016)	for	a	brief	overview	of	modern	scholarship	on	ethnicity	as	‘socially	constructed	and	instrumental’.	
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Their	 redefinition	 of	 the	 argument	 into	 one	 of	 insider	 versus	 outsider	 of	 the	imperial	space	of	Cologne	brings	us	back	to	economics	and	power.	Let	us	look	at	how	their	speech	deals	with	the	Tencteri’s	demands	in	these	two	areas.	To	the	complaint	of	sub	custode	et	pretio	coiremus,	 they	respond	that	vectigal	et	onera	
commerciorum	 resolvimus:	 sint	 transitus	 incustoditi	 sed	 diurni	 et	 inermes.	 The	Tencteri’s	 demand	 to	 cede	 all	 goods	 into	 a	 common	 supply	 is	 simply	 ignored.	Finally,	the	Tencteri’s	confident	prediction	of	dealing	with	the	world	on	a	more	equal	 footing	 in	 the	 future,	 or	 even	 ruling	 over	 it,	 is	 matched	 by	 the	Agrippinenses’	imposition	of	various	safeguards,	clearly	indicating	their	distrust	of	their	‘cousins’.	They	call	for	a	long	transitional	period	before	arriving	at	truly	unrestricted	interaction	(donec	nova	et	recentia	iura	vetustate	in	consuetudinem	
vertuntur)	and	for	an	external	arbiter	to	monitor	both	parties’	adherence	to	the	agreements	made.	There	is,	therefore,	only	a	very	limited	engagement	with	both	the	Tencteri’s	economic	argument	(the	Agrippinenses	may	remit	the	Tencteri’s	taxes	but	there	is	no	mention	of	them	opting	out	of,	or	condemning,	taxation	and	trade	altogether)	 and	 their	 arguments	 and	proposals	 concerning	 freedom	and	power.	 The	 Agrippinenses	 keep	 their	 walls,	 keep	 the	 requirement	 to	 visit	unarmed,	 and	 even	 add	 extra	 measures	 (the	 transition	 period,	 daytime	crossings	only,	 the	 external	 arbiter).	 They	 really	 only	 offer	 the	 cancellation	of	the	degrading	inspection	by	the	(Roman?)	custos	upon	entry	to	the	city.	Having	assessed	 their	 present	 situation	 and	 weighed	 up	 the	 alternative	 future	 put	forward	by	the	Tencteri,	 it	 is	clear	that	the	Agrippinenses	are	seeking	the	best	way	 to	 preserve	 their	 Roman-friendly	 status	 quo	 whilst	 avoiding	 immediate	retaliation	 from	 the	 Tencteri.	 Tacitus	 reports	 that	 the	 Tencteri	 received	 this	speech	 favourably.108 	Identity	 is	 important	 in	 these	 speeches,	 but	 a	 close	reading	 suggests	 that	 identifications	 for	 both	 groups	 are	 closely	 linked	 to	economic	and	political	positions.	The	Tencteri	have	no	part	in	the	new	imperial																																																									108sic	lenitis	Tencteris	(Hist.	4.65.17)	looks	puzzling	in	view	of	my	argument,	but	makes	more	sense	in	view	of	the	Ubii’s	presence	in	Civilis’	army	at	Hist.	4.77.1-2	(Media	acies	
Vbiis	Lingonibusque	data;	dextro	cornu	cohortes	Batavorum,	sinistro	Bructeri	
Tencterique),	backing	up	their	verbally	expressed	rapprochement	with	actions.	Given	their	later	massacre	of	two	groups	of	rebel	Germans	(commoners	at	Hist.	4.79-3-4	and	soldiers	at	Hist.	4.79.10-11),	their	appearance	here,	like	their	speech,	is	best	explained	by	needing	to	keep	the	Tencteri	on	side	until	an	opportunity	to	rebel	from	the	rebels	presented	itself.	
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structures	which	 transformed	 the	 Ubii	 into	 Agrippinenses:	 they	 are	 therefore	convincingly	 able	 to	 assert	 a	 transhistorical	 essentialist	 German	 identity.	 But	the	Agrippinenses	 in	the	text	cannot	and	will	not	adopt	this:	 they	are	not	who	they	were	before	the	advent	of	Rome.		The	speeches’	reductionist	position,	in	which	identity	is	linked	closely	to	being	inside	 or	 outside	 the	 nexus	 of	 Roman	 imperial	 space,	 is	 adopted	 in	 the	narrative’s	framing	of	the	speeches	as	well.	In	the	brief	chapter	contextualising	the	 Tencteri’s	 embassy,	 Tacitus	 mentions	 that	 the	 rebel	 leaders	 were	considering	sacking	Cologne	saevitia	ingenii	et	cupidine	praedae,	‘because	of	the	savage	nature	of	their	character	and	through	their	greed	for	loot’	(Hist.	4.63.3).	The	 statement	 is	 partly	 identity-focused,	 offering	 a	 different	 transhistorical	essentialisation	 of	 German	 identity	 than	 the	 Tencteri	 did,	 but	 relies	 at	 least	partly	 on	 Cologne’s	wealth,	which	 clearly	 differentiated	 it	 from	 its	 surrounds,	for	its	force.	In	the	same	chapter,	Tacitus	goes	on	to	state	the	economic	grounds	for	targeting	Cologne	in	even	less	ambiguous	terms:			
Transrhenanis	 gentibus	 invisa	 civitas	 opulentia	 auctuque;	 neque	 alium	
finem	belli	rebantur	quam	si	promisca	ea	sedes	omnibus	Germanis	foret	aut	
disiecta	Vbios	quoque	dispersisset.	
Hist.	4.63.8-11		‘The	 settlement	 was	 hateful	 to	 the	 transrhenane	 tribes	 because	 of	 its	wealth	and	growth,	and	 they	 thought	 there	could	be	no	other	end	 to	 the	war	than	it	being	open	to	all	the	Germans	or,	destroyed,	displacing	the	Ubii	too.’			This	introductory	chapter	therefore	twice	primes	the	reader	to	look	beyond	the	face	value	of	the	Tencteri’s	ideological-sounding	rhetoric	before	they	have	even	spoken.	The	introduction	to	the	Ubii’s	response	similarly	stresses	the	utilitarian	preoccupations	 of	 those	 who	 are	 about	 to	 speak,	 with	 no	 reference	 to	considerations	of	identity	whatsoever:			
Agrippinenses	sumpto	consultandi	spatio,	quando	neque	subire	condiciones	
metus	 futuri	 neque	 palam	 aspernari	 condicio	 praesens	 sinebat,	 in	 hunc	
modum	respondent…	
Hist.	4.65.1-3	
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‘The	Agrippinenses,	 after	 taking	 some	 time	 to	 consider,	 since	 fear	 of	 the	future	did	not	allow	them	to	submit	to	these	conditions	nor	their	present	circumstances	 allow	 them	 to	 reject	 them	 plainly,	 responded	 in	 the	following	way…’		The	speeches	prevent	us	from	adopting	wholesale	the	reductionist	position	that	economics	and	power	are	all	 that	matter,	however.	The	Agrippinenses’	speech	mentions	Cologne	as	 the	patria	of	 its	new	mixed	population,	a	Roman	concept	with	serious	ideological	significance.	The	Tencteri’s	speech	also	reveals	that	the	position	 of	 these	 supposedly	 stereotypically	 greedy	 and	 savage	 Germans	 is	more	 sophisticated	 than	 this	 authorial	 framing	 suggests.	 Chapter	 one	 already	discussed	their	astute	–	if	nonetheless	flawed109	–	observation	of	the	connection	between	 spatial	 arrangements	 and	 the	 ideologies	 they	 can	 foster	 and	 uphold.	Even	more	importantly,	Tacitus’	ventriloquising	of	their	denunciation	of	change	reads	 like	 a	 highly	 emotive	 and	moving	 piece	 of	 rhetoric	 instead	 of	 a	 cynical	charade.	Tacitus’	treatment	is	at	least	partly	sympathetic,	and	their	plea	stands	alongside	 other	 moving	 critiques	 of	 Roman	 imperial	 power	 in	 the	 Tacitean	corpus:	Calgacus’	famous	speech	in	the	Agricola,	Civilis’	first	speech	at	Hist.	4.14,	and	 the	 mutineers’	 complaints	 in	 Annals	 1.110 	Not	 coincidentally,	 all	 these	episodes,	 contextually	so	very	different,	also	depict	 these	groups’	dissatisfying	economic	and	political	relationships	to	Rome.	Their	shared	position	of	exclusion	and	 oppression	 undercuts	 identity	 differences	 on	 grounds	 of	 ethnicity.	 The	equalising	influence	of	different	ethnic	groups’	collective	subjection	to	imperial	power	will	 recur	 throughout	 this	 thesis.	Tacitus’	preliminary	contextualisation	of	the	Germans	who	speak	so	movingly	as	stereotypical	greedy	Germans	(such	as	 he	 grants	 to	 Cerialis	 in	 his	 speech	 later	 on	 in	Histories	4,	 as	 we	 will	 see),	instead	of	 exposing	 their	home-hitting	 criticisms	about	 economic	 exclusion	 as	false,	 is	 a	 framing	device	which	 allows	 such	 criticisms	of	Empire	 to	be	 voiced	without	ever	seriously	threatening	the	stability,	or	questioning	the	morality,	of	
																																																								109Because	they	appear	to	think	that	a	simple	reversion	of	spatial	change	would	also	turn	the	Agrippinenses	back	into	Ubii.	110See	chapter	three.	Liebeschuetz	(1966,	137)	connects	the	speeches	of	Calgacus	and	Civilis	as	similar	in	content	and	expression,	but	from	the	point	of	view	of	their	judgment	on	the	vices	of	civilisation	rather	than	collective	and	similar	oppression	by	Rome.	
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the	 structure	 itself.111	Economics	 and	 power	 matter,	 but	 identity	 does	 too.	Identity	matters,	but	so	do	economics	and	power.	
Petillius	Cerialis	to	the	Treveri	The	 next	 occasion	 on	 which	 we	 encounter	 the	 tactic	 of	 dissociation	 through	identity	politics	 is	 immediately	after	 the	Roman	general	Petillius	Cerialis’	 first	entry	into	the	narrative	and	shortly	after	the	Agrippinenses’	elaborate	hedging	to	 the	 Tencteri.	 Cerialis	 speaks	 to	 the	 Treveri	 and	 Lingones,	 who	 are	 at	 that	point	still	nominally	part	of	Civilis’	alliance	but	have	been	recently	defeated	by	auxiliaries	of	the	Roman	Sextilius	Felix	(Hist.	4.70):		
neque	ego	umquam	facundiam	exercui,	et	populi	Romani	virtutem	armis	
adfirmavi:	sed	quoniam	apud	vos	verba	plurimum	valent	bonaque	ac	mala	
non	sua	natura,	sed	vocibus	seditiosorum	aestimantur,	statui	pauca	
disserere	quae	profligato	bello	utilius	sit	vobis	audisse	quam	nobis	dixisse.	
terram	vestram	ceterorumque	Gallorum	ingressi	sunt	duces	imperatoresque	
Romani	nulla	cupidine,	sed	maioribus	vestris	invocantibus,	quos	discordiae	
usque	ad	exitium	fatigabant,	et	acciti	auxilio	Germani	sociis	pariter	atque	
hostibus	servitutem	imposuerant.	quot	proeliis	adversus	Cimbros	
Teutonosque,	quantis	exercituum	nostrorum	laboribus	quove	eventu	
Germanica	bella	tractaverimus,	satis	clarum.	nec	ideo	Rhenum	insedimus	ut	
Italiam	tueremur,	sed	ne	quis	alius	Ariovistus	regno	Galliarum	potiretur.	an	
vos	cariores	Civili	Batavisque	et	Transrhenanis	gentibus	creditis	quam	
maioribus	eorum	patres	avique	vestri	fuerunt?	eadem	semper	causa	
Germanis	transcendendi	in	Gallias,	libido	atque	avaritia	et	mutandae	sedis	
amor,	ut	relictis	paludibus	et	solitudinibus	suis	fecundissimum	hoc	solum	
vosque	ipsos	possiderent:	ceterum	libertas	et	speciosa	nomina	praetexuntur;	
nec	quisquam	alienum	servitium	et	dominationem	sibi	concupivit	ut	non	
eadem	ista	vocabula	usurparet.	Regna	bellaque	per	Gallias	semper	fuere	
donec	in	nostrum	ius	concederetis.	nos,	quamquam	totiens	lacessiti,	iure	
victoriae	id	solum	vobis	addidimus,	quo	pacem	tueremur;	nam	neque	quies	
gentium	sine	armis	neque	arma	sine	stipendiis	neque	stipendia	sine	tributis	
haberi	queunt:	cetera	in	communi	sita	sunt.	ipsi	plerumque	legionibus	
nostris	praesidetis,	ipsi	has	aliasque	provincias	regitis;	nihil	separatum	
clausumve.	
Hist.4.73.2-74.8	‘I	have	never	commanded	eloquence,	and	have	always	strengthened	the	valour	of	the	Roman	people	with	my	weapons;	but	since	with	you	words	seem	to	weigh	heavily	and	good	or	bad	events	are	not	judged	by	their																																																									111In	this	sense	is	no	different	to	Tacitus’	undermining	of	the	truth-speaking	Percennius	in	Annals	1	as	common	(gregarius	miles);	see	chapter	three,	p.	90-91.	I	disagree	with	Liebeschuetz	(ibid.)	that	the	framing	devices	‘detract	from	the	effect	of	the	speech’	for	either	Percennius	(as	he	claims)	or	by	analogy	for	the	Tencteri.	
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intrinsic	worth	but	according	to	the	comments	of	those	out	to	cause	trouble,	I	have	decided	to	say	a	few	words	which,	with	the	war	almost	finished,	will	be	more	useful	for	you	to	have	heard	than	for	me	to	have	said.	Roman	generals	and	emperors	came	into	your	lands	and	those	of	the	other	Gauls	not	through	greed,	but	with	your	ancestors	begging	us	to,	whom	civil	discord	had	exhausted	almost	to	destruction;	with	Germans	summoned	as	auxiliaries	they	had	imposed	slavery	on	their	allies	as	well	as	their	enemies.	How	often	we	have	engaged	in	fights	against	the	Cimbri	and	Teutones,	with	how	much	effort	by	our	legions	and	with	what	outcome	we	have	waged	German	wars,	is	clear	enough.	Nor	did	we	occupy	the	Rhine	so	that	we	might	protect	Italy,	but	so	that	no	other	Ariovistus	could	wrangle	the	kingship	of	the	Gallic	territories.	Do	you	think	you	are	dearer	to	Civilis	and	the	Batavi	and	the	tribes	from	across	the	Rhine	than	your	fathers	and	grandfathers	were	to	their	ancestors?	The	Germans	have	always	had	the	same	reason	for	crossing	over	into	Gaul:	lust	and	greed	and	the	desire	for	a	change	of	scene,	so	that	with	their	desolate	swamps	left	behind	they	could	take	possession	not	just	of	this	extremely	fertile	soil	but	also	of	you	yourselves.	Of	course	freedom	and	other	empty	words	are	being	dangled	in	front	of	you;	no	one	has	ever	desired	the	slavery	of	others	and	tyranny	for	themselves	who	has	not	used	these	very	words.	There	were	always	despots	and	wars	throughout	the	Gauls	until	you	submitted	to	our	laws.	We,	although	so	often	taunted,	have	imposed	only	this	on	you,	by	the	right	of	our	victory,	and	so	that	we	can	protect	the	peace.	For	peace	among	peoples	cannot	be	had	without	a	military	presence,	nor	this	military	presence	without	soldiers’	wages,	nor	soldiers’	wages	without	tribute:	all	other	arrangements	are	universal.	You	yourselves	commonly	command	our	legions	and	govern	these	and	other	provinces.	Nothing	is	held	aloof	from	you	or	closed	off	from	you.’		The	ethnic	distinction	drawn	in	this	speech	by	Cerialis	is	a	simple	binary	one,	of	Gaul	 versus	 German.	 Germans	 live	 on	 the	 east	 bank	 (eadem	 semper	 causa	
Germanis	 transcendendi	 in	Gallias),	 include	 Civilis,	 his	 Batavi	 and	 a	 number	 of	other	tribes	(an	vos	cariores	Civili	Batavisque	et	Transrhenanis	gentibus	creditis),	live	in	swamps	which	they	are	always	keen	to	leave	behind	for	the	fertile	fields	of	Gaul,	and	want	to	enslave	the	Gauls	(ut	relictis	paludibus	et	solitudinibus	suis	
fecundissimum	hoc	solum	vosque	 ipsos	possiderent).112	Gauls,	 in	 the	 speech,	 are	the	reverse	of	all	of	these	things:	they	live	on	the	west	bank,	include	the	Treveri	and	 Lingones	 (terram	 vestram	 ceterorumque	 Gallorum),	 possess	 fertile	 fields	and	 operate	 in	 a	 general	 context	 of	 Roman	 order	 and	 structures	 (such	 as	 the																																																									112The	swamps	of	Germany	appear	in	the	mutinies	of	AD14	as	similarly	undesirable,	in	the	soldiers’	complaints	that	Rome	passes	off	these	lands	to	them	upon	discharge	in	the	guise	of	a	benefit	when	they	are	quite	the	contrary;	they	also	feature	in	Annals	13’s	story	of	the	Frisii’s	migration	into	fertile	Roman	land.		
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taxes	which	 fund	 their	 safety	 from	 such	 incursions,	 nam	neque	quies	 gentium	
sine	armis	neque	arma	sine	stipendiis	neque	stipendia	sine	tributis	haberi	queunt)	and	 the	 provision	 of	 Roman	 social	 goods	 (pax,	 the	 aforementioned	 quies	
gentium,	and	the	opportunity	to	command	legions	and	provinces).113			Though	couched	 in	 terms	of	an	ethnic	binary,	 the	distinction	between	the	two	categories	 is	 thus	 in	 fact	 based	 on	 economic	 and	 political	 considerations.	Cerialis	 is	 not	 saying	 that	 the	 Treveri	 should	 abandon	 their	 alliance	with	 the	Batavi	because	they	are	Gauls	and	the	Batavi	Germans,	but	because	the	Batavi	may	 look	 like	allies	but	are	 really	out	 to	 steal	 the	Treveri’s	 lands	and	become	their	 political	 overlords.	 The	 engagement	 between	 the	 general’s	 speech	 here	and	that	of	the	Tencteri	to	the	Agrippinenses	reinforces	still	further	the	strength	of	 these	 economic	 factors	 in	 determining	 political	 decision-making.114	Ethnic	difference	 is	 represented	 but	 it	 appears	 as	 almost	 a	 shorthand	 for	environmental	separation	and	consequent	political	and	economic	division:	 the	ethnic	 division	 becomes	 a	 representation	 of	 poor	 (Germans)	 and	 rich	 (Gauls)	and	the	incentive	for	the	Gauls	becomes	holding	onto	that	wealth.	In	his	power-related	claim	about	the	specious	dangling	of	libertas	by	those	who	actually	wish	to	rule115,	 the	Tencteri’s	prediction	to	the	Ubii	that	aliis	imperabitis	is	recalled;	in	his	assertion	that	nihil	separatum	clausumve,	Cerialis	appears	to	be	rebutting	the	 Tencteri’s	 repeated	 professions	 that	 clauserant	 Romani…	 and	 arcerent	
Romani…	from	a	variety	of	things,	people	and	environments	in	order	to	exclude	them	economically	and	from	exerting	power	of	their	own.116																																																									113When	Cerialis	classifies	the	Treveri	and	Lingones	as	Gauls	(‘your	lands	and	those	of	the	other	Gauls’),	he	follows	Caesar’s	original	labeling	of	them	as	well	as	the	latter’s	implicit	separation	of	them	from	‘the	Germans’:	at	BG	1.37.3.1,	the	Treveri’s	first	occurrence	in	the	work,	they	complain	about	the	German	Suebi	settling	on	the	opposite	bank	of	the	Rhine	to	them.	Cerialis’	generalisation	about	the	fixity	of	Gauls	and	the	tendency	of	Germans	to	move	is	therefore	supported	by	past	evidence	from	Caesar.	Cf.	chapter	six	for	the	theme	of	fixity	and	migration	in	the	Germania.	114Rutherford	(2010,	315)	mentions	this	convention	of	paired	speeches	not	overheard	by	the	other	party	nonetheless	engaging	with	each	other	for	pre-battle	contiones:	it	seems	reasonable	to	extend	the	principle	to	other	kinds	of	speeches.	115See	Haynes	(2003,	163-71)	for	a	discussion	of	this	part	of	the	speech	which,	though	interesting,	is	not	central	to	this	thesis’	argument.	116With	further	references	to	opening	and	closing	in	the	Tencteri’s	proposed	parallels	that	etiam	fera	animalia,	si	clausa	teneas,	virtutis	obliviscuntur	and	quo	modo	lucem	
diemque	omnibus	hominibus,	ita	omnis	terras	fortibus	viris	natura	aperuit.	
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	The	specifics	of	Cerialis’	portrayal	of	the	Batavi	as	Germans	and	the	Treveri	as	Gauls	also	undermine	the	potency	of	the	ethnic	division	which	Cerialis	appears	to	be	 instating,	 this	 time	on	 its	own	(ethnic)	 terms.	Tacitus	noted	 the	Batavi’s	German	descent	 in	 their	 formal	 introduction	 to	 the	narrative	at	Hist.	4.12.6-9,	thus	matching	Cerialis’	 classification	here.	But	 their	 inhabiting	of	 the	 island	 in	the	middle	of	the	Rhine,	between	its	Gallic	and	Germanic	banks,	makes	them	at	least	 liminal	(as	noted	by	Rutherford).117	Their	simultaneous	cultivation	of	 the	island	 and	 extrema	 Gallicae	 ora	 vacua	 cultoribus	 arguably	 even	 pushes	 them	towards	 a	Gallic	 classification	on	a	Tacitean	map;	 and	at	 one	point	when	 first	trying	 to	 persuade	 the	 Treveri	 to	 join	 the	 revolt	 Civilis	 does	 indeed	 identify	himself	and	his	 tribe	as	Gallic	 (en	ego	praefectus	unius	cohortis	et	Canninefates	
Batavique,	exigua	Galliarum	portio,	Hist.	4.32.3).	Tacitus	tells	us	in	the	Germania	that	 the	Treveri,	addressed	here	as	Gauls	by	Cerialis,	 in	 fact	also	claimed	such	German	 descent.	 They	 are	 explicitly	 said	 to	 be	 concerned	with	 distinguishing	themselves	from	what	they	perceived	as	effeminate	Gauls.118	The	separation	of	Batavi	 as	 German	 and	 Treveri	 as	 Gallic	 is	 thus	 spurious:	 both	were	 Germans	who	had	crossed	into	Gaul	at	some	point.	Joining	together	Transrhenani	gentes	with	Civilis	and	his	Batavi	in	the	speech	therefore	makes	sense,	but	the	Treveri’s	exclusion	from	this	framework	does	not.		The	gap	between	reality	and	representation	is	explained	by	the	narrative’s	need	to	 persuasively	 malign	 Civilis,	 by	 a	 process	 which	 others	 him	 and	 then	associates	 his	 particular	 kind	 of	 otherness	 with	 economic	 threat,	 so	 that	 the	Treveri	will	dissociate	 themselves	 from	 the	 revolt.	His	German	representation	by	 Cerialis	 enables	 the	 general	 to	 equate	 Civilis	 with	 Ariovistus:	 in	 the	essentialising	 identity	 framework	 set	 out	 earlier,	 underpinned	 by	 economics,	both	were	Germans	who	crossed	the	Rhine	in	order	to	take	possession	of	Gallic	
																																																								117Rutherford	(2010),	320.	118‘The	Treveri	and	Nervii	work	extremely	hard	to	push	their	supposed	German	origins	convincingly,	as	if	through	this	renowned	bloodlink	they	can	be	kept	separate	from	their	similarity	to	the	feckless	Gauls’	(Treveri	et	Nervii	circa	adfectationem	Germanicae	
originis	ultro	ambitiosi	sunt,	tamquam	per	hanc	gloriam	sanguinis	a	similitudine	et	
inertia	Gallorum	separentur,	Ger.	28).	
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soil. 119 	The	 mention	 of	 Ariovistus	 and	 continued	 crossings	 through	 the	generations	since	 (evoked	 through	maioribus,	patres	avique)	 supports	Cerialis’	subsequent	 essentialisation	 of	 the	 German	 character	 (semper	 eadem	 causa	
Germanis	transcendendi…).120	The	continuity	 implied	 is	 then	stretched	 into	 the	future	 in	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 speech,	 in	 which	 the	 need	 for	 continued	protection	from	such	invading	Germans	(and	Britons)121	is	signalled	again:			
…nisi	forte	Tutore	et	Classico	regnantibus	moderatius	imperium	speratis,	aut	
minoribus	quam	nunc	tributis	parabuntur	exercitus	quibus	Germani	
Britannique	arceantur.	
Hist.4.74.13-15	‘…	unless	perhaps	you	hope	for	a	more	moderate	rule	when	Tutor	and	Classicus	are	in	power,	or	that	the	legions	by	which	the	Germans	and	the	Britons	are	kept	out	can	be	kept	ever	ready	with	less	tribute	than	is	the	case	now.’		With	this	nod	to	the	future,	located	in	the	timeless	generalisation	of	the	German	character	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 single	 example,	 long	 ago	 but	 powerful,	 the	 rest	 of	Cerialis’	 speech	 returns	 to	 economics	 and	 power,	 albeit	 from	 a	 new	 angle.	 It	sketches	 out	 the	 alternatives	 to	 Roman	 rule,	 reiterating	 their	 awfulness	compared	to	the	present	day:			
nam	 pulsis,	 quod	 di	 prohibeant,	 Romanis	 quid	 aliud	 quam	 bella	 omnium	
inter	 se	 gentium	 existent?	 octingentorum	 annorum	 fortuna	 disciplinaque	
compages	 haec	 coaluit,	 quae	 convelli	 sine	 exitio	 convellentium	non	 potest:	
sed	 vobis	 maximum	 discrimen,	 penes	 quos	 aurum	 et	 opes,	 praecipuae	
bellorum	 causae.	 proinde	 pacem	 et	 urbem,	 quam	 victi	 victoresque	 eodem	
iure	obtinemus,	amate	colite:	moneant	vos	utriusque	fortunae	documenta	ne	
contumaciam	cum	pernicie	quam	obsequium	cum	securitate	malitis.	
	
Hist.	4.74.16-24																																																										119Rankin	(1987,	146)	noted	Tacitus’	echo	of	Caesar’s	description	of	Ariovistus	when	describing	Civilis	as	ultra	quam	barbaris	solitum	ingenio	sollers	(Hist.	4.13.6-7).	The	Caesarian	reference	is	non	se	tam	barbarum	neque	tam	imperitum	rerum,	BG	1.44.9.2.	120A	more	modest	variation	on	the	Germania’s	much	more	elaborate	thesis	of	German	movement	–	see	chapter	six.	121The	alignment	of	the	far	more	distant	and	geographically	separated	Britons	with	the	Germans	here	serves	to	reinforce	the	spurious	otherness	of	the	much	more	nearby	Germans	across	the	very	porous	Rhine	boundary.	
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‘because	if	the	Romans	are	driven	out,	gods	forbid,	what	will	be	left	other	than	 all	 nations	 at	 war	 with	 one	 another?	 Eight	 hundred	 years	 of	 good	fortune	and	discipline	have	nourished	this	edifice	of	empire,	which	cannot	be	torn	apart	without	the	undoing	of	those	tearing	it	apart:	but	you	are	in	the	 greatest	 danger,	 who	 have	 gold	 and	 resources,	 which	 are	 the	 chief	causes	 of	 war.	 Hence	 you	must	 love	 and	 cultivate	 peace	 and	 the	 city	 of	Rome,	which	conquerors	and	conquered	occupy	by	the	same	 law;	 let	 the	outcomes	 of	 either	 scenario	 counsel	 you	 so	 that	 you	 do	 not	 prefer	arrogance	with	disaster	over	obedience	with	security.’		In	this	closing	address,	the	speech	lets	go	completely	of	identity	politics	within	the	anti-Roman	camp	as	a	means	of	breaking	up	 the	alliance.	 Instead,	Cerialis	allows	 for	 two	 groups	 of	 people	 only,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 starkest	 possible	utilitarian	 criterion:	 self-preservation.	 If	 the	 Treveri	 wish	 to	 continue	 to	 live	peacefully,	 they	 must	 choose	 to	 realign	 themselves	 with	 Rome	 (though	 the	further	 egalitarian	 declaration	 that	 [urbem]	 quam	victi	 victoresque	 eodem	 iure	
obtinemus	is	immediately	belied	by	the	word	obsequium).	The	alternative	is	the	destruction	 of	 the	wealthy	 tribe	 (penes	quos	aurum	et	opes)	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 a	self-imploding	Germany	perpetually	at	war	without	Rome’s	policing.	His	case	is	hyperbolically	put,	but	 in	being	so	reinforces	the	extent	to	which	he	considers	such	 considerations	 should	 influence	 his	 audience’s	 political	 positioning.	 And	they	do:	Tacitus	rounds	off	 the	speech	with	an	authorial	 tali	oratione	graviora	
metuentis	composuit	erexitque,	 ‘with	such	a	speech	did	he	calm	and	encourage	those	 fearing	 worse’.	 The	 graviora	 expected	 from	 the	 Romans	 remain	unspecified,	but	the	Tacitean	account	of	Rome’s	imperialism	in	Germany	makes	clear	enough	that	the	most	likely	forms	such	repercussions	took	were	economic	(fines,	 taxation,	 removal	 of	 benefits)	 or	 violent	 (rape,	 genocide,	 destruction	of	settlements).	 The	 Treveri	 weighed	 up	 their	 options,	 as	 Cerialis	 suggested	(moneant	vos…),	decided	which	was	graviora	and	refrained	from	further	action	in	the	rest	of	the	narrative.122	
																																																								122Tutor	references	their	state	of	occupation	(Tenebantur	victore	exercitu	Treviri,	Hist.	4.75.1)	a	little	later	on,	when	he	speculates	that	‘they	will	take	up	their	arms	again,	as	soon	as	their	fear	dissipates’	(resumpturos	arma,	ubi	metus	abscesserit,	Hist.	4.76.22-23).	He	is	wrong,	which	suggests	their	fear,	whether	of	not	being	able	to	win	or	of	repercussions	if	they	do	win,	does	not	dissipate.	
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Dissension	among	the	Gallo-Germanic	leadership	After	the	Treveri’s	defeat	and	their	capitulation	to	Cerialis’	occupying	forces,	Tacitus	describes	deliberations	among	the	Gallo-German	leadership	as	follows:		
Apud	Germanos	diversis	sententiis	certabatur.	Civilis	opperiendas	
Transrhenanorum	gentis,	quarum	terrore	fractae	populi	Romani	vires	
obtererentur:	Gallos	quid	aliud	quam	praedam	victoribus?	et	tamen,	quod	
roboris	sit,	Belgas	secum	palam	aut	voto	stare.	Tutor	cunctatione	crescere	
rem	Romanam	adfirmabat,	coeuntibus	undique	exercitibus:	transvectam	e	
Britannia	legionem,	accitas	ex	Hispania,	adventare	ex	Italia;	nec	subitum	
militem,	sed	veterem	expertumque	belli.	nam	Germanos,	qui	ab	ipsis	
sperentur,	non	iuberi,	non	regi,	sed	cuncta	ex	libidine	agere…	
Hist.	4.76.1-10	‘On	the	German	side,	different	opinions	were	being	contested.	Civilis	thought	they	ought	to	wait	for	the	tribes	from	across	the	Rhine,	by	fear	for	whom	the	already	broken	strength	of	the	Roman	people	would	be	utterly	crushed:	what	were	the	Gauls	other	than	spoils	for	the	victor?	But	that	nonetheless	the	Belgae	stood	with	him	openly	or	had	pledged	themselves.	Tutor	was	insistent	that	the	Roman	cause	would	be	strengthened	by	delay,	with	legions	being	united	from	all	directions:	that	a	legion	had	been	ferried	across	from	Britain,	multiples	summoned	from	Spain,	and	that	some	were	coming	from	Italy;	that	these	were	not	raw	recruits,	but	veterans	and	experienced	in	war.	And	that	the	Germans,	of	whom	they	had	such	hopes,	could	not	be	commanded	or	ruled,	but	that	they	did	just	as	they	pleased…’		The	passage	is	introduced	by	an	authorial	comment	advertising	discord	among	the	Germans,	and	the	speeches	bear	it	out.	The	two	Gallo-German	commanders	feel	differently	about	the	course	to	be	pursued,	and	their	reported	debate,	 like	the	other	speeches,	appears	to	frame	their	preferences	in	terms	of	the	identities	of	 the	 people	 involved	 in	 each	 option.	 However,	 as	 before,	 economic	 and	political	concerns	are	shown	to	underpin	both	their	valuation	of	ethnic	groups	and	their	own	positioning	of	themselves	on	the	spectrum	of	identities	offered.		The	Batavus	Civilis	 positions	himself	 as	 cisrhenane	German,	 including	himself	neither	 among	 the	 Gallos	 (despite	 his	 profession	 at	 Hist.	 4.32.3)	 nor	 the	Transrhenani	 (with	 whom	 Cerialis	 had	 classified	 him	 in	 his	 speech	 to	 the	Treveri).	 The	 Trevir	 Tutor,	 in	 contrast,	 denigrates	 Germani	 and	 mentions	 no	subdivision	 between	 cis-	 and	 transrhenane,	 thereby	 appearing	 to	 reject	 a	German	 identity	 for	 himself	 altogether.	 But	 in	 the	 schema	 adopted	 in	 these	
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consultations	 by	 the	 rebel	 leaders,	 the	 only	 option	 left	 for	 someone	 who	distances	himself	from	the	Germans,	short	of	being	Roman,	is	to	be	Gallic.	This	is	exactly	the	classification	which	Cerialis	adopted	for	Tutor’s	tribe,	the	Treveri,	in	his	speech	to	them	(see	Hist.	4.73-4).	Calling	them	Gallic	put	them	on	the	side	of	good	Roman	subjects	with	fertile	fields	which	are	always	under	threat	from	the	greedy	 and	 migrating	 Germans.	 Although	 the	 reported	 debate	 and	 Cerialis’	speech	are	not	set	up	in	a	conventionally	agonistic	manner,	it	is	clear	that	they	rely	on	the	same	identity	framework.	Moreover,	Cerialis’	dire	predictions	about	Germans	 and	 libertas	 are	 shown	 to	 be	 at	 risk	 of	 coming	 true.	 For	 Civilis,	positioning	himself	as	(cisrhenane)	German	in	this	speech,	the	Gauls	are	praeda,	literally	‘loot’,	of	which	the	human	equivalent	is	enslavement.	They	are	there	to	be	disposed	of	by	the	victorious	alliance	(including	both	kinds	of	Germans),	and	the	Transrhenani	will	 therefore	 indeed	 cross	 the	Rhine	 to	 rule	over	 the	Gauls	and	 take	 their	 things.	 Tutor,	 positioning	 himself	 as	 Gallic,	 is	 concerned	 about	precisely	 this:	 that	 ‘the	 Germans’	 will	 escape	 the	 control	 of	 the	 rebel	 leaders	and,	presumably,	act	out	this	essentialist	German	nature	by	crossing	and	ruling	over	the	rebels	themselves.			Civilis	and	Tutor’s	replication	of	the	identity	framework	put	forward	by	Petillius	Cerialis	a	few	chapters	earlier	(already	exposed	in	the	preceding	section	of	this	chapter	as	spuriously	unhistorical)	suggests	the	following	conclusions	about	the	Tacitean	 representation	 of	 identity	 in	 the	 Rhineland	 at	 this	 time.	 Firstly,	 that	within	the	narrative,	there	is	already	a	deep	split	between	the	two	leaders	of	the	rebellion,	with	one	buying	into	Cerialis’	value	judgments	of	Germans	as	a	threat	and	 the	 other	 articulating	 the	 German	 stereotype	 as	 his	 planned	 course	 of	action.	 Secondly,	 the	 replication	 shows	 that	 Tutor	 as	 a	 Trevir	 is	 much	 more	deeply	 steeped	 in	 Romanity	 than	 he	 realises.	 His	 replication	 of	 the	 general’s	Roman	framework	of	division	even	whilst	plotting	violence	against	Rome	is,	on	a	 more	 general	 level,	 deeply	 suggestive	 of	 how	 difficult	 it	 was	 for	 even	resistance	against	Rome	to	escape	the	ideologies	on	which	their	subjection	was	built.	 Thirdly,	 it	 shows	 that	 rebel	 leaders	 were	 both	 happy	 and	 able	 to	reposition	 themselves	 according	 to	 their	 immediate	 agendas.	 I	 mentioned	earlier	Civilis’	self-identification	as	Gallic	at	Hist.	4.32.	Even	more	aptly,	this	was	
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to	a	Treveran	auxiliary	cohort	with	their	native	commander	Alpinius	Montanus.	To	Montanus’	plea	to	abandon	his	resistance,	Civilis	responded			
vos	 autem	 Treviri	 ceteraeque	 servientium	 animae,	 quod	 praemium	 effusi	
totiens	 sanguinis	 expectatis	 nisi	 ingratam	 militiam,	 immortalia	 tributa,	
virgas,	 securis	 et	 dominorum	 ingenia?	 en	 ego	 praefectus	 unius	 cohortis	 et	
Canninefates	Batavique,	exigua	Galliarum	portio,	vana	illa	castrorum	spatia	
excidimus	 vel	 saepta	 ferro	 fameque	 premimus.	 denique	 ausos	 aut	 libertas	
sequetur	aut	victi	idem	erimus.	
Hist.	4.32.13-20		‘you,	Treveri,	and	others	living	in	slavery,	what	reward	do	you	expect	for	having	 so	 often	 shed	 your	 blood,	 unless	 it	 is	 an	 unprofitable	 term	 of	service,	tribute	without	end,	the	rods	and	axes	of	Roman	authority,	and	the	tempers	of	 those	who	rule	you?	But	 I,	 the	prefect	of	a	 single	cohort,	 and	the	Canninefates	and	Batavi,	a	tiny	portion	of	Gaul,	have	either	cut	down	their	 massive	 useless	 camps	 or	 are	 pressing	 them	 hard,	 hedged	 in	 by	sword	and	starvation.	Therefore	either	libertas	will	follow	on	the	heels	of	those	who	dare	to	act	or,	conquered,	we	will	be	as	we	are	now.’		Civilis’	positioning	in	this	speech	as	Gallic	is	determined	by	his	need	to	get	them,	as	Gauls,	on	side.	With	the	Treveri’s	withdrawal	from	the	alliance	after	Cerialis’	speech,	 however,	 expediency	 now	 dictates	 that	 he	 distance	 himself	 from	 the	Gauls	and	reposition	himself	as	German	in	order	to	keep	his	German	allies	close.	This	 is	what	 Tacitus	 shows	 him	 doing	 in	 the	 debate	 at	Hist.	4.76.	 Tutor,	who	does	not	wish	to	enlist	the	Germans	in	the	alliance’s	forthcoming	offensive,	has	no	need	to	switch	positions.		The	ability	of	both	Civilis	and	Tutor	to	reposition	themselves	effectively	within	the	spectrum	of	 identities	at	play	within	 the	Rhineland	of	 the	 first	century	AD	shows	the	malleability	of	these	categories	in	the	new	world	changed	by	Rome’s	advent,	which	introduced	both	force	and	economic	benefits	on	a	larger	scale	as	factors	 influencing	 the	 choice	 of	 which	 identity	 one	 to	 adopt.	 Essentialist	positions	 are	 frequently	 invoked,	 often	 successfully,	 when	 political	 agendas	make	 it	expedient	 to	do	so.	But	 the	narrative	makes	clear	 that	 they	cannot	be	maintained,	 by	 reapplying	 different	 essentialist	 labels	 to	 the	 same	 people	 at	different	 times.	Amidst	all	 this	 repositioning,	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 the	 reader	 to	pin	 down	 whether	 Civilis	 or	 Tutor	 are	 best	 considered	 Germans	 (as	 Tacitus	
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introduces	 the	 debate:	Hist.	4.76.1	 apud	Germanos…),	 or	 rather	 Gauls	 as	 they	both	 at	 times	 assert.	 It	 is	 equally	 impossible	 to	 find	 a	 reliable	 guide	 in	 the	narrative	 to	 the	 characteristics	 on	 which	 these	 categories	 are	 based.	 With	frequent	past	and	present	Rhine	crossings	and	assertions	of	Germanity	on	both	sides	of	the	Rhine,	location	is	no	guide	either.	The	supposedly	ethnic	groups	all	have	malleable	 political	 and	 economic	 foundations,	 and	 in	 recognition	 of	 this	the	 protagonists	 of	 the	 Batavian	 revolt	 can	 reposition	 themselves,	 and	 their	Roman	opponents	can	reposition	them,	as	belonging	to	different	ethnic	groups	when	 political	 or	 economic	 expediency	 impels	 them	 to.	 The	 narrative	 shows	that	this	malleability	often	works	in	the	rebels’	favour	(Civilis	does	achieve	the	Treveri’s	enlistment	by	his	profession	of	Gallic	identity)	but	that	it	can	work	in	Rome’s	 favour	 too.	 In	 this	 section,	 Tutor’s	 decision	 to	 take	 the	 field	 without	waiting	for	 ‘the	Germans’	 leads	to	the	alliance’s	first	serious	military	defeat.	In	the	next	two	sections,	I	will	show	how	one	further	exploitation	by	Cerialis	of	this	malleability	persuades	the	remaining	rebels	to	cease	hostilities	entirely.	
Petillius	Cerialis	to	the	remaining	rebels	The	 next	 group	 to	 be	 detached	 from	 Civilis	 are	 the	 Transrhenani	 themselves,	after	receiving	communications	from	Cerialis:			
nam	Cerialis	per	occultos	nuntios	Batavis	pacem,	Civili	veniam	ostentans,	
Veledam	propinquosque	monebat	fortunam	belli,	tot	cladibus	adversam,	
opportuno	erga	populum	Romanum	merito	mutare:	caesos	Treviros,	
receptos	Vbios,	ereptam	Batavis	patriam;	neque	aliud	Civilis	amicitia	
partum	quam	vulnera	fugas	luctus.	exulem	eum	et	extorrem	recipientibus	
oneri,	et	satis	peccavisse	quod	totiens	Rhenum	transcenderint.	si	quid	ultra	
moliantur,	inde	iniuriam	et	culpam,	hinc	ultionem	et	deos	fore.	
Hist.	5.24.4-12		‘For	Cerialis	by	secret	messengers	held	out	peace	to	the	Batavi	and	a	pardon	to	Civilis,	and	kept	warning	Veleda	and	her	supporters	that	the	outcome	of	the	war,	which	was	looking	unfavourable	because	of	so	many	defeats,	could	be	changed	by	opportune	kind	service	done	to	the	Roman	people:	that	the	Treviri	had	been	murdered,	the	Ubii	welcomed	back	into	the	Roman	fold,	control	of	their	fatherland	snatched	from	the	Batavi,	and	that	nothing	had	been	gained	by	the	friendship	of	Civilis	but	wounds	and	flights	and	mourning.	That	he	was	a	homeless	exile	to	the	burden	of	those	hosting	him,	and	that	they	had	committed	enough	mistakes	by	so	often	crossing	the	Rhine.	If	anything	further	was	being	plotted,	from	their	side	
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they	would	incur	injuries	and	blame	and	on	the	Roman	side	vengeance	and	the	gods	would	block	them.’			This	passage	isolates	both	Civilis	and	the	Transrhenani,	and	again	the	grounds	are	 economic	 and	 power-based.	 Tacitus	 summarises	 Cerialis’	 tactic	 in	 these	communications	 as	 miscebantur	 minis	 promissa,	 ‘promises	 were	 mixed	 with	threats’	(Hist.	5.25.1).	Despite	the	plurals	used,	only	variations	on	a	single	theme	are	 offered	 on	 either	 side.	Batavis	 pacem,	 Civili	 veniam	and	Veledam	monebat	
fortunam	 belli	 adversam	mutare	all	 amount	 to	 the	 avoidance	 of	 further	 harm	being	 inflicted	 by	 Rome,	 in	 different	 wordings.	 Iniuriam,	 culpam,	 ultionem	 et	
deos,	conversely,	all	convey	unspecified	threats	of	further	harm	to	be	added	to	the	 slightly	 more	 specific	 injuries	 of	 vulnera	 fugas	 luctus	 of	 which	 the	Transrhenani	 already	 had	 experience.	 He	 also	 alludes	 to	 the	 unfortunate	examples	of	the	murdered	Treveri	and	displaced	Batavi:	at	the	point	when	these	threats	and	promises	are	held	out	to	the	latter,	Cerialis	has	just	destroyed	their	fields	and	houses	on	the	island	(Cerialis	insulam	Batavorum	hostiliter	populates	
agros	villasque,	Hist.	5.23.14-5).123		This	 second	 speech	 by	 Cerialis	 differs	 from	 the	 others	 discussed	 in	 that	 the	language	 which	 masks	 these	 economic	 considerations	 is	 more	 spatial	 than	ethnic.124	Cerialis’	 description	 of	 Civilis	 as	 exulem	 eum	 et	 extorrem	 is	 of	 great	symbolic	 importance	 in	 isolating	 the	 rebel	 leader.	 Given	 that	 his	 speech	 to	Veleda’s	Germans	upholds	a	straightforward	duality	between	two	parties	only,	Rome	and	the	Germans,	calling	Civilis	a	homeless	exile	raises	the	question	of	to	what	spot	Cerialis	has	in	fact	relegated	him.	If	he	is	neither	German	nor	Roman,																																																									123	A	tactic	paralleled	in	Duvius	Avitus’	dealings	with	the	Tencteri	who	had	been	invited	to	join	arms	with	the	expelled	Ampsivarii:	ipse	legiones	in	agrum	Tencterum	induxit,	
excidium	minitans,	ni	causam	suam	dissociarent.	igitur	absistentibus	his	pari	metu	
exterriti	Bructeri;	et	ceteris	quoque	aliena	pericula	deserentibus	sola	Ampsivariorum	gens	
retro	ad	Vsipos	et	Tubantes	concessit,	‘he	himself	led	his	legions	into	the	Tencteri’s	fields,	threatening	them	with	annihilation	unless	they	dissociated	themselves.	Consequently,	with	them	abstaining,	the	Bructeri	were	terrified	by	a	similar	fear;	and	with	others	also	removing	themselves	from	dangers	not	their	own,	only	the	tribe	of	the	Ampsivarii	fell	back	to	the	territory	of	the	Usipi	and	Tubantes.’	Ann.	13.56.	124	Perhaps	in	recognition	of	the	Transrhenani’s	naming	by	virtue	of	their	location,	or	because	the	object	in	view	is	not	separation	between	groups	but	isolation	of	one	man	from	the	remaining	groups	–	Transrhenani	and	Batavi	–	which	are	less	easily	dissociated	on	grounds	of	ethnicity.	
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and	 those	 are	 the	only	 categories	 in	 the	 speech,	 there	 is	 literally	no	 space	 for	him:	 extorris,	 though	 frequently	 translated	 as	 exiled	 from	 one’s	 home	community,	 is	 a	 contracted	 adjective	 based	 on	 ex	 terra	 and	 so	 evokes	 the	possibility	of	a	much	more	radical	expulsion.	Civilis	is	placed	outside	the	circle	of	 Cerialis’	 (cisrhenane)	 ordered	 Roman	 world	 as	 well	 as	 outside	(transrhenane)	Germania	as	the	rightful	place	of	Veleda’s	people.	Within	such	a	spatial	 context,	 the	 designation	 Transrhenani	 itself	 becomes	 prescription	 as	much	as	description:	separated	by	the	Rhine,	Cerialis	implies	they	have	nothing	to	do	with	 the	cisrhenani,	and	 they	should	withdraw	from	being	 implicated	 in	their	misfortune.	If	crossing	the	Rhine	was	a	crime	(satis	peccavisse	quod	totiens	
Rhenum	transcenderint),	re-crossing	it	would	become	a	signal	example	of	virtue.	However,	given	that	Cerialis’	earlier	discourse	set	up	 the	Germans	as	 typically	crossing	the	Rhine	into	Gaul,	even	such	withdrawal	from	the	Roman	sphere	of	influence	by	crossing	in	the	opposite	direction	paradoxically	indicates	not	their	separation	 from	 the	 Roman	 order	 but,	 to	 the	 contrary,	 the	 extent	 of	 Rome’s	influence	 on	 them.	 The	 Transrhenani’s	 withdrawing	 to	 escape	 Roman	 power	becomes	a	demonstration	of	Roman	power.	
The	Batavi’s	final	judgment	The	final	break	in	the	chain	of	support	appears	when	the	Batavian	nation	itself	chooses	to	dissociate	 itself	 from	Civilis	and	his	rebellion.	As	was	the	case	with	Tutor’s	 speech	 to	 the	 leadership	 and	 Cerialis’	 to	 the	 Treveri,	 the	 Batavi’s	reported	 thoughts	 on	 the	 situation	 after	 the	 Transrhenani’s	 withdrawal	 from	the	alliance	seem	to	engage	in	a	dialogue	with	another	speech	–	that	of	Cerialis	to	 Veleda	 and	 the	 Transrhenani	 –	 despite	 not	 having	 been	 present	 to	 hear	 it.	Tacitus	reports	their	thoughts	as	follows:		
Miscebantur	minis	promissa	[a	Ceriale];	et	concussa	Transrhenanorum	fide	
inter	Batavos	quoque	sermones	orti:	non	prorogandam	ultra	ruinam,	nec	
posse	ab	una	natione	totius	orbis	servitium	depelli.	quid	profectum	caede	et	
incendiis	legionum	nisi	ut	plures	validioresque	accirentur?	si	Vespasiano	
bellum	navaverint,	Vespasianum	rerum	potiri:	sin	populum	Romanum	armis	
vocent,	quotam	partem	generis	humani	Batavos	esse?	respicerent	Raetos	
Noricosque	et	ceterorum	onera	sociorum:	sibi	non	tributa,	sed	virtutem	et	
viros	indici.	proximum	id	libertati;	et	si	dominorum	electio	sit,	honestius	
principes	Romanorum	quam	Germanorum	feminas	tolerari.	haec	vulgus,	
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proceres	atrociora:	Civilis	rabie	semet	in	arma	trusos;	illum	domesticis	malis	
excidium	gentis	opposuisse.	tunc	infensos	Batavis	deos,	cum	obsiderentur	
legiones,	interficerentur	legati,	bellum	uni	necessarium,	ferale	ipsis	
sumeretur.	ventum	ad	extrema,	ni	resipiscere	incipiant	et	noxii	capitis	poena	
paenitentiam	fateantur.	
Hist.	5.25	
	‘Promises	were	mixed	with	threats;	and	once	the	loyalty	of	the	Transrhenani	had	been	shaken	talk	started	amongst	the	Batavi	as	well:	that	they	should	not	drag	out	their	destruction,	and	that	it	was	not	possible	for	the	enslavement	of	the	whole	world	to	be	undone	by	a	single	tribe.	What	had	been	achieved	by	the	massacre	of	legions	and	burning	of	their	camps,	unless	that	more	and	stronger	ones	had	been	summoned?	[they	further	said]	That	if	they	had	waged	war	for	Vespasian,	he	was	now	in	control;	but	that	if	they	were	challenging	the	entire	Roman	people	to	war,	how	small	a	part	of	the	human	race	did	the	Batavi	represent!	Let	them	ponder	the	predicament	of	the	Raeti	and	the	Norici	and	the	burdens	of	other	allies:	on	themselves	no	tribute	but	only	army	service	and	men	were	imposed,	and	this	was	the	closest	thing	to	true	freedom.	And	if	there	had	to	be	a	choice	of	overlords,	that	the	foremost	Romans	in	rank	were	more	honourably	to	be	tolerated	than	German	women.	These	things	the	common	people	were	saying;	the	nobles	said	worse:	that	Civilis	in	his	madness	had	dragged	them	along	into	battle;	that	he	put	the	destruction	of	his	tribe	up	against	his	personal	grievances.	That	then	the	gods	became	hostile	to	the	Batavi,	since	legions	were	being	destroyed,	officers	murdered,	and	a	war	taken	up	which	was	of	significance	to	one	man	only,	but	full	of	grief	for	themselves.	That	they	had	reached	breaking	point,	unless	they	began	to	come	to	their	senses	and	publicly	avowed	their	regret	by	executing	the	guilty	party.’		The	 final	 separation	 achieved	 by	 Cerialis	 is	 intratribal,	 not	 intertribal.	 The	Batavi	 collectively	 reject	Civilis,	but	within	 this	unanimous	 rejection	 there	are	two	further	opinions:	one	among	the	vulgus,	one	among	the	proceres.	The	first	emphasises	yet	again	a	very	practical	reading	of	the	situation’s	power	dynamics:	the	 goal	 of	 ending	 Roman	 control	 was	 not	 achievable,	 and	 the	 costs	 of	attempting	it	were	proving	to	be	extreme.	If	they	failed	rather	than	surrendered,	repercussions	would	 follow	which	would	worsen	 even	 their	 current	 position:	more	 troops,	 and	 a	 relegation	 to	 the	 ranks	 of	 those	who	 pay	 tribute,	 like	 the	Raeti	and	Norici,	instead	of	being	exempt.			The	Batavi’s	resistance	to	Rome	is	by	no	means	an	exact	parallel	 for	uprisings	against	modern	colonialist	powers,	but	certain	of	its	dynamics	recur	in	Fanon’s	
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analysis	 of	 such	 modern	 uprisings.	 Specifically,	 in	 reverting	 to	 their	 Roman	allegiance	 because	 of	 the	 suffering	 they	 have	 undergone	 they	 succumb	 to	 a	weakness	which	Fanon	specifically	condemned	as	detrimental	(unless	guarded	against	by	the	political	education	of	the	masses)	to	the	rank	and	file’s	ability	to	sustain	 an	 uprising	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 anger	 at	 injustice	 –	 which	 he	 calls	‘spontaneity’	 –	 into	 a	 war	 with	 the	 potential	 for	 overthrowing	 the	 coloniser	permanently:	 ‘The	 hard	 lesson	 of	 facts,	 the	 bodies	 mown	 down	 by	 machine	guns:	these	call	forth	a	complete	reinterpretation	of	events.’125	For	the	Batavi	in	Tacitus’	 text,	 unlike	 in	 Fanon’s	 Angolan	 example,	 this	 repeated	 harsh	confrontation	 with	 the	 cost	 of	 their	 struggle	 does	 not	 make	 them	 re(de)fine	their	 methods	 into	 more	 effective	 resistance	 such	 as	 guerilla	 warfare,	 but	prompts	them	to	abandon	their	resistance	altogether.	At	the	same	time,	Cerialis	in	his	prompts	to	the	Batavi	and	Transrhenani	very	much	conforms	to	the	part	played	by	the	coloniser	at	this	dicey	point	in	Fanon’s	pattern	of	uprising:			 ‘The	enemy	is	aware	of	ideological	weaknesses,	for	he	analyzes	the	forces	of	 rebellion	 and	 studies	 more	 and	 more	 carefully	 the	 aggregate	 enemy	which	 makes	 up	 a	 colonial	 people;	 he	 is	 also	 aware	 of	 the	 spiritual	instability	 of	 certain	 layers	 of	 the	 population.	 The	 enemy	 discovers	 the	existence,	 side	 by	 side	 with	 the	 disciplined	 and	 well-organized	 advance	guard	of	 rebellion,	of	a	mass	of	men	whose	participation	 is	constantly	at	the	 mercy	 of	 their	 being	 for	 too	 long	 accustomed	 to	 physiological	wretchedness,	humiliation,	and	irresponsibility.’126		In	exactly	the	manner	outlined,	Cerialis	in	his	final	reported	communications	to	the	Transrhenani	and	Batavi	capitalised	on	the	latent	fragmentation	of	purpose	and	 experience	within	 the	 nominally	 united	 alliance.	His	 speeches	 exploit	 the	weakness	of	 the	 ideology	of	pan-Germanity	by	 reminding	 the	Transrhenani	of	their	 lack	 of	 business	 in	 Roman	 territory	 but	 the	 Batavi,	 conversely,	 of	 their	inescapable	 implication	 in	 Roman	 space.	 Simultaneously	 he	 capitalises	 on	 his	hearers’	 ‘wretchedness	 and	 humiliation’	 in	 the	 timing	 and	 content	 of	 his	communications	with	 the	Batavi,	which	 the	 text	 shows	were	 initiated	after	he	had	destroyed	the	rank	and	file’s	houses	and	fields,	but	not	those	of	their	leader	(Cerialis	 insulam	Batavorum	 hostiliter	 populatus	 agros	 villasque	 Civilis	 intactas																																																									125Fanon	(2001),	18;	originally	published	in	French	in	1961.	126Fanon	(2001),	19.	
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nota	 arte	 ducum	 sinebat,	 Hist.	 5.23). 127 	Cerialis’	 invitation,	 at	 this	 critical	moment,	to	review	their	pre-revolt	situation	next	to	their	present	suffering	and	any	 future	 alternatives,	 goes	 a	 long	 way	 towards	 rehabilitating	 their	appreciation	of	 the	status	quo.	Furthermore,	although	Tacitus	does	not	 report	Cerialis	as	 touching	upon	 the	matter	of	Veleda’s	 rule	explicitly	 in	any	of	 these	communications,	 further	 ideological	 splintering	 speaks	 from	 the	 Batavi’s	reflection	 that	 being	 ruled	 by	 a	 woman	 in	 the	 post-victory	 world	 was	comparatively	worse	than	their	current	subjection	to	the	Roman	emperor.	The	nobles	 make	 similar	 calculations	 about	 the	 undesirability	 of	 their	 present	situation	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 worse	 to	 come,	 not	 only	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 the	Romans	but	also	at	the	hands	of	the	gods.	Collectively,	the	thought	processes	are	utilitarian	 in	different	ways	but	united	 in	 coming	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	being	outside	imperial	control	was	worse	than	being	inside.	Their	definitive	return	to	Roman	allegiance	is	reflected	in	the	very	Roman	sentiments	with	which	Tacitus	ends	the	reported	thoughts	of	both	Batavian	groups.	The	vulgus	are	concerned	with	 the	 threat	 to	 social	 hierarchy	 posed	 by	 the	 female	 Veleda’s	 rule.128	The	
proceres	 are	 concerned	with	 the	 threat	 to	divine	order	 (both	 the	divine	order	itself	 and	 the	 Roman	 order	 approved	 by	 this	 divine	 order).	 Specifically,	 they	frame	Civilis’	actions	as	a	conflict	between	the	Roman	collectivity	that	preserves	order	and	the	individual	which	challenges	that	collectivity	and	its	order,	which	recalls	both	Catiline	and	Sertorius.129		These	reported	thoughts	 therefore	contain	a	multitude	of	arguments	 to	 justify	returning	to	Rome,	not	all	of	which	can	be	true	simultaneously	(the	post-victory																																																									127This	increase	of	the	pressure	of	suffering	on	the	Batavi	as	a	means	to	achieving	renewed	compliance	is	one	way	in	which	the	Batavian	revolt	differs	from	Fanon’s	scheme,	in	which	modern	colonial	powers,	when	rebellion	starts	to	peter	out,	improve	their	colonial	subjects’	situation.	Another	difference	is	the	Batavian	revolt’s	resolution,	which	is	a	very	far	cry	from	Fanon’s	optimistic	and	extremely	un-Roman	prediction	that	‘[the	war]	will	be	ended	not	because	there	are	no	more	enemies	left	to	kill,	but	quite	simply,	because	the	enemy,	for	various	reasons,	will	come	to	realize	that	his	interest	lies	in	ending	the	struggle	and	in	recognizing	the	sovereignty	of	the	colonized	people’,	Fanon	(2001),	22.	128Suddenly	we	are	back	in	the	sphere	of	the	Germania’s	Roman	assessment	of	Germany’s	tolerance	of	women	in	power:	Suionibus	Sitonum	gentes	continuantur.	Cetera	
similes	uno	differunt,	quod	femina	dominatur;	in	tantum	non	modo	a	libertate	sed	etiam	a	
servitute	degenerant,	Ger.	45.6.	129Tacitus	notes	Civilis’	self-identification	with	Sertorius	very	early	on	at	Hist.	4.13.7.	
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world	 is	 presented	 as	 desirable	 but	 unachievable	 and	 simultaneously	
undesirable,	 in	 its	 rule	 by	 Veleda).130	In	 fact,	 this	 multiplicity	 of	 ‘solutions’	corresponds	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 unanimity	 and	 clarity	 on	what	 the	 rebellion	 actually	stood	for	which,	in	Tacitus’	text,	had	been	present	from	the	start.	The	vulgus	and	
proceres’	final	 reflections	at	Hist.	5.25	 repeat	 the	options	outlined	by	Civilis	 in	his	initial	speech	to	the	Batavi	at	Hist.	4.14.23-4:		
ne	Romanis	quidem	ingratum	id	bellum,	cuius	ambiguam	fortunam	
Vespasiano	imputaturos:	victoriae	rationem	non	reddi.		 ‘[he	said	further	that]	this	war	would	not	be	unwelcome	to	the	Romans,	of	which	an	ambiguous	outcome	could	be	credited	to	Vespasian	and	that	no	account	would	have	to	be	given	for	a	total	victory.’		Tacitus	 explicitly	 attests	 the	 presence	 of	 both	 these	 categories	 in	 this	audience.131	Their	final	reflections	show	that	they	have	not	forgotten	the	speech.		Only	now,	they	have	decided	to	end	all	ambivalence	and	ambiguity	concerning	Civilis’	motivations	and	consequently	the	status	of	the	revolt.	The	final	speech	of	the	rebellion	is	therefore	in	direct	engagement	with	the	first.132																																																											130The	volte-face	is	striking,	since	Tacitus	had	reported	the	defection	of	Veleda’s	Germans	from	the	Batavian	alliance,	not	their	inclusion	in	it,	as	a	major	contributing	factor	to	the	Batavi’s	decision	to	give	up	on	Civilis:	concussa	Transrhenanorum	fide	inter	
Batavos	quoque	sermones	orti,	Hist.	5.25.1-2.	131Civilis	primores	gentis	et	promptissimos	vulgi	specie	epularum	sacrum	in	nemus	
vocatos…,	Hist.	4.14.9.	132See	Rutherford	(2010,	320),	who	notes	the	engagement	between	these	first	and	last	speeches	in	terms	of	their	focus	on	libertas/servitus,	but	not	for	the	issue	of	ambiguous	self-presentation	which	helps	to	make	the	Batavian	revolt	an	elaborate	instance	of	ring-composition.	The	order	in	which	Civilis	gains	support	is	also	the	order	in	which	his	various	supporters	fall	away:	the	rebellion	grows	from	Civilis’	personal	initiative	as	a	Romanised	individual	via	the	support	of	his	own	tribe	to	include	other	Gallo-German	tribes	more	widely,	and	diminishes	first	with	the	falling	away	of	this	Gallo-German	support,	then	the	detachment	of	his	own	Batavi,	leaving	him	once	more	on	his	own,	stripped	of	his	Germanic	identity	and	trying	to	reconnect	with	Rome.	The	order	in	which	Cerialis	lists	the	alliance’s	individual	failures	in	his	speech	to	Veleda	and	the	other	Transrhenane	Germans	also	maps	onto	this	sequence	of	fragmentation:	caesos	
Treviros,	receptos	Vbios,	ereptam	Batavis	patriam;	neque	aliud	Civilis	amicitia	partum	
quam	vulnera	fugas	luctus.	Exulem	eum	et	extorrem…	(Hist.	5.24.7-9).	Similarly,	the	Transrhenani	who	crossed	the	Rhine	are	firmly	redeposited	on	the	further	bank	and	the	Batavi	restored	to	their	status	as	subordinate	allies	to	Rome	(though	we	do	not	know	on	what	terms	in	reality,	the	narrative	reports	their	assumption	that	they	would	continue	as	they	were	before	the	revolt).	
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Deciding	that	 it	was	too	ambitious	all	along	to	aim	for	complete	independence	for	themselves	as	well	as	the	world133,	the	Batavian	vulgus	now	retrospectively	conclude	 that	 they	were	 fighting	 for	 Vespasian	 all	 along,	 dispensing	with	 any	further	 need	 to	 fight.	 Again,	 the	 parallel	with	 the	 later	 stages	 of	 spontaneous	uprisings	 in	Fanon’s	scheme	 is	 instructive.	He	warns	 that	 in	 these	 later	stages	‘[t]he	objectives	of	the	struggle	ought	not	to	be	chosen	without	discrimination,	as	they	were	in	the	first	days	of	the	struggle.	If	care	is	not	taken,	the	people	may	begin	 to	question	 the	prolongation	of	 the	war	 at	 any	moment	 that	 the	 enemy	grants	 some	 concession.’134	In	Histories	5,	 the	Batavi	 retrospectively	pin	down	their	muddled	mishmash	of	objectives	with	great	precision	in	order	to	facilitate	exactly	this	cessation	of	hostilities	and	the	resumption	of	their	colonially	subject	position.	This	choice	increases	their	distance	from	the	German	cause	and	moves	them	closer	to	an	identification	of	their	best	interests	with	Rome.	Their	politics	are	once	more	Roman	and	the	rebellion	becomes	a	feature	not	of	the	German-Roman	imperial	divide,	but	of	the	divisions	within	the	Roman	Empire	between	haves	 and	 have-nots	 (bellum	 civile	 after	 all,	 not	 bellum	 externum).	 Identity	remains	 part	 of	 the	 story,	 but	 the	 multiplicity	 and	 fluidity	 of	 identities	constituted	 with	 reference	 to	 one’s	 economic	 and	 political	 position	 in	 the	Roman	Empire	undermines	fixed	and	distinct	ethnic	categories	and	means	the	Batavi	 are	 able	 to	 reposition	 themselves	 as	Roman	 convincingly.	The	proceres	also	 see	 Roman	 power	 play	 at	 work	 in	 their	 interpretation	 of	 the	 conflict	 as	essentially	a	clash	between	Civilis	and	other	groups	within	the	Roman	political	class:	 Civilis	 rabie	 semet	 in	 arma	 trusos;	 illum	domesticis	malis	 excidium	gentis	
opposuisse,	 ‘[they	said]	that	Civilis	in	his	madness	had	dragged	them	along	into	battle;	 that	 he	 put	 the	 destruction	 of	 his	 tribe	 up	 against	 his	 personal	grievances.’	 They	 decide	 it	 is	 not	 an	 issue	 that	 pertains	 to	 the	 Batavian	collectivity	as	good	Roman	subjects,	but	only	to	this	Roman	individual	of	a	very	different	political	class.135																																																									133A	detail	not	explicitly	proposed	by	Civilis,	but	judging	by	this	comment	clearly	inferred	by	his	audience	at	the	time.	134Fanon	(2001),	22.	135It	is	interesting	that	their	reframing	of	the	conflict	as	Roman	and	Civilis	as	a	disgruntled	Roman	of	the	political	class	is	immediately	followed	by	Civilis’	accepting	Cerialis’	offer	to	parley	(Cerialis	Civili	veniam	ostentans,	Hist.	5.24.4-5).	He	then	commences	to	conduct	the	interview	on	terms	that	imply	one	Roman	general	speaking	
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Conclusion	To	summarise,	 then,	 the	Batavian	revolt	 fails	not	on	military	grounds	but	 fails	through	 its	 inability	 to	 sustain	 unity	 over	 fragmentation.	 More	 specifically,	sufficient	constituent	groups	belonging	to	the	Gallo-German	alliance	shift	 from	the	 angry	 and	 violent	 rejection	 of	 their	 present	 situation	 to	 being	 persuaded,	through	 rhetoric	 backed	 up	 with	 threats	 and	 smallish	 demonstrations	 of	military	power,	 that	obedience	 to	Rome	 is	more	 in	 their	 interest	 than	holding	out	for	a	German	utopia.		Three	 aspects	 of	 the	 Tacitean	 representation	 of	 the	 revolt	 are	 particularly	important	 in	understanding	 the	process	of	 the	revolt’s	breakdown.	First	of	all,	the	 recognition	 that	 the	 adoption	 or	 assignment	 of	 identities	 in	 the	 revolt	 is	determined	by	considerations	of	economics,	politics	and	power,	in	all	of	which	Rome	in	the	first	century	AD	Rhineland	had	the	power	to	give	as	well	as	to	take	away;	 to	make	 life	easier	and	to	make	 life	harder.	The	economic	dimension	to	choosing	one’s	identity	is	present	most	explicitly	in	Tacitus’	authorial	framing	of	the	 Tencteri’s	 exchange	 of	 speeches	 with	 the	 Ubii-turned-Agrippinenses,	 but	this	 and	 the	 other	 considerations	 run	 through	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 speeches	 in	
Histories	4	and	5	implicitly.	The	alliance’s	German	leadership	begins	to	implode	halfway	 through	 into	 Gallic	 and	 German	 as	 a	 result	 of	 disagreement	 on	 how	useful	 the	 transrhenane	 Germans	 could	 be	 in	 achieving	 both	 victory	 and	 the	post-victory	 world.	 The	 Transrhenani	 are	 dissuaded	 from	 serious	 and	prolonged	involvement	by	the	rhetoric	of	ethnic	separation	combined	with	the	threat	of	Roman	force.	The	Batavi,	finally,	abandon	Civilis	after	an	invitation	to	reposition	 themselves	 as	 Roman	 and	 keep	 their	 current	 position	 (privileged	compared	to	that	of	other	tribes)	is	extended	at	a	point	when	the	possibility	of	
																																																																																																																																																													to	another	when,	up	until	this	moment,	the	narrative	has	only	shown	traces	of	a	gradual	reversion	of	Civilis	from	Romanised	auxiliary	commander	to	German	native	as	the	rebellion	progresses,	in	both	appearance	and	habits.	To	Rutherford’s	list	of	elements	contributing	to	the	transformation	we	can	add	the	ritual	feasting	in	the	sacred	forest	(Hist.	4.14.	primores	gentis	et	promptissimos	vulgi	specie	epularum	sacrum	in	nemus	
vocatos)	reflecting	a	German	habit	Tacitus	mentioned	at	Ger.	22.3.	The	decision	to	grow	his	hair	so	as	to	cut	it	later	in	fulfillment	of	a	vow	is	also	mentioned	by	Tacitus	in	the	
Germania	as	a	German	rite	of	passage	into	adulthood	(Ger.	31.1)	and	thus	makes	sense	for	Civilis	as	one	‘reborn’	as	a	German.	
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complete	 destruction	 seems	 very	 real,	 having	 just	 had	 their	 homes	 and	 fields	destroyed	by	Cerialis’	army.		A	second	notable	feature	of	the	rhetoric	of	persuasion	used	by	and	to	different	groups	 across	Histories	4	and	5	 is	 the	 fluidity	 of	many	of	 its	 central	 concepts.	The	labels	of	Gallic	or	German	are	often	invoked	but	their	application	to	and	by	individuals	 or	 groups	 shifts	 constantly.	 This	 shifting	 shows	 how	meaningless	these	categories,	if	ever	they	did	hold	water	in	the	first	place136,	had	become	in	the	 porous	 and	 liminal	 frontier	 zone	 of	 the	 Rhineland,	 and	 in	 light	 of	 Rome’s	appearance	 in	 the	area	as	a	 coloniser	with	both	an	army	(push)	and	a	host	of	benefits	to	provide	(pull).	Ideological	attachments	to	specific	identities	were	not	rendered	meaningless	 by	 this	 player	 reshuffling	 the	 pieces	 on	 the	 board,	 but	they	 diminished	 in	 importance	 next	 to	 these	 new,	 additional	 influences	 on	shaping	 identity	politics.	The	Ubii-turned-Agrippinenses	are	 the	most	extreme	example	 of	 this	 dynamic	 in	 the	narrative,	 attesting	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 entirely	new	identity	as	a	result	of	a	political	choice	underpinned	by	economic	benefits.	At	 the	same	 time	as	 identities	and	 labels	 shifting	on	 the	grounds	of	utilitarian	considerations,	 the	 goalposts	 of	 the	 revolution	 are	 also	 shown	 by	 Tacitus	 to	have	 oscillated	 in	 the	 course	 of	 its	 conduct:	 its	 purpose	 is	 alternatively	presented	 as	 a	 Flavian	 victory	 and	 already	 achieved137 ,	 a	 German	 victory	possible	 to	 achieve	 but	 carrying	 the	 threat	 of	 even	 worse	 oppression	 (by	women)	 than	 that	 by	 Rome,	 or	 a	 German	 victory	 impossible	 to	 achieve,	 too	costly	 in	 the	 process	 of	 trying,	 and	 even	 more	 costly	 in	 the	 case	 of	 failure.	Similarly,	most	of	 the	 tribes	 involved	are	portrayed	as	 finding	 their	pre-revolt	situation	 unbearable	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 conflict,	 but	 deemed	 not	 so	 bad	after	their	losses	had	made	a	cessation	of	hostilities	the	most	prudent	course.			This	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 third	 and	 final	 point,	 which	 is	 that	 Tacitus’	 rhetorical	discourses	 either	perform	or	 induce	 a	 continual	 self-assessment,	 on	 economic																																																									136See	Krebs	(2006),	113	for	Caesar	as,	essentially,	the	creator	of	Germany	and	(2011),	205-7	for	Tacitus’	breaking	down	of	Caesar’s	distinction	in	favour	of	a	‘Borealist’	depiction	of	northerners	generally.		137Already	declared	by	the	Treveran	auxiliary	chief	Alpinius	Montanus	at	Hist.	4.32.6-7:	
si	Vespasianum	iuvare	adgressus	foret	[Civilis],	satis	factum	coeptis,	‘if	he	had	attacked	to	help	Vespasian,	enough	had	been	done	to	achieve	that’.		
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and	 political	 grounds,	 of	 groups’	 past,	 present	 and	 future	 positions.	 Petillius	Cerialis’	 two	speeches	are	most	clearly	constructed	with	this	purpose	 in	mind,	and	 are	 shown	 to	 be	 effective	 too:	 the	 Treveri	 do	 not	 resume	 hostilities,	 the	Transrhenani	withdraw	back	across	the	Rhine,	the	Batavi	argue	themselves	into	abandoning	 Civilis.	 Cerialis’	 rhetorical	 strategy,	 combining	 seemingly	dispassionate	economic	and	political	analysis	with	the	threat	of	repercussions,	is	 shown	 to	 be	much	more	 powerful	 in	 containing	 and	 defusing	 the	 Batavian	revolt	 than	 Roman	 military	 victories.	 This	 casts	 a	 different	 light	 on	 what	 I	characterised	in	the	previous	chapter	as	Rome’s	‘failure’	to	achieve	an	effective	physical	mastery	over	the	Rhineland’s	space	or	people:	there	are	clearly	other,	better	 means	 of	 achieving	 Roman	 control.	 These	 means	 would	 seem,	 on	 a	superficial	 reading,	 to	 be	 the	 division	 of	 the	 peoples	 into	 ethnic	 groups.	However,	 on	 my	 more	 detailed	 reading,	 access	 to	 the	 benefits	 of	 empire,	security	over	property,	and	wealth,	together	with	more	negative	pressures	(fear	of	 Roman	 military	 power)	 are	 the	 effective	 means	 of	 maintaining	 imperial	control.	 Cerialis	 understands	 this	 and	 tailors	 his	 rhetoric	 accordingly.	 His	manipulation	of	 rhetoric	and	political	values	 reveal	him	 to	be	a	more	 realistic	general	than	has	generally	been	admitted.138	In	this	way,	the	programme	of	the	reconquest	 of	 the	 Rhineland	 after	 the	 revolt	 becomes	 in	 Tacitus’	 retelling	 a	paradigm	of	successful	imperial	suppression.	
																																																								138E.g.	Benario	(1988),	238	and	Levene	(2008),	285	on	the	basis	of	such	incidents	as	
Hist.	4.77.2-12	and	5.22.	
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3	 The	Mutinies		
Introduction	Moving	 on	 to	 the	 Annals,	 I	 begin	 this	 chapter	 with	 a	 reading	 of	 the	 double	mutinies	narrative	 in	book	1	 (Ann.	1.16-30;	Ann.	1.31-49).	Though	only	one	of	the	two	is	set	in	the	Rhineland	(the	other	in	Pannonia),	it	has	been	convincingly	established	that	they	were	designed	as	twin	narratives;	we	should	not,	without	good	reason,	read	the	one	without	reference	to	the	other.139	Moreover,	Tacitus’	
Germania	 makes	 sufficient	 reference	 to	 Pannonia	 to	 indicate	 both	 its	geographical	nearness	and	 its	similarity;	 in	 the	Germania,	at	 least,	Pannonia	 is	an	eastward	extension	of	Germany.140			This	 chapter	will	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 episode	of	 the	mutinies	 replicates	 and	interprets	 some	 of	 the	 major	 themes	 of	 the	 Batavian	 rebellion.	 Both	 events	occurred	 at	 times	 when	 the	 deaths	 of	 the	 reigning	 Julio-Claudian	 emperors,	Augustus	in	AD14	and	Nero	in	AD68,	had	severed	a	highly	personalised	political	relationship	between	ruler	and	ruled,	one	which	had	kept	discontent	with	 the	regime’s	 treatment	of	 them	from	spilling	over	 into	violence	 in	both	cases.	The	immediate	aftermath	of	these	imperial	deaths	will	be	revealed	as	an	‘empty’	site	which	imperial	regime	and	imperial	subject	both	strive	to	occupy	as	quickly	as	possible,	 ideologically	 and	 practically.	 The	 most	 significant	 of	 these	 is	 the	mutineers’	 creation	 of	 a	 democratic	 tumultus	 in	 response	 to	 the	 imperial	redeployment	 of	 the	 Late	 Republican	 iustitium	after	 Augustus’	 death,	 but	 the	Batavians’	violent	rebellion	in	the	absence	of	a	formal	iustitium	must	be	seen	as	a	comparable	attempt	to	deal	with	the	‘gap’	left	by	imperial	death.			Batavians	and	Romans	not	only	act	but	also	at	times	talk	identically	in	Tacitus’	narrative,	 revealing	both	as	caring	deeply	about	 their	 relationship	with	Rome.																																																									139See	Bacha	(1906),	whose	evidence	establishing	twinning	was	added	to	substantially	by	Woodman	(2006).	140Ger.	1.1	and	43.1	assert	physical	and	linguistic	separation	of	the	German	lands	and	people	from	the	Pannonian;	Ger.	5.1	and	28.3,	on	the	other	hand,	assert	proximity	and	contact.	
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The	discourses	they	employ	all	illustrate	imperial	Rome’s	excessive	assertion	of	power	over	them	in	comparison	to	Republican	custom	and	law.	In	word	as	well	as	 deed	 in	 these	 narratives,	 the	 ghost	 of	 the	 Republic	 is	 never	 far	 away.	 The	similarities	 are	 lexical	 and	 in	 the	 discourse	 and	 can	 be	 arranged	 under	 the	thematic	headings	of	 causation,	 libertas	and	bodies,	and	 libertas	and	 language.	Their	 separation	 in	 time	 and	 space	 (in	 the	 sense	 of	 geography	 but	 also	ideological	space)	serves	to	reinforce	the	pervasive	nature	of	corruption	under	the	 one-man	 rule	 of	 first	 the	 Julio-Claudians	 and	 arguably	 the	 model	 of	 the	principate	 itself.	 It	 also	 serves	 as	 the	 most	 extensive	 demonstration	 in	 the	Tacitean	text	of	how	this	power	cut	 through	expected	 identity	differences	and	relegated	all	imperial	subjects	to	the	same	status.	
Causation	The	 first	 significant	 similarity	 is	 Tacitus’	 assertion	 that	 both	 mutinies	 and	Batavian	revolt	were	causally	linked	to	imperial	death	at	Rome.	In	Pannonia,	he	describes	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 mutiny	 as	 nullis	 novis	 causis	 nisi	 quod	 mutatus	
princeps	 licentiam	turbarum	et	ex	civili	bello	 spem	praemiorum	ostendebat,	 ‘for	no	 new	 reasons	 unless	 it	 was	 because	 the	 change	 in	 princeps	 provided	 an	opportunity	for	the	recklessness	of	crowds	and	hopes	of	spoils	from	a	civil	war	to	emerge’.	The	German	mutiny’s	causation	is	described	in	similar	terms:	isdem	
causis	 (Ann.	1.31).	 In	 the	Histories,	 Civilis	 is	 said	 to	 have	 been	 at	 least	 partly	inspired	to	revolt	by	opportunism	in	the	troubled	and	uncertain	circumstances	of	 AD69	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Nero’s	 death,	 first	 at	 Hist.	 4.13.10-2	 by	 Tacitus	(missis	sane	ad	eum	Primi	Antonii	litteris,	quibus	avertere	accita	Vitellio	auxilia	et	
tumultus	 Germanici	 specie	 retentare	 legiones	 iubebatur,	 ‘certainly	 Antonius	Primus	sent	letters	to	him,	in	which	he	was	ordered	to	turn	away	the	auxiliary	troops	summoned	by	Vitellius	and	to	hold	up	the	legions	under	the	pretence	of	a	Germanic	uprising’,	and	then	at	Hist.	4.14.23-4	by	himself	(ne	Romanis	quidem	ingratum	 id	 bellum,	 cuius	 ambiguam	 fortunam	 Vespasiano	 imputaturos:	victoriae	rationem	non	reddi,	‘[that]	this	war	would	not	be	unwelcome	even	to	the	Romans,	 of	which	 an	 ambiguous	 outcome	 could	 be	 credited	 to	Vespasian,	and	 for	 a	 total	 victory	 no	 account	 would	 have	 to	 be	 given	 at	 all.’).	 His	
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correspondence	 with	 the	 generals	 Primus	 and	 Flaccus	 makes	 him	 an	 active	player	in	the	game	of	thrones,	as	a	stable	successor	for	Nero	has	yet	to	emerge.			For	 the	 mutineering	 Roman	 legions,	 the	 ‘old	 causes’	 (nullis	 novis	 causis)	 for	mutiny	 were	 as	 present	 while	 Augustus	 was	 alive	 as	 after	 he	 had	 died;	 and	while	 he	 was	 alive	 there	 was	 no	 sign	 of	 mutiny	 in	 these	 legions	 but,	 to	 the	contrary,	much	evidence	pointing	to	the	maintenance	of	ferocious	discipline.141	The	 epsisode	 shows	 there	 is	 something	 crucial	 about	 the	 falling	 away	 of	 a	reigning	 monarch.142	The	 next	 section	 will	 explore	 how	 Tacitus	 presents	 the	role	 of	 Augustus’	 death	 in	 the	 mutinies	 on	 the	 double	 level	 of	 narrative	 and	historiography,	 steering	 his	 reader	 to	 an	 interpretation	 of	 this	 event	which	 is	diametrically	opposed	 to	 that	of	 the	mutinous	soldiers	 in	 the	narrative.	 It	will	show	that	the	Batavians	are	faced	with	a	similar	problem	after	the	death	of	Nero	and	 before	 Vespasian’s	 accession	 and	 will	 offer	 some	 thoughts	 on	 what	 the	parallels	achieve.	
The	King	is	dead,	long	live	the	King!	 	There	are	different	elements	to	an	understanding	of	the	death	of	a	king,	the	first	being	 that	 it	 is	 the	 person,	 not	 the	 office,	 which	 matters.	 This	 is	 the	 view	generally	 posited	 for	 ancient	 Rome	 by	 classical	 scholars.143	It	 is	 present	 in	Tacitus	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	Annals,	when	 he	 points	 to	 the	welcome	 peace																																																									141Ann.	1.17	hinc	saevitiam	centurionum;	at	hercule	verbera;	1.18	verberum	notas;	1.20	
antiquam	duramque	militiam	revocabat	[Aufidienus	Rufus	praefectus	castrorum];	1.23	the	centurion	whose	nickname	was	cedo	alteram	(‘fetch	me	another	stick!’);	1.26	
poenas	sine	arbitro	in	Pannonia	and	1.31	saevitiamque	centurionum;	1.35	verberum	
notas	and	si	qua	alia	ex	necessitate	aut	adversus	otium	castrorum	quaeruntur	on	the	Rhine.	142Tacitus	describes	the	Thracian	revolt	too	as	occurring	audita	mutatione	princeps	(Ann.	2.64):	the	regime	change	is	what	prompted	king	Rhescuporis’	encroachment	on	his	nephew	and	fellow	king	Cotys’	territory	(established	by	Augustus’	partitioning	of	the	kingdom).	143See	Ando	(2000,	30–34)	for	a	discussion	of	how	Augustus	developed	a	system	of	adoption	to	allow	his	individual	charisma	to	be	transferred	between	generations	so	they	could	all	be	seen	as	Augusti	and	this	personal	loyalty	could	become	dynastic.	But	compare	Phang	(2008,	24)	who	posited	that	the	legitimation	of	the	imperial	family	as	hereditary	rulers	required	a	rationalisation,	instead	of	transfer,	of	Augustus’	personal	charisma;	she	also	posits	that	the	crises	of	the	1st	century	AD	show	that	this	rationalisation	to	some	extent	failed	and	on	some	level	the	importance	of	charisma	persisted.	For	moralistic	analysis	of	actions	and	events,	including	rebellions,	in	Roman	historiography	as	the	result	of	individuals’	personalities,	not	failures	of	the	‘system’,	see	Woolf	(2011),	36ff.	
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Augustus	 brought	 to	 a	 state	 riven	 by	 internal	 strife:	 […Augustum]	 qui	 cuncta	
discordiis	civilibus	fessa	nomine	principis	sub	imperium	accepit,	 ‘[Augustus]	who	took	into	his	care,	under	the	name	of	princeps,	everything	that	had	been	drained	by	civil	discord’	 (Ann.	1.1).	The	comment	highlights	how	 the	Augustan	system	was	 solely	 constituted	 through	 the	 person	 of	 Augustus	 and	 his	 personal	achievements.	Patel	identified	the	workings	of	this	Augustan	system	in	Tacitus	as	‘constituted	and	preserved	through	systems	of	mutual	gain’:	in	return	for	his	power,	 he	 provided	 otium	 (rest	 from	 worldly	 or	 political	 concerns),	 annona	(grain)	 and	 dona	 (gifts,	 often	 money)	 in	 an	 exchange	 which	 Tacitus,	 quoted	above,	 says	 people	 welcomed	 and	 certainly	 tolerated.144	This	 view	 relies	 on	personal	 loyalty,	 and	 would	 see	 the	 mutinies	 as	 confirmation	 that	 Augustus	himself	 rather	 than	Augustus	qua	 emperor	was	 significant	 to	 the	mutineering	troops.	This	personal	relationship	mattered	since	it	prevented	the	soldiers	from	complaining	 at	 the	 miserable	 service	 conditions	 listed	 by	 Percennius	 at	 Ann.	1.17.	 The	 Pannonian	 commander	 Iunius	 Blaesus	 saw	 this	 as	 a	 factor	 for	 the	mutineers,	 as	he	 says	 that	neque	ipsos	a	divo	Augusto	tam	nova	petivisse,	 ‘they	had	 not	 made	 such	 radical	 demands	 of	 the	 divine	 Augustus’	 (Ann.	 1.19).145	Consequently,	 in	 this	 first	 view,	 a	 new	 person,	 not-Augustus,	 would	 not	command	the	loyalty	which	Augustus	did,	and	which	formed	an	obstacle	to	their	taking	 action.	 The	 death	 of	 the	 monarch	 then	 represents	 the	 end	 of	 a	personalised	political	relationship,	a	break	in	the	regime.	A	new	realignment	of	political	 relationships	 subsequently	 needs	 to	 occur;	 the	 state	 needs	 to	 work	towards	 a	 new	 way	 of	 being.	 In	 Patel’s	 terms,	 the	 issue	 is	 whether	 Tacitus’	Tiberius	 will	 manage	 to	 continue	 the	 Augustan	 system.	 My	 reading	 of	 the	mutinies	 suggests	 the	 soldiers	 are	 unsure	 of	 his	 ability	 or	 willingness	 to	 do	so,146	so	they	attempt	to	force	regime	change	by	replacing	him	with	Germanicus,	of	whom	 they	 have	 a	 clear	 perception	 as	 possessing	 Republican	 leanings	 and																																																									144Patel	(2013),	10–11.	145It	also	applies	to	Rhescuporis,	of	whom	Tacitus	says	that	he	‘[Augustum]	quem	
auctorem	utriusque	regni,	si	sperneretur,	vindicem	metuebat	[Rhescuporis],	Ann.	2.64.	146Tacitus	tells	us	there	were	those	quaenam	post	Augustum	militiae	condicio	
ambigentis	(Ann.	1.16)	in	the	Pannonian	camps.	He	also	suggests	that	if	anyone	in	the	imperial	family	fired	the	Roman	people’s	enthusiasm	it	had	been	Drusus,	not	Tiberius	(Ann.	1.33).	Lastly,	these	troops	had	served	under	Tiberius	already	(as	he	himself	reminds	them	in	the	letter	Drusus	reads	out,	Ann.	1.25)	and	they	knew	what	sort	of	general	he	was.	
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therefore	 offering	 the	 hope	 of	 a	 different	 way	 of	 doing	 things	 (libertatem	
redditurus,	‘he	would	restore	libertas	to	them’,	Ann.	1.33).147	When	this	fails	and	they	are	 forced	 to	work	within	 the	parameters	of	 the	existing	system,	 they	no	less	 vigorously	 attempt	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 Tiberian	 system	 is	 different	 to	 the	Augustan,	most	obviously	in	improved	service	conditions.	Both	attempts,	either	wholesale	 regime	 change	 or	 Tiberian	 rule	 on	 different	 terms	 to	 the	Augustan	system,	indicate	that	the	mutineers	see	the	death	of	Augustus	as	a	real	break	in	the	regime.		The	presence	in	the	narrative	of	the	alternative	view,	that	it	did	not	constitute	such	a	break,	can	be	defended	on	two	levels,	narrative	and	historiographical.	On	the	narrative	level,	Tacitus	dates	the	Pannonian	mutiny	to	fine	Augusti	et	initiis	
Tiberii	 auditis,	 ‘when	 Augustus’	 demise	 and	 the	 start	 of	 Tiberius’	 reign	 were	heard	 of	 [simultaneously]’,	 suggesting	 neither	 the	 fact	 of	 succession	 itself	 nor	the	 identity	 of	 the	 successor	 were	 in	 doubt.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 however,	 the	soldiers’	actions	subsequently	belie	this	view	that	Tiberius’	succession	was	seen	as	certain.	The	second	level	holds	more	promise,	and	is	provided	by	Tacitus’	use	of	two	framing	devices	in	the	narrative	to	defend	the	continuity	of	the	regime:	his	 undermining	 of	 Percennius’	 act	 of	 speaking	 when	 he	 attacks	 it,	 and	 his	pervasive	 use	 of	 the	 metaphor	 of	 madness	 throughout	 the	 accounts	 of	 the	mutinies	 (and	 the	 Batavian	 rebellion).	 Both	 of	 these	 historiographical	techniques	frame	the	mutinies	in	moral	terms	and	are	intended	to	separate	the	reader’s	interpretation	of	them	from	that	suggested	by	the	bare	facts	as	they	are	narrated.		Erich	Auerbach	and	Jacques	Rancière	both	picked	up	on	the	significance	of	the	portrayal	 of	 Percennius	 in	 framing	 our	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Rhine	 mutinies’	relationship	 to	 the	 death	 of	 Augustus.	 Rancière	 commented	 that	 ‘[Thus	 t]he	narration	seems	to	be	ordered	according	to	a	radical	disjunction.	The	revolt	 is	explained	twice:	in	its	absence	of	reason	and	in	the	reasons	that	it	gives	itself.’148																																																									147On	libertas	as	meaning	the	republic,	see	Gallia	(2012),	23–28	and	chapter	one	of	Gowing	(2005),	specifically	p.	18.	148Rancière	(1994),	26.	
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His	 ‘absence	 of	 reason’	 derives	 from	 Auerbach’s	 observation	 that	 Tacitus	invalidates	 Percennius’	 speech	 in	 advance.	 Tacitus	 does	 this	 by	 stating	 at	 the	outset	his	own	view	of	the	real	causes	of	the	mutiny	in	purely	ethical	terms149;	that	 is,	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 base	 nature	 of	 the	 common	 mob	 which	 is	 by	definition	always	 in	 the	wrong	 regardless	of	what	 they	have	 to	 say.	Auerbach	proposed	 plausibly	 that	 Tacitus’	 invalidation	 of	 Percennius’	 act	 of	 speaking	makes	clear	that	preserving	the	order	of	society	was	of	paramount	importance,	and	there	are	no	excuses	for	 jeopardising	this.	When	the	common	mob	usurps	the	right	of	 the	elite	 to	public,	even	political,	discourse,	social	order	 is	already	threatened.150	Although	neither	reason	(in	the	sense	of	‘sanity’)	nor	reasons	(as	‘explanations’)	are	 in	 fact	absent	 from	the	soldiers’	discourse,	reason	becomes	‘absent’	 through	 Tacitus’	 condemnation	 of	 their	 act	 of	 speaking,	 hinting	 that	what	they	go	on	to	say	should	be	disregarded.			The	second	framing	device	supporting	the	view	of	Tiberius’	accession	as	regime	continuity	 instead	of	a	break	 is	 the	pervasive	metaphor	of	madness,	 identified	by	 Tony	 Woodman	 as	 present	 throughout	 the	 ‘double	 histories’	 of	 the	Pannonian	and	Rhineland	mutinies	to	describe	the	behaviour	of	the	mutineers	who	agitate	against	Tiberius.151	Woodman’s	listing	of	the	parallels	between	the	two	episodes	is	not	complemented	by	an	analysis	of	the	work	this	metaphor	is	doing	 in	 the	 text.	 His	 silence	 suggests	 that	 the	 madness,	 for	 him,	 is	 simply	unreason.	But	this	cannot	be	so:	their	discourse	is	logical,	even	persuasive.	Patel	challenged	 the	 unreason	 by	 offering	 a	 meaningful	 reading	 of	 the	mutinies	 as	‘democratic	 violence’	which	 ‘interrupts	 established	 roles	 and	places	 and	 in	 so	doing	make	visible	certain	wrongs	imposed	onto	subordinates’.152	Although	this																																																									149Auerbach	(1953),	37.	150Ash	(1999,	60)	sees	this	same	disapproval	at	work	in	Tacitus’	treatment	of	the	mutiny	of	Aponius	Saturninus’	troops	from	Moesia	at	Hist.	3.11:	‘So,	in	the	final	analysis	the	Flavian	troops	may	have	had	a	case,	but	that	does	not	make	their	spontaneous	mutiny	acceptable.	No	matter	how	ambiguous	Saturninus	is	as	a	leader,	the	soldiers	should	still	obey	him,	which	is	why	Tacitus	remarks	with	disdain,	‘although	once	Roman	soldiers	had	competed	in	courage	and	moderation,	now	the	rivalry	was	in	insolence	(procacitatis)	and	insubordination’.	151Woodman	(2006),	312	for	madness.	The	reading	of	the	mutinies	as	‘histoires	dédoublées’	or	‘contes	géminés’	derives	from	Bacha	(1906).	See	Woodman	(2006),	204–5,	section	II(i).	152Patel	(2013),	13.	
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makes	 the	 madness	 meaningful,	 this	 still	 leaves	 the	 metaphor	 itself	unexplained:	 if	 there	 is	reason,	why	choose	 to	call	 it	madness?	Seeing	Tacitus’	use	 of	 insanity	 as	 morally	 descriptive,	 not	 causative	 or	 explanatory,	 gets	 the	reader	out	of	this	fix;	in	this	sense,	it	is	like	Rancière’s	‘absence	of	reason’.	As	a	descriptive	model	 it	 conveys	Tacitus’	moral	 judgment	on	 two	 levels:	one	 is	on	the	 wisdom,	 or	 lack	 of,	 of	 taking	 on	 the	 established	 authorities	 over	 their	corruption,	a	sentiment	amounting	to	needing	to	be	mad	to	take	on	an	opponent	as	 powerful	 as	 Rome.	 The	 other	 level	 is	 his	 judgment	 on	 the	 morality	 of	threatening	the	social	order	as	a	response	to	abuse	by	the	state.153	In	choosing	to	 frame	 the	 conflict	 which	 he	 introduced	 as	 nullis	 novis	 causis	 nisi	 mutatu	
principe	 in	 such	 ethical	 terms,	 Tacitus’	 focus	 can	 be	 read	 in	 a	 Thucydidean	framework,	 with	 the	 death	 of	 the	 monarch	 as	 the	 aition	 (immediate	 cause)	while	refusing	to	label	as	‘actionable’	what	the	reader	must	see	as	the	prophasis	(real	 reason)	 of	 the	 conflict,	 namely	 the	 nullae	 novae	 causae	 of	 the	 imperial	soldiers’	oppression,	which	in	turn	correspond	to	Rancière’s	‘the	reasons	it	[the	mutiny]	gives	itself’.154			This	 does,	 however,	 leave	 us	with	 the	 problem	 that	 Tacitus	 could	 have	made	these	 points	much	more	 easily	 by	 not	 giving	 such	 a	 sympathetic	 voice	 to	 the	repressed	lower	classes	in	the	Roman	army,	despite	the	framing	devices	which	undermine	the	validity	of	their	actions.	One	of	the	aims	of	this	chapter	will	be	to	explore	why,	 and	what	 their	 discourse	 achieves	 despite	 Tacitus’	 fundamental	rejection	of	their	actions.	
Iustitium	In	the	camps,	the	death	of	Augustus	by	itself	should	have	made	little	difference	to	 the	daily	 life	of	 the	 soldiers:	 there	would	have	been	no	 fewer	 commanders	present	than	before	to	enforce	discipline.	But	Tacitus	explicitly	draws	attention	to	a	decision	by	the	Pannonian	authorities	to	mark	the	passing	of	Augustus	by																																																									153Even	Woodman	links	madness	to	occasions	of	civil	strife	through	his	recollection	of	Thucydides’	linking	of	stasis	and	plague	(another	form	of	illness),	though	he	does	not	take	the	thought	any	further:	Woodman	(2006),	329.	154The	dichotomy	is	set	up	at	Thuc.	Hist.	1.23.6.	It	is	unconcerned	with	the	moral	rightness	or	wrongness	of	the	situation	as	an	explanatory	tool,	unlike	Tacitus’	ethical	framework	for	interpreting	the	mutinies.	
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declaring	 a	 iustitium:	 fine	 Augusti	 et	 initiis	 Tiberii	 auditis	 ob	 iustitium	 aut	
gaudium	 intermiserat	 solita	 munia,	 ‘when	 Augustus’	 demise	 and	 the	 start	 of	Tiberius’	 reign	were	heard	of	 [simultaneously],	he	suspended	 the	usual	duties	either	through	mourning	or	through	joy’	(Ann.	1.16).	In	Germany	the	iustitium	is	implicit	–	isdem	aestivis	in	finibus	Vbiorum	habebantur	per	otium	aut	levia	munia,	‘in	the	territory	of	the	Ubii	they	were	being	kept	in	summer	camps,	passing	their	time	 with	 leisure	 activities	 or	 light	 duties’,	 Ann.	1.31	 –	 but	 may	 be	 inferred.	Tacitus	makes	this	iustitium	as	a	suspension	of	normality	a	causal	factor	in	the	breakdown	of	order	in	the	camp:	eo	principio	lascivire	miles,	discordare,	pessimi	
cuiusque	sermonibus	praebere	auris,	denique	luxum	et	otium	cupere,	disciplinam	
et	laborem	aspernari,	 ‘for	this	reason	the	soldiers	first	started	to	run	wild,	start	arguing,	 and	 listening	 to	 the	 talk	 of	 every	 layabout,	 until	 finally	 they	 craved	comforts	and	an	easy	life	and	despised	discipline	and	hard	work’	(Ann.	1.16).		It	is	worth	untangling	the	work	iustitium	does	in	the	narrative,	and	for	that	we	need	 to	 clarify	 its	meaning.	 The	 Oxford	 Classical	 Dictionary	 gives	 its	 primary	meaning	 as	 a	 legal	 term	 signifying	 ‘a	 cessation	 of	 judicial	 and	 all	 other	 public	business,	 in	 the	 event	 of	 national	 calamities,	 riots,	 etc.’.	 Suspensions	 of	 public	business	occurred	on	 the	many	 religious	holidays	 in	 the	Roman	calendar,	 and	would	 also	often	occur	on	days	 commemorating	 events	both	positive,	 such	 as	the	celebration	of	a	military	victory,	and	negative,	such	as	a	significant	military	defeat	(for	fear	of	contaminating	the	present	day	with	its	ill	luck).155	At	the	heart	of	this	way	of	commemorating	lies	a	desire	to	makes	events	concrete	instead	of	abstract,	 and	meaningful	 to	 the	 entire	 community.	 The	 courts	 and	 the	 forum,	whose	 business	 ceased,	 were	 central	 to	 the	 reality	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ideological	identity	 of	 the	Roman	Republic.	 A	 central	 authority	with	 the	power	 to	 decree	such	a	suspension	of	business	and	be	obeyed	was	powerful	indeed.	But	Tacitus’	use	of	iustitium	also	evokes	memories	of	the	iustitia	of	the	Late	Republic,	which	were	declared	as	a	result	of	the	senatus	consultum	ultimum	at	times	of	tumultus	or	 great	 commotion	 (defined	 by	 Agamben	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 ancient	 sources	 as																																																									155See	Grafton	and	Swerdlow	(1988)	for	a	good	overview	of	the	Roman	tradition	on	‘ominous	days’	and	its	relation	to	earlier	Mediterranean	civilisations,	though	the	article	is	largely	concerned	with	tracing	the	provenance	of	the	Roman	material	we	have	and	the	technicalities	of	dating	events.	
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anything	that	caused	magna	trepidatio	in	Rome).156	Acts	committed	during	this	time	 to	 suppress	 the	 perceived	 danger	 to	 the	 state	 took	 place	 in	 a	 state	 of	
anomia	or	absence	of	 law	(hence	 the	 term	 ‘state	of	exception’),	divorced	 from	the	 legal	 system	 for	 as	 long	 as	 the	 iustitium	 lasted.	 Agamben	 cites	 the	grammarians’	definition	of	 it	 as	 a	 suspension	not	of	 the	administration	of	 law	but	of	law	itself.157	In	the	very	act	of	decreeing	it	in	the	face	of	a	threat	the	state	also	 legitimised	 its	 own	 existence	 –	 you	 cannot	 define	 something	 as	 a	 threat	without	 implying	 that	 which	 is	 threatened	 is	 something	 to	 be	 valued	 and	protected.	 A	 second	 legitimisation	 follows	 from	 the	 first,	 namely	 the	legitimisation	of	severe	interference	in,	and	control	of,	public	and	private	life	by	the	 state	 executive	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 defending	 the	 state.	 This	 interference	could	 take	a	range	of	shapes,	 from	marking	 the	public	calendar	or	suspending	everyday	 business	 to	 violence	 and	 even	 the	 technically	 illegal	 execution	 of	citizens	without	trial.158		Tacitus	 plays	 with	 all	 these	 elements	 in	 an	 unexpected	 way,	 evoking	 the	widening	 gap	 between	 Republican	 tradition	 and	 principate	 throughout.	 First	there	is	the	ideological	import	of	Blaesus’	iustitium	for	the	soldiers.	By	applying	to	Augustus’	passing	the	word	traditionally	used	for	events	which	affected	the	entire	 Republican	 community,	 sometimes	 even	 acute	 threats	 to	 its	 survival,	Tacitus	 is	 making	 Iunius	 Blaesus’	 iustitium	 look	 like	 an	 attempt	 to	 reinforce	continuity	between	Republic	and	principate	and	 thus	bolster	 the	 legitimacy	of	the	Augustan	family	at	the	head	of	the	state.	 In	this	he	followed	a	trend	set	by	Augustus,	 who	 ‘beginning	 with	 the	 death	 of	 his	 nephew	 Marcellus,	 would	proclaim	a	iustitium	every	time	the	family	mausoleum	was	opened’,	for	the	very	purpose	of	making	‘the	bona	and	the	mala	of	a	single	family	(…)	the	concern	of	the	 res	 publica’.159	But	 by	 the	 time	 of	 the	 mutinies	 the	 Tacitean	 reader	 has	already	been	warned	 that	 the	Republic	 had	 given	way	 to	 system	described	 in	terms	 of	 an	 individual,	 not	 a	 structure:	 the	 very	 first	 chapter	 of	 the	 Annals																																																									156Agamben	(2005),	42.	157Agamben	(2005),	41.	158As	in	121BC	(death	of	Gaius	Gracchus),	100BC	(death	of	Saturninus),	and	63BC	(death	of	some	of	the	Catilinarian	conspirators),	all	actions	committed	as	a	result	of	the	SCU’s	injunction.	159Agamben	(2005),	68,	citing	Fraschetti	(1990),	57.	
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summarises	 the	move	 from	 populi	Romani	prospera	vel	adversa	 to	 temporibus	
Augusti	dicendis.	The	individuality	of	this	new	regime	in	fact	highlights	the	break	with	the	collectivity	of	the	Republic	instead	of	demonstrating	its	continuity	with	it.	More	dangerously	 in	the	narrative	of	 the	mutinies,	 the	 iustitium	calls	up	for	the	 soldiers	 the	 question	 of	 Tiberius’	 continuation	 of	 this	 personal	 system.	 It	allows	 them	 to	 see	 an	 opportunity	 to	 build	 up	 an	 entirely	 new	 and	 different	relationship	 with	 the	 new	 ruler,	 preferably	 Germanicus,	 instead	 of	 resigning	themselves	 to	 life	as	usual	under	Tiberius:	break,	not	 continuity.	 In	 this	 sense	the	 iustitium	 failed	 to	 achieve	 the	 ideological	 purpose	 envisaged	 by	 first	Augustus	and	then	Blaesus.			In	 a	 second	 surprising	 move,	 Tacitus	 the	 historiographer	 makes	 the	 Roman	soldiers’	 violence	 into	 the	 tumultus.	 Their	 actions	 represent	 the	danger	 to	 the	state	 which	 traditionally	 triggered	 the	 decreeing	 of	 a	 iustitium	 with	 its	suspension	 of	 law	 to	 enable	 good	 citizens	 to	 resist	 the	 danger.	 They	 are	 the	threat,	 not	 the	 remedy	 as	we	might	 have	 expected.	 Tacitus	 also	 presents	 this	threat	 as	 coming	 into	 being	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 iustitium,	 reversing	 the	 usual	order.160	The	Republican	iustitium	to	allow	the	Republican	state	to	defend	itself	against	 an	 anti-Republican	 threat	 in	 Tacitus	 becomes	 an	 imperial	 iustitium	which	provokes	an	anti-imperial	(and	perhaps	more	Republican)	threat.	On	this	reading	 the	 tumultus,	 more	 than	 the	 iustitium,	 acts	 as	 a	 legitimation	 of	 the	imperial	regime.	Conveniently,	however,	the	iustitium’s	inherent	anomia	is	then	able	 to	 act	 as	 a	 legitimation	 of	 the	 savage	 retributions	 deemed	 necessary	 to	preserve	the	throne	by	Blaesus,	Germanicus	and	Drusus.	This	was	desirable	on	two	fronts:	firstly,	though	Roman	commanders	traditionally	and	legally	had	the	power	of	life	and	death	over	their	soldiers161,	by	the	time	of	the	principate	truly	severe	 punishments	 would	 have	 been	 rare	 due	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 factors,	including	the	potential	of	excessive	severity	to	arouse	resistance	in	the	soldiers	(as	proved	by	these	mutinies),	and	a	shift	in	morality	to	make	extremes	ethically	
																																																								160This	embeds	it	into	Patel’s	view	of	the	Tiberian	books	of	the	Annals	representing	peacetime	politics	and	procedures	as	sources	of	conflict;	Patel	(2013),	iii.	161Phang	(2008),	115.	
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controversial.162	Secondly,	 the	spectre	of	the	Republican	 iustitium	and	its	 ‘legal	suspension	 of	 legality’	 adds	 a	 hue	 of	 respectability	 to	 the	 violence	 committed	against	 these	 soldier-citizens	 to	 safeguard	 the	 precarious	 legal	 and	 moral	position	 of	 the	 first	 imperial	 successor.	 Blaesus	 is	 using	 iustitium	 and	 the	violence	legitimised	by	its	anomia	 (an	artificial	 imperial	 ‘gap’	 in	normality	and	legality)	 as	 a	 defence	 against	 the	 ideological	 ‘gap’	 which	 opens	 up	 after	 each	imperial	 death	 and	 carries	 with	 it	 the	 potential	 of	 violence	 against	 the	 new	occupant	of	the	throne.		On	a	second	level,	there	is	iustitium’s	practical	as	opposed	to	ideological	import.	Its	relaxation	of	everyday	tight	discipline	tells	us	that	Augustus	was	not	the	only	constraining	 factor	 on	 violence	 to	 be	 removed.	 By	 interrupting	 the	 soldiers’	professional	 lives	 Blaesus	 replicates	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	 civic	 courts	 and	assemblies	mentioned	 earlier.	 Phang	 illuminated	 the	 connection	 between	 the	repression	 of	 soldiers’	 ira	 as	 a	 quality	 required	 in	 battle	 and	 the	 fear	 of	 the	destructive	 furor	 it	 could	 turn	 into	 –	 especially	 when	 directed	 against	 fellow	citizens	–	if	it	was	not	moderated	by	modestia	(which	she	defined	as	‘respect	or	obedience	to	authority’).163	This	modestia	could	not	be	legally	imposed	but	was	conditioned	 into	 existence	 through	disciplina	 and	 formed	 part	 of	 the	 soldiers’	
habitus,	a	‘durable,	ingrained	disposition	of	thinking,	feeling,	and	behaving	that	is	characteristic	of	a	given	field’	(Phang’s	rephrasing	of	Bourdieu).164	One	means	of	 inculcation	was	 combat	 training;	 another	was	 labor	 in	 the	 form	 of	 fatigues	and	camp	building,	but	these	were	 ideally	ongoing	pursuits,	not	 imposed	for	a	training	 period	 only.165	During	 the	 mutinies,	 labor	 is	 foregone	 (intermiserat	
solita	munia,	Ann.	1.16;	per	otium	aut	levia	munia,	Ann.	1.31)	so	the	habitus,	the	main	guarantor	of	good	behaviour,	relaxes	and	disorder	follows.	Where	Sallust	saw	 the	 loosening	 of	 the	 Roman	 habitus	occasioned	 by	 the	 removal	 of	metus	
hostilis	 (with	 its	 need	 to	 be	 in	 constant	 readiness)	 as	 the	 direct	 cause	 of	subsequent	 moral	 decline,	 Tacitus	 substitutes	 disciplina	 for	metus	 hostilis.166																																																									162Ibid.,	123–27,	especially	decimation.	163Ibid.,	37,	75	(connection);	74	(definition).	164Ibid.,	73	(modestia);	31	(definition).	Bourdieu	(1990),	53	for	the	original	definition.	165Phang	(2008),	32.	166Sallust,	BC	10.	
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Thus	 by	 using	 a	 Sallustian	 moral	 schema	 to	 explain	 the	 exact	 role	 of	 his	Thucydidean	 aition,	 he	 once	 again	 denies	 any	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 soldiers’	complaints	about	their	circumstances.		Another	practical	aspect	of	Blaesus’	iustitium	may	be	the	lack	of	any	attempt	in	the	 mutinies	 narratives	 by	 the	 camp	 commanders	 to	 administer	 an	 oath	 of	loyalty	 to	Tiberius	 (their	oath	 to	Augustus	would	have	 lapsed	with	his	death).	This	cannot	have	been	a	historiographical	oversight,	given	that	Tacitus	stresses	Germanicus’	immediate	administration	on	Tiberius’	behalf	of	such	an	oath	to	the	Sequani	and	Belgae	whom	he	happened	to	be	visiting	when	he	heard	the	news	of	the	Rhine	mutiny	(Ann.	1.34).	Furthermore,	Birley	plausibly	explains	the	start	date	of	 the	Histories,	1	 January	AD69,	 in	 terms	of	 the	Rhine	 legions’	 refusal	 to	swear	allegiance	to	Galba	on	that	day.167	Tacitus	was	therefore	clearly	aware	of	the	symbolic	but	also	 immediately	practical	significance	of	oaths	 in	containing	the	threat	inherent	in	large	numbers	of	citizens	under	arms.	
Gaps	To	 sum	up,	 the	 ‘gap’168	left	 by	 the	 death	 of	 the	 emperor	 and	marked	 through	
iustitium	in	AD14	is	not	productive	of	new	forms	of	power.	Though	intended	to	affirm	 regime	 continuity	 by	 marking	 the	 death	 of	 the	 monarch	 before	 his	successor	 takes	 power,	 its	 relaxation	 of	 discipline	 literally	 gives	 the	 soldiers	pause	 for	 thought	and	allows	them	to	conclude	that	 instead	of	continuity	 they	see	an	opportunity	to	negotiate	from	scratch	a	highly	personalised	relationship	with	 the	 new	 ruler.	What	 emerges	 from	 the	 gap	 is	 ideological	 difference,	 and	although	 Tacitus’	 narrative	 details	 the	 discourses	 which	 stake	 out	 these	opposing	positions,	violence	is	needed	to	decide	the	issue.																																																											167Birley	(2000),	239.	168The	idea	that	the	removal	of	metus	hostilis	created	a	‘gap’	is	also	implied	in	Sallust	by	his	use	of	the	verb	‘pateo’,	‘to	open’:	sed	ubi	labore	atque	iustitia	res	publica	crevit,	reges	
magni	bello	domiti,	nationes	ferae	et	populi	ingentes	vi	subacti,	Carthago,	aemula	imperi	
Romani,	 ab	 stirpe	 interiit,	 cuncta	maria	 terraeque	patebant,	 ‘but	when	 the	 res	publica	had	 grown	 through	 its	 efforts	 and	 its	 justice,	 greats	 kings	 had	 been	 subdued	 in	war,	savage	 nations	 and	 huge	 tribes	 subjected	 through	 sheer	 force,	 Carthago,	 the	 Roman	Empire’s	chief	rival,	was	annihilated	roots	and	all,	all	the	seas	and	lands	of	the	world	lay	open	[to	them]’,	Sall.	BC	10.1.	
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Through	his	invocation	of	the	tumultus/iustitium	link	Tacitus	looks	back	to	the	Republic	and	invites	the	reader	to	compare	then	and	now.	The	soldiers,	whose	
tumultus	threatens	the	imperial	regime,	are	advocating	a	somehow	Republican	principate	 under	 Germanicus’	 leadership	 which	 they	 hope	 will	 eliminate	corruption	 and	 abuse.	 The	 iustitium	 which	 was	 traditionally	 employed	 to	safeguard	 the	Republican	state	 from	danger	 is	being	used	as	an	 instrument	 to	quench	 resistance	 to	 the	 imperial	 regime.	 One	 gets	 the	 impression	 that	 the	regime	would	have	violently	beaten	down	resistance	even	without	the	iustitium	but	that	it	welcomes	it	as	a	cover	providing	some	legality	to	its	actions.	In	this	sense,	even	though	the	iustitium	itself	ends,	the	powers	it	traditionally	lent,	over	and	above	those	of	 the	 law,	were	appropriated	 in	perpetuum	by	the	regime.169	And	 so	 its	 anomia	 and	 its	 violence	 in	 AD14	 follow	 Agamben’s	 model	 of	 the	evolution	of	states	of	exception	in	modern	states	into	being	the	norm.170	Tacitus	looks	 forward	 too:	 the	 revolutionary	 potential	 of	 the	 legionaries	 in	 AD14	foreshadows	 the	 reality	 of	 AD69	 when	 Tacitus	 says	 legionaries	 realised	 fully	that	 they	have	 the	power	 to	choose	emperors:	 finis	Neronis	(…)	omnis	legiones	
ducesque	conciverat,	evulgato	imperii	arcano	posse	principem	alibi	quam	Romae	
fieri,	‘the	death	of	Nero	…	stirred	up	all	the	legions	and	generals,	once	the	secret	of	 empire	 had	 been	 divulged,	 namely	 that	 an	 emperor	 could	 be	 made	somewhere	 other	 than	 Rome’	 (Hist.	 1.4.6-10). 171 	In	 AD68	 the	 ‘gap’	 thus	produced	much	more	 extreme	 violence,	 the	 intensity	 potentially	 explained	by	the	lack	of	a	Neronian	heir.	Yet	after	two	years	this	strife	too	settled	down	to	a	continuation	of	the	principate	instead	of	producing	a	new	kind	of	regime.		Some	 of	 the	 factors	mentioned	 at	 play	 in	 the	mutinies	 apply	 to	 the	 Batavian	Julius	Civilis	in	AD69:	he	too	is	faced	with	a	‘gap’	after	the	death	of	the	monarch	to	whom	he	had	 sworn	 loyalty.172	Given	 the	 long	 standing	of	 their	 treaty	with																																																									169Measures	taken	to	suppress	the	so-called	conspiracy	of	Libo	Drusus	against	Tiberius	in	AD16	(Tac.	Ann.	2.27-31)	suggest	a	similar	disregard	for	the	law	without	a	formal	
iustitium,	for	example	in	the	picketing	of	Libo’s	house	by	soldiers	(cingebatur	interim	
milite	domus).	170Agamben	(2005),	Ch.	1	‘The	State	of	Exception	as	a	Paradigm	of	Government’	(1-31).	171Kotze	(1996),	132	and	Fulkerson	(2006),	183	also	noted	the	foreshadowing.	For	a	detailed	and	recent	discussion,	see	Low	(2013),	41–55,	reworked	as	Low	(2016).	172Slofstra	(2002),	31	suggests	Nero	was	Civilis’	patron.	
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Rome,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	 death	 of	 Nero,	 in	 whose	 army	 Civilis	 had	commanded	 auxiliary	 troops,	 released	 him	 from	 the	 obligation	 of	 loyalty	 to	Rome.	 But,	 as	 for	 the	 soldiers,	 no	 mention	 is	 made	 by	 Tacitus	 of	 any	 oath	retaken	by	Civilis	 to	Galba,	Otho	or	Vitellius.	To	 the	contrary,	 the	 rivals’	quick	succession	 argues	 against	 anything	 so	 formal	 having	 taken	 place,	 especially	 if	we	assume	that	legionaries	would	be	‘secured’	before	auxiliaries.	Further,	what	information	Tacitus	does	give	us	suggests	Civilis	had	no	reasons	to	exert	himself	greatly	on	behalf	of	any	of	the	pretenders	with	whom	a	new	relationship	would	have	to	be	negotiated:	Paulum	Fonteius	Capito	falso	rebellionis	crimine	interfecit;	
iniectae	 Civili	 catenae,	missusque	 ad	Neronem	 et	 a	 Galba	 absolutus	 sub	 Vitellio	
rursus	discrimen	adiit,	flagitante	supplicium	eius	exercitu,	 ‘Fonteius	Capito	killed	Paulus	on	a	false	charge	of	rebellion;	chains	were	put	on	Civilis,	and	he	was	sent	to	Nero.	Released	by	Galba	he	again	got	into	a	tight	corner	under	Vitellius,	with	the	army	demanding	his	 execution’	 (Hist.	4.13.2-5).	Nor	was	 there	a	Neronian	heir,	 equivalent	 to	 Tiberius	 in	 the	 mutinies	 narrative,	 to	 whom	 it	 could	 be	argued	or	felt	loyalty	was	owed	whilst	awaiting	a	formal	oath.	We	saw	that	the	
iustitium	did	not	reinforce	the	centrality	of	the	emperor	to	the	soldiers’	lives	but	instead	allowed	them	to	realise	how	much	power	they	held.	The	same	holds	for	the	 ‘gap’	which	 opened	 up	 for	 Civilis	 and	 his	 followers,	 only	 it	was	 less	 clear	against	 whom	 this	 power	 to	 get	 what	 they	 wanted	 should	 be	 leveraged.	Evidence	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Batavian	 rebellion	 strongly	 reinforced	 just	 how	many	directions	events	could	still	take:	two	Neronian	successors	were	dead	in	the	space	of	a	few	months	and	two	more	candidates	fighting	it	out.	And	unlike	the	 soldiers,	 the	 Batavians	 had	 no	 reason	 to	 presume	 either	 the	 continued	existence	of	the	(by	then	much	more	formalised)	imperial	office	or	the	identity	of	the	final	victor.			Although	this	discussion	has	made	clear	the	different	ways	in	which	‘gaps’	can	exert	their	influence	and	shape	events,	the	parallels	between	the	gaps	of	AD14	and	 AD68	 suggest	 that	 Tacitus	 saw	 imperial	 death	 as	 having	 revolutionary	potential	 even	 under	 relatively	 stable	 circumstances	 such	 as	 when	 there	 is	 a	designated	 or	 expected	 heir	 and	 within	 the	 confines	 of	 that	 most	 ordered	 of	spaces,	 the	 Roman	 military	 camp.	 Where	 there	 is	 succession,	 there	 is	 a	 gap	
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which	 each	 time	 opens	 up	 the	 question	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 principate	 as	continuous	or	alternatively	to	be	negotiated	each	time	through	violent	conflict.	The	 cautionary	 tale	 of	 Galba	 and	 Piso	 in	 the	 Histories	 demonstrates	 that	attempting	 to	 avoid	 the	 appearance	 of	 this	 question	 through	 pre-emptive	adoption	 during	 life	 was	 an	 insufficient	 defence.	 Once	 the	 question	 had	 been	allowed	 to	 surface,	 Galba	 then	 failed	 to	 win	 over	 the	 soldiers	 to	 the	 side	 of	continuity	 either	 by	 argument	 or	 by	 force.	 Birley	 followed	 Syme	 in	 seeing	Nerva’s	 situation	 as	 an	 almost	 exact	 reenactment	 of	Galba’s	 in	 this	 respect.173	The	 adoption	 of	 Trajan	 did	 prevent	 further	 rivalry	 for	 the	 throne	 or	 perhaps	even	a	coup	by	Trajan	himself	as	the	leading	general	of	the	day174,	but	his	first	act	 after	 being	 adopted	 by	 Nerva	 was	 to	 visit	 the	 troops	 to	 secure	 their	loyalty. 175 	It	 may	 be	 this	 which	 allowed	 for	 his	 success	 in	 traversing,	 or	preventing	 from	 opening	 up,	 the	 gap	 where	 Galba,	 notoriously	 unwilling	 to	court	the	troops’	favour,	failed.	This	suggests,	in	line	with	what	Tacitus	shows	in	the	 mutinies,	 that	 successfully	 closing	 the	 gap	 between	 successive	 imperial	rulers	depended	on	violence,	or	at	least	the	threat	of	it.	
Discourse	(I):	Libertas	and	bodies	
Servitium	As	 I	mentioned	 earlier,	 Rancière	 noted	 the	 ‘radical	 disjunction’	 governing	 the	narrative	of	the	mutinies,	of	which	the	first	component,	the	absence	of	reason,	resulted	 in	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 ‘gap’	 opened	 up	 by	 imperial	 death.	 The	 ‘gap’	produced	 by	 either	 iustitium’s	 cessation	 of	 business	 (for	 the	 mutineers)	 or	 a	more	informal	structural	vacuum	(for	the	Batavians)	is	not	creative,	but	through	its	removal	of	customary	strictures	allows	room	for	reflection	as	well	as	for	pre-existing	 tensions	 to	 erupt.	 The	 component	 to	 be	 addressed	 now	 is	 these	 pre-existing	 tensions,	 the	 nullae	 novae	 causis.	 These	 revolve	 around	 shared	experiences	 of	 maltreatment	 by	 a	 corrupt	 regime,	 and	 are	 expressed	 in	 the	
																																																								173Birley	(2000),	239,	n.	23.	174Suggested	by	Alston	(2014),	145.	175Ibid.	
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narrative	 through	 similar	 discourses	 for	 Batavians	 and	 mutineers,	 polarised	around	servitium/libertas.176		Civilis’	 personal	 grudges	 against	 the	 Romans	 for	 past	maltreatment	 are	 well-documented	 by	 Tacitus:	 falso	 rebellionis	 crimine	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 the	Neronian	commander	 Fonteius	 Capito,	 followed	 by	 flagitante	 supplicium	 eius	 [Vitelli]	
exercitu,	Hist.	4.13.5.	When	he	speaks	to	and	for	his	countrymen	he	laments	the	corrupt	conduct	of	a	Roman	levy,	and	then	sums	up	their	general	treatment	in	terms	of	the	polarities	of	slavery	and	freedom:	iniurias	et	raptus	et	cetera	servitii	
mala	enumerat:	neque	enim	societatem,	ut	olim,	 sed	 tamquam	mancipia	haberi,	‘he	listed	for	them	the	injustices,	rapes	and	other	misfortunes	belonging	to	their	state	of	 serfdom,	 saying	 that	 they	were	not	 treated	as	allies,	 as	 they	once	had	been,	but	 as	 slaves’	(Hist.	4.14.11-13).	When	 their	 thoughts	 are	 reported	after	their	 rebellion	 has	 fizzled	 out,	 they	 describe	 their	 aim	 retrospectively	 as	 nec	
posse	ab	una	natione	 totius	orbis	 servitium	depelli,	 ‘it	 was	 not	 possible	 for	 the	enslavement	of	the	whole	world	to	be	undone	by	a	single	tribe’	(Hist.	5.25.3-4).		The	Roman	 legions	also	complain	about	 their	 treatment:	 they	need	to	spend	a	high	proportion	of	what’s	left	after	the	normal	deductions	for	clothes	and	food	on	bribes	of	their	senior	officials	to	be	excused	extra	duties177,	and	they	do	not	receive	wounds	and	scars	from	the	enemy,	but	from	their	own	commanders:		
	
[Percennius]	…	interrogabat	cur	paucis	centurionibus	paucioribus	tribunis	
in	modum	servorum	oboedirent.	quando	ausuros	exposcere	remedia,	nisi	
novum	et	nutantem	adhuc	principem	precibus	vel	armis	adirent?	satis	per	
tot	annos	ignavia	peccatum,	quod	tricena	aut	quadragena	stipendia	senes	et	
plerique	truncato	ex	vulneribus	corpore	tolerent.	ne	dimissis	quidem	finem	
esse	militiae,	sed	apud	vexillum	tendentis	alio	vocabulo	eosdem	labores	
perferre.	ac	si	quis	tot	casus	vita	superaverit,	trahi	adhuc	diversas	in	terras	
ubi	per	nomen	agrorum	uligines	paludum	vel	inculta	montium	accipiant.	
enimvero	militiam	ipsam	gravem,	infructuosam:	denis	in	diem	assibus	
animam	et	corpus	aestimari:	hinc	vestem	arma	tentoria,	hinc	saevitiam	
centurionum	et	vacationes	munerum	redimi.	at	hercule	verbera	et	vulnera,	
																																																								176This	polarity	was	asserted	by	Keitel	(1993)	as	at	the	heart	of	the	speeches,	Roman	and	Other,	in	Histories	4,	but	I	extend	the	notion	well	beyond	this	scope.	177Davies	(1989),	189	for	the	deduction	ad	victum	from	soldiers’	stipends.	
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duram	hiemem,	exercitas	aestates,	bellum	atrox:	aut	sterilem	pacem	
sempiterna.	
Ann.	1.17;	Pannonia		‘[Percennius]	…	asked	why	they	obeyed	so	few	centurions	and	even	fewer	tribunes	in	such	a	slavish	manner.	When	would	they	dare	to	demand	redress,	if	they	were	not	going	to	approach	a	new	and	still	precariously	placed	emperor	either	with	pleas	or	violence?	[He	also	said]	that	they	had	missed	enough	opportunities	through	the	years	on	account	of	their	cravenness,	and	old	men	were	dragging	out	thirty	or	forty	years	of	service,	with	the	bodies	of	many	maimed	through	injuries.	And	that	there	was	no	end	to	service	even	for	those	who	had	been	discharged,	but	instead	whilst	serving	in	the	vexillae	they	performed	the	same	duties	under	a	different	name.	And	if	anyone	should	have	survived	such	threats	to	their	life,	they	were	then	dragged	to	the	far	ends	of	the	earth	where	under	the	name	of	fields	they	took	possession	of	the	damp	ends	of	swamps	or	the	wildest	bits	of	mountains.	Indeed,	military	service	itself	was	harsh	and	unrewarding:	body	and	soul	were	deemed	worth	ten	asses	a	day,	and	from	this	had	to	be	subtracted	clothes,	weapons	and	tents;	out	of	this,	too,	the	cruelty	of	their	commanding	officers	and	respite	from	chores	had	to	be	bought	off.	But	by	god,	they	had	lashings	and	injuries,	harsh	winters	and	eventful	summers,	and	a	grim	war.	Their	unremunerative	peace,	on	the	other	hand,	seemed	everlasting.’		
nudant	universi	corpora,	cicatrices	ex	vulneribus,	verberum	notas	
exprobrant;	mox	indiscretis	vocibus	pretia	vacationum,	angustias	stipendii,	
duritiam	operum	ac	propriis	nominibus	incusant	vallum,	fossas,	pabuli	
materiae	lignorum	adgestus,	et	si	qua	alia	ex	necessitate	aut	adversus	otium	
castrorum	quaeruntur.	atrocissimus	veteranorum	clamor	oriebatur,	qui	
tricena	aut	supra	stipendia	numerantes,	mederetur	fessis,	neu	mortem	in	
isdem	laboribus,	sed	finem	tam	exercitae	militiae	neque	inopem	requiem	
orabant.	
Ann.	1.35;	Germany		‘All	of	them	bared	their	bodies	and	showed	the	scars	from	injuries	and	the	marks	from	lashes;	then	in	a	cacophony	of	voices	they	cursed	the	cost	of	remission	from	chores,	the	inadequacy	of	their	pay,	the	harshness	of	their	labour	and	in	carefully	chosen	words	also	complained	about	the	building	of	the	camp	wall,	digging	of	trenches,	foraging	for	food	and	timber,	and	any	other	tasks	which	derived	either	from	necessity	or	from	the	desire	to	counteract	leisure	time	within	the	camp.	The	loudest	din	came	from	the	veterans,	who	had	thirty	or	more	years	under	their	belts,	and	begged	that	relief	should	be	provided	to	them	in	their	tiredness,	not	in	the	form	of	death	in	service,	but	of	an	end	to	such	an	intense	tour	of	duty	and	a	well-provided	retirement.’		
		 	 	102	
This	 treatment	 supports	 Percennius’	 presentation	 of	 the	 soldiers’	 situation	 in	Pannonia	 as	 that	 of	 slaves	 (interrogabat	 cur	 paucis	 centurionibus	 paucioribus	
tribunis	 in	 modum	 servorum	 oboedirent?,	 Ann.	 1.17).	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 this	identification	of	the	soldiers	with	slaves	lie	two	issues:	that	of	punishment	and	that	of	the	labour	these	soldiers	were	made	to	perform	by	their	superiors.	The	legality	 of	 Roman	 commanders’	 all-encompassing	 authority	 was	 adduced	earlier.178	Evidence	 attesting	 to	 harsh	 discipline	 does	 not	 suggest	 this	 was	illegal.179	In	that	sense,	the	legionary’s	position	was	like	the	slave’s.	The	soldiers’	complaints,	 however,	 suggest	 that	 moderation	 was	 expected	 in	 meting	 out	punishment,	 in	recognition	of	their	status	as	citizens,	and	that	this	moderation	was	absent	 from	 the	German	and	Pannonian	 camps.	The	other	aspect	of	 their	identification	 with	 slaves	 is	 the	 cultural	 distinction	 between	 servile	 labour,	which	was	seen	as	degrading,	and	 labour	appropriate	 to	soldiers.180	When	 the	mutineers	complain	about	having	to	buy	off	their	centurions	to	avoid	particular	kinds	of	work,	it	suggests	they	feel	they	are	being	made	to	do	too	much	labour	of	the	servile	kind.		The	Batavian	 situation	 is	 similar:	we	get	no	 sense	 from	 the	narrative	 that	 the	
dilectus	itself	 is	what	sparks	support	 for	Civilis;	 the	Batavians	have,	after	all,	a	track	 record	 of	 decades	 of	 valued	 service	 in	 the	 Roman	 army.181		 Support	emerges	 after	 the	 corrupt	 conduct	 of	 the	 levy,	 particularly	 the	 servile	punishment	of	rape	being	inflicted	on	their	free	(and	loyal,	allied)	bodies.	When	the	 Batavians	 at	 the	 end	 of	 their	 rebellion	 say	 that	 nec	 posse	 ab	 una	 natione	
totius	 orbis	 servitium	 depelli,	 ‘it	 was	 not	 possible	 for	 the	 enslavement	 of	 the	
																																																								178See	n.	162.	179Ibid.	180Phang	(2008),	234–39.	181They	are	involved	in	Germanicus’	punitive	expedition	into	Germany	in	AD14	in	
Annals	2,	and	Bellen	(1981,	39)	posits	their	involvement	in	missions	under	Octavian’s	leadership	as	early	as	36BC:	‘Fest	steht	auf	jeden	Fall,	daβ	unter	den	Truppen	Oktavians,	die	36	v.	Chr.	in	Sizilien	eingesetzt	wurden,	sich	Germanen	befanden	und	es	ist	nach	den	hier	angestellten	Überlegungen	mehr	als	verlockend,	in	ihnen	Bataver-	und	Ubierkontingente	zu	sehen,	die	von	Agrippa	bei	seiner	Rückkehr	aus	Gallien	(37)	Oktavian	zugeführt	worden	waren’.	The	African	Tacfarinas,	who	also	rebels	against	Rome,	similarly	had	a	history	of	distinguished	service	in	the	Roman	army:	is	natione	
Numida,	in	castris	Romanis	auxiliaria	stipendia	meritus,	mox	desertor,	Ann.	2.52.	
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whole	world	to	be	undone	by	a	single	tribe’	(Hist.	5.25.3-4)	they	are	articulating	their	aim	of	achieving	a	state	of	non-servitium.		What	 unites	 mutineers	 and	 Batavians,	 therefore,	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 grievance	 at	Rome’s	 behaviour.	 They	 articulate	 that	 they	 are	 treated	 as	 slaves	when	 their	respective	statuses	as	citizen	and	free	do	not	justify	such	treatment,	and	it	is	the	imperial	 elite’s	 excessive	 power	 which	 enables	 them	 to	 reduce	 the	 citizen-soldier	 and	 the	 ally	 to	 the	 de	 facto	 status	 of	 slave.	 This	 also	 means	 that	 the	oppressed	cannot	have	recourse	to	legal	change	to	alleviate	their	suffering,	both	because	 the	 elite	 is	 able	 to	 (and	does)	disregard	 the	 law,	 and	because	 (quasi)	legal	 safeguards	 are	 already	 in	 place.	 Tacitus	 tells	 us	 the	 official	 terms	 of	 the	Batavian	treaty	with	Rome	were	already	 lenient,	and	that	 the	tribe	recognised	this	 leniency:	 to	 rationalise	 their	 return	 to	Roman	allegiance	at	 the	end	of	 the	rebellion,	 they	 advised	 themselves	 that	 respicerent	 Raetos	 Noricosque	 et	
ceterorum	onera	sociorum:	sibi	non	tributa,	sed	virtutem	et	viros	indici.	Proximum	
id	libertati,	‘Let	them	ponder	the	predicament	of	the	Raeti	and	the	Norici	and	the	burdens	of	other	allies:	on	themselves	no	tribute	but	only	army	service	and	men	were	 imposed,	and	 this	was	 the	closest	 thing	 to	 true	 freedom’,	Hist.	5.25.8-10.	For	 the	 soldiers	 too	 any	 improvement	 in	 their	 legal	 position	 remained	 in	competition	with	the	lived	reality	in	which	they	encountered	abuses	of	power,	and	 the	 legal	 change	 itself	was	 abolished	 again	 by	 the	 emperor	 soon	 after	 its	achievement	(Ann.	1.78).	Their	preferred	solution	to	supplant	Tiberius	in	favour	of	 Germanicus	 as	 a	 Republican-style	 head	 of	 state	 (it	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	precisely	 what	 they	 had	 in	 mind)	 also	 fails	 in	 the	 face	 of	 overwhelming	repression	 by	 the	 regime.	 In	 Tacitus’	 Tiberian	 universe	 options	 beyond	articulating	dissatisfaction	are	few.	
Libertas	The	mutineers	and	Batavians’	shared	desire	for	a	state	or	status	in	which	they	are	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 arbitrary	 whims	 of	 imperial	 Rome’s	 representatives	conforms	 remarkably	 closely	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 libertas	 as	 it	 was	 used	 in	 the	political	discourse	of	the	Late	Roman	Republic.	Valentina	Arena	defined	this	as	‘a	 status	of	non-subjection	 to	 the	 arbitrary	will	 of	 either	 a	 foreign	power	or	 a	
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domestic	group	or	 individual’.182	This	definition	 is	both	broad	enough	to	allow	us	to	recognise	its	applicability	in	the	very	different	circumstances	of	Batavians	and	mutineering	Romans	and	narrow	enough	to	allow	us	to	specify	 its	precise	meaning	in	each	context.	An	important	circumstantial	difference	between	them	and	the	political	elite	of	the	Late	Republic	must	be	highlighted,	however:	Arena	contends,	contrary	to	most	of	the	scholarship	on	this	topic,	that	Late	Republican	political	 discourse	 was	 not	 marked	 by	 different	 conceptions	 of	 libertas.	Both	supporters	 and	 opponents	 of	 measures	 such	 as	 land	 distribution	 or	 the	application	 of	 the	 senatus	 consultum	 ultimum	 drew	 on	 a	 single,	 shared	conception	of	this.	The	arguments	they	had	were	not	about	defining	it	but	about	the	 best	 means	 to	 preserve	 it.	 Even	 more	 importantly,	 all	 these	 actors	 were	similarly	circumstanced,	unlike	Batavians	and	Romans:	they	had	political	power	and	exerted	it	within	the	same,	closed	political	system.	In	contrast,	although	the	mutinous	 Roman	 soldiers	 were	 citizens,	 the	 lower	 classes	 to	 which	 they	belonged	would	never	gain	office	and	be	producers	of	political	discourse	in	this	system,	neither	under	 the	Republic	nor	 the	principate	 (when	political	 oratory	continued	to	take	place	but	with	much	lower	stakes).	Batavians	were	outsiders	of	 a	different	 kind,	 and	at	 the	 time	of	 their	 conflict	with	Rome	were	not	 even	officially	 incorporated	 into	 Roman	 provinces.183	Yet	 despite	 their	 position	 as	outsiders	whose	conceptions	of	libertas	differ	based	on	their	different	positions	within	imperial	society,	Tacitus,	in	making	them	talk	of	wanting	to	be	free	from	domination	 in	 terms	 evocative	 of	 Late	 Republican	 political	 discourse,	 makes	them	speak	like	insiders.																																																										182Arena	(2012),	7.	183See	Millar	(1981),	111–2,	152,	and	302	on	the	situation	on/near	the	Rhine	and	the	Batavian’s	role	in	events	there,	if	not	their	actual	status.	It	seems	likely	that	the	Batavians	had	some	sort	of	formal	treaty	relationship	with	Rome,	but	beyond	their	exemption	from	tribute	and	obligation	to	provide	an	unknown	quantity	of	men	and	arms	with	an	unknown	frequency	–	Hist.	5.25	–	we	have	no	particulars.	This	to	me	suggests	that	Tacitus	did	not	think	the	particulars	of	the	treaty	impinged	on	the	morality	of	the	corruptly	conducted	dilectus	he	is	narrating.	Roymans	(2004,	55–57)	argues	in	favour	of	a	treaty,	partly	on	the	basis	of	a	Batavian	presence	in	the	Julio-Claudian	bodyguard	before	the	rebellion	of	AD68.	Bellen	(1981,	37–39)	posits	the	relationship	and	treaty	went	back	as	far	as	Agrippa’s	governorship	of	Gaul	in	37BC	and	were	prompted	by	the	need	for	troops	against	the	renewed	hostilities	with	Sextus	Pompeius.	The	Romans’	desperate	need	for	reinforcements	may	explain	the	lenient	terms	of	the	treaty	in	that	the	Batavians	did	not	have	to	provide	tribute,	only	men	and	arms.	
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	The	locus	where	the	question	of	servitium	versus	 libertas	 found	its	most	direct	practical	application	in	Roman	society	is	the	body,	hence	the	significance	of	the	mutineers’	 mutilation	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 their	 commanders	 and	 the	 rape	perpetrated	 during	 the	 Batavian	 dilectus,	 both	 discussed	 earlier.	 But	 for	 the	Roman	soldiers,	there	is	the	extra	dimension	of	their	bodies	being	not	only	free	but	citizen	bodies.	Arena,	again,	stresses	the	origins	of	Late	Republican	libertas	as	 deriving	 from	 the	 Lex	 Sempronia	 de	 capite	 civis	 Romani	 of	 123BC,	 which	forbade	 the	 execution	 of	 Roman	 citizens	 iniussu	 populi.184	This	 law	 further	reinforced	the	link	already	present	in	the	Roman	legal	system	which	constituted	the	citizen	to	a	large	extent	through	his	physical	body:	only	citizen	bodies	were	allowed	 to	 join	 the	 army,	 only	 citizens	 had	 the	 right	 of	provocatio,	 that	 is	 the	right	 to	 appeal	 against	 coercitio	 by	 a	 magistrate,	 which	 was	 any	 attempt	 to	compel	 their	 bodies	 by	 force. 185 	Soldiers	 in	 service	 lacked	 their	 civilian	colleagues’	 right	 of	 provocatio,	 so	 the	 passage	 showing	 them	 appealing	 to	Drusus	 and	 Germanicus	 against	 the	 violation	 of	 their	 bodies	 presents	 the	soldiers	as	foregrounding	their	citizen	identities.	The	scenes	where	they	display	their	wounds	to	these	leaders	amount	to	a	re-enactment	of	a	civilian	provocatio	of	the	Republic	by	the	citizen-soldiers	of	the	Empire.	The	display	of	wounds	was	also	 a	 traditional	 way	 in	 which	 Romans	 asserted	 their	 virtus.	 Republican	politicians	 could	 use	 their	 battle	 scars	 from	 bellum	 externum	 as	 badges	 of	outstanding	citizenship,	 as	 ‘signs	of	 legitimacy’	 in	 the	competition	 for	political	status. 186 	In	 contrast,	 the	 mutineers’	 wounds	 are	 not	 respectable,	 but	demeaning:	not	inflicted	by	the	enemy	in	the	defence	of	the	state,	but	inflicted	by	Romans	on	Romans	 in	 a	perverted	 state-sanctioned	bellum	civile.	 They	 are	therefore	not	badges	of	loyalty	to	the	state;	they	are	proof	of	injustices.																																																										184Arena	(2012),	258;	Rotondi	(1962),	309–10	on	the	sources	for	this	law;	Williamson	(2005),	384	on	the	historical	context	of	the	Gracchi;	Steel	and	van	der	Blom	(2013),	52–53	mention	it	as	a	measure	specifically	designed	to	safeguard	libertas.	185The	leges	Porciae	which	preceded	the	lex	Sempronia	during	the	2nd	century	BC	forbade,	for	example,	the	flogging	of	citizens:	OCD	(4th	ed.)	‘provocatio’.	186Phang	(2008),	47.	Dio	54.14.2-3	mentions	former	senator	Licinius	Regulus	enumerating	his	campaigns	and	stripping	bare	his	body	to	reveal	his	scars	when	he	is	struck	from	the	senatorial	record	after	Augustus’	reform	of	the	senate	in	18BC.	
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Historiographically,	the	citizen-mutineers’	display	of	servile	wounds	inflicted	by	their	 own	 side	 reveals	 the	 gap	which	 has	 opened	 up	 between	 the	Republican	valuation	 of	 the	 citizen	 body	 and	 its	 imperial	 equivalent.	 But	 of	 course	 times	
have	changed,	and	even	the	soldiers	are	aware	of	it:	their	display	to	Germanicus	in	 particular	 constitutes	 a	 paradox,	 in	 that	 it	 is	 an	 appeal	 to	 the	 emperor	 (by	proxy)	 for	 the	 redress	 of	 their	 un-Republican	 treatment.	 The	 paradox	 is	appropriate	to	their	situation	in	time,	on	the	threshold	of	the	institutionalisation	of	the	principate	as	opposed	to	simply	the	reign	of	Augustus.	The	fact	that	the	Batavians	 share	 their	 outrage	 at	 their	 bodily	 treatment,	 however,	 shows	 two	things	foremost.	First,	that	the	main	distinction	is	that	between	servitium/non-
servitium	 (and	 thus	 some	 conception	 of	 libertas)	 rather	 than	 between	slave/citizen.	And	secondly,	that	Tacitus’	text,	in	aligning	Roman	citizens	as	well	as	 the	 Batavian	 auxiliaries	 on	 one	 side	 of	 this	 dichotomy,	 asserts	 further	evidence	of	the	erosion	of	certain	status	distinctions	under	the	Empire,	such	as	citizen/non-citizen,	centre/periphery,	foreign/Roman,	free/slave,	in	favour	of	a	Roman	conception	of	society	as	polarised	around	the	emperor	on	one	side	and	his	subjects	on	the	other.187		 	But	 there	 is	 a	 further	 aspect	 to	 Arena’s	 argument	 concerning	 libertas	 in	 Late	Republican	political	discourse	which	 is	 relevant	 to	 its	use	 in	Tacitus:	whereas	for	a	 long	 time	political	opponents	under	 the	Late	Republic	drew	on	the	same	definition	of	 libertas	as	a	state	of	non-domination,	from	the	mid-1st	century	BC	onwards	 the	concept	underwent	 two	changes:	 first,	an	 ‘alteration	of	 the	set	of	references	to	which	it	could	be	applied	by	virtue	of	 its	agreed	criteria’	(i.e.	 the	idea	that	sometimes	a	disregard	for	the	strict	letter	of	the	law	was	required	to	safeguard	 libertas	became	accepted),	and	secondly	 that	 the	rule	of	 law	was	no	longer	the	essential	foundation	and	guarantor	of	libertas.	Instead,	this	function	
																																																								187Lavan	(2013),	111	mentions	Caracalla’s	universal	grant	of	citizenship	to	all	free	men	in	AD212	as	the	end	point	of	this	development	towards	obscuring	all	other	distinctions,	though	only	the	non-imperial	half	of	the	dichotomy	underwent	any	such	change	during	those	two	centuries	–	the	emperor	had	reigned	supreme	and	alone	on	the	other	side	since	the	Augustan	age.	
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was	 usurped	 by	 the	 private	 iudicium	of	 the	 man	 committed	 to	 the	 right	 and	good.188	Finally,	she	argues	that			 ‘[b]y	endorsing	 the	exclusion	of	 the	objectivity	of	 law	as	an	entity	above	anyone’s	 judgement	 which	 those	 who	 supported	 the	 senatus	 consultum	ultimum	 	 advocated,	 the	 people	 opened	 a	 very	 dangerous	 breach	 in	 the	intellectual	 world	 of	 the	 Republic,	 which	 contributed	 to	 the	 ideological	premises	 for	 its	 fall	 (….)	 [this]	 resulted	 in	 the	 legitimation	 of	 a	 political	behaviour	 which,	 by	 making	 Octavian’s	 actions	 ideologically	 possible,	ultimately	acted	as	one	of	the	engines	of	social	and	political	change.’189			The	possibility	of	 the	 iudicium	of	 the	man	committed	 to	 the	right	and	good	as	underpinning	 the	 notion	 of	 libertas	culminated	 in	 the	 ascendancy	 of	 Octavian	and	then	became	institutionalised	in	the	person	of	the	emperor.		Arena’s	 dichotomy	 between	 the	 ‘old’	 Republican	 conception	 of	 libertas	 as	derived	 from	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 the	 ‘newer’	 conception	 of	 it	 as	 something	which	could	be	under	the	care	of	a	single	individual	is	reflected	in	Tacitus.	For	every	 occasion	where	 the	mutineers	 or	 the	Batavians	 air	 the	 ‘old’	 conception,	there	are	Romans	from	higher	up	in	the	imperial	entourage	to	speak	up,	on	the	basis	of	 the	new	one,	 for	 the	necessity	 and	 legitimation	of	 the	princeps	whom	the	Republicans	 identified	 as	 the	ultimate	 source	 of	 their	 domination.	At	Ann.	1.28	 in	 Pannonia,	 Drusus’	 messengers	 go	 round	 denouncing	 the	 legitimacy	(Percennione	 et	 Vibuleno	 sacramentum	 dicturi	 sumus?)	 as	 well	 as	 ability	(Percennius	et	Vibulenus	 stipendia	militibus,	agros	emeritis	 largientur?)	 of	 such	as	Percennius	and	Vibulenus	to	provide	the	soldiers	with	what	they	want	from	an	 emperor.	 On	 the	 Rhine,	 the	 imperial	 standpoint	 is	 voiced	 by	 Germanicus	when	he	highlights	how	central	Tiberius	is	to	the	situation	of	the	soldiers:			
primane	et	vicesima	legiones,	illa	signis	a	Tiberio	acceptis,	tu	tot	proeliorum	
socia,	tot	praemiis	aucta,	egregiam	duci	vestro	gratiam	refertis?	hunc	ego	
nuntium	patri	laeta	omnia	aliis	e	provinciis	audienti	feram?	ipsius	tirones,																																																									188Arena	(2012),	160–66.	Compare	Gowing	(2005),	18–19.	189Arena	(2012),	276.	She	points	out	Cicero	was	instrumental	in	the	development	of	these	changes,	first	through	the	SCU	against	Catiline	in	63BC	which	he	based	on	the	first	conceptual	change;	secondly	through	that	against	Antony	in	43BC	which	he	based	on	the	privatum	consilium	of	those	committed	to	the	continuation	of	the	commonwealth.		
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ipsius	veteranos	non	missione,	non	pecunia	satiatos:	hic	tantum	interfici	
centuriones,	eici	tribunos,	includi	legatos,	infecta	sanguine	castra,	flumina,	
meque	precariam	animam	inter	infensos	trahere.		
Ann.	1.42	‘You	first	and	twentieth	legions,	both	with	eagles	received	from	Tiberius,	allies	of	him	in	so	many	battles,	made	richer	by	him	through	so	many	bonuses,	is	this	the	kind	of	extraordinary	thanks	you	give	to	your	general?	Shall	I	take	this	message	to	my	father	who	hears	only	glad	tidings	from	other	provinces?	that	his	recruits,	his	veterans,	are	not	satisfied	with	retirement	or	money?	That	in	this	camp	only	murdered	centurions	will	do,	and	tribunes	expelled,	legates	locked	up,	camps	and	rivers	tainted	with	blood,	and	me	dragging	out	a	precarious	existence	among	troops	hostile	to	me?’		The	 common	 good	 requires	 the	 princeps;	 denying	 him	 is	 both	 wrong	 and	misguided	in	terms	of	procuring	their	aims.	In	Batavia,	Cerialis	again	argues	the	necessity	of	the	princeps,	virtuous	or	not	as	he	may	be,	for	exactly	this	reason:			
quo	modo	sterilitatem	aut	nimios	 imbris	et	cetera	naturae	mala,	 ita	 luxum	
vel	avaritiam	dominantium	 tolerate.	 vitia	 erunt,	donec	homines,	 sed	neque	
haec	 continua	 et	 meliorum	 interventu	 pensantur:	 nisi	 forte	 Tutore	 et	
Classico	 regnantibus	 moderatius	 imperium	 speratis,	 aut	 minoribus	 quam	
nunc	 tributis	 parabuntur	 exercitus	 quibus	Germani	Britannique	arceantur.	
nam	 pulsis,	 quod	 di	 prohibeant,	 Romanis	 quid	 aliud	 quam	 bella	 omnium	
inter	se	gentium	existent?		
Hist.	4.74.9-17	‘In	 the	same	way	you	put	up	with	droughts	and	pouring	 rains	and	other	natural	disasters,	put	up	with	the	decadence	and	greed	of	those	who	rule	you.	There	will	be	vices	for	as	long	as	there	are	humans,	but	they	are	not	never-ending	 and	 are	 balanced	 out	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 better	 times;	unless	 perhaps	 you	 hope	 for	 a	 more	 moderate	 rule	 when	 Tutor	 and	Classicus	are	in	power,	or	that	the	legions	by	which	the	Germans	and	the	Britons	are	kept	out	 can	be	kept	ever	 ready	with	 less	 tribute	 than	 is	 the	case	now.	Because	if	the	Romans	are	driven	out,	gods	forbid,	what	will	be	left	other	than	all	nations	at	war	with	one	another?’				Similar	arguments	are	put	 forward	 in	a	similar	manner	 in	 two	speeches	made	by	 outraged	 Roman	 commanders	 to	 unruly	 Roman	 soldiers,	 one	 during	 the	mutinies	and	the	other	during	the	Batavian	rebellion:		
quo	 usque	 filium	 imperatoris	 obsidebimus?	 quis	 certaminum	 finis?	
Percennione	 et	 Vibuleno	 sacramentum	 dicturi	 sumus?	 Percennius	 et	
Vibulenus	 stipendia	 militibus,	 agros	 emeritis	 largientur?	 denique	 pro	
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Neronibus	 et	 Drusis	 imperium	 populi	 Romani	 capessent?	 quin	 potius,	 ut	
novissimi	 in	 culpam,	 ita	 primi	 ad	paenitentiam	 sumus?	 tarda	 sunt	 quae	 in	
commune	expostulantur:	privatam	gratiam	statim	mereare,	statim	recipias.	
	
Ann.	1.28;	Clemens	(centurio)	‘How	far	will	you	pursue	your	siege	of	the	emperor’s	son?	What	will	be	the	end	to	your	battle?	Are	we	to	take	our	oaths	to	Percennius	and	Vibulenus	now?	Will	Percennius	and	Vibulenis	provide	pay	for	soldiers	and	lands	for	veterans?	Then	will	 they	 take	on	 the	empire	of	 the	Roman	people	 in	 the	place	 of	 the	 Nerones	 and	 the	 Drusi?	 Isn’t	 it	 better,	 just	 as	 we	were	 the	latest	ones	to	fall	into	error,	to	be	the	first	to	come	to	repentance?	Things	which	 are	 demanded	 on	 behalf	 of	 a	 group	 are	 slow	 to	 come	 about;	 but	forgiveness	for	yourselves	as	individuals	you	can	earn	on	the	spot,	and	will	receive	immediately.’		
vobis	 satellitibus	 Civilem	 et	 Classicum	 Italiam	 invasuros.	 an,	 si	 ad	moenia	
urbis	Germani	Gallique	duxerint,	arma	patriae	inferetis?	horret	animus	tanti	
flagitii	 imagine.	 Tutorine	 Treviro	 agentur	 excubiae?	 signum	 belli	 Batavus	
dabit,	et	Germanorum	catervas	supplebitis?	quis	deinde	sceleris	exitus,	cum	
Romanae	legiones	contra	derexerint?	transfugae	e	transfugis	et	proditores	e	
proditoribus	 inter	 recens	 et	 vetus	 sacramentum	 invisi	 deis	 errabitis?	 te,	
Iuppiter	 optime	maxime,	 quem	per	octingentos	 viginti	 annos	 tot	 triumphis	
coluimus,	 te,	Quirine	Romanae	parens	urbis,	 precor	 venerorque	ut,	 si	 vobis	
non	fuit	cordi	me	duce	haec	castra	incorrupta	et	intemerata	servari,	at	certe	
pollui	 foedarique	 a	 Tutore	 et	 Classico	 ne	 sinatis,	 militibus	 Romanis	 aut	
innocentiam	detis	aut	maturam	et	sine	noxa	paenitentiam.	
	
Hist.	4.58.24-38;	Dillius	Vocula	(legatus)	‘…	that	with	you	as	their	cronies,	Civilis	and	Classicus	will	invade	Italy.	Or,	when	 the	Germans	and	Gauls	have	 led	you	up	 to	 the	walls	of	Rome,	will	you	carry	arms	against	your	fatherland?	The	mind	recoils	at	the	thought	of	such	 a	 crime.	Will	 you	 keep	watch	 at	 night	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 Tutor	 the	Trevir?	Will	the	Batavian	give	the	order	to	attack,	and	will	you	help	to	bulk	out	the	fighting	bands	of	Germans?	What	will	the	outcome	of	this	crime	be,	when	Roman	legions	have	lined	up	against	you?	Will	you	oscillate,	hateful	to	 the	 gods,	 as	 deserters	 from	other	 deserters,	 traitors	 of	 other	 traitors,	between	 	your	 recent	and	your	old	oath?	 I	beseech	you,	 Jupiter	Optimus	Maximus,	 whom	 we	 have	 honoured	 with	 so	 many	 triumphs	 over	 the	course	 of	 eight	 hundred	 years,	 and	 you,	 Quirinus,	 parent	 of	 the	 city	 of	Rome,	and	I	pay	honour	to	you	so	that,	if	you	cannot	find	it	in	your	hear	to	keep	this	camp	uncorrupted	and	unviolated,	with	me	as	its	leader,	you	will	assuredly	not	allow	 it	 to	be	polluted	and	stained	by	Tutor	and	Classicus,	and	 will	 grant	 to	 the	 Roman	 soldiers	 either	 innocence	 or	 a	 speedy	reconsideration	with	no	harm	done.’190																																																									190The	sentiment	of	Vocula’s	closing	statement	here,	talking	to	his	own	soldiers,	resembles	that	of	Cerialis	to	the	Transrhenani	at	the	end	of	the	rebellion,	which	is	
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	Rhetorically	Percennius	et	al.	and	the	Batavians	et	al.	are	both	the	focus	of	what	Ash	identified	as	a	congeries:	a	‘piling	up	of	synonymous	words	or	concepts	with	the	 purpose	 of	 ‘unius	 amplificatio’’,	 strengthening	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 single	theme.191	The	theme,	in	this	case,	is	that	neither	common	soldiers	nor	Batavians	are	 able	 to	 perform	 the	 roles	 the	 emperor	 (and	 his	 delegates	with	 imperium)	fulfill	 in	 looking	 out	 for	 the	 soldiery	 both	 during	 (sacramentum,	 stipendia,	
excubiae,	 signum	 belli)	 and	 after	 (agros	 emeritis)	 their	 service.	 Through	 this	denial,	the	opposite	case	is	made,	which	advocates	loyalty	to	the	princeps	as	the	only	 provider	 of	 such	 goods.	 The	 ludicrousness	 of	 either	 soldiers	 or	 Germans	being	 put	 in	 charge	 is	 given	 rhetorical	 form:	 in	 both	 cases	 an	 invasion	 of	 the	Roman	state	by	these	soldiers192	is	held	forth	for	contemplation,	 followed	by	a	hypothetical	 enumeration	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 such	 an	 act	 (appalling,	 it	 is	implied),	and	closed	off	with	a	recommendation	to	repent	and	mend	their	ways.			Looking	 at	 these	 examples,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 the	 argument	 of	 these	advocates	of	the	principate	is	once	again	structured	on	two	different	levels,	the	narrative	 and	 the	 historiographical.	 What	 Tacitus	 has	 both	 soldiers	 and	Batavians	say	reveals	them	to	care	about	 libertas	as	freedom	from	domination	only	 in	 a	 utilitarian	 way.	 Drusus’	 anonymous	 messengers,	 Germanicus,	 and	Petillius	 Cerialis	 all	 legitimate	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 princeps	 to	 soldiers	 and	Batavians	on	this	basis:	they	would	be	worse	off	because	those	who	are	trying	to	 get	 their	 support	 are	 not	 the	 emperor,	 and	 only	 the	 emperor	 can	 do	 the	
																																																																																																																																																													telling	in	itself:	…	Veledam	propinquosque	monebat	fortunam	belli,	tot	cladibus	
adversam,	opportuno	erga	populum	Romanum	merito	mutare,	Hist.	5.24.5-7.	191Ash	(2010a),	223–24.	Cerialis’	final	speech	to	the	remaining	rebels	relies	on	this	same	strategy	of	piling	up	synonyms	on	a	single	theme,	cf.	chapter	two,	p.	75.	192Clemens	speaks	of	besieging	filium	imperatoris:	the	identification	of	the	imperial	family	with	the	state	is	a	particular	and	well-attested	feature	of	the	Tiberian	principate,	see	Woodman	(2006),	325.	Although	it	was	articulated	most	elaborately	and	directly	in	the	Senatus	Consultum	de	Pisone	patre	of	AD20	(see	Severy	(2000)),	Millar	(1993)	traced	the	development	of	the	language	which	fostered	this	link	to	Ovid’s	Tiberian	poetry.	Tacitus	is	therefore	only	retrojecting	a	very	little	when	he	asserts	the	connection	for	AD14.	Then	again,	Fraschetti	(1990,	57)	sees	it	as	originating	in	the	much	earlier	iustitia	proclaimed	after	deaths	in	the	domus	Augusta	beginning	with	Marcellus	in	23BC.	
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emperor’s	 job,	which	 is	 to	 give	 them	various	 economic	 and	 status	 benefits.193	There	is	also	an	aspect	of	class-based	snobbery	to	their	rhetoric:	the	inability	of	Percennius/Vibulenus	 and	 the	 Gallo-Germans	 to	 usurp	 the	 duties	 of	 the	emperor	 or	 to	 act	 politically	 to	 that	 effect	 is	 partly	 grounded	 in	 their	identification	 in	 the	 narrative	 as	 lower	 class	 (both	 are	 described	 as	gregarius	
miles).194	Batavians	and	mutineers	kick	against	the	system	not	because	it	has	an	emperor	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 old	 Republican	 system,	 but	 because	 the	 emperor’s	corrupt	minions	exploit	them	in	a	way	which	they	feel	violates	their	status.	They	are	not	fighting	for	an	ideology	which	sees	libertas	as	the	highest	social	good	in	and	 of	 itself	 (even	 the	 soldiers’	 preference	 for	 Germanicus	 as	 head	 of	 a	Republican	 state	 is	 grounded	 in	 their	 expectations	 of	 better	 treatment	 from	him).		The	actors	in	this	story	themselves	are	thus	not	presented	as	political	agitators.	Political	 freedom	 would	 not	 have	 been	 a	 concern	 for	 those	 classed	 as	barbarians,	 nor,	 arguably,	 for	 the	 Roman	 poor	 who	 were	 excluded	 from	 the	practice	 of	 politics	 even	 if	 they	 belonged	 to	 the	 polity	 as	 citizens	 and	 cared	about	 that	status.	Nonetheless,	 their	view	of	 libertas	as	 the	absence	of	corrupt	
dominatio	 of	 their	 bodies	 is	 evocative	 of	 political	 libertas,	 precisely	 because	political	 freedom	was	 partly	 constituted	 through	 the	 unassaulted	 body	 of	 the	citizen	 (especially	 if	 he	 participated	 in	 politics).	 The	 senatorial	 elite	 which	formed	 Tacitus’	 main	 audience	 would	 have	 likely	 been	 alert	 to	 this	 implicit	
																																																								193The	lack	of	planning	for	the	aftermath	of	a	revolution	is	a	feature	of	several	conspiracy	narratives	in	Roman	historiography,	including	the	Catilinarian.	Cicero’s	first	speech	against	Catiline	shares	other	features	with	the	mutinies,	confirming	the	connection	in	Tacitus’	narrative	between	mutiny	and	political	conspiracy	as	equally	harmful	to	the	state:	first,	the	resonant	borrowing	by	Clemens	of	Cicero’s	Catilinarian	
quo	usque?	construction	to	open	his	speech,	as	noted	by	Pagán	(2005,	420).	Further,	the	imagery	of	a	siege	to	describe	the	danger	to	the	established	order	(desinant	insidiari	
domi	suae	consuli,	circumstare	tribunal	praetoris	urbani,	obsidere	cum	gladiis	curiam,	Cic.	Cat.	I.32).	Cicero’s	use	of	words	relating	to	religious	sacrifice	at	the	end	of	his	prayer	(homines	bonorum	inimicos,	hostis	patriae,	latrones	Italiae	scelerum	foedere	inter	
se	ac	nefaria	societate	coniunctos	aeternis	suppliciis	vivos	mortuosque	mactabis,	Cic.	
Cat.	I.33)	recalls	the	religiosity	of	Tacitus’	vocabulary	(incorrupta,	intemerata,	pollui,		
foedari)	at	the	end	of	Vocula’s	prayer.		194See	Fulkerson	(2006),	173	for	the	connection	between	theatre	and	questionable	morality	with	regard	to	Percennius’	background	as	claqueur	at	the	theatre.	Malloch	(2004),	202	similarly	stresses	the	‘city	origins	and	vices’	of	the	Rhine	mutineers.	
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alternative	reading	of	imperial	dominatio	of	bodies	as	political,	especially	since	they	 had	 at	 several	 times	 throughout	 the	 1st	 century	 AD	 experienced	 being	humiliatingly	 sidelined	 by	 emperors	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 their	 former,	 much	more	 important	 role.195	Such	 nostalgic	 engagement	 with	 Republican	 political	ideology	need	not	surprise	us:	 it	 is	possible	to	voice	regret	 for	the	 loss	of	past	political	 freedoms	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 acknowledging	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	change	 which	 ended	 them.	 It	 is	 in	 fact	 possible	 to	 read	 Tacitus’	 litany	 of	successive	episodes	of	dominatio	in	his	potted	history	of	‘urbem	Romam’	at	Ann.	1.1	as	seeing	political	libertas	as	more	or	less	under	continuous	threat	(or	only	existing	 as	 an	 ideal)	 since	 Rome’s	 very	 beginning,	 and	 Augustan	 times,	 in	contrast,	as	the	most	fully	realised	incarnation	of	it	that	had	ever	existed:		
Urbem	 Romam	 a	 principio	 reges	 habuere;	 libertatem	 et	 consulatum	 L.	
Brutus	 instituit.	 dictaturae	 ad	 tempus	 sumebantur;	 neque	 decemviralis	
potestas	ultra	biennium,	neque	tribunorum	militum	consulare	ius	diu	valuit.	
non	Cinnae,	non	Sullae	 longa	dominatio;	et	Pompei	Crassique	potentia	cito	
in	 Caesarem,	 Lepidi	 atque	 Antonii	 arma	 in	 Augustum	 cessere,	 qui	 cuncta	
discordiis	civilibus	fessa	nomine	principis	sub	imperium	accepit.	
Ann.	1.1		 ‘From	its	beginning,	kings	held	the	city	of	Rome;	it	was	Lucius	Brutus	who	instituted	 both	 libertas	 and	 the	 consulate.	 As	 occasion	 demanded,	dictatorships	were	 taken	up,	 but	 the	power	of	 the	decemviri	did	not	 last	beyond	two	years,	nor	did	 the	consular	 law	of	 the	military	 tribunes	hold	out	a	long	time.	Neither	Cinna	nor	Sulla	held	sway	for	long,	and	the	rule	of	Pompey	and	Crassus	quickly	made	way	for	Caesar,	the	military	dominance		of	 Lepidus	 and	Antonius	 submitted	 to	Augustus,	who	 took	 into	 his	 care,	under	 the	 name	 of	 princeps,	 everything	 that	 had	 been	 drained	 by	 civil	discord.’		Tacitus,	 despite	 his	 nostalgia,	 is	 reconciled	 to	 the	 trade-off	 of	 the	 Republic’s	steep	ups	and	downs,	 including	highly	 fluctuating	 levels	of	 senatorial	 freedom	and	 importance,	 for	 the	 flatter	 but	more	 stable	 political	 landscape	 under	 the	principate.		
																																																								195Sometimes	physically:	see	Tiberius’	sending	Drusus	to	Pannonia	as	imperial	representative	at	the	head	of	a	senatorial	delegation	(Ann.	1.24);	see	p.	121.	
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To	conclude,	the	soldiers	and	Batavians	are	united	in	voicing	their	displeasure	at	 being	 treated	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 slaves.	 Their	 bodies	 are	 wholly	 at	 the	disposition	of	the	imperial	representatives	with	whom	they	deal	or	under	whom	they	 serve,	when	 their	 status	 as	 free	 people	 and	 for	 the	mutineers	 as	 Roman	citizens	should	have	protected	 them	from	such	abuses	of	power.	They	call	 the	absence	 of	 such	 domination	 libertas.	 The	word	 recalls	 the	 legal	 protection	 of	citizen	bodies	 from	coercitio	and	execution	without	 trial	by	magistrates	under	the	Late	Republic	but	also	brings	to	mind	an	explicitly	political	conception	of	the	word	during	this	period	to	denote	the	absence	of	any	one	politically	dominant	individual	 or	 group.	 In	 this	 way	 Tacitus	 sets	 up	 a	 contrast	 in	 the	 narrative	between	Republican	 tradition	and	 the	 realities	of	 imperial	power	experienced	by	 the	 soldiers	which	 has	 implications	 for	 the	world	 outside	 the	 narrative	 as	well.	 This	 world	 was	 inhabited	 by	 the	 senatorial	 elite	 reading	 Tacitus	 whose	political	agency	under	the	principate	was	as	constrained	as	the	soldiers’	bodies.	
Carnival	I	have	already	briefly	 touched	on	 the	 limited	options	available	 to	 the	Tiberian	citizen-soldier	or	provincial	ally	forcibly	reduced	to	the	status	of	slave.	What	the	narrative	 shows	 they	 can	 achieve	 is	 to	 turn	 the	 tables,	 however	 briefly:	 to	salvage	their	wounded	pride	by	inflicting	on	others196,	before	retribution	sets	in,	what	they	have	had	to	bear	themselves.	The	window	of	opportunity	is	brief	and	precarious,	judging	by	the	floggings	authorised	by	Blaesus	at	Ann.	1.21	and	the	murder	 of	 Percennius	 and	Vibulenus	 sanctioned	by	Drusus	 at	Ann.	1.29-30	 in	Pannonia.	 In	 Germany	 two	 further	 summary	 executions	 are	 ordered	 by	
praefectus	castrorum	Manius	Ennius	at	Ann.	1.38,	and	murder	at	the	hands	of	a	soldiers’	 tribunal	 is	permitted,	 if	not	commanded,	by	Germanicus	at	Ann.	1.44.	Not	only	are	the	high	brought	low,	the	low	are	uplifted:	Tacitus’s	presentation	of	Percennius	as	a	dux	contionabundus	(Ann.	1.16-17)	reveals	him	as	usurping	the	place	 of	 a	 general	 and	making	 a	mockery	 of	 a	 legitimate	 general’s	 speech	 by	preaching	dissension,	not	unity.197	The	Gallo-Germans	too	‘turn	the	tables’:	in	a																																																									196The	named	praefectus	castrorum	Aufidienus	Rufus	at	Ann.	1.20	in	Pannonia,	and	the	unnamed	centuriones	on	the	Rhine	at	Ann.	1.32.	197The	two	terms	do	not	occur	as	a	syntagma:	Percennius	is	said	to	be	a	dux	theatralium	
operarum,	not	militum	(1.16),	and	contionabundus	does	not	occur	til	the	next	chapter	
		 	 	114	
general	sense,	by	beating	the	Romans	in	a	number	of	skirmishes,	but	also	more	symbolically	in	two	very	specific	cases.	First,	the	Trevir	Classicus	at	Hist.	4.59.6-7	enters	a	captured	Roman	camp	dressed	as	a	Roman	general	(sumptis	Romani	
imperii	insignibus	in	castra	venit).	A	 little	 later	 the	Lingonian	 Julius	Sabinus,	at	
Hist.	4.67.1-5,	usurps	the	name	of	‘Caesar’	and	then	goes	on	to	perform	a	whole	host	 of	 theoretically	 unCaesar-like	 actions,	 such	 as	 besieging	 the	 Sequani,	faithful	 allies	 of	 Rome.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 view	 the	 Batavi’s	 actions	 similarly	 to	those	 of	 the	 Romans:	 knowing	 how	 lenient	 their	 official	 treaty	 relations	with	Rome	already	were	and	that	no	change	could	be	achieved	for	the	better	in	that	regard,	 they	 inflict	 as	 much	 violence	 as	 possible	 on	 those	 who	 perpetrated	violence	upon	them.			In	 this	 reversal	 of	 the	 normal	 order	 of	 things,	 the	mutinies	 display	 important	aspects	of	 ‘those	periodic	 feasts	(such	as	the	Anthesteria	and	Saturnalia	of	 the	classical	 world	 and	 the	 charivari	 and	 Carnival	 of	 the	 medieval	 and	 modern	world)	 that	 are	 characterised	 by	 unbridled	 license	 and	 the	 overturning	 of	normal	 legal	 and	 social	 hierarchies’. 198 	The	 main	 problem,	 however,	 with	analogies	to	the	‘modern’	medieval	carnival	and	further	theoretical	elaborations	of	 it,	 such	 as	 Bakhtin’s,	 is	 that	 seeing	 the	 mutinies	 wholesale	 as	 a	 carnival	ignores	that	carnival	was	a	social	 institution	which	had	the	approval,	grudging	or	 otherwise,	 and	 sometimes	 even	 the	 encouragement	 of	 the	 dominating	classes.	 In	 Tacitus	 the	 iustitium	 is	 declared	 by	 those	 in	 authority,	 yes,	 but	 its	violent	 consequences	 are	 described	 as	 wholly	 unexpected,	 undesired,	 and	disapproved	of;	 retributions	 are	 correspondingly	 savage.	Bakhtin’s	 theoretical	elaboration	 of	 the	 societal	 reversal	 of	 carnival	 into	 what	 he	 called	 the	‘carnivalesque’	also	seems	inappropriate	for	Tacitus’	scene.	Even	if	we	disregard	the	 specific	 historical	 grounding	 of	 this	 concept199	in	 the	 (unique,	 Bakhtin																																																																																																																																																														(1.17).	They	are,	however,	placed	suggestively	close	together.	The	rare	contionabundus	can	be	both	positive	and	negative	in	its	meaning	of	proposing	something	in	a	public	assembly	(OLD	‘delivering	a	public	speech	or	harangue’)	but	velut	denotes	its	negative	use	here.	Auerbach	(1953),	37,	too,	spotted	the	carnivalesque	in	this	and	refers	to	him	as	‘playing	the	general’.	Pagán	(2005),	422	notes	the	incongruity	of	a	general	preaching	dissension.	198Agamben	(2005),	71.	199Developed	in	Rabelais	and	his	World	(1984).	
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argues)	circumstances	of	the	Renaissance,	the	only	feature	of	the	carnivalesque	which	emerges	in	Tacitus’	narrative	is	the	body’s	display	of	degeneration	used	for	 anti-authoritarian	 purposes	 in	 the	 soldiers’	 display	 of	 their	 dishonorable	scars.	But	even	this	relies	on	extending	–	overstretching	–	his	definition	of	the	degenerated	 body	 from	 natural	 bodily	 functions	 to	 the	 man-inflicted	 bodily	disfigurements	Tacitus	reports.	Nor	is	this	body	being	‘celebrated’	or	associated	with	regeneration	and	renewal.200	To	the	contrary,	the	reversals	result	in	harsh	retributions	which	further	mutilate,	and	even	kill,	these	bodies.			Whatever	 is	 in	Tacitus	 of	 the	 carnival	 aligns	more	 easily	with	 the	 theory	 that	sees	 violent,	 exuberant	 role-reversal	 as	 a	metaphorical	 safety-valve,	 ‘which	 in	some	overall	 functional	way	 reinforces	 the	bonds	of	 authority	by	allowing	 for	their	temporary	suspension’.201	In	this	theory	the	failure	of	the	state	of	reversal	to	become	permanent	makes	the	rebellions	by	no	means	pointless,	as	there	is	a	vengeful	 gratification	 to	 be	 derived	 from	 ‘acting	 out’	 these	 frustrations.	 Scott	questioned	the	safety	valve	theory	by	wondering	whether	domination	really	is	easier	 to	return	 to	afterwards.202	For	Tacitus’	 soldiers	 it	definitely	 is:	after	 the	lunar	 eclipse	 in	 Pannonia	 and	 the	 threatened	 removal	 of	 Agrippina	 and	 her	entourage	 to	 the	 Treviri,	 both	 sets	 of	mutineers	 are	 completely	 reconciled	 to	authority	again	(tum	redire	paulatim	amor	obsequii,	Ann.	1.28)	or	even	request	a	return	 to	 the	 status	quo:	 supplices	ad	haec	 et	 vera	 exprobrari	 fatentes	 orabant	
puniret	noxios,	ignosceret	lapsis	et	duceret	in	hostem,	 ‘having	become	contrite	at	these	words	and	confessing	that	they	were	being	punished	for	true	crimes,	they	begged	that	he	should	punish	the	guilty,	forgive	those	who	had	been	misguided	and	lead	them	out	against	the	enemy’,	Ann.	1.44.	The	Batavi,	too,	come	to	their	senses	and	the	people,	if	not	Civilis,	appear	to	be	forgiven.203																																																										200Dentith	(1995),	70–76.	201Dentith	(1995),	73.	Although	it	is	arguable	whether	Blaesus	saw	himself	suspending	the	bonds	of	authority	in	declaring	the	iustitium,	the	soldiers	act	as	if	they	are	freed	from	these	bonds.	202Scott	(1990),	177.	203Cerialis	per	occultos	nuntios	Batavis	pacem,	Civili	veniam	ostentans,	Hist.	5.24.4-5;	though,	sadly,	Tacitus’	account	of	the	aftermath	of	the	revolt	is	lost	and	they	largely	disappear	from	the	historical	record.	
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If	 bodies	 are	 the	 object	 of	 corrupt	 imperial	dominatio	 which	 is	 resented,	 it	 is	thus	apt	that	any	resistance	against	this	dominatio	should	partly	find	expression	through	the	body,	alongside	discourse.	Victims	and	persecutors	swap	roles	in	a	carnivalesque	reversal	of	 the	normal	order	 to	gratify	 their	 feelings	of	outrage.	But	 this	 can	 only	 occur	 to	 a	 very	 limited	 extent:	 given	 that	 the	 dominatio	originates	 from	 the	 unlimited	 power	 of	 the	princeps,	 violent	 resistance	 is	 still	subject	 to	 that	very	same	power	and	structurally	unable	 to	overcome	 it	 in	 the	longer	 term.	 The	 narrative	 proves	 that	 by	 the	 ultimate	 failure	 of	 both	 the	mutinies	 and	 the	 Batavian	 rebellion	 to	 overthrow	 the	 regime	 or	 achieve	 any	lasting	results.204	
Discourse	(II):	Libertas	and	language	The	resemblance	between	parts	of	the	mutinies	and	the	Batavian	revolt	goes	a	lot	further	than	the	way	both	sets	of	actors	perceive	their	relationship	with	the	Roman	state	as	one	of	master	and	slave	as	manifested	through	the	treatment	of	their	 bodies.	 They	 also	 repeatedly	 complain	 about	 a	mismatch	 between	what	they	 perceive	 and	 what	 Rome	 says;	 between	 what	 Rome	 says	 and	 what	 it	means:		
Postremo	 promptis	 iam	 et	 aliis	 seditionis	 ministris	 velut	 contionabundus	
interrogabat	 cur	 paucis	 centurionibus	 paucioribus	 tribunis	 in	 modum	
servorum	 oboedirent.	 quando	 ausuros	 exposcere	 remedia,	 nisi	 novum	 et	
nutantem	adhuc	principem	precibus	 vel	 armis	adirent?	 satis	 per	 tot	 annos	
ignavia	peccatum,	quod	tricena	aut	quadragena	stipendia	senes	et	plerique	
truncato	 ex	 vulneribus	 corpore	 tolerent.	 ne	 dimissis	 quidem	 finem	 esse	
militiae,	sed	apud	vexillum	tendentis	alio	vocabulo	eosdem	labores	perferre.	
ac	 si	 quis	 tot	 casus	 vita	 superaverit,	 trahi	adhuc	diversas	 in	 terras	ubi	per	
nomen	agrorum	uligines	paludum	vel	 inculta	montium	accipiant.	enimvero	
militiam	 ipsam	 gravem,	 infructuosam:	 denis	 in	 diem	 assibus	 animam	 et	
corpus	aestimari:	hinc	vestem	arma	tentoria,	hinc	saevitiam	centurionum	et	
vacationes	munerum	redimi.	at	hercule	verbera	et	vulnera,	duram	hiemem,	
exercitas	 aestates,	 bellum	atrox:	 aut	 sterilem	pacem	 sempiterna.	 nec	 aliud	
levamentum	quam	si	certis	sub	legibus	militia	iniretur,	ut	singulos	denarios	
mererent,	 sextus	 decumus	 stipendii	 annus	 finem	 adferret,	 ne	 ultra	 sub	
vexillis	 tenerentur,	 sed	 isdem	 in	 castris	 praemium	 pecunia	 solveretur.	 an																																																									204Though	it	is	clear	that	Tacitus	is	not	interested	in	ascribing	a	specific	expected	outcome	to	either	mutineers	or	Batavi	(cf.	chapter	two’s	discussion	of	how	and	why	aims	are	shown	to	oscillate).	It	is	the	power	structures	analysed	in	the	course	of	the	mutinies	and	the	rebellion	which	allow	him	to	explore	and	criticise	the	nature	of	the	principate	and	its	effects	on	its	subordinates.	
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praetorias	 cohortis,	 quae	 binos	 denarios	 acceperint,	 quae	 post	 sedecim	
annos	penatibus	suis	reddantur,	plus	periculorum	suscipere?	non	obtrectari	
a	 se	 urbanas	 excubias:	 sibi	 tamen	 apud	 horridas	 gentis	 e	 contuberniis	
hostem	aspici.		
Ann.	1.17,	mutinies	‘After	this,	with	other	assistants	to	his	rebellion	already	at	hand,	he	asked,	as	if	addressing	a	gathered	crowd,	why	they	obeyed	so	few	centurions	and	even	fewer	tribunes	in	such	a	slavish	manner.	When	would	they	dare	to	demand	redress,	if	they	were	not	going	to	approach	a	new	and	still	precariously	placed	emperor	either	with	pleas	or	violence?	[He	also	said]	that	they	had	missed	enough	opportunities	through	the	years	through	their	cravenness,	and	old	men	were	dragging	out	thirty	or	forty	years	of	service,	with	the	bodies	of	many	maimed	through	injuries.	And	that	there	was	no	end	to	service	even	for	those	who	had	been	discharged,	but	instead	whilst	serving	in	the	vexillae	they	performed	the	same	duties	under	a	different	name.	And	if	anyone	should	have	survived	such	threats	to	their	life,	they	were	then	dragged	to	the	far	ends	of	the	earth	where	under	the	name	of	fields	they	took	possession	of	the	damp	ends	of	swamps	or	the	wildest	bits	of	mountains.	Indeed,	military	service	itself	was	harsh	and	unrewarding:	body	and	soul	were	deemed	worth	ten	asses	a	day,	and	from	this	had	to	be	subtracted	clothes,	weapons	and	tents;	out	of	this,	too,	the	cruelty	of	their	commanding	officers	and	respite	from	chores	had	to	be	bought	off.	But	by	god,	they	had	lashings	and	injuries,	harsh	winters	and	eventful	summers,	and	a	grim	war.	Their	unremunerative	peace,	on	the	other	hand,	seemed	everlasting.	Nor	was	there	any	other	relief	possible	than	to	go	into	the	military	with	fixed	regulations	in	place	to	the	extent	that	they	could	earn	a	denarius,	and	the	sixteenth	year	of	service	would	bring	retirement,	and	so	that	no	one	would	be	held	back	in	the	vexillae,	but	the	money	would	be	paid	in	the	camp	itself.	[Then	he	asked]	whether	the	praetorian	cohorts	who	receive	two,	and	who	are	returned	safe	to	their	homes	after	sixteen	years,	took	on	more	danger	in	the	line	of	duty?	He	did	not	wish	to	disparage	urban	duties,	but	nonetheless	it	was	by	them,	in	rough	foreign	parts,	that	the	enemy	could	be	seen	from	their	very	tents.’			
Igitur	Civilis	desciscendi	certus,	occultato	 interim	altiore	consilio,	cetera	ex	
eventu	 iudicaturus,	 novare	 res	 hoc	 modo	 coepit.	 iussu	 Vitellii	 Batavorum	
iuventus	 ad	 dilectum	 vocabatur,	 quem	 suapte	 natura	 gravem	 onerabant	
ministri	 avaritia	 ac	 luxu,	 senes	 aut	 invalidos	 conquirendo,	 quos	 pretio	
dimitterent:	 rursus	 impubes	 et	 forma	 conspicui	 (et	 est	 plerisque	 procera	
pueritia)	 ad	 stuprum	 trahebantur.	 hinc	 invidia,	 et	 compositae	 seditionis	
auctores	 perpulere	 ut	 dilectum	 abnuerent.	 Civilis	 primores	 gentis	 et	
promptissimos	vulgi	specie	epularum	sacrum	in	nemus	vocatos,	ubi	nocte	ac	
laetitia	 incaluisse	videt,	a	 laude	gloriaque	gentis	orsus	 iniurias	et	raptus	et	
cetera	servitii	mala	enumerat:	neque	enim	societatem,	ut	olim,	sed	tamquam	
mancipia	haberi:	 quando	 legatum,	gravi	quidem	comitatu	et	 superbo,	 cum	
imperio	 venire?	 tradi	 se	 praefectis	 centurionibusque:	 quos	 ubi	 spoliis	 et	
sanguine	 expleverint,	 mutari,	 exquirique	 novos	 sinus	 et	 varia	 praedandi	
vocabula.	 instare	dilectum	quo	 liberi	a	parentibus,	 fratres	a	 fratribus	velut	
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supremum	dividantur.	numquam	magis	adflictam	rem	Romanam	nec	aliud	
in	 hibernis	 quam	 praedam	 et	 senes:	 attollerent	 tantum	 oculos	 et	 inania	
legionum	 nomina	 ne	 pavescerent.	 at	 sibi	 robur	 peditum	 equitumque,	
consanguineos	 Germanos,	 Gallias	 idem	 cupientis.	 ne	 Romanis	 quidem	
ingratum	 id	 bellum,	 cuius	 ambiguam	 fortunam	 Vespasiano	 imputaturos:	
victoriae	rationem	non	reddi.	
Hist.	4.14,	Batavians		‘Therefore	Civilis	decided	to	secede.	While	he	was	keeping	hidden	his	real	intention,	and	would	judge	all	other	things	as	they	unfolded,	he	began	a	revolution	in	the	following	manner.	By	the	order	of	Vitellius	the	Batavian	youth	had	been	called	to	a	levy,	which,	already	burdensome	by	its	very	nature,	the	officials	made	even	harder	to	bear	with	their	greed	and	lack	of	restraint,	by	seeking	out	the	old	and	the	weak,	whom	they	would	only	let	go	for	a	price:	then	again	they	would	drag	off	the	young	and	those	notable	for	their	physique	(and	there	is	much	tall	youth	there)	to	be	raped.	Hence	the	bad	feeling,	and	the	leaders	of	the	prepared	rebellion	made	it	so	that	people	refused	to	be	conscripted.	Civilis	addressed	the	chiefs	of	the	tribe	and	those	commoners	most	ready	to	act,	called	together	to	a	sacred	grove	under	the	pretext	of	a	feast,	and	when	he	saw	that	they	had	grown	restive	through	the	late	hour	and	with	jollity,	he	listed,	starting	from	a	point	of	praise	and	the	tribe’s	glory,	the	injustices,	rape	and	other	misfortunes	belonging	to	their	state	of	serfdom,	saying	that	they	were	not	treated	as	allies,	as	they	once	had,	but	as	slaves:	when	would	a	legate	come	their	way,	with	a	massive	and	proud	entourage,	with	actual	power?	They	were	being	handed	over	to	prefects	and	centurions,	whom,	when	they	had	filled	themselves	with	loot	and	blood,	changed,	and	sought	out	new	money	traps	and	different	words	for	their	stealing.	A	levy	was	upon	them	by	which	children	would	be	separated	from	parents,	brothers	from	brothers	as	if	forever.	But	the	Roman	state	had	never	been	more	under	pressure,	nor	was	there	anything	in	their	winter	camps	but	loot	and	old	men:	let	them	only	lift	their	eyes	and	not	tremble	at	the	empty	names	of	the	legions.	But	with	themselves	were	a	stout	cohort	of	foot	soldiers	and	cavalrymen,	German	relatives,	and	Gauls	wanting	similar	things.	This	war	would	not	be	unwelcome	even	to	the	Romans,	a	war	of	which	an	ambiguous	outcome	could	be	credited	to	Vespasian,	and	for	a	total	victory	no	account	would	have	to	be	given	at	all..’		In	both,	mention	of	 a	 seditio	 is	 followed	by	a	 rousing	 speech	enumerating	 the	evils	 besetting	 Pannonian	 soldiers	 and	 Batavians	 respectively,	 and	 their	concerns	 are	 surprisingly	 similar.	 Civilis’	 assertion	 that	 tradi	 se	 praefectis	
centurionibusque:	 quos	 ubi	 spoliis	 et	 sanguine	 expleverint,	 mutari,	 exquirique	
novos	 sinus	 et	 varia	 praedandi	 vocabula	 can	 be	 mapped	 seamlessly	 onto	 the	Pannonian	 soldiers’	 concerns	 at	Ann.	1.17.	 Sanguine	stands	 for	 the	 verbera	of	which	 the	 legionaries	 complain;	 in	 both	 cases	 these	 are	 administered	 by	
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praefecti	 and	 centuriones.205 	The	 spolia	 taken	 from	 the	 Batavians	 by	 these	corrupt	 officers	 are	 similar	 to	 the	 bribes	 extracted	 from	 the	 soldiers	 to	 spare	them	 further	 maltreatment:	 saevitiam	 centurionum	 et	 vacationes	 munerum	
redimi.	On	both	sides	there	are	attempts	to	cover	up	these	injustices	with	fancy	words:	 for	 the	Pannonian	 legionaries	 their	 term	of	 being	 kept	 sub	vexillatione	after	 they	 complete	 their	 term	 of	 legionary	 service	 is	 alio	 vocabulo	 eosdem	
labores	 perferre,	 and	 when	 they	 finally	 are	 allowed	 their	 retirement	 they	 are	forced	 to	 take	 per	 nomen	 agrorum	 uligines	 paludum	 vel	 inculta	 montium.	Further,	the	Batavian	idea	that	their	association	with	Rome	was	one	of	societas	turned	 tamquam	mancipia	 is	 reiterated	 by	 Civilis	 in	 different	words:	miseram	
servitutem	 falso	 pacem	 vocarent	 [Romani]	 (Hist.	 4.17.10).206	A	 distinct	 lack	 of	faith	 in	the	correlation	between	words	used	by	the	Roman	authorities	and	the	reality	faced	by	the	soldiers	characterises	the	discourse	of	the	mutineers	and	is	paralleled	 by	 the	 situation	 facing	 the	 Batavians.	 The	 import	 of	 this	 shared	discourse	 is	 great:	 the	 corruption	 of	 the	 language	 used	 by	 official	representatives	 of	 Rome	 is	 here	 shown	 to	 be	 universal	 in	 its	 application;	 not	used	exclusively	 against	provincials	but	 also	against	Romans	 to	 ‘keep	 them	 in	their	place’.207	
	The	 cross-pollination	 between	 these	 episodes	 is	 too	 fertile	 to	 be	 explained	 in	terms	of	the	recycling	of	historiographical	topoi	for	‘scenes	of	rebellion’,	and	of	the	topoi	listed	by	Fulkerson	in	her	analysis	of	the	German	mutiny	none	recur	in	the	Batavian	rebellion.208	The	meaning	of	the	similarities	lies	elsewhere.		
																																																								205For	the	Batavians,	see	the	quote	above,	and	for	Pannonia	cf.	the	revenge	inflicted	on	harsh	disciplinarians	Aufidienus	Rufus,	praefectus	castrorum,	at	Ann.	1.20	as	well	as	on	
centurio	‘cedo	alteram’	Lucilius	at	Ann.	1.23.	206The	Batavian	position	is	also	articulated	by	the	Caledonian	Calgacus	in	the	Agricola:	
auferre	trucidare	rapere	falsis	nominibus	imperium,	atque	ubi	solitudinem	faciunt,	pacem	
appellant,	Agr.	30.	207See	Rudich	(1993)	as	a	‘study	of	a	society	suffering	from	a	crisis	of	values	and	of	people	who	were	at	the	same	time	the	victims	and	perpetrators	of	that	crisis’	(publisher	description)	through	the	medium	of	doublespeak;	Alston	and	Spentzou	(2011),	Ch.	6	‘Imperial	Dreams.	Being	Roman	in	a	World	Empire’	on	crises	of	representation	of	those	who	speak	‘Roman’;	and	Bartsch	(1994)	on	the	imperial	script	which	determines	reality,	regardless	of	reality.	208Fulkerson	(2006),	174–78	for	the	list.	
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Imperial	language	Crucial	to	reading	the	mutinies	as	partly	about	the	failure	of	language	under	the	principate	is	the	accession	debate	of	Tiberius	in	the	senate,	which	immediately	precedes	 them	 (ending	with	hic	rerum	urbanarum	status	erat,	cum	Pannonicas	
legiones	seditio	incessit,	 ‘this	was	the	state	of	urban	affairs,	when	a	rebellion	hit	the	Pannonian	legions’,	Ann.	1.16).	By	placing	this	debate	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	Annals	and	at	the	very	significant	moment	of	the	first	dynastic	succession	Tacitus	 makes	 clear	 that	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 keys	 to	 understanding	 Tiberius’	principate.	Another	effect	of	 this	strategic	placement	 is	 that	a	stark	contrast	 is	achieved	 between	 all	 the	 talking	 about	 the	 state’s	 future	 taking	 place	 in	 one	place,	 and	all	 the	 action	 to	determine	 that	 future	 taking	place	 in	 another.	The	conversation	is	conducted	as	if	there	were	still	room	for	maneuver	when	there	is	 not,	 and	 when	 it	 is	 clear	 from	 Tacitus’	 narrative	 that	 both	 senators	 and	Tiberius	know	this,	but	cannot	say	 it.	This	 ‘ability	to	 impose	[his]	own	fictions	upon	the	world’	was	labeled	as	a	mark	of	the	tyrant	by	Bartsch,	and	his	will	and	ability	to	punish	those	who	misunderstand,	willfully	or	not,	the	imperial	script	as	particularly	Tacitean	 features	of	 such	 tyrannical	manipulations	of	 language	and	truth.209	In	the	Tiberian	accession	debate	the	emperor	ought	to	decide	what	is	to	be	the	truth	of	the	political	settlement	–	this,	too,	is	a	form	of	domination.	Patel	highlighted	that	Tiberius’s	failure	to	realise	his	power	to	 ‘decide’	truth	is	exactly	what	confuses	his	senatorial	listeners	–	the	debate	thus	comes	to	be	read	as	 a	 personal	 failing	 of	 Tiberius	 as	 emperor.	 The	 potential	 duplicity	 of	 the	emperor	is	crucial	in	a	regime	in	which	imperial	power	asserts	meaning	and	is	more	 meaningful	 than	 whether,	 at	 a	 personal	 level,	 the	 words	 Tiberius	 uses	reflect	his	 true	 feelings	or	meaning.210	Tacitus’	narrative	 shows,	however,	 that	they	 cannot	 publicly	 acknowledge	 this	 uncertainty,	 so	 that	 the	 emperor’s	perceived	 insincerity	generates	 senatorial	 insincerity	and	any	 real	meaning	of	the	 words	 spoken	 by	 Tiberius’	 or	 others	 must	 go	 unacknowledged	 or																																																									209See	Bartsch	(1994),	16,	following	Rosenblatt,	for	the	ability	to	impose	one’s	fictions	and	p.	20	for	listeners’	errors	in	Tacitus.	210Patel	(2013),	12.	She	sees	Tiberius’	protestations	as	not	necessarily	insincere,	but	I	believe	Tacitus’	stress	on	his	sending	out	his	sons	as	representatives	of	the	imperial	family	rather	than	as	part	of	a	senatorial	delegation	argues	against	a	respect	for	the	senate’s	Republican	prerogatives.	This	does	not	rule	out	his	feeling	ambivalence	about	his	own	position,	which	is	perfectly	compatible	with	decisive	action.	
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unrecognised.	 There	 is	 no	 room	 for	 truth	 in	 the	 official	 discourse	 or	 in	 the	oppositional	discourses	of	the	senatorial	dissidents.			The	failure	of	language	in	the	accession	debate	thus	does	not	lie	in	talking	about	the	wrong	things.	 It	 is	easy	to	see	why	the	disposition	of	the	state	at	a	time	of	(potential)	unprecedented	dynastic	succession	would	be	of	great	concern	to	the	senate.	Their	lack	of	experience	of	the	senate’s	operation	under	the	Republican	system	(quotus	quisque	reliquus	qui	rem	publicam	vidisset?,	‘how	many	and	who	were	 left	who	had	witnessed	the	Republic?,	Ann.	1.3)	does	not	 invalidate	their	concern,	as	the	memory	of	it	persisted	(though	it	may	explain	their	inability	to	recognise	 or	 speak	 truth.)	 But	 they	 are	 no	 longer	 the	 right	 people	 to	 do	 the	talking,	 even	 if	 they	were	able	 to	 recognise	 or	 speak	 truth.	 This	 is	 first	 of	 all	because	they	have	lost	their	traditional	right	to	dominate	political	discourse	to	the	 emperor’s	 supreme	power.	But	 the	narrative	 also	 shows	 it	 is	 the	 soldiers,	not	 the	 senate,	 who	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 affect	 arrangements	 at	 the	 top	(although	 their	 potential	 at	 this	 point	 in	 time	 goes	 unrealised,	 as	 Germanicus	refuses	their	offer	to	supplant	Tiberius).211		Tiberius’	actions	make	much	clearer	the	message	he	is	hedging	by	his	confusing	words:	he	sends	his	son	Drusus	to	quell	the	mutiny	in	Pannonia	at	the	head	of	a	group	 of	 primores	 civitatis	 (Ann.	 1.24),	 a	 set	 of	 advisors	 which	 must	 have	included	 senators.	 Subsequently,	 after	 the	 German	mutiny	 becomes	 known	 at	Rome,	Tacitus’	report	of	Tiberius’	deliberations	includes	no	thought	of	sending	senators	 (Ann.	 1.47).	 Later	 still,	 Tacitus	 says	 Tiberius	 made	 journey	preparations	 as	 if	 to	 go	 himself	 at	 the	 head	 of	 an	 entourage	 of	 comites.	 He	contrasts	 Tiberius’	 voiced	 reluctance	 to	 take	 on	 autocratic	 rule	 with	 a	description	 of	 his	 actions	 which	 suggests	 the	 senate	 was	 firmly	 sidelined	 in	favour	 of	members	 of	 the	 imperial	 family.	 Another	 example	which	 illustrates	how	 power	 lies	 outside	 the	 senate	 is	 the	 near-lynching	 of	 the	 senatorial																																																									211Recognised	by	Pelling	(2012),	293:	‘…	of	course	the	mutinies	are	‘historically	unimportant’	only	in	the	crudest	sense,	for	they	introduce	so	many	important	themes	to	illuminate	the	crucial	role	an	army	can	play	in	making	or	breaking	a	princeps.	These	themes	are	the	more	striking	here	for	their	stark	juxtaposition	with	the	polite	nonsense	of	the	accession	debate…’.	
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delegation	 in	 the	 Rhine	 camps	 by	 the	 mutineers,	 for	 fear	 that	 the	 recently	granted	 concessions	 will	 be	 revoked	 (Ann.	 1.39).	 The	 senators	 had	 no	 such	purpose	 but	 had	 been	 sent	 earlier	 to	 confer	 upon	 Germanicus	 the	 special	powers	which	would	designate	him	as	heir.212		Tiberius’	 dicey	 relationship	with	 language	 is	 typical	 for	 the	 Julio-Claudians	 in	Tacitus	and	in	the	literary	tradition	more	widely.	Bartsch’s	study	dealt	with	the	Neronian	sources’	preoccupation	with	his	ability	 to	assert	what	was	reality	or	not	 and	 to	make	 the	wrong-footed	 suffer	 for	getting	 it	wrong.	The	 sources	on	Gaius	 also	 speak	 of	 his	 need	 to	 impose	 his	 fictions	 on	 the	 world	 and	 the	senators’	fear	at	not	knowing	the	script	and	thus	how	to	behave,	especially	with	an	 emperor	 so	 changeable.213	In	 keeping	with	 this	 tradition,	 the	Annals	 show	throughout	 that	 playing	 fast	 and	 loose	 with	 reality	 and	 the	 language	 that	describes	 it	 was	 endemic	 at	 Rome	 under	 the	 Julio-Claudians.	 The	 recurrence	during	 the	Batavian	 rebellion	of	 the	 complaint	 that	Rome’s	 imperial	delegates	(this	time	Nero’s)	say	one	thing	and	mean	another	confirms	this.	In	the	Agricola,	set	under	Domitian,	Tacitus’	Calgacus	repeats	the	complaint	once	more.214	The	repetition	 at	 three	 such	 different	 points	 in	 time	 suggests	 that	 for	 Tacitus	 the	erosion	of	 language	was	not	 simply	 a	 Julio-Claudian	phenomenon	but	became	an	 inherent	 feature	 of	 the	 principate	 itself,	 born	 from	 the	 immense	 practical	power	of	the	imperial	aristocracy	to	override	law	and	tradition.	
Centre	and	periphery	But	 these	 reiterations	 of	 the	 complaint	 that	 Rome	 separates	 language	 from	reality	occur	not	just	across	time	but	across	space,	too,	in	very	different	settings																																																									212Miller	(1992)	ad	loc.	on	Ann.	1.14.3’s	proconsulare	imperium	as	‘the	association	in	the	general	power	which	indicates	a	possible	successor’.	213E.g.	Dio	59.4.5-6	and	59.6.7	for	inconsistency	and	fear,	and	for	fictions	59.17.9	(describing	Gaius’	night-time	speechifying,	aided	by	fires,	after	the	bridge-building	between	Puteoli	and	Bauli)	καὶ	γὰρ	τὴν	νύκτα	ἡμέραν,	ὥσπερ	που	τὴν	θάλασσαν	γῆν,	ποιῆσαι	ἠθέλησεν,	‘indeed,	it	was	his	wish	to	make	the	day	right,	as	he	had	made	the	sea	land’	(tr.	E.	Cary,	Loeb	1914-7)	and	Suet.	Gai.	26	alios	cum	clam	interemisset,	citare	
nihilo	minus	ut	uiuos	perseuerauit,	paucos	post	dies	uoluntaria	morte	perisse	mentitus,	‘others,	after	he	had	privately	put	them	to	death,	he	continued	to	send	for,	as	if	they	were	still	alive,	and	after	a	few	days	pretended	that	they	had	laid	violent	hands	on	themselves’..	214See	n.	207.	
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(semi-Romanised	 Rhineland,	 wild	 Britain,	 and	 camps	 in	 Germany	 and	Pannonia).	 The	 breakdown	 of	 language	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 Empire	 is	 both	known	and	replicated	on	the	periphery.	Nonetheless,	we	cannot	equate	centre	and	 periphery	with	 specific	 ethnicities,	 as	we	 have	 seen	 already	 that	 corrupt	language	is	not	just	directed	against	the	native	inhabitants	of	the	periphery	but	also	against	Romans	‘transplanted’	there.	Neither	does	any	single	ethnicity	have	the	 monopoly	 on	 perpetrating	 this	 abuse.	 One	 aspect	 of	 the	 breakdown	 of	language	 at	 Rome	 is	 re-enacted	 by	 the	 legionaries	 themselves.	 This	 is	 the	artificiality	 which	 we	 saw	 marking	 the	 debate	 in	 the	 senate	 at	 Tiberius’	accession	(and	which	is	a	precursor	to	the	outright	theatricality	in	the	Neronian	books).215	Fulkerson	 labeled	the	artificiality	characterising	the	mutinies	on	the	Rhine	 ‘competitive	 roleplaying’	 between	 an	 emotional	 soldiery	 and	 an	emotional	 leader;	but	 it	 is	not	Germanicus	as	 the	 imperial	scion	sent	out	 from	Rome	who	 somehow	 introduces	 this	 drama	 from	 the	 centre	 to	 the	periphery:	the	soldiers	start	 first.	Before	Germanicus	has	spoken	even	one	word	they	are	forcing	him	to	witness	at	close	quarters	the	physical	toll	taken	on	their	bodies:	
postquam	vallum	iniit	dissoni	questus	audiri	coepere.	Et	quidam	prensa	manu	eius	
per	 speciem	 exosculandi	 inseruerunt	 digitos	 ut	 vacua	 dentibus	 ora	 contingeret,	‘after	he	entered	the	compound,	rough	complaints	began	to	be	heard.	And	some,	having	 taken	 his	 hand	with	 the	 appearance	 of	 being	 about	 to	 kiss	 it,	 inserted	their	fingers	so	that	he	touched	mouths	empty	of	teeth’	(Ann.	1.34).	The	soldiers	are	not	necessarily	‘faking	it’	or	‘putting	it	on’,	but	the	impression	is	they	know	that	 interactions	with	 the	 imperial	house	are	 characterised	by	 this	 element	of	‘acting’	and	 if	 they	wish	 to	be	heard,	 this	 is	what	 they	should	do.	Blurring	 the	lines	 further,	 Tacitus	 shows	 how	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Batavian	 episode	 the	accusation	of	manipulating	language	to	serve	one’s	own	ends	is	directed	against	Civilis	by	his	own	Batavian	people:	haec	vulgus,	proceres	atrociora:	Civilis	rabie	
semet	 in	arma	 trusos;	 illum	domesticis	malis	 excidium	gentis	 opposuisse,	 ‘These	things	the	common	people	were	saying;	the	nobles	said	worse:	that	Civilis	in	his	madness	had	dragged	them	along	into	battle;	that	he	put	the	destruction	of	his	tribe	up	against	his	personal	 grievances’,	Hist.	5.25.12-14.	 Instead	of	 falling	 in	with	the	libertas/servitium	discourse	to	explain	his	call	to	violence,	the	Batavian																																																									215Bartsch	(1994),	16–21.	
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nobles	say	he	used	this	discourse	as	a	pretext	for	the	personal	grievances	which	pushed	him	 into	risking	 the	annihilation	of	 the	Batavian	nation.	Finally,	Civilis	and	Cerialis	accuse	each	other	of	masking	a	lust	for	power	behind	nice-sounding	words:		
tradi	se	praefectis	centurionibusque:	quos	ubi	spoliis	et	sanguine	expleverint,	
mutari,	exquirique	novos	sinus	et	varia	praedandi	vocabula	
Hist.	4.14.15-17;	Civilis	‘They	were	 being	 handed	 over	 to	 prefects	 and	 centurions,	 whom,	when	they	had	 filled	 themselves	with	 loot	 and	blood,	 changed,	 and	 sought	 out	new	money	traps	and	different	words	for	their	stealing.’		
ceterum	 libertas	 et	 speciosa	 nomina	 praetexuntur;	 nec	 quisquam	 alienum	
servitium	 et	 dominationem	 sibi	 concupivit	 ut	 non	 eadem	 ista	 vocabula	
usurparet.	
Hist.	4.73.21-3;	Cerialis	‘Of	course	freedom	and	other	empty	words	are	being	dangled	in	front	of	you;	no	one	has	ever	desired	the	slavery	of	others	and	tyranny	for	themselves	who	has	not	used	these	very	words.’		The	examples	 cumulatively	 show	 that	 the	occurrences	of	 linguistic	 corruption	on	the	periphery	do	not	bear	any	relation	to	the	origins	of	the	speaker,	but	that	it	is	ubiquitous	under	the	principate.	It	is	no	wonder	that	groups	as	disparate	as	Batavians	and	mutineers	articulate	the	same	complaint.	
Libertas	and	language	The	joint	accusation	by	both	groups	of	a	disconnect	between	imperial	language	and	truth	implies	an	accompanying	desire	for	freedom	from	imperial	dominatio	of	 language,	 complementary	 to	 that	 for	 freedom	 from	 imperial	 dominatio	 of	their	bodies.	Both	articulations	are	underpinned	by	the	excess	of	power	at	the	disposal	of	the	princeps	and	express	longing	for	the	 libertas	of	Late	Republican	political	 discourse.	 Haynes	 linked	 imperial	 language	 to	 Republican	 libertas	when	 she	 posited	 that	 ‘imperial	 discourse,	 nearly	 identical	 in	 structure	 and	expression	to	that	of	 the	Republic	but	divorced	from	Republican	connotations,	provided	 an	 empty	 site	 where	 Roman	 fantasies	 of	 self-definition	 took	 strong	
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hold’.216	Tacitus’	use	of	iustitium	in	the	mutinies	show	it	to	be	exactly	such	a	site	of	 Roman	 self-definition	 as	 Haynes	 describes.217	Empty	 only	 in	 the	 sense	 of	being	untrue	to	the	spirit	(not	the	letter)	of	its	Late	Republican	form,	it	fills	its	suspension	of	the	law	with	meaning	and	tradition	to	enable	it	to	act	against	the	
tumultus	 in	which	 there	 is	no	 social	 order.	 In	doing	 so,	 the	new	order	defines	itself	 as	 legitimate	 and,	 in	 its	 guise	 of	 guarantor	 of	 the	 social	 order,	 as	continuous	 with	 the	 Republican	 regime.	 It	 is	 the	 soldiers’	 tumultus	which	 is	more	 appropriately	 described	 as	 empty.	 Firstly	 because	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 social	order,	 but	 secondly	 because	 it	 rejects	 the	 iustitium’s	 ‘filling’	 which	 aims	 to	reimpose	social	order	and	stress	continuity.	And	finally	and	most	 importantly,	because	the	desire	for	Germanicus	to	head	up	a	Republican	state	is	a	much	more	explicit	 ‘fantasy	 of	 self-definition’	 than	 the	 iustitium’s	 self-definition	 as	 an	extension	 of	 the	 Republic.	 The	 citizen-soldiers	 of	 AD14	 may	 not	 have	experienced	the	Republic,	but	some	memory	of	its	 libertas	was	still	a	powerful	constituent	 in	 their	 attempt	 at	 self-definition	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 principate’s	assertion	of	control	over	their	language	and	their	bodies.	As	for	the	Batavians,	if	language	 and	 truth	 are	 disconnected	 in	 the	 imperial	 discourse,	 then	 another	way	of	reading	the	violence	of	their	revolt	is	as	a	way	of	refusing	to	play	word	games.	 Although	 there	 is	 plenty	 of	 discourse	 flying	 around,	 very	 little	 of	 it	amounts	to	dialogue	with	the	opposite	side	or	is	even	spoken	to	Rome,	as	if	they	know	it	would	be	pointless.		This	consideration	of	the	pointlessness	of	language	under	the	principate	brings	us	 back	 to	 my	 earlier	 explanation	 of	 the	 metaphor	 of	 madness	 which	 runs	throughout	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 mutinies	 as	 morally	 descriptive.	 I	 will	demonstrate	 how	 language	 evocative	 of	mental	 illness	 also	 occurs	 in	 Tacitus’	description	 of	 the	 Batavian	 rebellion,	 before	 proceeding	 to	 interpret	 its	significance.																																																									216Haynes	(2004),	33.	217I	see	Haynes’	perception	as	applying	to	the	wider	discourses	voiced	by	Tacitus	and	not	just	to	those	places	in	which	it	is	marked	lexically	by	e.g.	the	difference	between	
nomen	and	vocabulum.	For	example,	Percennius	at	Ann.	1.17	uses	nomen	and	
vocabulum	interchangeably	to	describe	fobbing	off	a	bad	deal	as	a	good	deal,	and	neither	word	features	in	the	accession	debate	which	I	see	as	crucial	to	the	issue	of	language.	
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	Parallels	are	easily	established.	First,	the	verb	resipiscere	is	used	at	Hist.	5.25.16	as	part	of	a	passage	setting	out,	in	indirect	speech,	the	self-reflection	undergone	by	 the	 Batavians	 as	 they	 decide	 to	 give	 up	 on	 rebellion.	 The	 Oxford	 Latin	Dictionary	gives	its	meaning	as	‘to	recover	one’s	reason’	(OLD	2,	after	‘to	regain	consciousness,	 come	 to	 (after	 fainting	 or	 sim.)’)	 which	 therefore,	 by	 a	 single	word	at	 the	very	end	of	 the	 lengthy	episode,	manages	 to	 characterise	 it	 as	 an	event	in	which	they	had	lost	this	reason,	i.e.	had	gone	mad.	The	infinitive	occurs	three	times	in	the	Loeb	Classical	Library	online:	in	Pliny	the	Elder,	it	occurs	in	a	section	dealing	with	foreign	medicine	where	it	is	used	to	describe	the	curing	of	the	delirious	by	the	Magi	by	sprinkling	them	with	mole’s	blood218;	the	other	two	references	 are	 from	Valerius	Maximus	 and	 are	 used	 to	 denote	 the	 process	 of	sobering	 up	 from	 alcoholic	 intoxication	which,	 in	 both	 anecdotes,	 is	 stopping	rational	 discourse	 or	 behaviour	 from	 taking	 place.219	In	 addition	 madness,	
rabies,	 is	 precisely	 the	 word	 which	 the	 Batavian	 proceres	 choose	 to	 apply	 to	Civilis’	 undertaking	 in	 which	 they	 were	 dragged	 along.	 Finally,	 when	 Cerialis	holds	 out	 inducements	 to	 disengage	 his	 supporters	 from	 Civilis,	 the	 phrase	
miscebantur	minis	promissa	is	used,	which	resembles	the	mixing	of	medicine.220			The	parallels	continue	in	the	treatment	of	the	disease:	just	as	in	the	case	of	the	mutinies	and	the	Batavian	rebellion	we	saw	that	for	every	articulation	of	the	old	
libertas	 there	 was	 a	 Roman	 to	 speak	 up	 for	 acceptance	 of	 its	 new,	 imperial	conception,	 the	madness	of	both	episodes	 requires	a	Roman	commander	with	the	right	knowledge	of	medicine	to	restore	sanity.	And	here	we	come	full	circle,	as	the	medicine	is	of	course	not	a	physical	draught	but	applied	through	words.	Although	no	longer	marked	by	medical	language,	the	manner	in	which	Drusus’	staff	 bring	 the	mutinous	Pannonians	 to	 their	 senses	 resembles	 the	manner	 in	which	 Cerialis	 brought	 the	 Batavians	 back	 to	 their	 allegiance:	 multiple	
																																																								218Plin.	Nat.	Hist.	30.24.	219Val.	Max.	Facta	et	dicta	memorabilia	6.12	ext.	1;	6.15	ext.	1.	220As	it	does	in	Celsus	De	Med.	3.16.14.4,	3.6.16.2,	but	really	passim.	Celsus	probably	wrote	his	treatise	on	medicine	during	the	reign	of	the	emperor	Tiberius	(Loeb	Classical	Library	online	edition	of	De	Medicina,	vii),	so	the	terminology	predates	Tacitus.	
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messengers	 offering	 differentiated	 messages	 to	 different	 groups,	 effectively	breaking	up	the	unity	of	the	resistance:		
utendum	 inclinatione	 ea	 Caesar	 et	 quae	 casus	 obtulerat	 in	 sapientiam	
vertenda	 ratus	 circumiri	 tentoria	 iubet;	 accitur	 centurio	 Clemens	 et	 si	 alii	
bonis	 artibus	 grati	 in	 vulgus.	 hi	 vigiliis,	 stationibus,	 custodiis	 portarum	 se	
inserunt,	 spem	 offerunt,	 metum	 intendunt.	 'quo	 usque	 filium	 imperatoris	
obsidebimus?	quis	certaminum	finis?	Percennione	et	Vibuleno	sacramentum	
dicturi	 sumus?	 Percennius	 et	 Vibulenus	 stipendia	 militibus,	 agros	 emeritis	
largientur?	 denique	 pro	 Neronibus	 et	 Drusis	 imperium	 populi	 Romani	
capessent?	 quin	 potius,	 ut	 novissimi	 in	 culpam,	 ita	 primi	 ad	 paenitentiam	
sumus?	 tarda	 sunt	 quae	 in	 commune	 expostulantur:	 privatam	 gratiam	
statim	 mereare,	 statim	 recipias.'	 commotis	 per	 haec	 mentibus	 et	 inter	 se	
suspectis,	tironem	a	veterano.	legionem	a	legione	dissociant.	
	
Ann.	1.28;	centurio	Clemens		‘Caesar	 thought	 that	 this	 change	 in	 mood	 ought	 to	 be	 exploited,	 and	thinking	 that	 what	 fate	 had	 supplied	 should	 be	 turned	 to	 good	 use	 he	ordered	 a	 circuit	 of	 the	 troops’	 tents.	 A	 centurion,	 Clemens,	 was	summoned	 and	 anyone	 else	 popular	 with	 the	 crowd	 because	 of	 their	skilled	 rhetoric.	 They	wove	 themselves	 in	 and	 out	 of	 watchposts,	 guard	posts,	 sentries	 at	 gates,	 and	 they	 held	 out	 hope	 but	 also	 promoted	 fear.	‘How	far	will	you	pursue	your	siege	of	the	emperor’s	son?	What	will	be	the	end	to	your	battle?	Are	we	to	take	our	oaths	to	Percennius	and	Vibulenus	now?	Will	Percennius	and	Vibulenus	provide	pay	for	soldiers	and	lands	for	veterans?	Then	will	 they	 take	on	 the	empire	of	 the	Roman	people	 in	 the	place	 of	 the	 Nerones	 and	 the	 Drusi?	 Isn’t	 it	 better,	 just	 as	 we	were	 the	latest	ones	to	fall	into	error,	to	be	the	first	to	come	to	repentance?	Things	which	 are	 demanded	 on	 behalf	 of	 a	 group	 are	 slow	 to	 come	 about;	 but	forgiveness	for	yourselves	as	individuals	you	can	earn	on	the	spot,	and	will	receive	immediately.’	Through	minds	affected	by	these	words	and	already	suspicious	of	one	another,	they	detached	recruit	from	veteran,	legion	from	legion.’		
nam	 Cerialis	 per	 occultos	 nuntios	 Batavis	 pacem,	 Civili	 veniam	 ostentans,	
Veledam	 propinquosque	 monebat	 fortunam	 belli,	 tot	 cladibus	 adversam,	
opportuno	 erga	 populum	 Romanum	 merito	 mutare:	 caesos	 Treviros,	
receptos	 Vbios,	 ereptam	 Batavis	 patriam;	 neque	 aliud	 Civilis	 amicitia	
partum	 quam	 vulnera	 fugas	 luctus.	 exulem	 eum	 et	 extorrem	 recipientibus	
oneri,	et	satis	peccavisse	quod	totiens	Rhenum	transcenderint.	si	quid	ultra	
moliantur,	inde	iniuriam	et	culpam,	hinc	ultionem	et	deos	fore.	Miscebantur	
minis	 promissa;	 et	 concussa	 Transrhenanorum	 fide	 inter	 Batavos	 quoque	
sermones	orti…	
Hist.	5.24.3-25.2	
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‘For	Cerialis	by	secret	messengers	held	out	peace	to	the	Batavi	and	a	pardon	to	Civilis,	and	kept	warning	Veleda	and	her	supporters	that	the	outcome	of	the	war,	which	was	looking	unfavourable	through	all	the	defeats,	could	be	changed	by	opportune	kind	service	done	to	the	Roman	people:	that	the	Treviri	had	been	murdered,	the	Ubii	welcomed	back	into	the	Roman	fold,	control	of	their	fatherland	snatched	from	the	Batavi,	and	that	nothing	had	been	gained	by	the	friendship	of	Civilis	but	wounds	and	exiles	and	mourning.	That	he	was	a	homeless	exile	to	the	burden	of	those	hosting	him,	and	that	they	had	committed	enough	mistakes	by	so	often	crossing	the	Rhine.	If	anything	further	was	being	plotted,	from	their	side	they	would	incur	injuries	and	blame	and	on	the	Roman	side	vengeance	and	the	gods	would	block	them.	Promises	were	mixed	with	threats;	and	with	the	faith	of	the	Transrhenani	shaken,	mutterings	also	arose	among	the	Batavi…	.		
haec	vulgus,	proceres	atrociora.	
Hist.	5.25.12		‘These	things	the	commoners	said;	the	nobles	said	even	worse.’		We	 saw	 that	 Tacitus’	 re-use	 of	 the	 complaint	 of	 Roman	 linguistic	 corruption	across	 the	 episodes	 of	 the	 mutinies	 and	 the	 Batavian	 rebellion,	 so	 widely	separated	 in	 time	 and	 space,	 showed	 that	 the	 failure	 of	 language	 is	 endemic	under	the	principate	as	a	result	of	its	excessive	power.	But	it	does	so	alongside	showing	 equally	 harshly	 the	 failure,	 in	 both	 settings,	 of	 violent	 resistance	against	the	system	which	perpetrates	this	abuse	of	power.	Finally,	by	means	of	his	 framing	 devices	 of	 invalidating	 Percennius’	 speech	 setting	 out	 reasons	 for	rebellion	 and	 additionally	 describing	 the	 mutinies	 as	 ‘madness’,	 Tacitus	conveyed	 his	 absolute	 moral	 disapprobation	 of	 threatening	 social	 order.	 By	extending	the	metaphor	of	madness	to	the	Batavian	episode,	we	come	full	circle:	the	duplication	of	motifs	 from	the	mutinies	 to	 the	Batavian	rebellion	55	years	later	 serves	 the	 dual	 purpose	 of	 reinforcing	 the	 universality	 both	 of	 the	principate’s	 abuse	 of	 power	 in	 specific	ways	 and	 of	 Tacitus’	 condemnation	 of	violent	reaction	against	this	state	by	the	oppressed,	whatever	their	situation.	
Conclusion	This	chapter	started	with	the	analysis	of	imperial	death	as	a	causal	factor	in	the	mutinies	and	the	Batavian	rebellion.	In	both	episodes	imperial	deaths	cause	the	appearance	of	 ‘gaps’	as	transitional	moments	when	the	ideological	significance	of	the	principate	is	assessed	by	its	subjects	and	exploited	for	the	improvement	
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of	their	personal	situation,	through	violence.	Tacitus’	narrative	shows	how	the	mutineers	see	the	death	of	Augustus	as	the	end	of	a	highly	personalised	political	relationship	 based	 on	 loyalty	 and	 mutual	 exchange	 of	 benefits,	 and	consequently	 a	 break	 in	 the	 imperial	 regime.	 It	 also	 shows,	 however,	 that	Tacitus	did	not	think	this	was	a	valid	way	of	interpreting	the	death	of	emperors:	in	his	understanding	of	the	nature	of	the	regime,	these	events	did	not	preclude	its	 continuity.	 He	 made	 this	 clear	 through	 his	 use	 of	 two	 framing	 devices	 to	separate	his	view	of	the	mutinies	from	the	justifications	offered	by	the	soldiers:	first	by	presenting	Percennius	as	 lower	class	and	thereby	morally	 inferior	and	having	no	right	to	speak,	and	secondly	by	describing	the	mutineers’	behaviour	through	the	metaphor	of	madness:	madness	to	take	on	a	regime	which	always	wins,	 and	 madness	 to	 jeopardise	 the	 stability	 and	 peace	 brought	 by	 the	principate.		Tacitus	 uses	 the	 notion	 of	 iustitium	 in	 the	 mutinies	 narrative	 to	 make	 both	points	 about	 continuity	 and	 separation.	On	 the	 narrative	 level	 the	 iustitium	 is	employed	 by	 the	 army	 commander	 Iunius	 Blaesus	 to	 continue	 Augustus’	appropriation	 of	 the	 word	 for	 crises	 under	 the	 Republic	 to	 deaths	 in	 the	imperial	family.	It	was	intended	as	a	marker	of	continuity	between	Republic	and	principate,	 and	 between	Augustus	 and	 Tiberius,	 but	 it	 enables	 the	 soldiers	 to	ponder	 the	 position	 they	 are	 in	 and	 conclude	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 marking	 a	 break.	Violence	is	facilitated	further	by	the	iustitium’s	practical	effect	of	suspending	the	soldiers’	 disciplinary	 routines	 which	 in	 Roman	 military	 ideology	 would	 have	helped	 to	 contain	 and	 direct	 their	 aggression	 against	 the	 enemy.	 Its	historiographical	 exploitation	 by	 Tacitus	 also	 revolves	 around	 this	uncomfortable	 relationship	 with	 iustitium’s	 Republican	 incarnation.	 In	 the	mutinies,	the	soldiers’	violence	is	not	presented	as	sanctioned	by	the	iustitium	in	defence	of	the	state	but	as	the	tumultus	threatening	the	state	which	traditionally	prompted	 a	 iustitium.	 The	 roles	 are	 reversed:	 the	 iustitium	 is	 symbolically	representative	 of	 the	 new	 imperial	 regime’s	 intention	 to	 take	 over	 without	change,	 but	 provokes	 violence	 intended	 to	 overthrow	 that	 status	 quo	 and	provoke	 a	 renegotiation.	 But	 because	 iustitium	 carries	 with	 it	 the	 state	 of	
anomia	 which	 allows	 violence	 in	 defence	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 regime	 can	 exact	 a	
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harsh	retribution	 from	those	threatening	 it.	 Its	Republican	heritage	thus	 lends	an	 aura	 of	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 violence	 used	 by	 imperial	 representatives	 to	safeguard	one-man	rule.			The	regime’s	powers	of	oppression	also	play	a	large	role	in	the	case	of	soldiers’	and	Batavians’	professed	reasons	for	rebelling.	They	are	united	through	voicing	in	 the	 text	 similar	 discourses	 complaining	 that	 imperial	 delegates	 reduce	 all	status	distinctions	(free/citizen/slave/ally)	 to	 the	single	status	of	slave.	Under	the	principate	all	have	become	 imperial	slaves,	and	this	 is	manifested	through	the	inappropriate	treatment	of	their	bodies.	This	is	even	more	important	for	the	mutineers	who	are	not	only	freeborn	but	citizens.	The	libertas	they	want	is	non-
servitium,	that	 is,	not	 to	be	 in	 the	position	of	 slaves	with	no	recourse	 to	being	compelled	by	those	more	powerful.			What	 they	want	 is	 thus	 phrased	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 Late	Republican	definition	 of	political	libertas.	This	was	partly	grounded	in	the	rule	of	law	and	with	a	distinct	application	to	the	citizen	body,	which	was	protected	from	violence	by	the	state	by	 the	 right	 of	 provocatio.	 On	 this	 definition,	 their	 complaints	 characterise	imperial	rule	as	Late	Republican	dominatio.	What	they	do	not	realise	is	that	this	reflects	an	outdated	and	idealised	view	of	the	Late	Republic,	which	even	before	its	 end	at	Actium	underwent	a	 change	 from	being	underpinned	by	 the	 rule	of	law	 to	 being	 based	 on	 the	 private	 iudicium	 of	 the	 individual.221	This	 change	opened	 the	 door	 to	 the	 ascendancy	 of	 Octavian	 and	 the	 development	 of	 the	principate,	so	that	even	the	principate	could,	on	this	later	definition,	be	equated	with	a	restoration	of	 libertas.	This	 is	given	expression	in	the	narrative	when	it	features	Romans	arguing	for	the	necessity	of	the	princeps.	This	mostly	rests	on	a	utilitarian	 and	 narrow	 basis	 for	 the	 soldiers	 and	 Batavians,	 but	 is	 evocative																																																									221Sallust	in	the	Bellum	Catilinae	dated	this	evolution	to	much	earlier	than	Arena’s	suggestion:	the	collectivity	of	the	Middle	Republic,	which	was	so	just	it	almost	had	no	need	for	its	laws	(ius	bonumque	apud	eos	non	legibus	magis	quam	natura	valebat,	‘law	and	morality	with	them	was	strong	not	so	much	because	of	the	laws	than	because	of	their	character’,	BC	9.1),	split	apart	into	ambitious	individualism	after	the	destruction	of	Carthage	brought	wealth	as	well	as	security	to	the	state,	resulting	in	the	lawlessness	of	first	civil	war	and	then	Sulla’s	proscriptions	(neque	modum	neque	modestiam	victores	
habere,	‘its	victors	had	neither	restraint	nor	discretion’,	BC	11.4).	
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enough	 to	 invite	 more	 politically	 aware	 senatorial	 (and	 modern)	 readers	 to	overcome	 their	 nostalgia	 for	 Republican	 senatorial	 freedom	 by	 remembering	the	Civil	War	of	the	Late	Republic	which	led	to	the	concept’s	redefinition.		In	 the	 narrative,	 articulating	 a	 dissatisfaction	 with	 abuses	 of	 the	 principate’s	unlimited	 power	 seems	 to	 be	 one	 of	 a	 very	 limited	 set	 of	 options,	 given	 the	regime’s	powers	of	repression.	However,	a	brief	turning	of	the	tables	is	possible,	and	both	episodes	display	moments	of	carnivalesque	role	reversal	and	revenge,	which	 precede	 a	 return	 to	 mutineers’	 and	 Batavians’	 former	 positions	 of	powerless	subjection.		But	there	is	a	second	form	of	dominatio	in	these	episodes	which	affects	even	this	view	 of	 articulating	 discontent	 as	 a	 viable	 option.	 This	 is	 the	 domination	 of	language	 perpetrated	 by	 Rome	 on	 the	 soldiers	 and	 Batavians	 –	 the	 princeps’	power	 to	 name	 a	 spade	 a	 shovel	 translates	 into	 their	 physical	 maltreatment	being	dressed	up	with	fancy	words.	This	disconnect	between	what’s	really	going	on	and	what	 is	being	expressed	through	language	is	typical	 for	Tiberius	 in	the	
Annals,	and	typical	in	Tacitus	as	well	as	the	wider	literary	tradition	on	the	entire	Julio-Claudian	dynasty.		To	 sum	 up,	 finally,	 the	 recurrence	 of	 these	 identical	 complaints	 at	 different	points	in	time	and	different	locations	in	space	shows	Tacitus	thought	the	abuse	of	power	was	endemic	 in	 the	 Julio-Claudian	and	even	 the	 imperial	 system	 (as	the	 complaint	 resurfaces	 in	 the	 Agricola	 where	 Calgacus	 makes	 it).	 This	 is	entirely	compatible	with	his	view	that	there	was	no	better	alternative.	
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4	 The	Germanicus	campaigns		
Introduction	The	German	campaigns	waged	by	Germanicus	 in	AD15-17	 (Ann.	1.55-71;	Ann.	2.5-26)	have	been	only	selectively	studied,	with	interest	focusing	mainly	on	the	person	 of	 Germanicus	 and	 his	 relationship	 with	 Tiberius	 and	 less	 on	 the	specifics	 of	 the	 campaigns	 and	 their	 setting.	 Agrippina’s	 scene	 on	 the	bridgehead	has	been	used	mostly	to	suggest	that	she	was	a	transgressive	female	overstepping	 the	bounds	of	her	 sex	 in	 isolation	 from	 the	military	 crisis	which	spurred	 it,	 and	 the	Teutoburg	 episode	as	 yet	 another	 example	of	Germanicus’	oft-noted	 tendency	 to	excessive	emotion.222	The	 struggles	of	 the	 troops	 led	by	Caecina	 have	 been	 overlooked	 by	 all	 but	 Woodman223,	 but	 the	 length	 and	elaboration	of	 the	account	 suggests	more	 than	a	 token	 inclusion	 for	historical	reasons.	The	same	holds	for	the	expedition	against	the	Marsi	prompted	by	the	aftermath	of	the	German	mutiny.		This	 chapter	 analyses	 the	 spatialisation	 in	 these	 scenes	 in	 terms	 of	 conflicts	between	 Roman	 and	 German	 spaces	 which	 often	 occupy	 the	 same	 physical	territory.	 The	 resulting	 multilayeredness	 of	 the	 landscape	 raises	 issues	 of	translation	 and	 comprehension	 for	 Romans	 moving	 through	 a	 Germany	 in	which	Roman	ruins	superimposed	on	the	otherwise	unknowable	forests	are	the	only	available	structuring	elements	to	help	them	navigate	and	understand	their	surroundings.	 The	 combination	 of	 this	 tension	 between	 spaces,	 the	 negative	connotations	of	many	of	these	guideposts,	and	the	absence	of	knowledge	of	the	German	underscape	beneath	 them	creates	 fear	 in	 the	rank	and	 file	when	such	insights	are	absent	or	defective.	In	contrast	to	these	fearful	responses,	I	examine	in	 turn	 the	 very	 different	 reactions	 of	 Germanicus	 himself,	 his	wife	Agrippina																																																									222Pelling	(2012),	281	refers	to	the	‘hysteria’	of	the	death	scene	at	Ann.	2.69-73;	Pelling	(2012),	284	speaks	of	an	‘excess	of	comitas	or	ciuilitas	or	theatricality’;	Pagán	(1999),	311–13	speaks	of	‘Germanicus’	exorbitance’	as	a	‘motif’.	223Woodman	(1988),	168–76.	However,	I	offer	a	different	explanation	for	the	episode’s	inclusion	to	his	interpretation	of	it	as	‘a	sub-plot	which	increases	the	suspense	of	the	major	engagements’	(p.	174).	
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and	his	general	Caecina	as	striving,	with	varying	levels	of	success,	to	guard	the	integrity	of	Roman	space	and	indeed	permanently	subordinate	German	space	to	it.	 The	 final	 section	 discusses	 the	 raid	 on	 the	 Marsi	 as	 departing	 from	 this	preoccupation	 with	 conflicts	 of	 space,	 instead	 foregrounding	 identity	 as	 its	primary	 concern.	 The	 unthreatening	 Marsi’s	 destruction	 at	 the	 hands	 of	formerly	mutinous	Romans	is	essential	to	the	restoration	of	the	legions’	Roman	identity,	the	breakdown	of	which	Annals	1	showed	to	be	as	much	of	a	threat	to	the	stability	of	the	empire	as	an	unknowable	and	unconquered	Germany.	
Competing	spaces	Chapter	one	finished	with	an	assessment	of	Rome’s	inability	to	make	permanent	inroads	into	the	resisting	Batavian	landscape,	and	the	human	destruction	by	the	Batavi	 of	 many	 of	 the	 permanent	 markers	 –	 such	 as	 Drusus’	moles	 and	 the	camps	along	the	Rhine	–	which	Rome	had	managed	to	establish	since	the	area	was	 first	pacified.	Alongside	 the	power	of	an	alien	 landscape	which	cannot	be	completely	 controlled,	 the	 other	 main	 factor	 responsible	 for	 this	 failure	 is	Rome’s	 focus	 on	 control	 through	measures	 of	 repression	 instead	 of	 co-option	into	 the	 empire	 on	 a	 fair	 basis.	 The	 only	 lasting	 spatial	 change	 managed	 by	Rome	 along	 the	 Rhine	 in	 Tacitus’	 Histories	was	 the	 colony	 of	 Cologne.	 The	tension	 between	 this	 imperial	 urban	 space	 and	 the	 numerous	 pockets	 of	alternative	German	space	which	still	surrounded	it,	on	either	side	of	the	Rhine,	is	present	throughout	Tacitus’	narration	of	the	Batavian	rebellion.		The	German	passages	of	Annals	1	and	2,	as	befits	their	earlier	narrated	time	(by	about	55	years),	play	even	more	evidently	with	the	 idea	of	multiple	coexisting	and	competing	spaces	on	the	far	side	of	the	Rhine.	A	focus	on	the	spatial	in	the	text	reveals	that	Germanicus’	campaign	is	full	of	building.	His	troops	carry	packs	(onustum	sarcinis	armisque	[militem],	Ann.	1.63)	and	travel	with	impedimenta	or	baggage	trains	(Ann.	1.65),	which	include	tools	–	the	presence	of	such	things	per	
quae	egeritur	humus	aut	exciditur	caespes	being	advertised	by	 the	narration	of	their	 loss	(also	Ann.	1.65).	Their	purpose	is	clear	when	Tacitus	refers	on	three	separate	 occasions	 to	 the	 formal	 practice	 of	 castrametation	 (castra	metari	 at	
Ann.	1.65	and	Ann.	2.8	and	castris	faciendis	at	Ann.	2.21;	compared	to	only	once	
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during	the	Batavian	rebellion,	castra	fecere	at	Hist.	4.26.13,	and	even	then	 in	a	passage	 where	 the	 manuscript	 tradition	 is	 as	 muddled	 as	 the	 narrative).	Germanicus’	columns	are	fully	aware	that	they	will	meet	little	that	will	be	of	use	to	them	along	their	way	and	have	come	prepared	to	carve	what	Roman	spaces	they	need	out	of	their	German	environment.			This	act	of	carving	out	Roman	space	had	several	ideological	meanings	as	well	as	practical	functions.	On	the	former	level,	it	was	a	way	of	extending	Roman	values	and	discipline	into	foreign	spaces;	this	is	how	Polybius	saw	it.224	It	was	also	one	of	 the	 forms	 of	 labor	 which	 reinforced	 an	 army’s	 disciplina225;	 this	 is	 how	Tacitus	 depicts	 it	 when	 he	 describes	 Corbulo’s	 management	 of	 his	 eastern	troops	 at	Annals	13.35226,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 of	 his	German	 troops	 at	Ann.	11.18. 227 	Annals	 1	 itself	 contains	 two	 examples	 of	 these	 functions,	 which	illustrate	what	the	Corbulo	passages	explicitly	state:	the	expedition	against	the	Marsi	and	the	legions’	loss	of	their	tools	at	Ann.	1.65.	The	first	example	will	not	be	 discussed	 in	 detail	 until	 the	 end	 of	 this	 chapter,	 as	 its	 decidedly	 un-imperialistic	 impetus	 requires	 such	 separate	 treatment	 from	 the	 other	Germanicus	 campaigns,	 but	 Tacitus	 explicitly	 motivates	 this	 otherwise																																																									224Polyb.	6.19-42.	225See	Phang	(2008),	37-72	(chapter	two	‘Combat	training	and	discipline’).	226Sed	Corbuloni	plus	molis	adversus	ignaviam	militum	quam	contra	perfidiam	hostium	
erat:	quippe	Syria	transmotae	legiones,	pace	longa	segnes,	munia	castrorum	aegerrime	
tolerabant.	satis	constitit	fuisse	in	eo	exercitu	veteranos,	qui	non	stationem,	non	vigilias	
inissent,	vallum	fossamque	quasi	nova	et	mira	viserent,	sine	galeis,	sine	loricis,	nitidi	et	
quaestuosi,	militia	per	oppida	expleta.	igitur	dimissis,	quibus	senectus	aut	valitudo	
adversa	erat,	supplementum	petivit.	et	habiti	per	Galatiam	Cappadociamque	dilectus,	
adiectaque	ex	Germania	legio	cum	equitibus	alariis	et	peditatu	cohortium.	retentusque	
omnis	exercitus	sub	pellibus,	quamvis	hieme	saeva	adeo,	ut	obducta	glacie	nisi	effossa	
humus	tentoriis	locum	non	praeberet.	ambusti	multorum	artus	vi	frigoris,	et	quidam	inter	
excubias	exanimati	sunt.	adnotatusque	miles,	qui	fascem	lignorum	gestabat,	ita	
praeriguisse	manus,	ut	oneri	adhaerentes	truncis	brachiis	deciderent.	ipse	cultu	[l]evi,	
capite	intecto,	in	agmine,	in	laboribus	frequens	adesse,	laudem	strenuis,	solacium	
invalidis,	exemplum	omnibus	ostendere.	dehinc,	quia	duritia	caeli	militiaeque	multi	
abnuebant	deserebantque,	remedium	severitate	quaesitum	est.	nec	enim,	ut	in	aliis	
exercitibus,	primum	alterumque	delictum	venia	prosequebatur,	se	qui	signa	reliquerat,	
statim	capite	poenas	luebat.	idque	usu	salubre	et	misericordia	melius	apparuit:	quippe	
pauciores	illa	castra	deseruere	quam	ea,	in	quibus	ignoscebatur.	227ubi	praesentia	satis	composita	sunt,	legiones	operum	et	laboris	ignavas,	populationibus	
laetantis,	veterem	ad	morem	reduxit,	ne	quis	agmine	decederet	nec	pugnam	nisi	iussus	
iniret.	stationes	vigiliae,	diurna	nocturnaque	munia	in	armis	agitabantur;	feruntque	
militem	quia	vallum	non	accinctus,	atque	alium	quia	pugione	tantum	accinctus	foderet,	
morte	punitos.	
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unprovoked	aggression	with	reference	to	the	legions’	desire	to	erase	the	shame	of	 their	 abandonment	 of	 disciplina	 during	 the	 mutinies.	 Their	 combat	 is	 an	alternative	 form	 to	 Corbulo’s	 castrametation	 of	 the	 labor	 which	 goes	 into	creating,	 restoring	 and	 maintaining	 disciplina.	 The	 second	 example	 from	 the	more	 straightforwardly	 imperialist	 campaigns	 later	 in	 Annals	 1	 shows	 the	importance	of	such	labor	through	illustrating	the	breakdown	of	disciplina	if	it	is	
not	 performed.	 The	 real	 import	 of	 Caecina’s	 troops	 being	 reported	 as	 losing	their	tools	lies	not	in	the	fact	that	this	outcome	reflects	badly	on	the	process	that	led	 to	 it	 (their	 customary	 tactics	 being	 patently	 unsuitable	 to	 the	 swampy	battlefield	 by	 the	 Long	Bridges).228	Nor	 does	 it	 lie	 in	 the	 sympathy	 evoked	by	their	resulting	uncomfortable	situation	of	having	to	dig	a	camp	without	proper	tools,	though	it	does	both	these	things.	Instead,	it	lies	in	their	resulting	inability	to	carve	out	a	sufficiently	Roman	space	to	keep	the	soldiers	insulated	from	their	surrounding	 German,	 frightening,	 space.	 They	 get	 neither	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	process	 of	 castrametation	 (the	 confidence	 and	 steadfastness	 that	 derive	 from	
disciplina)	nor	 the	benefit	of	 its	outcome,	 a	 safe	Roman	space.	As	 section	 four	analyses	in	detail,	the	consequence	is	a	total	breakdown	of	discipline	and	spatial	integrity	within	the	camp	at	the	slightest	provocation.		Yet	 alongside	 the	 need	 to	 carve	 out	 new	 spaces	 from	 their	 German	surroundings,	the	legions	in	the	text	frequently	encounter	the	visible	remnants	of	an	earlier	age	in	which	Augustan	lieutenants	did	manage	to	make	their	mark	on	 the	 landscape.	 At	Ann.	1.56	 L.	 Apronius	 is	 delegated	 to	 the	 fortification	 of	existing	 roads	 and	 river	 fortifications	 (L.	 Apronio	 ad	 munitiones	 viarum	 et	
fluminum	relicto)	on	the	further	bank	of	the	Rhine.	In	the	same	chapter	Tacitus	mentions	 Germanicus	 building	 a	 castellum	 super	 vestigia	 paterni	 praesidii	 in	
monte	 Tauno,	 referencing	 the	 Elder	 Drusus’	 campaigns.	 At	 Ann.	 1.61	 the	Teutoburg	 forest	 still	 displays	 signs	 of	 Varus’	 camp	 and	 fortifications	 (prima	
Vari	castra	lato	ambitu	et	dimensis	principiis	trium	legionum	manus	ostentabant;	
dein	semiruto	vallo,	humili	fossa	accisae	iam	reliquiae	consedisse	intellegebantur).																																																									228illi	sanguine	suo	et	lubrico	paludum	lapsantes	excussis	rectoribus	disicere	obvios,	
proterere	iacentis.	plurimus	circa	aquilas	labor,	quae	neque	ferri	adversum	ingruentia	
tela	neque	figi	limosa	humo	poterant.	Caecina	dum	sustentat	aciem,	suffosso	equo	
delapsus	circumveniebatur,	ni	prima	legio	sese	opposuisset,	Ann.	1.65.	
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There	are,	further,	the	‘Long	Bridges’	built	by	L.	Domitius	at	least	twenty	years	earlier229,	which	Tacitus	says	should	put	Caecina’s	troops	in	a	position	to	travel	
notis	itineribus	 (Ann.	1.63).230	During	 the	second	year	of	campaigning,	we	read	that	 castellum	 Lupiae	 flumini	 adpositum	 obsideri	 (Ann.	2.7).	 Further	 on	 in	 the	same	 chapter,	 the	 reference	 to	 the	 nearby	 tumulum	 tamen	 nuper	 Varianis	
legionibus	structum	locates	us	back	in	the	area	of	the	Teutoburger	pass	through	its	allusion	to	Germanicus’	earlier	ordering	of	the	Varian	battlefield.231	Both	the	
veteram	aram	Druso	sitam	and	the	castellum	Alisonem	on	this	site	were	Roman	structures	which	predated	Germanicus’	presence.232	In	the	same	breath	we	read	that	 cuncta	 inter	 castellum	 Alisonem	 ac	 Rhenum	 novis	 limitibus	 aggeribusque	
permunita.	 The	 force	 of	 novis	 lies	 in	 its	 suggestion	 that	 Germanicus	 found	existing	structures	 in	 this	 territory	dating	back	to	 the	earlier	period	of	Roman	expansion	into	Germany	during	which	Aliso	was	built,	which	he	now	restored	or	supplemented.233	Finally,	 at	 Ann.	 2.8	 Germanicus	 and	 his	 waterborne	 troops	enter	the	fossa	Drusiana,	an	enormous	canal	built	by	his	father	Drusus	that	led	from	inland	Germany	to	the	Zuiderzee	and	from	there	to	the	North	Sea.	
	But	many	of	these	Roman	markers	from	the	past	are	(in)	ruins.	Of	Drusus’	fort	on	Mount	 Taunus,	 only	 vestigia	remain.	 The	 camp	 at	 Teutoburg	where	 Varus																																																									229His	obituary	at	Ann.	4.44	reveals	him	to	be	the	consul	of	16BC,	who	penetrated	into	Germany	during	a	subsequent	proconsular	command	in	2BC.	230It	is	unclear	where	these	itinera	are	nota	because	they	used	this	route	on	the	way	up	(if	so,	Tacitus	does	not	mention	it)	or	because	Germanicus	and	his	staff	had	access	to	written	records	from	earlier	commanders,	documenting	their	existence	and	route.	231Makins	(2013),	103	notices	that	Germanicus	here	seems	to	be	visiting	old	ground	–	the	narrative	does	not	clearly	signal	it,	although	it	is	true	that	the	German	episodes	of	
Annals	1	end	with	attempts	to	reconvey	the	troops	to	the	Rhine	for	the	winter,	a	journey	for	which	they	would	likely	have	taken	the	same,	familiar	route	back	as	they	did	on	the	way	up.	232It	remains	puzzling	why	this	altar	to	Drusus	at	Teutoburg,	if	it	was	already	in	existence	at	the	time	of	Germanicus’	visit	(as	the	narrative’s	stress	on	veterem	seems	to	demand)	had	not	been	destroyed	by	Arminius	around	the	time	of	the	Varian	disaster,	instead	of	recently.	The	fortress	at	Aliso	had	been	built	by	the	Elder	Drusus	himself	(OCD	4th	ed.	‘Aliso’,	Dio	54.33.4).		233Isaac	(1988),	126–27	established	convincingly,	by	analogy	with	Ann.	1.61,	that	the	
limites	and	aggeres	here	referred	to	must	mean	military	roads	and	causeways	over	swamps	rather	than	boundary	walls	and	ramparts.	Even	if	these	were	new	structures	imposed	by	Germanicus,	as	Isaac	claims,	the	occurrence	of	the	word	novis	seems	to	me	to	imply	emphasis.	Additionally,	the	text’s	delineation	of	territory	is	such	to	establish	beyond	doubt	that	previous	campaigns	would	also	have	cut	roads	and	built	causeways,	of	which	traces	likely	survived,	even	if	in	a	decayed	state.	
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made	his	last	stand	has	fallen	into	ruin,	as	indicated	by	the	semiruto	vallo.	The	
albentia	ossa	spread	around	on	the	battlefield	attest	to	the	natural	processes	of	decay	working	their	effect	on	the	unburied	bodies.234	L.	Domitius’	Long	Bridges	(Ann.	 1.63)	 were	 also	 clearly	 still	 discernible	 in	 the	 landscape	 twenty	 years	later,	 but	 Tacitus	 mentions	 that	 they	 had	 decayed	 since	 they	 were	 first	 built	(ruptos	 vetustate	 pontes),	 and	 the	 difficulty	 of	 repositioning	 them	 in	 hostile	territory	(reponeret	simulque	propulsaret	hostem).	Roads	and	bridges	are	ways	of	making	territories	navigable	and,	to	state	a	truism,	access	is	a	prerequisite	for	being	able	to	deploy	other	mechanisms	of	control	–	such	as	armies	–	effectively.	As	well	as	enabling	control,	they	also	express	it.	Roads	are	visible	reminders	of	the	 roadmaker’s	 mastery	 over	 the	 landscape	 and	 any	 obstacles	 it	 may	 have	presented	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 road	 (as	 celebrated	 in	 poem	 4.3	 of	 Statius’	
Silvae,	 esp.	 lines	 40-66;	 see	 chapter	 one,	 p.	 40ff).	 In	 Tacitus’	 account	 of	 the	decayed	 Long	 Bridges,	 none	 of	 these	 three	 functions	 of	 access,	 control	 and	landscape	subjugation	are	any	longer	fulfilled235:	Caecina’s	troops	cannot	access	the	 route	 without	 rebuilding;	 whilst	 doing	 so	 they	 are	 besieged	 instead	 of	besieging,	and	the	German	landscape	has	started	to	master	the	road	instead	of	vice	 versa.	 From	 the	 description	 of	 their	 positioning	 (inter	 paludes…	 cetera	
limosa,	tenacia	gravi	caeno	aut	rivis	 incerta	erant)	we	 can	 infer	 that	 the	boggy	ground	is	eating	away	at	the	wood’s	structural	integrity.	The	impression	is	of	an	environment	 slowly	 reverting	 back	 to	 its	 natural	 state,	 eating	 away	 at	 any	interventions	 from	 outside.	 The	 agency	 of	 the	 landscape	 is	 inescapable	 and	visible	in	its	impact	on	Roman	interventions.	The	Roman	landscape	which	past	Romans	had	 superimposed	on	Germany	has,	 by	 the	 time	of	Germanicus’	 visit,	dwindled	 to	 a	 fragmentary	overlay	only,	 a	 landscape	of	 ruin.	German	 space	 is	eroding	Roman	space.		As	in	the	Rhineland	of	the	Batavian	revolt,	where	the	camps	left	untouched	by	the	river’s	 force	were	destroyed	by	human	hands,	 the	people	who	 inhabit	 this																																																									234I	see	no	reason	to	claim	them	as	a	meaningless	poetic	transplant	from	the	campique	
ingentes	ossibus	albent	of	Virgil,	A.12.36,	as	Woodman	does	(Woodman	1979,	148–49).	235For	Makins	(2017,	230),	control	was	never	established	in	the	first	place:	‘the	ramshackle	causeway	commemorates	an	earlier	failed	attempt	to	bring	the	area	under	Roman	control’.	
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consuming	 landscape	work	with	 that	 landscape	 in	 overturning	Roman	 spatial	interventions.	 Tacitus	 implies	 that	 the	 hostility	 of	 the	 decidedly	 unpacified	inhabitants	 of	 the	 area	 poses	 an	 extra	 challenge	 for	 Caecina’s	 troops	who	 are	aiming	 to	 re-establish	 the	 bridges:	 the	 struggle	 with	 the	 landscape	 is	simultaneous	with	 the	 struggle	with	 the	people	 and	one	has	 to	 see	 these	 two	aspects	of	Caecina’s	 task	as	 intimately	 interlinked	 (Caecinae	dubitanti	quonam	
modo	ruptos	vetustate	pontes	reponeret	simulque	propulsaret	hostem,	Ann.	1.63).	At	Teutoburg	(Ann.	1.61),	Pagán	interpreted	Germanicus’	actions	as	successfully	transforming	 the	 disordered	 space	 of	 the	 battlefield,	 upon	 which	 nature	 had	already	made	 incursions,	 into	 an	ordered	 cemetery	 safe	 from	such	 intrusions.	But	 the	 tumulus	 which	 resulted	 from	 this	 transformation	 is	 already	 found	unmade	by	unspecified	Germans	at	Ann.	2.7,	with	the	added	destruction	of	the	much	older	altar	to	Drusus.	It	is	in	this	joint	action	by	humans	and	landscape	to	undo	 the	 transformation	 of	 German	 space	 into	 Roman	 space 236 	that	 the	representation	 of	 Germany	 the	 Annals	most	 closely	 resembles	 the	 dynamic	between	people	and	place	which	Tacitus	depicts	in	the	Histories’	account	of	the	Batavian	revolt.	237	
Germany	as	a	Roman	ruin	An	 indication	of	 the	 importance	of	 these	sites	of	Roman	history	as	structuring	elements	 for	 Romans’	 navigation	 through	 Germany	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 much	higher	number	of	occasions	where	Germanicus	and	his	troops	pass	or	visit	‘old	ground’	 –	 those	 sites	 of	 previous	 Roman	 activity	 with	 preserved	 material	remains	 which	 were	 listed	 earlier	 –	 compared	 to	 instances	 where	 they	 find	themselves	forging	new	paths	and	camps.238	In	a	practical	sense,	the	density	of	Roman	 structures,	 however	 decayed,	 in	 the	 areas	 traversed	 by	 Germanicus	during	 these	 campaigns	 suggest	 that	 even	 the	 partial	 survival	 of	 Roman	landscapes	of	conquest	and	occupation	was	held	to	make	legionaries’	progress																																																									236Of	course	both	these	instances	are	also	examples	of	German	people	undoing	Roman	
people	as	well	as	Roman	space.	237Pagán	(1999),	303.	238Woolf	(2009,	207)	off-handedly	introduced	a	paper	on	something	completely	different	(ethnicity)	with	this	contextualisation	of	Tacitus’	Germany:	‘[Tacitus’	Germany	is]	forever	a	place	of	treacherous	landscapes.	Dark	forests	hide	enemies	and	the	traces	of	Roman	disasters.’	This	section	substantiates	and	elaborates	on	this	casual	remark.	
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easier.	The	narrative	never	shows	them	opening	up	new	pathways	by	choice:	at	
Ann.	1.63	Arminius	lures	Germanicus	into	trackless	territory	(avia),	and	at	Ann.	2.8	Germanicus,	after	a	smooth	journey	up	the	Ems	thanks	to	Drusus’	canal239,	is	forced	 to	 build	 bridges	 from	 scratch	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 where	 he	
thought	he	had	arrived	and	where	he	had	actually	arrived240:	classis	Amisiae	ore	
relicta	 laevo	amne,	erratumque	 in	eo	quod	non	subvexit	aut	 transposuit	militem	
dextras	in	terras	iturum,	 ‘the	fleet	was	left	tethered	to	the	left	bank	of	the	Ems,	and	in	doing	so	an	error	was	made	because	Germanicus	had	not	sailed	up	to	or	disembarked	 his	 soldiers	 onto	 the	 lands	 on	 the	 right	 bank	 where	 they	 were	going’.	The	Germans,	in	contrast,	know	where	they	are	so	well	that	they	can	use	shortcuts	through	the	forests,	compendiis	vias,	unknown	to	the	Romans,	to	beat	Caecina	 to	 the	 Long	 Bridges	 (also	 Ann.	 1.63).	 On	 both	 occasions	 where	Germanicus	 deviates	 from	 familiar	 paths,	 the	 digressions	 cost	 him	 dearly	 in	terms	 of	 time,	 efficiency	 and	 success.	 First,	 Arminius’	 baiting	 ends	 with	 the	Romans	 only	 just	 avoiding	 being	 pushed	 into	 a	 swamp,	 and	 secondly,	 in	rectifying	 Germanicus’	 error	 in	 locating	 himself	 in	 (German)	 space	 they	 lose	several	 days	 (plures	 dies	 efficiendis	 pontibus	 absumptis)	 and	 can	 no	 longer	execute	a	quick	strike	against	Arminius.241	Roman	engineering	can,	and	does	on	this	occasion,	overpower	even	previously	untouched	German	landscape,	but	it	is	a	difficult	 struggle	even	when	Germanicus	has	 the	natural	path	of	 the	 river	 to	inform	his	progress.	In	contrast,	the	ocean	provides	no	such	information,	as	the	shipwreck	 at	Ann.	2.23	 proves,	 nor	 can	 it	 be	 bridged	 or	 otherwise	 bound	 by	Roman	technology.		
																																																								239fossam	cui	Drusianae	nomen	ingressus…	lacus	inde	et	Oceanum	usque	ad	Amisiam	
flumen	secunda	navigatione	pervehitur,	‘entering	the	canal	which	bore	Drusus	name…	he	sailed	from	there	into	the	lake	and	then	the	Ocean	until	he	came	to	the	river	Ems	via	a	favourable	journey’.		240The	manuscripts	we	have	of	the	text	are	too	muddled	in	this	passage	to	allow	us	to	reconstruct	precisely	what	happens,	but	it	is	clear	that	the	error	is	born	from	a	lack	of	knowledge.	241This	is	not	to	say	that	only	uncharted	territory	produces	setbacks:	at	Ann.	2.23	Germanicus,	retreating,	follows	the	same	river	route	down	the	Ems	into	the	Ocean	(per	
flumen	Amisiam	Oceano	invexit)	by	which	he	came	up	(Ann.	2.8	fossam	cui	Drusianae	
nomen…	lacus	inde	et	Oceanum	usque	ad	Amisiam	flumen)	but	gets	shipwrecked	on	the	Ocean	–	the	unpredictable	German	waterscapes	at	work	again.	
		140	
The	existing	Roman	landscape	is	not	only	the	means	by	which	Germanicus	and	his	 troops	 prefer	 to	 navigate	 Germany	 but	 also	 the	 means	 by	 which	 they	understand	 its	 nature.	 However,	 in	 doing	 so	 they	 are	 already	 at	 one	 remove	from	 Germany.	 All	 that	 the	 decayed	 forts	 and	 roads	 can	 attest	 to	 is	 Roman	Germany,	 because	 many	 other	 spaces	 as	 well	 as	 what	 is	 underneath	 Roman	Germany	remains	impenetrable.	Germany	itself	can	only	be	construed	through	an	inversion	of	what	they	see,	known	by	what	it	is	not	(knowable,	suitable	to	be	transformed	 into	 Roman	 space	 without	 serious	 effort	 and	 constant	maintenance),	but	not	by	what	it	is.	At	no	point	in	the	narrative	other	than	the	visit	 to	 Teutoburg	 at	 Ann.	 1.61	 do	 we	 encounter	 translators	 of	 the	 German	landscape	 to	 help	 Germanicus	 read	 it.	 Even	 then,	 within	 this	 single	 scene,	 a	contrast	 is	 implied	 between	 what	 needs	 translating	 and	 what	 does	 not.	 The	Tacitean	text	allocates	translators	to	two	categories	of	things	only:	 first,	 to	the	kind	 of	 human	 activity	 which	 does	 not	 leave	 traces	 in	 the	 landscape	 and	therefore	needs	human	 interpreters	 (where	 and	how	particular	Romans	died,	but	 also	where	 and	 how	 the	 Germans	 desecrated	 the	 eagles	which	 they	 then	removed	from	the	scene)242;	and	secondly,	to	spatial	intrusions	by	the	Germans	into	 the	Roman	 spatial	 order	 of	 the	 camp,	 such	 as	 the	 instruments	 of	 torture	pointed	 out	 by	 the	 survivors:	 the	 tribunal	 (platform)	 from	 which	 Arminius	spoke,	 the	patibula	(gibbets)	and	 scrobes	(pits)	 for	 the	prisoners.	Pagán	noted	how,	 in	 contrast,	 the	 physical	 remains	 of	 traditional	 Roman	 structures	 of	 the	camp	 in	 their	 traditional	 places	 can	 speak	 for	 themselves243:	 semiruto	 vallo,	
humili	 fossa	 accisae	 iam	 reliquiae	 consedisse	 intellegebantur:	 medio	 campi	
albentia	ossa,	ut	fugerant,	ut	restiterant,	disiecta	vel	aggerata,	‘from	a	dilapidated	rampart	and	a	shallow	ditch,	it	could	be	understood	where	those	legions	still	left	to	have	entrenched	themselves	had	fallen;	the	whitening	bones	in	the	middle	of	the	 field	 were	 strewn	 around	 or	 heaped	 up	 depending	 on	 whether	 they	 had																																																									242cladis	eius	superstites,	pugnam	aut	vincula	elapsi,	referebant	hic	cecidisse	legatos,	illic	
raptas	aquilas,	primum	ubi	vulnus	Varo	adactum,	ubi	infelici	dextera	et	suo	ictu	mortem	
invenerit,	‘survivors	of	that	disaster,	who	escaped	either	from	the	battle	or	from	the	chains	of	the	enemy,	related	how	the	legates	had	succumbed	here,	the	eagles	had	been	stolen	there,	the	place	in	which	the	first	wound	was	inflicted	on	Varus,	and	that	where	he	found	his	death	through	the	blow	inflicted	by	his	own	unfortunate	right	hand’;	but	also	utque	signis	et	aquilis	per	superbiam	inluserit	[Arminius],	‘how	Arminius	disrespected	the	signa	and	the	eagles’.	243Pagán	(1999),	308.	
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resisted	or	stood	fast’.	The	scene’s	division	of	different	kinds	of	evidence	implies	that	 the	 survivors’	 capacity	 for	 translating	 their	 surroundings	 was	 limited	 to	what	they	had	personally	experienced.	It	is	not	a	general	skill,	and	is	therefore	no	 good	 outside	 of	 the	 ruins	 of	 the	 camp	 at	 Teutoburg.	 As	 if	 to	 reinforce	 the	point,	 immediately	 afterwards	 Germanicus	 is	 baited	 into	 following	 Arminius	into	 the	avia	of	 the	 forests	already	discussed,	a	digression	 from	familiar	paths	which	almost	ends	in	disaster.	The	Roman	readers	of	the	Roman	battlescape	of	Teutoburg	 are	 no	 guide	 to	 reading	 the	 German	 landscape	 of	 pathless	 forests.	The	next	section	investigates	how	Tacitus	depicts	the	process	of	understanding	the	 German	 landscape	 which	 is	 underneath	 and	 all	 around	 the	 Roman	superimpositions.	
Translating	un-Roman	Germany	The	 first	 thing	 to	 note	 is	 that	 Tacitus’	 narrative	 does	 not	 show	 any	 of	 the	Germans	who	are	identified	as	pro-Roman	taking	on	the	role	of	translating	the	German	 landscape	 on	 behalf	 of	 Rome.	 Arminius’	 disinclination	 to	 put	 the	bilingual	 capacities	 he	 gained	 during	 his	 service	 to	 Rome	 at	 their	 disposal	 is	understandable.	But	the	pro-Roman	and	Latin-speaking	Segestes	(Ann.	1.55)	is	not	mentioned	as	being	enlisted	 in	 this	capacity	either,	and	 indeed	disappears	from	the	narrative	quite	early	on	at	Ann.	1.59,	to	settle	vetere	in	provincia	(Gaul).	Segestes’	 son,	 the	 priest-turned-rebel-turned-penitent	 Segimundus,	 had	 been	sent	 to	 the	 Gallic	 bank	 of	 the	 Rhine	 even	 earlier	 (Ann.	 1.57),	 and	 Segestes’	brother	 Segimerus	 and	 his	 unnamed	 son	 are	 removed	 across	 the	 river	 to	Cologne	 at	 Ann.	 1.71.	 The	 use	 of	 native	 guides,	 co-opted	 into	 the	 Roman	apparatus	 of	 conquest,	 was	 an	 established	 Roman	 route	 to	 understanding	foreign	 territory244,	 but	 the	Germanicus	 campaigns	contain	 no	mention	 of	 the	practice.	 Instead,	 all	 the	 key	 individuals	 foregrounded	 in	 the	 narrative	 as	suitable	to	perform	this	role	are	either	co-opted	 into	the	German	landscape	of	resistance,	 like	Arminius	himself,	disappearing	 into	 the	 forests,	or	 removed	 to	Roman	 landscapes	 outside	 transrhenane	 Germany.	 Given	 the	 parallel	tendencies,	in	the	narrative,	of	the	German	people	and	the	German	landscape	to																																																									244Austin	and	Rankov	(1995),	67.	The	authors	also	cite	the	perils	of	deception	and	misinformation	in	such	cases,	which	made	it	imperative	to	try	to	confirm	the	information	by	other	means.	
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undo	Roman	spatial	 interventions	 in	 the	territory	and	restore,	or	revert	 to,	 its	‘natural’	 German	 state,	 the	 removal	 of	 persons	 with	 one	 foot	 in	 each	 of	 the	cultures	makes	sense	as	a	precaution	against	the	possibility	of	their	reverting	to	German	loyalties.	
	On	 two	 occasions,	 however,	 German	 informants	 open	 up	 the	 landscape	 of	Germany	 to	 Germanicus’	 understanding	 and	 therefore	 enable	 the	 intersecting	power	balance	between	people	and	place,	Roman	and	German,	to	be	rearranged	in	Rome’s	favour.	As	if	to	increase	the	force	of	the	contrast,	the	passages	(Ann.	2.12ff	 and	 Ann.	 2.20ff)	 follow	 immediately	 after	 Germanicus’	 error	 in	disembarking	 his	 troops	 (Ann.	 2.8).	 Ann.	 2.12	 mentions	 a	 perfuga	 who	communicates	delectum	ab	Arminio	locum	pugnae	to	Germanicus,	who	then	goes	on	to	win	the	battle	on	the	plain	of	 Idistaviso,	despite	 the	disadvantages	of	 its	surroundings	and	of	the	Roman	position	within	it,	both	described	by	Tacitus	in	great	detail	at	the	start	of	the	battle.245	The	implication	is	that,	forearmed	with	knowledge	 from	 the	 informant246,	 Germanicus	 is	 able	 to	 exploit	 to	maximum	effect	the	Roman	factors	under	his	control	(tactics	and	kit,	both	emphasised	in	the	contio	as	superior	to	the	Germans’)247	in	order	to	successfully	overcome	the	joint	 resistance	of	 the	German	people	and	 landscape.	This	victory	over	people	and	 land	 is	 powerfully	 expressed	 in	 the	 final	 images	 of	 Roman	 bowmen																																																									245Ann.	2.16	is	[campus]	medius	inter	Visurgim	et	collis,	ut	ripae	fluminis	cedunt	aut	
prominentia	montium	resistunt,	inaequaliter	sinuatur.	pone	tergum	insurgebat	silva,	
editis	in	altum	ramis	et	pura	humo	inter	arborum	truncos,	‘this	field,	between	the	Weser	and	some	hills	so	that	the	banks	of	the	river	either	give	way	to	it	or	the	mountain	cliffs	narrow	it,	curves	irregularly.	At	its	rear	a	forest	rises	on	a	ridge,	with	branches	reaching	into	the	sky	and	clear	ground	in	between	the	trunks	of	trees’	(location);	
campum	et	prima	silvarum	barbara	acies	tenuit:	soli	Cherusci	iuga	insedere	ut	
proeliantibus	Romanis	desuper	incurrerent,	‘the	barbarian	army	held	the	field	and	the	edges	of	the	woods,	only	Cherusci	occupied	the	ridges	so	that	they	could	come	down	from	above	on	the	fighting	Romans’	(position).	246Idistaviso	must	be	the	place	that	is	meant.	It	cannot	be	the	Roman	camp,	as	generals	would	guard	against	incursions	into	the	camp	as	a	matter	of	course.	247Ann.	2.14	non	campos	modo	militi	Romano	ad	proelium	bonos,	sed	si	ratio	adsit,	silvas	
et	saltus;	nec	enim	inmensa	barbarorum	scuta,	enormis	hastas	inter	truncos	arborum	et	
enata	humo	virgulta	perinde	haberi	quam	pila	et	gladios	et	haerentia	corpori	tegmina,	‘not	only	fields	were	conducive	to	Roman	military	success,	but	if	they	kept	their	heads,	also	woods	and	hillsides;	nor	could	the	immense	shields	of	the	barbarians,	and	their	enormous	spears	be	wielded	in	the	spaces	between	tree	trunks	and	undergrowth	springing	up	from	the	ground	in	the	same	way	that	Roman	javelins,	short	swords	and	close	fitting	body	armour	could’.	
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shooting	 Germans	 out	 of	 trees	 or	 cutting	 down	 the	 trees	 themselves:	quidam	
turpi	fuga	in	summa	arborum	nisi	ramisque	se	occultantes	admotis	sagitariis	per	
ludibrium	figebantur,	alios	prorutae	arbores	adflixere	(Ann.	2.17).	They	perform	the	same	slaughter	on	those	trying	to	get	away	by	swimming	across	the	Weser.	It	 is	 a	 stark	 reversal	 of	 patterns	 both	 expected	 (on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	Histories’	connection	between	Germans	and	their	lands)248	and	established	in	the	account	of	the	campaigns	so	far.249		The	sequence	of	events	from	informant	to	success	is	replicated	at	Ann.	2.20250,	where	 Germanicus’	 foreknowledge	 of	 both	 Arminius’	 plans	 and	 terrain	 are	explicit	 (consilia	 locos	 prompta	 occulta	 noverat).	 The	 presence	 of	 an	intermediary	 like	 the	 transfuga	of	Ann.	2.12	 is	 implied.	 The	 Romans	win	 this	second	battle	as	well,	and	this	 time	for	reasons	which	are	exactly	 those	which	Germanicus’	contio	advanced	as	guarantors	of	success	before	the	first	battle:	nec	
minor	 Germanis	 animus,	 sed	 genere	 pugnae	 et	 armorum	 superabantur,	 ‘the	Germans	had	no	less	lust	for	battle,	but	were	outmatched	because	of	the	nature	of	 the	 battle	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 their	weaponry’	 (Ann.	2.21).	 Their	 spears	 and	bodies	are	hampered	by	circumstances	similarly	cramped	to	those	at	Idistaviso	(ingens	multitudo	 artis	 locis	 praelongas	 hastas	 non	 protenderet,	 non	 colligeret,	
neque	adsultibus	et	velocitate	corporum	uteretur).	 The	presence	 on	 the	Roman	side	 of	 German	 traitors	 who	 can	 read	 the	 landscape,	 in	 short,	 has	 enabled	Germanicus	to	take	measures	accordingly	and	tip	the	balance	of	success	on	this	occasion.		These	 issues	with	reading	and	interpreting	both	the	past	and	the	 landscape	 in	Germany	offer	an	interesting	contrast	with	how	Germanicus	goes	about	reading	history	 into	 the	 landscapes	 of	 the	 East.	 At	 Athens,	 he	 encounters	 non-visual	evidence	of	a	foreign	history,	in	the	oratory	of	Greece’s	greatest	rhetors	(vetera	
suorum	 facta	 dictaque	 praeferentes	 [Athenienses],	 Ann.	 2.53),	 which	 predates	Rome	and	yet	does	not	 exclude	Roman	knowledge.	Though	Tacitus	 gibes	 that																																																									248See	chapter	one.	249Section	six	of	this	chapter	explains	why	the	cutting	down	of	trees	at	Ann.	1.50	should	be	viewed	differently.		250It	is	also	present	at	Hist.	5.18.7-13.	
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the	 Athenians	 dressed	 up	 their	 speech	 in	 this	 allusive	 and	 historically	sanctioned	 manner	 ‘in	 order	 to	 lend	 dignity	 to	 their	 flattery’	 (quo	 plus	
dignationis	adulatio	haberet;	 Pelling’s	observation	and	 translation251),	 the	gibe	does	 not	 invalidate	 his	 implicit	 recognition	 that	 the	 pre-Roman	 Greek	 past	 is	alive	in	Roman	Athens,	present	in	the	minds	not	only	of	the	Greeks	but	also	of	the	Romans	who	are	fully	conversant	with	the	cultural	 framework	referred	to.	Germanicus’	visit	to	Egypt	is	also	motivated	by	his	awareness	of	their	glorious	pre-Roman	 past	 and	 a	 desire	 to	 see	 beyond	 its	 Roman	 connotations	(cognoscendae	antiquitatis,	Ann.	2.59.1).	 He	 succeeds	 in	 doing	 so	 by	 taking	 an	interest	 in	 the	 hieroglyphs	 from	 the	 reign	 of	 Ramses	 II	 (et	manebant	 structis	
molibus	litterae	Aegyptiae,	priorem	opulentiam	complexae,	Ann.	2.60)	in	addition	to	 reading	 more	 classical	 allusions,	 such	 as	 to	 Menelaus	 and	 Hercules,	 into	specific	features	of	the	landscape	(orsus	oppido	a	Canopo.	condidere	id	Spartani	
ob	 sepultum	 illic	 rectorem	navis	Canopum,	quae	 tempestate	Menelaus	Graeciam	
repetens	diversum	ad	mare	terramque	Libyam	deiectus	est.	inde	proximum	amnis	
os	dicatum	Herculi…).	Piso	in	his	turn	offers	yet	a	third	way	of	approaching	the	history	of	landscapes	visited	by	Romans.	With	regard	to	Athens,	his	phrase	non	
Athenienses	tot	cladibus	extinctos	…	coluisset	[Germanicus]	(Ann.	2.55)	 suggests	that	whatever	or	whoever	Germanicus	thinks	he	is	visiting,	it	is	not	the	Athens	of	old.	The	place	itself	is	not	denied	its	glorious	history	but	its	people	are.	Piso	denies	that	this	heritage	belongs	to	the	current	inhabitants	of	the	place,	whom	he	 sees	 instead	 as	 formed	 entirely	 through	 their	 association	 with	 Rome,	 and	negatively	 so,	 as	 past	 allies	 of	 Rome’s	 enemy	 Mithridates	 and	 opponents	 of	Octavian	 in	 the	civil	war.	 In	his	view,	 the	current	 inhabitants	are	essentially	a	different	 people,	 using	 the	 same	 name	 and	 moving	 around	 amongst	 the	monuments	left	by	their	extinct	predecessors.		What	unites	the	differing	 interpretations,	however,	 is	 the	fact	that	Rome	has	a	mental	 framework	 for	 accessing	 this	 past	 history:	 elite	 young	 Roman	 males	learned	Greek	as	a	matter	of	 course	so	 the	Athenians’	 references	 to	 their	past	orators	 did	 not	 pass	 Germanicus	 by.	 In	 Egypt,	 translators	 of	 its	more	 opaque	culture	and	language	were	readily	available	(iussusque	e	senioribus	sacerdotum																																																									251Pelling	(2012),	301.	
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patrium	 sermonem	 interpretari,	 referebat…,	 Ann.	 2.60),	 and	 what	 the	 priest	reveals	about	this	empire	long	gone	is	then	readily	assimilated	by	his	audience	through	 comparison	 to	 the	 present	 day	 Roman	 Empire	 and	 its	 neighbours:	
legebantur	 et	 indicta	 gentibus	 tributa…	 haud	 minus	 magnifica	 quam	 nunc	 vi	
Parthorum	aut	potentia	Romana	iubentur.	Both	of	these	cultures,	therefore,	are	recognised	and	valued	as	cultures	by	Germanicus.	They	are	alternative	systems	which	are	different	–	hence	the	interest	–	but	similar	enough	to	be	understood,	hence	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 sense	 of	 them	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 Rome	 and	 of	 any	condemnation	 of	 them	 as	 valueless.	 Even	 more	 importantly,	 at	 the	 time	 of	Germanicus’	visit	both	Greece	and	Egypt	had	long	been	conquered	and	co-opted	into	the	Roman	Empire	(since	146BC	and	30BC,	respectively).			In	both	cases,	the	known	and	the	solidly	conquered	go	together,	in	the	same	way	that	the	threat	posed	by	Germany	is	compounded	by	the	combination	of	being	unknown	and	not	yet	 fully	conquered.	The	German	templum	to	Tanfana	which	Germanicus’	 troops	 destroy	 at	 Ann.	 1.51 252 	is	 not	 granted	 the	 benefit	 of	
translatio	Romana	(the	 practice	 of	 describing	 a	 foreign	 custom	by	means	 of	 a	Roman	 equivalent)	 and	 incorporation	 into	 Roman	 religious	 practice,	 as	happened	 frequently	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Roman	 conquest,	 but	 is	 simply	destroyed	 by	 Germanicus	 and	 his	 troops.	 Instead	 of	 translating	 Germany’s	history,	culture,	or	religion,	Germanicus	and	his	troops	rely	solely	on	the	Roman	markers	in	the	German	landscape.	Their	only	access	to	Germany	is	through	the	occasional	 acquired	knowledge	of	 the	battle	positions	of	 the	enemy.	With	 this	exception,	their	project	is	focused	on	deploying	power	in	the	landscape	to	bring	victory	to	Rome	and	destruction	to	Germany,	to	restore	Roman	memories	in	the	landscape,	 and	 to	 display	 Roman	 authority	 through	 camps	 and	 memorials.	Nevertheless,	 in	 spite	 of	Germanicus’	 successes	 and	 those	of	 his	 father	 in	 this	regard,	 the	 German	 landscape	 of	 Annals	1	 and	 2	 remains	 hostile,	 difficult	 to	read,	 and	 always	 capable	 of	 swallowing	 such	 Roman	 markers	 of	 power,	 and	Germany	is	not	made	into	a	province.	It	is	salutary	to	remember	that	both	of	the	Roman	successes	discussed	in	this	section	formed	part	of	an	organised	retreat	
from	Germany,	back	to	the	Rhine	and	the	safety	of	Roman	Gaul	on	the	other	side.																																																									252See	section	six	of	this	chapter,	‘Asserting	Romanity	through	violence’.	
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Ruins,	memory	and	fear:	Caecina	and	Agrippina	The	 Roman	 travellers	who	 journey	 through	 this	 powerful	 landscape	 of	 either	unknown	threat	or	constant	ruin	have	powerful	responses	to	it.	The	landscape,	as	we	have	seen,	reabsorbs	whatever	Roman	markers	of	guidance,	control	and	understanding	are	put	upon	it.	Those	markers	are	patches	on	the	landscape,	or	perhaps	 corridors	 of	 knowledge	 and	 control,	 that	 exist	 amidst	 an	incomprehensible	 ‘natural’	 Germany	which	 is	 illegible	 and	 thus	 frightening	 to	the	Romans.	Makins	noted	that	at	Teutoburg	the	soldiers’	growing	identification	with	 their	 fallen	 comrades	 as	 the	 burial	 proceeds	 prompts	 sorrow,	 pity	 and	reflections	 on	 mortality.253	The	 latter	 cannot	 be	 dissociated	 from	 fear	 that	similar	things	might	happen	to	them,	at	the	hands	of	either	people	or	landscape.	Tacitus	mentions	this	fear	as	an	effect	dreaded	by	Tiberius	as	one	consequence	of	 the	 Teutoburg	 visit:	 quod	 Tiberio	 haud	 probatum,	 seu	 cuncta	 Germanici	 in	
deterius	 trahenti,	 sive	 exercitum	 imagine	 caesorum	 insepultorum	 tardatum	 ad	
proelia	et	formidolosiorem	hostium	credebat,	 ‘which	was	not	at	 all	 approved	of	by	 Tiberius,	 whether	 because	 he	 interpreted	 all	 Germanicus’	 actions	 in	 the	worst	 possible	 light,	 or	 because	 he	 believed	 the	 army,	 at	 the	 sight	 of	 the	unburied	dead,	would	become	reluctant	to	fight	and	more	fearful	of	the	enemy’,	
Ann.	1.62.	The	comment	is	tendentious,	especially	as	the	reader,	in	the	mutinies,	has	 already	 been	 groomed	 to	 see	 Tiberius	 as	 perpetually	 finding	 fault	 with	Germanicus,	regardless	of	the	merits	or	demerits	of	the	imperial	heir’s	actions.	In	 fact,	 such	 fear	 engendered	 by	 the	 confrontation	with	 battlefields	 had	 been	recognised	by	Roman	lawmakers	centuries	earlier,	and	steps	taken	to	prevent	it.	Makins	cites	Appian’s	 record	of	a	Roman	decree	being	passed	during	 the	Civil	War	in	90BC	that	soldiers	should	be	buried	as	they	fell	instead	of	at	Rome	in	full	sight	 of	 the	 civilian	 population,	 as	 the	 latter	 might	 be	 deterred	 from	 army	service	 at	 the	 pitiful	 (or	 gruesome?)	 sight.254	Both	 Tacitus	 and	 Tiberius	 were	probably	aware	of	 this	official	precedent	 for	 recognising	and	guarding	against	the	 debilitating	 effects	 of	 fear.	 Pelling	 recognised	 that	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	Teutoburg	burial,	which	 ironically	 fulfills	exactly	this	decree’s	requirements	of																																																									253Makins	(2017):	sorrow	(p.	220-1,	227),	pity	(p.	217,	226),	mortality	(p.	226).	254Makins	(2013),	14	citing	Appian,	BC	1.(5.)43,	who	uses	ὄψις	or	‘spectacle’	leaving	the	reader	to	invest	it	with	emotions	of	their	choice.	
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soldier	burying	soldier	on	the	site	of	the	battlefield,	bears	out	Tiberius’	fears	in	that	 the	 soldiers	 do	 get	 jumpy.255	The	 following	 section	 examines	 Tacitus’	complex	depiction	of	how	their	encounters	with	German	space	affect	and	distort	the	Roman	soldiers’	perception	of	Roman	space	on	 two	occasions.	The	 first	 is	the	strategically	useless	but	 fairly	 lengthy	 ‘Caecina	episode’	of	Ann.	1.63-8,	 for	which	 I	 argue	 that	 Caecina’s	 behaviour	 is	 more	 meaningful	 than	 an	 ‘act	 of	personal	courage’	and	the	overall	purpose	more	than	to	‘increase	the	suspense	of	 the	 major	 engagements’.256	The	 second	 occasion	 is	 the	 scene	 describing	Agrippina’s	stewardship	of	that	part	of	the	army	on	the	west	bank	of	the	Rhine	which	Germanicus	did	not	take	on	his	campaign.	
	Caecina’s	‘story’	reads	as	a	litany	of	setbacks	for	the	general	and	his	troops	from	the	 moment	 they	 set	 off	 on	 their	 overland	 journey	 to	 return	 to	 the	 Rhine	(Caecina,	 qui	 suum	 militem	 ducebat,	 monitus,	 quamquam	 notis	 itineribus	
regrederetur,	pontes	longos	quam	maturrime	superare,	Ann.	1.63).	Very	soon	the	decayed	state	of	 the	Long	Bridges	 (ruptos	vetustate	pontes)	exposes	 them	 to	a	barbarian	 onslaught	 while	 they	 suffer	 the	 adverse	 effects	 of	 the	 Germans’	manipulation	 of	 the	 local	 streams.257	Tacitus	 introduced	 this	 chapter	with	 the	summary	cuncta	pariter	Romanis	adversa	(Ann.	1.64),	but	things	get	worse	still.	Caecina’s	 troops	 spend	 a	 disturbed	 night	 being	 kept	 awake	 by	 the	 enemy’s	ululations	 (laeto	 cantu	 aut	 truci	 sonore,	 Ann.	 1.65)	 and	 he	 himself	 has	 a	nightmare	about	Varus	rising	up	from	the	Teutoburger	swamps	they	have	only	just	 left,	 and	 trying	 to	 pull	 him	 down	 with	 him	 (Quintilium	 Varum	 sanguine	
oblitum	 et	 paludibus	 emersum	 cernere	 et	 audire	 visus	 est	 velut	 vocantem,	 non	
tamen	 obsecutus	 et	 manum	 intendentis	 reppulisse).258	The	 next	 day	 they	 find																																																									255Pelling	(2012),	302:	‘the	Romans	are	indeed	terrified	by	Arminius,	and	come	within	an	ace	of	replaying	the	Varus	disaster’;	O’Gorman	(2000),	54	cites	only	Caecina’s	dream	as	proof	of	fear,	when	the	soldiers’	panicked	behaviour	seems	a	much	stronger	example.	256Woodman	(1988),	174.	257If	not	quite	imitating,	then	certainly	recalling,	the	hydraulic	interventions	of	Civilis	and	his	troops	at	Hist.	5.14.2	and	5.19.7-11,	half	noted	by	Goodyear	ad	loc.	though	only	in	the	context	of	Tacitus	getting	ahead	of	himself	in	mentioning	undas	(Ann.	1.64.2)	before	the	work	of	diverting	the	streams	had	actually	been	done.	258Though	see	Makins	(2017,	228,	n.	86)	for	Annemarie	Ambühl’s	suggestion	that	the	gesture	could	just	as	well	be	read	as	an	invitation	to	Caecina	to	pull	Varus	out	of	the	swamp,	constituting	further	spatial	restoration	of	the	disaster.	
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themselves	 ranged	 against	 Varus’	 nemesis,	 Arminius	 himself,	who	 encourages	his	 own	 troops	 and	 taunts	 his	 opponents	 by	 explicit	 reference	 to	 the	 disaster	whose	 traumatic	 aftermath	 they	 have	 only	 just	 experienced	 (‘en	 Varus	
eodemque	iterum	fato	vinctae	legiones!’,	still	Ann.	1.65).	Come	the	battle,	they	are	unable	to	fight	properly	due	to	the	muddy	nature	of	Arminius’	chosen	ground.	They	mostly	 survive	 the	 encounter,	 but	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 having	 lost	 or	damaged	most	of	 their	 food	and	 tools,	which	 the	muddy	 landscape	has	claimed	 (amissa	
magna	ex	parte	per	quae	egeritur	humus	aut	exciditur	caespes),	 leaving	them	to	pitch	a	very	makeshift	camp.	Though	we	get	no	glimpses	into	the	inner	feelings	of	the	soldiers,	their	overwrought	state	is	illustrated	by	Tacitus	at	Ann.	1.66:		
Forte	equus	abruptis	vinculis	vagus	et	clamore	territus	quosdam	
occurrentium	obturbavit.	tanta	inde	consternatio	inrupisse	Germanos	
credentium	ut	cuncti	ruerent	ad	portas,	quarum	decumana	maxime	
petebatur,	aversa	hosti	et	fugientibus	tutior.	Caecina	comperto	vanam	esse	
formidinem,	cum	tamen	neque	auctoritate	neque	precibus,	ne	manu	quidem	
obsistere	aut	retinere	militem	quiret,	proiectus	in	limine	portae	miseratione	
demum,	quia	per	corpus	legati	eundum	erat,	clausit	viam:	simul	tribuni	et	
centuriones	falsum	pavorem	esse	docuerunt.	
Ann.	1.66	‘By	chance	a	horse,	broken	loose	from	its	tethering	and	wandering	around	frightened	by	all	the	clamouring,	disconcerted	those	running	towards	it.	From	this	incident	originated	so	much	consternation	with	those	who	believed	that	the	Germans	had	overrun	the	camp	that	all	together	rushed	to	the	gates,	of	which	the	decumana	was	primarily	sought	out	because	it	faced	away	from	the	enemy	and	was	safer	for	those	fleeing.	When	Caecina	had	discovered	that	their	fears	had	been	groundless,	he	was	still	unable	to	stop	or	hold	back	the	soldiers	with	either	his	authority,	his	entreaties	or	even	his	hands.	He	finally	threw	himself	down	on	the	threshold	of	the	gate	and	so	closed	off	their	escape	route	with	pity,	because	they	would	have	had	to	march	over	the	body	of	their	legate.	At	the	same	time	the	tribunes	and	centurions	explained	that	their	panic	was	spurious.’		The	soldiers’	fright	must	be	interpreted	in	light	of	the	fear	which	gripped	them	at	 Teutoburg:	 that	 of	 being	 slaughtered	 themselves	 and	 then	 being	 absorbed	into	the	German	environment.	As	the	soldiers	resisted	the	German	landscape	at	Teutoburg	 by	 ordering	 the	 chaos	 of	 the	 battlefield	 into	 a	 burial	 ground,	 so	Caecina’s	camp,	however	provisional,	must	be	seen	as	a	stronghold	of	order	and	Romanity	 amidst	 the	 encroaching	 outside.	 But	 somehow	 fear	 and	 panic	infiltrate	it,	and	they	attempt	to	abandon	both	the	ordered	Roman	space	of	the	
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camp	 and	 what	 disciplina	 remained	 to	 them	 after	 the	 previous	 night’s	improvised	instead	of	routine	castrametation.259		Caecina,	whose	ability	to	keep	a	cool	head	in	all	circumstances	was	celebrated	by	Tacitus	at	Ann.	1.64260,	is	the	first	to	read	the	situation	correctly	in	the	face	of	his	soldiers’	distorted	perception	of	the	spatial	crisis	at	hand.	As	reason	fails	to	stop	their	stampede,	the	general	resorts	to	a	symbolic	gesture	at	the	very	point	where	 inside	 and	outside	meet	 and	where	 a	 reversal	 of	 perspective	 is	 always	inherently	present:	Tacitus	says	he	obstructs	the	limen	of	the	door	by	placing	his	body	 between	 the	 soldiers	 and	 the	 outside	 (proiectus	 in	 limine	 portae	
miseratione	demum,	quia	per	corpus	 legati	eundum	erat,	 clausit	viam).	 It	 is	 the	sight	of	the	aristocratic	body	interposing	itself	between	the	soldiers	and	danger,	disorder	and	irrationality,	which	recalls	them	to	safety,	order	and	their	senses.	Only	 when	 this	 bar	 is	 interposed	 between	 the	 soldiers	 and	 the	 landscape	 of	irrationality	 and	 fear	 is	 Caecina’s	 speech	 (si	 fugerent,	 pluris	 silvas,	 profundas	
magis	paludes,	saevitiam	hostium,	Ann.	1.67)	able	to	restore	the	traditional	and	appropriate	boundaries.		The	 soldiers’	 behaviour	 in	 this	 scene	 is	 prefigured	by	 that	 of	 the	horse	which	introduces	 the	 chapter	 (forte	 equus	 abruptis	 vinculis	 vagus	 et	 clamore	 territus	
quosdam	occurrentium	obturbavit…).	The	horse’s	incomprehension	of	the	noise	surrounding	 it	 causes	 its	 fear	 and	 its	 flight	 from	 the	 safe	 space	where	 it	 had	been	 tethered.	 The	 soldiers	 in	 their	 panic	 turn	 into	 such	 unthinking	 animals	governed	by	environmentally	induced	fear,	and	are	only	with	difficulty	restored	to	rational	humanity	by	a	gesture	which	combines	space	(the	physical	body	as	spatial	obstruction)	and	symbolism	(the	Roman	aristocratic	body	as	a	reminder	of	who	they	are).	Tacitus	in	these	scenes	juxtaposes	thoughts	of	German	nature	as	unsafe	(Ann.	1.65)	and	the	Roman	camp	as	safe	(Ann.	1.66).	But	he	also	shows																																																									259See	section	one,	‘Competing	spaces’.	260quadragesimum	id	stipendium	Caecina	parendi	aut	imperitandi	habebat,	secundarum	
ambiguarumque	rerum	sciens	eoque	interritus,	‘Caecina	was	in	his	fortieth	year	of	either	submitting	to	or	exercising	military	authority,	fully	aware	of	how	to	keep	his	head	in	both	success	and	crisis	and	fearless	because	of	it’.	So	steadfast	and	approbatory	is	Tacitus’	portrayal	of	Caecina	that	Benario	(2003,	401–2)	suggests	the	clades	Variana	might	have	been	avoided	had	Caecina	been	in	charge.	
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that	 the	 environment	 tends	 to	 appropriate	 and	 shape	 all	 that	 occurs	 on	 it,	making	 it	 a	 landscape	 of	 future	 threat	 as	well	 as	 past	 horror	 for	 the	Romans.	This	 capacity	 can	 taint	 even	 positive	 and	 well-ordered	 spaces	 such	 as	 the	Roman	camp	and	make	the	soldiers	waver	in	their	duty.		Once	 the	 soldiers	 are	 restored	 to	 their	 correct	 awareness,	Ann.	1.68	 contrasts	their	perception	of	 the	space	surrounding	them	with	that	of	 the	Germans.	The	first	half	of	 the	chapter	records	Arminius’	and	Inguiomerus’	 followers’	divided	opinions	 on	 their	 respective	 proposed	 strategies.	 The	 former	 wants	 to	 lure	Rome	out	of	 the	safe	environment	of	 the	camp	into	the	hostile	outside	and	 let	the	 environment	 do	 its	 work	 (Arminio	 sinerent	 egredi	 egressosque	 rursum	per	
umida	et	inpedita	circumvenirent	suadente);	the	latter	wishes	for	the	Germans	to	leave	this	advantageous	environment	in	order	to	invade	the	Roman	space	of	the	camp	 (atrociora	 Inguiomero	 et	 laeta	 barbaris,	 ut	 vallum	 armis	 ambirent).	Inguiomerus’	plan	 is	 the	more	popular,	 laeta	barbaris,	because	the	 loot	will	be	uncorrupted	 by	mud	 and	 blood,	 and	 is	 accepted.	 The	 Roman	 soldiers,	 whose	understanding	of	the	spaces	around	them	has	been	restored	by	Caecina,	delight	in	 the	 German	 choice	 to	 attack	 the	 Roman	 fortification	 (tergis	 Germanorum	
circumfunduntur,	exprobrantes	non	hic	silvas	nec	paludes,	sed	aequis	locis	aequos	
deos)	and	the	consequences	are,	of	course,	disastrous	 for	 the	Germans	(vulgus	
trucidatum	 est).	 Arminius,	 Caecina	 and	 the	 Roman	 legionaries,	 despite	 their	fear-induced	wobble,	are	proved	right	in	their	spatial	readings:	the	Roman	camp	is	a	place	of	safety	 in	a	surrounding	landscape	of	ever-encroaching	death,	ruin	and	 destruction.	 Only	 faith	 in	 both	 Roman	 space	 and	 the	 Roman	 discipline	which	 shapes	 their	 identity	 as	 soldiers	 can	 preserve	 them.	 The	 four-chapter	sequence	of	Ann.	1.65-58	thus	has	a	thematic	coherence	that	makes	sense	of	the	episode	rather	than	being	simply	an	oddly	long	drawn	out	retreat	(which	Ann.	1.63	makes	 clear	 it	 is).	 Following	 as	 it	 does	 on	 the	 heels	 of	 the	 confrontation	with	 the	 Teutoburger	 battlefield,	 it	 illustrates	 the	 lingering	 effects	 on	 the	soldiers	 of	 the	 destruction	 perpetrated	 by	 the	 German	 people	 and	 landscape	which	they	perceived	there.		
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In	the	light	of	Caecina’s	concern	to	maintain,	physically	if	necessary,	the	correct	boundaries	 between	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 spaces	 and	 the	 dangers	 they	represent,	 Agrippina’s	 behaviour	 in	 preventing	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	 bridge	over	 the	Rhine	 at	 Vetera	 in	 the	 very	 next	 chapter	 (Ann.	1.69)	 takes	 on	 a	 new	significance.		
Pervaserat	interim	circumventi	exercitus	fama	et	infesto	Germanorum	
agmine	Gallias	peti,	ac	ni	Agrippina	inpositum	Rheno	pontem	solvi	
prohibuisset,	erant	qui	id	flagitium	formidine	auderent.	sed	femina	ingens	
animi	munia	ducis	per	eos	dies	induit,	militibusque,	ut	quis	inops	aut	saucius,	
vestem	et	fomenta	dilargita	est.	tradit	C.	Plinius	Germanicorum	bellorum	
scriptor,	stetisse	apud	principium	ponti	laudes	et	grates	reversis	legionibus	
habentem.		‘Meanwhile	a	rumour	had	done	the	rounds,	of	the	army	blockaded	and	a	hostile	army	of	Germans	on	its	way	to	Gaul.	And	if	Agrippina	had	not	forbidden	that	the	bridge	built	across	the	Rhine	be	destroyed,	there	were	those	who	would	have	dared	to	commit	that	crime.	But	this	woman	of	immense	spirit	in	those	days	took	on	the	duties	of	a	general,	and	to	the	soldiers	she	dispensed	clothes	and	bandages	as	each	was	in	need	or	wounded.	Pliny,	the	author	of	the	German	Wars,	wrote	that	she	stood	on	the	bridgehead	expressing	praise	and	thanks	to	the	returning	legions.’		The	 scene	 has	 often	 featured	 as	 evidence	 in	 investigations	 into	 determining	Tacitus’	 attitude	 towards	 women	 or	 whether	 there	 is	 any	 pattern	 to	 the	collective	 works’	 representation	 of	 women	 in	 general	 and	 some	 women	 in	particular.261	Out	of	others	which	focus	on	the	figure	of	Agrippina	Maior	alone,	three	discuss	the	episode	on	the	bridge	in	some	depth.	Both	Santoro	L’Hoir	and	Hayne	read	the	episode	as	indicative	of	Agrippina’s	ambition	and	infringement	of	 the	 traditional	 territory	of	elite	Roman	males.262	McHugh,	 in	contrast,	 reads	Agrippina	 as	 indeed	 ‘ventur[ing]	 into	 traditionally	 male	 activities’	 but	 argues	this	must	not	automatically	be	equated	with	deserving	censure	 for	 it,	as	 there	were	 respectable	 Republican	 precedents	 for	 wives	 looking	 after	 their	 absent	husbands’	business.263																																																											261Notably	Baldwin	(1972)	and	McDougall	(1981).	262Santoro	L’Hoir	(1994),	12–13	n.	30,	17,	and	18	n.	57;	Hayne	(2000),	37–39.	263McHugh	(2012),	76.	
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Against	 this	backdrop,	 I	make	the	dual	argument	that,	 firstly,	Germanicus’	and	Agrippina’s	 imperial	 identities,	 as	 prince	 and	 princess,	 outweigh	 both	 the	Republican	precedents	and	the	gender	angle;	and	secondly,	that	the	enormity	of	her	 achievement	 befits	 Tacitus’	 –	 in	 my	 view	 –	 unequivocal	 praise	 (femina	
ingens	 animi).	 Tacitus	 reports	 Tiberius’	 grumblings	 upon	 receiving	 news	 of	Agrippina’s	 achievement	 as	 follows:	 id	Tiberii	 animum	altius	 penetravit…	nihil	
relictum	imperatoribus,	ubi	femina	manipulos	intervisat,	signa	adeat,	largitionem	
temptet,	 ‘this	 made	 a	 deep	 impression	 on	 Tiberius’	 mind…	 there	 would	 be	nothing	 left	 for	generals,	when	a	woman	 inspects	 the	companies,	 is	present	at	the	banners,	provides	largesse’	(still	at	Ann.	1.69).	It	is	Tiberius	in	the	text	who	takes	 the	 negative	 gendered	 angle,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 anti-Germanicus	 and	 by	extension	anti-Agrippina	angle,	as	Tacitus	has	primed	us	to	expect.264	In	as	 far	as	 there	 is	 an	 authorial	 voice	 in	 Tacitus,	 it	 states	 very	 clearly	 that	 without	Agrippina’s	intervention	a	disaster	would	have	befallen	a	Roman	army,	pursued	and	 cut	 off	 from	 safety	 in	 enemy	 territory.	 From	 a	 spatial	 point	 of	 view	 her	actions	on	the	bridge	are	therefore	analogous	to	Caecina’s	clearly	heroic	gesture	at	 Ann.	 1.66,	 and	 therefore	 equally	 appropriate	 to	 the	 situation	 and	 equally	praiseworthy.	 Agrippina	 (too)	 frustrates,	 by	 means	 of	 positioning	 her	aristocratic	(even	imperial)	body	in	the	way,	the	unacceptable	desire	of	fearful	troops	 to	 separate	 themselves	 from	what	 they	perceive,	 on	 the	basis	of	 faulty	information	and	fear,	as	an	environment	fraught	with	danger	and	death	which	might	overwhelm	them.	Just	as	the	disobedience	and	flight	of	1.66	would	have	been	dishonourable,	the	destruction	of	the	bridge	would	have	been	a	flagitium	as	 referenced	 at	 1.69;	 and	 just	 as	 the	 pavorem	 at	 the	 frightened	 horse	 in	Caecina’s	 camp	 is	 falsum,	 the	 tale	 of	 the	 barbarians	 at	 the	 gate	 in	Agrippina’s	camp	is	a	fama	only;	lastly,	formido	occurs	in	both	cases	as	the	primary	driver	of	behaviour	(consternatio	inrupisse	Germanos	credentium	and	pervaserat	fama	….	
infesto	Germanorum	agmine	Gallias	peti).	 She	 is	 a	good	wife,	 certainly,	but	 is	 a	member	 of	 the	 imperial	 family	 in	 her	 own	 right	 and	 in	 the	 Tacitean	representation	 of	 the	 incident	makes	 her	 decision	 to	 act	without	 reference	 to	her	 husband.	 She	 temporarily	 becomes	 an	 imperial	 dux	 interposing	 her																																																									264ipse	Druso	fratre	Tiberii	genitus,	Augustae	nepos,	set	anxius	occultis	in	se	patrui	
aviaeque	odiis	quorum	causae	acriores	quia	iniquae,	Ann.	1.33.	
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aristocratic	 body	 between	 Roman	 disaster	 and	 its	 aversion	 because	 that	 was	what	was	needed,	just	as	Caecina	did.		The	narrative	says	nothing	to	encourage	us	to	believe	that	communication	lines	between	the	expeditionary	forces	across	the	Rhine	and	the	permanent	camps	on	the	left	bank	of	the	Rhine	were	kept	open,	but	an	absence	of	news	can	be	just	as	powerful	 a	 generator	 of	 wild	 tales	 as	 news	 itself.	 And	 though	 these	 troops,	unlike	 their	 counterparts	 across	 the	 river,	 have	 not	 witnessed	 the	 damage	inflicted	on	their	Roman	comrades’	bodies	at	Teutoburg,	their	complaint	at	Ann.	1.17	 that	 sibi	 tamen	apud	horridas	gentis	e	contuberniis	hostem	aspici	 suggests	they	saw	enough	 in	 the	ordinary	 line	of	duty	 for	past	memories	 to	 fuel	 future	imagined	horrors.265	In	Germany,	only	Agrippina	and	Caecina	stand	between	the	irruption	 of	 disorder	 into	 Roman	 ordered	 space	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	relinquishing	of	Roman	control	over	German	space,	 through	the	abandonment	of	the	camp	or	the	destruction	of	the	Rhine	bridge,	on	the	other.	
Bloody	Germanicus	Germanicus’	 reception	 of	 the	 environment	 that	 surrounds	 him	 is	 noticeably	different	from	that	of	his	fearful	soldiers.	Others	have	already	noted	how	in	the	course	of	his	travels	through	the	landscape	of	memory	and	ruin,	he	seems	to	be	not	so	much	afflicted	with	fear	as	propelled	by	the	desire	to	avenge	the	Roman	people’s	 past	 wrongs	 suffered	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 Germans.	 O’Gorman	 noted	that	the	early	promise	of	vengeance	at	Ann.	1.3	is	carried	out	in	the	Germanicus	campaigns.266	Makins	framed	Germanicus’	resolution	or	erasure	of	the	disgrace	at	Teutoburg	as	fulfilling	the	two	‘socially	conditioned	imperatives’	of	‘the	need	to	honor	 the	dead	and	 the	need	 to	 rewrite	defeat	as	victory’.267	Pagán	sees	an	overall	 theme	 of	 a	 Germanicus	 who,	 in	 both	 retrospective	 vengeance																																																									265Reported	for	the	Pannonian	mutinies,	but	we	must	remember	Tacitus’	insistence	that	isdem	causis	Germanicae	legiones	turbatae	at	Ann.	1.31.	266bellum	ea	tempestate	nullum	nisi	adversus	Germanos	supererat,	abolendae	magis	
infamiae	ob	amissum	cum	Quintilio	Varo	exercitum	quam	cupidine	proferendi	imperii	aut	
dignum	ob	praemium	(‘at	that	time,	there	was	no	war	left	anywhere	apart	from	that	against	the	Germans,	waged	more	for	reasons	of	wiping	out	the	disgrace	of	the	army	lost	with	Quintilius	Varus	than	from	a	desire	to	expand	the	empire	or	because	the	rewards	justified	it’;	O’Gorman	(2000),	153.	267Makins	(2013),	102.	
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(Teutoburg	at	Ann.	1.61)	and	prospective	conquest	(Ann.	2.5-26),	does	not	know	where	 to	 stop:	 he	 incurs	 ritual	 pollution	 when	 his	 emotions	 push	 him	 to	participate	 in	 the	 burial	 of	 the	 Varian	 victims	 and	 he	 keeps	 crossing	 rivers,	which	 calls	 up	 the	 grand	 ambitions	 of	 a	 Caesar	 or	 an	 Alexander	 instead	 of	 a	representative	 of	 the	 Augustan	 policy	 of	 containment.268	In	 addition	 to	 these	imperialist	 concerns,	 I	 identify	 another,	 more	 personal	 impetus	 behind	Germanicus’	trajectory	through	Germany,	in	which	he	vies	with	the	memory	of	his	father.	Not	only	does	he	restore	a	memorial	to	Drusus	Senior	(Ann.	2.7)	and	follow	in	his	footsteps	through	the	fossa	Drusiana	(Ann.	2.8),	he	also	appeals	to	his	soldiers	to	help	him	emulate	his	father	and	uncle	(se	patris	patruique	vestigia	
prementem	 isdem	 in	 terries	 victorem	 sisterent,	 Ann.	 2.14)	 and	 builds	 trophies	(Ann.	 18	 and	 22)	 asserting	 definitive	 conquest	 (debellatis	 inter	 Rhenum	
Albimque	nationibus)	 of	 territories	 first	 pacified	 and	marked	with	 a	 trophy	by	his	father.269		However,	only	scant	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	sheer	bloody	nature	of	many	of	the	actions	taken	in	the	course	of	the	Germanicus-led	campaigns.	Pagán	does	not	 mention	 this	 narrative	 strand	 at	 all,	 despite	 the	 dubious	 morality	 of	 this	violence	 potentially	 fitting	 quite	well	with	 her	 central	 thesis	 of	 a	 Germanicus	who	 knows	no	 bounds.	 Although	 arguably	 the	 violence	 associated	with	 battle	against	 Arminius	 (e.g.	 Ann.	 1.69)	 can	 be	 justified	 within	 the	 framework	 of	vengeance	 and	 aemulatio,	 the	 narrative	 is	 rife	 with	 acts	 much	 more	 morally	questionable	than	‘honest’	battle.	At	Ann.	1.68	there	is	indiscriminate	slaughter	of	 those	 who	 have	 essentially	 already	 been	 defeated:	 Arminius	 integer,	
Inguiomerus	post	grave	vulnus	pugnam	deseruere:	 vulgus	 trucidatum	est,	 donec	
ira	et	dies	permansit.	At	Ann.	2.17	German	refugees	from	the	battlefield	are	shot	down	from	the	trees	per	ludibrium,	and	when	a	retaliatory	battle	takes	place	at	2.21	Germanicus,	well	on	his	way	to	a	victory,	openly	acknowledges	that	he	has	shifted	 the	 goalposts	 from	 ‘winning’	 to	 ‘genocide’:	 nil	 opus	 captivis,	 solam																																																									268Pagán	(1999),	312–13;	cf.	Ann.	1.11	quae	cuncta	sua	manu	perscripserat	Augustus	
addideratque	consilium	coercendi	intra	terminos	imperii.	269Flor.	2.30.23-4,	Ptol.	2.10,	Dio	55.1.2-3.	Both	O’Gorman	(2000),	63	and	Makins	(2013),	104	comment	on	Germanicus’	tendency	to	look	to	the	past	in	the	context	of	his	later	visit	to	Actium,	but	not	in	the	context	of	his	German	campaigns.	
		155	
internicionem	 gentis	 finem	 bello	 fore,	 [shouting]	 ‘that	 they	 had	 no	 need	 for	prisoners	of	war	and	that	only	the	destruction	of	the	entire	tribe	would	mean	an	end	 to	 this	 war’.	 Acts	 of	 similar	 cruelty	 are	 perpetrated	 against	 people	 not	involved	in	the	Varusschlacht,	with	no	casus	belli	mentioned	by	Tacitus.	At	Ann.	1.55	 Germanicus	 orders	 a	 sudden	 raid	 (repentino	 excursu)	 against	 the	 Chatti,	which	 at	 Ann.	 1.56	 is	 narrated	 as	 Chattis	 adeo	 inprovisus	 advenit,	 ut	 quod	
imbecillum	aetate	ac	 sexu	 statim	captum	aut	 trucidatum	sit	 and	 incenso	Mattio	
(id	genti	caput)	aperta	populatus	vertit	ad	Rhenum;	‘He	came	upon	the	Chatti	so	unexpectedly	that	anyone	in	a	position	of	weakness	through	age	or	gender	was	immediately	captured	or	killed’.	This	is	followed	not	long	after	by	quantumque	
Amisiam	 et	 Lupiam	amnis	 inter	 vastatum	 (Ann.	1.60).	 At	Ann.	2.13	 the	 Roman	response	 to	 a	 German	 emissary’s	 offer	 of	 wives,	 much	 better	 pay	 than	 they	currently	 earned	 or	 had	 hoped	 to	 achieve	 by	 their	mutiny270,	 and	 local	 lands,	contains	 an	 unmistakable	 reference	 to	 rape	 in	 tracturum	 coniuges	 and	
matrimonia	ac	pecunias	hostium	praedae	destinare.			The	 violent	 acts	 described	 occur	 outside	 the	 context	 and	 bounds	 of	 what	 is	arguably	sanctioned	by	both	the	ius	ad	bellum	(attacking	Arminius’	troops)	and	
ius	in	bello	(taking	prisoners	of	war	on	the	battlefield,	selling	them).	This	was	a	moral	 and	 legal	 system	 to	 which	 Rome	 nominally	 did	 subscribe,	 judging	 by	Germanicus’	 accusation	 at	 Ann.	 2.14	 that	 the	 Germans	 disregard	 such	injunctions	 when	 things	 are	 going	 their	 way	 (inter	 secunda	 non	 divini,	 non	
humani	iuris	memores	[Germani]).271	To	link	these	examples	of	transgression	to	the	established	psychological	profile	of	Germanicus	in	scholarship	as	essentially	excessive	in	all	its	facets	would	clearly	be	facile.272	Extending	Pagán’s	argument	on	 transgression	at	Teutoburg	 to	 the	violations	 just	 listed	 is	no	help	either:	 it	would	 reduce	 them	 to	 the	 level	 of	 literary	 symbolism,	 a	 political	 metaphor,																																																									270Goodyear	ad	loc.	271Segestes’	complaint	at	Ann.	1.58	(quia	parum	praesidii	in	legibus	erat)	when	he	recounts	Varus’	inaction	in	the	face	of	Arminius’	rise	is	puzzling	in	context	(what	laws	did	Segestes	feel	would	have	been	of	use	to	him	in	this	case?)	but	makes	more	sense	if	it	is	read	as	descriptive	of	the	kind	of	Roman	lawlessness	with	which	Germanicus	waged	the	campaigns	of	AD15-7.	In	this	regard,	Goodyear	ad	loc.	mentions	that	‘before	the	uprising	Varus	was	attempting	to	persuade	the	Germans	of	the	benefits	of	Roman	laws	(Vell.	2.118.1).’	272See	n.	223.	
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when	we	must	 at	 least	 in	part	 read	 them	as	 accounts	of	 inflicting	 real	human	suffering.	If	we	assume	that	Tacitus’	account	is	at	least	as	much	historical	record	of	these	German	campaigns	as	it	is	a	product	of	literature,	in	a	modified	version	of	Lendon’s	diatribe	against	overly	narrow	literary	readings273,	these	campaigns	
were	 characterised	 by	 extraordinary	 violence	 even	 by	 Roman	 standards	 and	Tacitus	 wants	 us	 to	 know	 it.	 Invoking	 Pagán’s	 argument	 of	 a	 new	 Caesar	 or	Alexander	to	solve	this	puzzle	would	also	ignore	the	fact	that	expansion	of	the	empire	is	so	manifestly	not	the	object	of	these	campaigns:	no	choices	are	offered	to	 the	 local	 population,	 just	 death.	 Judging	 by	 Germanicus’	 actions,	 no	Romanisation	 is	 intended,	 no	 pacifying	 of	 this	 territory	 to	 be	 included	 in	 a	transrhenane	Roman	province	of	Germania	after	he	moves	forward	the	existing	border.	He	neither	tries	to	sway	nor	forces	the	people	who	live	here	to	submit	to	Rome’s	will	and	live	peacefully	ever	after	as	citizens	in	the	making.	Compared	to	the	 energy	 spent	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Batavian	 revolt	 on	 winning	 over,	 or	recalling	 to	 loyalty,	 a	 multitude	 of	 tribes	 by	 means	 of	 rhetoric	 (even	 if	judiciously	 backed	 up	 with	 the	 threat	 of	 force)	 even	 by	 those	 highest	 in	command,	the	absence	of	dialogue	is	startling.				Only	Arminius’	brother	Flavus	gets	trotted	out	to	take	up	the	position	of	empire	and	 defend	 the	 status	 of	 the	 native	 converted	 to	 Rome:	 hic	 magnitudinem	
Romanam,	opes	Caesaris	et	victis	gravis	poenas,	 in	deditionem	venienti	paratam	
clementiam;	neque	coniugem	et	filium	eius	hostiliter	haberi,	 ‘he	talked	about	the	magnificence	of	Rome,	the	wealth	of	Caesar	and	the	heavy	penalties	imposed	on	the	conquered	but	the	clemency	extended	to	those	who	surrender	themselves,	and	[mentioning	also]	that	his	wife	and	son	were	not	being	mistreated	in	their	care’	 (Ann.	 2.10).	 The	 short	 indirect	 speech,	 relying	 for	 its	 persuasion	 on	reference	to	an	alien	and	abstract	concept,	the	prosperity	of	a	distant	figure	and	the	absence	of	dire	punishment	for	anyone	who	submits,	falls	flat	in	the	face	of	Arminius’	response.	This	 is	reported	equally	 indirectly	and	equally	briefly,	but	the	 concepts	 referenced	 are	 culturally	 relevant	 and	 specific:	 ille	 fas	 patriae,	
libertatem	 avitam,	 penetralis	 Germaniae	 deos,	 matrem	 precum	 sociam;	 ne	
propinquorum	 et	 adfinium,	 denique	 gentis	 suae	 desertor	 et	 proditor	 quam																																																									273See	Lendon	(2009).	
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imperator	 esse	 mallet,	 ‘the	 other	 talked	 about	 the	 ancestral	 law	 of	 their	fatherland,	 their	 hereditary	 freedom,	 the	 gods	 of	 inland	 Germany,	 and	 their	mother	as	a	fellow	supplicant	that	he,	Flavus,	should	not	prefer	being	a	deserter	and	traitor	of	his	nearest,	dearest	and	tribe,	over	being	their	chief’.			The	 paired	 speeches	 are	 reminiscent	 of	 the	 opposing	 approaches	 taken	 by	Cerialis	 and	Civilis	 in	 their	pre-battle	contiones	at	Histories	5.16	and	5.17	 (see	chapter	 one,	 p.	 46ff),	 producing	 a	 similar	 unfavourable	 comparison	 of	 the	(prospective)	 oppressor’s	 generalising	 gaze	 with	 the	 local	 knowledge	 of	 a	(potential)	subject	heavily	invested	in	his	native	soil.	But	Tacitus	at	least	grants	to	Cerialis	an	apology	for	empire	at	Histories	4.74.6-7	which	references	several	examples	of	what	Roman	imperialists	saw	as	positive	gains	from	subjection	by	the	 Roman	 Empire	 (ipsi	 plerumque	 legionibus	 nostris	 praesidetis,	 ipsi	 has	
aliasque	provincias	regitis).	The	reason	why	no	Roman	apologists	occur	 in	 this	scenario	 is	 therefore	not	because	Romans	thought	no	such	positive	case	could	be	made	for	the	empire,	but	because	Germanicus	has	no	interest	in	persuading	anyone	 of	 this.	 In	 these	 campaigns,	 in	 which	 the	 end	 of	 war	 is	 equated	 with	genocide	 and	 the	 burning	 down	 of	 settlements,	 Rome	 truly	creates	 a	 solitudo	and	calls	it	pax,	enacting	Calgacus’	prediction	for	the	future	of	Britain	at	Agr.	30.	Tacitus’	 narrative	 suggests	 that	 the	Germans	 have	 understood	 this	 as	well:	 at	
Ann.	2.19	 it	 is	acknowledged	that,	had	 they	not	been	driven	 into	resistance	by	the	sight	of	Germanicus’	 trophy	(Ann.	2.18),	 some	of	 the	 tribes	affected	would	have	migrated	across	the	Elbe,	simply	putting	themselves	out	of	physical	reach	of	the	Roman	destructiveness.274		Germanicus’	trophies	around	the	Elbe	make	complete	sense	in	such	a	context	of	destruction.	The	basic	descriptions	Tacitus	provides	of	 both	 (at	Ann.	2.18	and	
Ann.	2.22)	allow	us	to	compare	them	to	another	Julio-Claudian	trophy	from	the	west,	 that	 of	 Augustus	 at	 La	 Turbie,	 dedicated	 20	 years	 before	 Germanicus’	campaigns	in	7/6BC.275	This	is	what	Tacitus	tells	us	about	Germanicus’	trophies:																																																									274qui	modo	abire	sedibus,	trans	Albim	concedere	parabant,	pugnam	volunt,	arma	
rapiunt.	275Cornwell	(2013),	266.	
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miles	in	loco	proelii	Tiberium	imperatorem	salutavit	struxitque	aggerem	et	
in	 modum	 tropaeorum	 arma	 subscriptis	 victarum	 gentium	 nominibus	
imposuit.	
Ann.	2.18	‘The	soldiers	hailed	Tiberius	as	imperator	on	the	site	of	the	battle,	raised	a	platform	and	piled	up	arms	in	the	manner	of	a	trophy,	with	the	names	of	the	conquered	peoples	listed	underneath.’		
Laudatis	 pro	 contione	 victoribus	 Caesar	 congeriem	 armorum	 struxit,	
superbo	cum	titulo:	debellatis	inter	Rhenum	Albimque	nationibus	exercitum	
Tiberii	Caesaris	ea	monimenta	Marti	et	Iovi	et	Augusto	sacravisse.	
Ann.	2.22	‘After	praising	his	victorious	troops	in	a	speech,	Caesar	constructed	a	pile	of	armour	with	this	proud	superscript:	that,	having	conquered	in	battle	the	nations	 between	 the	 Rhine	 and	 the	 Elbe,	 the	 army	 of	 Tiberius	 Caesar	dedicated	these	monuments	to	Mars,	Jupiter	and	Augustus.’		Tacitus’	 description	 of	 their	 superscripts	 is	 brief,	 yet	 conforms	 to	 the	 pattern	suggested	by	 the	epigraphic	 fragments	 from	La	Turbie,	which	 in	 turn	matches	fairly	well	the	description	provided	by	the	Elder	Pliny.276	Its	restored	phrasing	of	 gentes	 Alpinae	 devictae,	 followed	 by	 a	 list,	 resembles	 closely	 what	 Tacitus	suggests	 occurred	 on	 the	 first	 Germanicus	 trophy	 by	 subscriptis	 victarum	
gentium	nominibus.	 Its	 designation	 of	 geographical	 extent	 by	means	 of	gentes	
Alpinae	 omnes	 quae	 a	 mari	 supero	 ad	 inferum	 pertinebant	 resembles	Germanicus’	indication	of	geographical	spread	debellatis	inter	Rhenum	Albimque	
nationibus	on	the	second	trophy.	Cornwell’s	claim	for	La	Turbie	 that	 its	stated	purpose	is	to	celebrate	the	complete	subjugation	of	the	enemy	can,	on	this	basis,	be	extended	to	the	Germanicus	trophies.	Both	descriptions	also	match	La	Turbie	in	emphasising	this	subjugation	without	any	mention	of	pax.	We	can	only	speculate	on	the	reasons.	In	La	Turbie’s	case,	Cornwell	contrasted	it	with	the	celebration	of	this	ideology	by	the	monumental	
Ara	Pacis,	commissioned	in	13BC	and	dedicated	in	9BC,	only	a	few	years	after	La	Turbie.	For	her,	‘[t]his	absence	may	suggest	that	pax	was	at	this	time	and	in	this	context	a	fundamentally	Roman	concept	employed	in	a	civic	setting,	in	order	to																																																									276Recorded	and	discussed	by	Cornwell	(2013),	264–65.	
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explain	 and	 express	 imperium.	 Whilst	 this	 concept	 of	 pax	 was	 extremely	important	at	Rome	at	the	time,	it	was	clearly	not	necessary	or	relevant	for	the	discourse	of	Roman	 imperialism	 to	the	conquered	 territories.’277	This	 suggests	that	pax	was	an	important	part	in	Rome’s	self-definition	as	an	imperialist	power	during	the	Augustan	period	but	either	deemed	a	notion	unlikely	to	persuade	the	conquered	 of	 their	 good	 fortune,	 or	 such	 persuasion	 of	 the	 conquered	 was	deemed	 to	 be	 unnecessary.	 The	 absence	 of	 pax	 on	 trophies	 despite	 its	importance	 to	 the	 Augustan	 ideological	 programme,	 often	 through	monumentalisation,	supports	the	Tacitean	picture	of	a	Germany	in	AD15-7,	only	just	 post-Augustan,	 in	which	no	Roman	apology	 for	 empire	 is	 be	 extended.	 In	contrast,	in	AD70	Tacitus	portrays	Petillius	Cerialis	as	quite	happy	to	do	so.	The	point	 is	 that	 both	 time	 and	 space	 are	 different	 between	 these	 thematically	related	occasions	in	transrhenane	Germany	of	AD17	and	the	Rhineland	in	AD70.	To	revise	my	earlier	formulation,	under	Germanicus	Rome	creates	a	solitudo	in	Germany	and	does	not	even	bother	to	call	it	pax.	But	 here	 the	 similarities	 between	 the	 Turbie	 monument	 and	 Germanicus’	trophies	and	campaigns	end.	Cornwell	notes	that	the	statement	on	the	former,	that	the	gentes	devictae	were	also	redactae,	recalls	Velleius	Paterculus’	phrases	for	 the	 formal	 creation	 of	 a	 Roman	 province,	 redacta	 in	 formulam	 provinciae	(Vell.	 2.38)	 and	 redacta	 in	 formam	 provinciae	 (Vell.	 2.97.4	 cf.	 2.44.4).278	The	claim	to	formalisation	is	further	bolstered	by	her	discussion	of	the	monument’s	placement	 within	 the	 newly	 built	 road	 scheme	 of	 the	 Alpine	 area.279	It	 was	placed	 in	 a	 suitable	 location	 to	 complement	 the	visual	 and	 symbolic	 claims	of	Roman	control	expressed	through	the	nearby	via	Julia	Augusta,	and	this	was	not	necessarily	at	the	highest	point	of	the	area:		‘In	one	sense	the	monuments	[Pompey’s	Pyrenees	trophy	of	71BC	as	well	as	La	Turbie]	are	subordinated	to	the	course	of	the	road,	yet	they	further	emphasise	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 road	 as	 a	 display	 of	 imperium,	 by	monumentalising	the	area.’280		
																																																								277Ibid.,	276.	278Ibid.,	271.	279Ibid.,	266–69.	280Ibid.,	269.	
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No	 such	 transformation	 of	 the	 gentes	 or	monumentalisation	 of	 the	 landscape	speaks	from	the	Tacitean	report	of	the	Germanicus	trophies,	based	as	they	are	on	 an	 agger	 and	 congeries	 armorum	 respectively,	 nor	 from	 that	 of	 his	campaigns,	conducted	as	they	were	on	decaying	roads	or	in	pathless	forests.	The	 trophies	 thus	 further	 support	 the	notion	 that	Germanicus	 travels	 through	Germany	in	the	conviction	that	the	land	is	unsuitable	to	Roman	annexation.	Its	tendency	to	revert	to	a	state	of	nature	which	slowly	destroys	everything	 in	 its	path	 carries	 no	 potential	 for	 settlement	 on	 any	 model	 acceptable	 to	 Rome.	Destruction	becomes	 the	only	possible	 response	 to	 this	 type	of	 resistance,	 the	only	kind	of	mastery.	The	issue	is	not	Germanicus’	competence,	as	Giua	showed:	as	a	general,	he	takes	thought	for	the	future,	delegates	to	capable	officers,	does	the	 best	 he	 can	 with	 the	 information	 he	 has,	 and	 learns	 from	 past	 mistakes,	changing	his	 strategy	 to	 avoid	 their	 repetition.	 Everything	 that	 goes	wrong	 in	the	Tacitean	narrative	is	outside	his	control.281	The	issue	is	with	the	landscape	to	which	 he	 applies	 that	 competence.	 It	 simply	 cannot	 be	 transformed	 in	 the	way	Rome	needs	it	to.	
Asserting	Romanity	through	violence	As	I	mentioned	in	section	one,	the	raid	against	the	Marsi	(Ann.	1.49-51)	stands	out	 among	 the	 other	 acts	 of	 violence	 of	 Annals	 1	 and	 2	 in	 its	 absence	 of	provocation	by	either	people	or	land	and	its	incongruously	domestic	setting	in	the	Marsi’s	village.	Their	introduction	into	the	narrative	is	at	the	same	time	the	performance	 of	 their	 destruction	 as	 a	 tribe:	 their	 women	 and	 children,	 the	means	 to	 a	 future,	 are	 killed	 without	 mercy	 during	 the	 raid:	 quinquaginta	
milium	 spatium	 ferro	 flammisque	pervastat.	Non	 sexus,	 non	aetas	miserationem	
attulit	 (Ann.	 1.51).282	Having	 put	 the	 humans	 to	 the	 sword,	 the	 flames	 are	reserved	 for	 the	 destruction	 of	 their	 domestic	 and	 public	 buildings:	 profana	
simul	 et	 sacra	 et	 celeberrimum	 illis	 gentibus	 templum	quod	Tanfanae	vocabant.	And	 yet	 the	 Marsi	 have	 not	 provoked	 these	 legions,	 nor	 has	 a	 ‘natural’	 and	threatening	Germany	that	needs	to	be	subdued	yet	made	any	appearance,	as	the																																																									281Giua	(1988),	91.	282The	remainder	of	their	fighting	men	regroup	to	attack	Rome	at	Ann.	1.57	and	a	still	smaller	surviving	fraction	of	those	suffer	a	third	defeat	at	Ann.	2.25.	
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mutinies	 took	 place	 within	 the	 ordered	 space	 of	 the	 Roman	 camp.	 Where	Tacitus	 does	 introduce	 the	 German	 landscape	 into	 the	 Marsi	 episode,	 the	Romans	 actually	 benefit	 from	 these	 encounters.	 The	 stars	 provide	 favourable	light	for	the	nighttime	raid	(iuvit	nox	sideribus	inlustris)283,	contrasting	markedly	with	 the	 destructive	 influence	 of	 the	 equinoctial	 star	 of	Ann.	1.70	 on	Vitellius	and	 his	 two	 legions	 the	 following	 year	 (mox	 inpulsu	 aquilonis,	 simul	 sidere	
aequinoctii,	 quo	 maxime	 tumescit	 Oceanus,	 rapi	 agique	 agmen).	 Germanicus’	camp	 is	 constructed	 properly,	 frontem	 ac	 tergum	 vallo,	 latera	 concaedibus	
munitus,	with	concaedibus	perhaps	designed	to	activate	an	echo	 later	on	when	the	 reader	 arrives	 at	 Caecina’s	 sad	 plight	 of	 amissa	magna	 ex	 parte	 per	 quae	
egeritur	humus	aut	exciditus	caespes	and	the	equally	pathetic	camp	that	results	at	Ann.	1.66.	 Caecina’s	 cutting	 of	 the	 trees	which	 obstruct	 his	 path	 (obstantia	
silvarum	 amoliri	 iubetur,	 Ann.	 1.50)	 contrasts	 with	 the	 Romans’	 later	disorientation	in	forests	which	remain	avia	instead	of	having	roads	cut	through	them. 284 	The	 Romans	 here	 overpower	 the	 landscape	 instead	 of	 being	overpowered	by	it.		The	contrast	with	the	later	campaigns	as	regards	people	and	landscape	enable	us	 to	 eliminate	 the	 provocation	 and	 resistance	 which	 underpinned	 these	campaigns	 as	 possible	 explanations	 for	 the	 violence	 against	 the	 Marsi.	 This	leaves	the	raid’s	particular	genesis	as	the	most	likely	explanation.	Tacitus	says:		
truces	etiam	tum	animos	cupido	 involat	eundi	 in	hostem,	piaculum	furoris;	
nec	 aliter	 posse	 placari	 commilitonum	 manis	 quam	 si	 pectoribus	 impiis	
honesta	 vulnera	 accepissent.	 sequitur	 ardorem	 militum	 Caesar	 iunctoque	
ponte	tramittit	duodecim	milia	e	legionibus…		
Ann.	1.49		‘A	 desire	 to	 meet	 the	 enemy	 in	 battle,	 in	 redemption	 of	 their	 former	madness,	 suddenly	 took	 hold	 of	 their	 still	 unsettled	 minds;	 not	 in	 any	other	 way	 could	 the	 spirits	 of	 their	 fellow	 soldiers	 be	 placated	 than	 by	their	 accepting	 honourable	wounds	 to	 their	 sinful	 breasts.	 Caesar	 fell	 in																																																									283Giua	(1988),	80	noted	that	‘l’operazione,	favorita	anche	da	una	notte	chiara	di	stelle,	e	quasi	un	gioco’.	284Caecina’s	actions	are	more	reminiscent	of	Caes.	BG	3.29.1	than	of	Ann.	2.17,	where	the	legionaries	do	cut	down	trees	but	not	in	the	context	of	navigation.	
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with	his	soldiers’	ardour	and	after	joining	the	two	riverbanks	by	a	bridge	he	put	across	twelve	thousand	of	his	legionaries…’		The	emotive	framing	of	the	aftermath	of	the	mutinies	(cupido,	piaculum	furoris,	
pectoribus	impiis,	honesta	vulnera)	makes	clear	that	the	raid	emanates	from	the	emotional	 state	 of	 these	 Roman	 legions	 rather	 than	 from	 anything	 they	encounter	around	them.	Fresh	 from	the	extremely	un-Roman	 internal	strife	of	the	 mutinies	 (civilium	 armorum	 facies,	 Ann.	 1.49),	 the	 narrative	 of	 the	 raid	illustrates	 the	 process	 by	 which	 these	 perpetrators	 of,	 essentially,	 civil	 war	restore	 their	 identity	 as	 Romans	 through	 a	 resumption	 of	 the	 labor	 which	underpinned	 the	Roman	army’s	disciplina.285	As	we	 saw,	 such	 labor	to	 restore	
disciplina	 could	 take	 different	 forms,	 of	 which	 Germanicus,	 whose	 attempt	 at	punishment	 during	 the	mutinies	 resulted	 only	 in	 further	 disorganisation	 and	bloodshed	 (permissa	vulgo	 licentia	atque	ultio	 et	 satietas.	mox	 ingressus	 castra	
Germanicus,	 non	medicinam	 illud	plurimis	 cum	 lacrimis	 sed	 cladem	appellans…,	
Ann.	1.49),	chooses	combat.286		
	In	 this	sense,	 the	mutiny-followed-by-a-raid	as	set	up	by	Tacitus	plays	out	 the	transformational	dynamics	of	the	Teutoburger	episode	from	polluted	space	into	ordered	Roman	space.	Germanicus,	prompted	by	the	indiscriminate	slaughter	of	Roman	soldiers,	responds	as	emotionally	to	it	(plurimis	cum	lacrimis)	as	he	does	to	Teutoburg	(praesentibus	doloris	socius);	uses	the	word	clades,	the	traditional	description	of	the	Varian	disaster	(non	medicinam	illud	sed	cladem	appellans),	to	describe	it,	and	physically	transforms	the	site	on	which	the	mutiny	occurred	in	order	 to	 erase	 the	 traces	 of	 this	 shameful	 crime	 (though	 here	 by	 means	 of	cremation,	 not	 burial:	 cremari	 corpora	 iubet).	 As	 is	 the	 case	 after	 Teutoburg,	when	 Germanicus	 sets	 off	 in	 pursuit	 of	 Arminius,	 the	 confrontation	 with	 the	battlefield	then	prompts	a	military	response,	in	the	shape	of	the	raid	against	the	Marsi.	There	are	lexical	echoes	to	support	the	contextual	analogy	in	the	phrase	
cupido	involat,	prefiguring	the	later	cupido	invadit	at	Teutoburg,	and	in	Tacitus’																																																									285See	n.	226.		286Dio	spells	this	out	even	more	clearly,	stating	that	‘Germanicus,	being	afraid	even	so	that	they	[the	mutineers]	would	fall	to	rioting	again,	invaded	the	enemy’s	country	and	tarried	there,	giving	the	troops	plenty	of	work	and	food	in	abundance	at	the	expense	of	aliens’	(Dio	57.6.1,	tr.	Loeb	1924).	
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use	of	religious	 language	(piaculum	furoris)	 to	describe	this	 transformation,	as	he	 does	 for	 that	 at	 Teutoburg	 (solvendi	 suprema).	 But	 whereas	 the	 burial	 at	Teutoburg	 was	 labelled	 a	 religious	 transgression	 by	 Tiberius	 (because	Germanicus’	priestly	responsibilities	prohibited	contact	with	the	dead),	the	raid	against	the	Marsi	is	the	opposite.	The	mutiny	itself	was	their	transgression,	and	this	sortie	is	the	restoration	of	the	Romans	to	their	proper	concerns	in	Germany,	which	 are	 to	 subdue	 its	 landscape	 and	 its	 people.	 The	 Tacitean	 text’s	representation	of	the	Marsi	and	their	habitat	as	the	least	threatening	of	all	the	Germans	in	the	Annals	has	the	effect	of	highlighting	precisely	how	Germanicus’	destructive	 raid	 is	 not	 a	 response	 to	 the	 German	 environment,	 but	 a	 site	 on	which	it	is	made	clear	that	Roman	identity	and	unity	must	be	secured	above	all	other	concerns.	And	one	way	 in	which	unstable	Romans	reassert	and	perform	their	 identities	 is	 through	 exclusionary	 violence	 against	 the	 Other:	 fidensque	
recentibus	 ac	 priorum	 oblitus	 miles	 in	 hibernis	 locatur,	 Tacitus	 rounds	 off	 his	account	of	the	raid.287	The	Germany	of	the	Marsi,	with	its	women,	children	and	named	 temple,	 is	 therefore	 neither	 unconquerable	 nor	 unknowable	 nor	 even	threatening	 to	 the	 empire,	 unlike	 the	 territories	 further	 inland	 which	 are	explored	during	 the	campaigns	of	AD15-7.	But	 its	destruction	 is	 the	means	by	which	 an	 entirely	Roman	 threat	 to	 the	 empire,	 its	mutinous	 legions,	 is	 finally	abolished.288	
																																																								287At	Ann.	2.13	even	the	hypothetical	abandonment	of	their	Roman	identity	(not	this	time	through	the	civil	war	that	is	mutiny,	but	through	the	proposed	exchange	for	a	German	one)	invites	violent	retaliation	on	the	possessors	of	the	alternative	identity	offered	as	a	means	of	asserting	Roman	identity	and	loyalty:	unus	hostium,	Latinae	
linguae	sciens,	acto	ad	vallum	equo	voce	magna	coniuges	et	agros	et	stipendii	in	dies,	
donec	bellaretur,	sestertios	centenos,	si	quis	transfugisset,	Arminii	nomine	pollicetur.	
intendit	ea	contumelia	legionum	iras:	veniret	dies,	daretur	pugna;	sumpturum	militem	
Germanorum	agros,	tracturum	coniuges,	‘one	of	the	enemy,	with	knowledge	of	Latin,	after	being	carried	to	the	rampart	on	his	horse	loudly	proclaimed,	in	the	name	of	Arminius,	a	promise	of	wives,	fields	and	a	daily	stipend	of	two	hundred	sesterces	for	as	long	as	the	war	lasted	for	anyone	who	should	have	changed	sides.	This	insult	sharpened	the	anger	of	the	legions:	let	the	day	comes,	let	battle	be	joined;	the	soldiers	would	take	the	Germans’	fields	and	drag	off	their	wives’.	288In	this	sense,	the	restoration	of	Roman	identity	through	violence	against	the	Marsi	plays	a	similar	role	to	Rome’s	war	against	the	Jews	in	Histories	5	as	noted	by	Ash	(2009),	96–99.	
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Conclusion	In	conclusion,	this	chapter	argues	that	Tacitus’	depiction	of	Germany	in	Annals	1	and	2	as	a	landscape	of	multiple	layers	as	well	as	competing	spaces	is	crucial	to	understanding	the	course	of	events	in	these	books.	The	first	two	sections	of	the	chapter	 set	 out	 the	 way	 Tacitus	 sets	 the	 scene.	 I	 first	 examine	 how	 the	campaigns	of	AD15-7	are	full	of	castrametation	as	a	Roman	act	which	carves	out	Roman	 space	 from	 German	 space	 but	 which	 also	 keeps	 the	 travelling	 army	bound	into	an	ordered	unit	and	keeps	fear	at	bay.	Alongside	these	fresh	pockets	of	 Romanity,	 Germany	 also	 exhibits	 Roman	 structures	 from	 past	 campaigns,	creating	a	layer	of	Roman	space	superimposed	on	the	German	underscape.	The	text	shows	that	many	of	 these	past	structures	are	either	decaying	naturally	or	destroyed,	 presenting	 these	 processes	 as	 the	 natural	 tendencies	 of	 both	Germany	and	its	 inhabitants	when	not	prevented	by	Roman	force.	Section	two	then	shows	how	much	of	the	Roman	movement	through	Germany	happens	via	such	 old	 Roman	 routes	 which	 take	 in	 many	 of	 these	 old	 structures.	 In	 the	narrative,	 the	 Romans	 never	 choose	 to	 open	 up	 news	 paths;	when	 they	 do	 it	often	 ends	 in	 disaster.	 This	 in	 turn	 limits	 their	 understanding	 of	 Germany,	 as	they	 can	 understand	 the	 Roman	 top	 layer	 only.	 Of	 the	 rest	 of	 Germany,	 they	know	only	that	it	is	unknowable.			The	 two	 following	sections	of	 the	chapter	discuss	 this	 issue	of	knowledge	and	knowability	 in	 more	 depth.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 landscape’s	 general	 tendency,	section	 three	 frames	Rome’s	 removal	 across	 the	Rhine	 of	 suitable	 pro-Roman	Germans	who	could	be	potential	translators	and	navigators	of	the	landscape	as	a	 necessary	 precaution	 to	 avert	 the	 reversal	 of	 these	 Roman	 allies	 to	 their	natural	German	state.	Through	the	presence	of	 traitors	 furnishing	Germanicus	with	 information	 that	 allows	him	 to	win	 two	battles,	Tacitus	makes	 clear	 that	borrowed	 knowledge	 of	 the	 land	 can	 make	 a	 difference	 to	 Roman	 success,	enabling	Germanicus	to	deploy	his	power	and	skill	to	better	effect.	Nonetheless,	there	 is	 a	 contrast	 between	 this	 mediated	 understanding	 of	 Germany	 for	destructive	purposes	with	Germanicus’	deeper	and	more	sincere	understanding	of	 the	 equally	 mediated	 Egyptian	 antiquities	 later	 on	 in	 book	 2.	 Unlike	Germany’s	 landscape,	 that	 of	 Egypt	 poses	 no	 threat	 to	 Roman	 power,	 as	 it	 is	
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both	long	conquered	and	its	 imperialist	monuments	and	their	implications	are	readily	comprehensible	to	the	Roman	imperial	heir.	Section	four	examines	how	the	absence	of	real	knowledge	and	understanding	about	Germany	produces	fear	in	 the	 rank	 and	 file	 on	 two	 occasions,	 threatening	 to	 break	 down	 the	 Roman	structuring	 of	 space	 in	 their	 respective	 parts	 of	 Germany.	 On	 one	 of	 these		occasions	this	threatened	order	is	explicitly	linked	to	the	soldiers’	loss	of	tools,	which	 prevented	 them	 from	 pitching	 a	 proper	 camp	 as	 an	 act	 of	 labor	which	maintained	 Roman	 discipline	 and	 identity.	 On	 both	 occasions	 where	 this	dynamic	of	spatial	panic	occurs,	 the	 integrity	of	 the	Roman	space	 is	preserved	by	 the	 physical	 interposition	 of	 the	 Roman	 aristocratic	 bodies	 of	 Caecina	 and	Agrippina	in	the	spaces	the	soldiers	seek	to	transgress,	forcing	the	pause	which	recalls	 them	 to	 their	 proper	 awareness	 of	 their	 identity	 and	 duty.	 As	 in	 the	previous	sections,	Rome	can	achieve	 things	 in	German	space	but	 it	 is	difficult,	problematic,	and	always	has	the	potential	for	failure.		The	 final	 two	 sections	 discuss	 the	 extreme	 violence	 of	 Germanicus’	 actions	 in	the	 course	 of	 the	 campaigns	 of	 AD15-17	 and	 during	 the	 raid	 on	 the	Marsi	 in	AD14.	 Despite	 these	 episodes’	 similarities	 in	 depicting	 a	 thirst	 for	 blood	 and	destruction	completely	out	of	proportion	 to	any	provocation	as	 legitimised	by	the	ius	in	bellum	or	ius	in	bello,	I	argue	that	these	passages	must	be	understood	very	 differently.	 Whereas	 the	 brutality	 of	 the	 Germanicus	 campaigns	 is	 born	from	the	conviction	that	Germany	and	its	people	are	unsuitable	for	co-option	as	potential	Roman	territory	and	subjects,	and	therefore	has	an	outward	focus,	the	murderousness	of	 the	 raid	against	 the	Marsi	 is	 inward-looking,	born	 from	 the	former	 mutineers’	 need	 to	 reconfirm	 their	 identity	 as	 loyal	 Roman	 citizen-soldiers.	The	method	they	instinctively	(cupido	involat…)	pursue,	and	which	gets	approved	by	Germanicus,	is	to	reassert	this	group	identity	by	assaulting	another	group.	 This	 just	 happens	 to	 be	 the	Marsi,	whose	 innocence	 is	 stressed	 by	 the	lack	 of	 provocation	 or	 resistance	 from	 either	 people	 or	 landscape	 which	 so	characterise	 the	 other	 campaign.	With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 raid	 on	 the	Marsi,	therefore,	 the	 German	 passages	 of	 Annals	 1	 and	 2	 are	 built	 on	 the	 same	foundations	 throughout:	 Germany	 as	 a	 complex	 space,	 structured	 both	horizontally	 (by	 means	 of	 competing	 spaces)	 and	 vertically	 (by	 means	 of	
		166	
layered	spaces),	of	which	the	constitution	is	perpetually	contested,	perpetually	shifting,	and	perpetually	eluding	the	Roman	grasp,	even	though	it	is	an	arena	in	which	Roman	violent	power	can	 leave	a	mark	 in	the	 landscape,	a	mark	which,	over	 time,	 the	 landscape	might	obliterate	 in	 turn.	 In	 this	 regard,	 its	 treatment	follows	the	lines	set	out	decades	earlier	by	Tacitus	in	the	Germania,	as	chapter	six	will	show.	
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5	 The	rest	of	the	Annals		
Introduction	There	 are	 many	 other	 instances	 of	 Germanae	 res	 recorded	 by	 Tacitus	 in	 the	
Annals.	 The	 main	 ones	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 are:	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Gallic	rebellion	of	AD21	that	was	led	by	Florus	in	northern	Gaul	where	the	boundary	with	 Germany	 started	 to	 blur	 (Ann.	 3.40-46);	 the	 fluctuating	 fates	 of	 the	Romano-Cheruscan	 king	 Italicus	 (Ann.	11.16-17);	 Corbulo’s	 campaigns	 in	 the	Rhineland	 (Ann.	11.18-20);	 the	 Frisii’s	 rebellion	 of	 AD28	 (Ann.	4.72-74),	 their	settlement	by	Corbulo	in	AD47	(Ann.	11.19)	and	their	departure	for	the	Roman	military	frontier	zone	in	AD58	(Ann.	13.55-56);	and	the	immediate	reoccupation	by	 the	 Ampsivarii	 of	 the	 contested	 lands	 from	which	 the	 Frisii	 had	 just	 been	removed	 by	 Rome	 (Ann.	 13.53-57).	 Passing	 reference	 will	 be	 made	 to	Maroboduus’	final	efforts	against	Rome	after	the	defeat	of	Arminius	(Ann.	2.44-46,	 2.62-63)	 and	 the	 Suebian	Vannius’	 ejection	 from	his	 kingdom	 followed	by	his	request	to	be	restored	by	Rome	(Ann.	12.29-30).289		All	these	passages	engage	further	with	the	relationship	between	imperial	power	and	 its	 subjects	 through	 foregrounding	 the	 spaces	 in	 which	 this	 power	 is	deployed	 and	 resisted.	 Thematic	 connections	 are	 made	 to	 other	 Tacitean	passages	(the	Batavian	revolt	and	the	Roman	mutinies	for	Florus	and	Sacrovir;	the	 campaigns	 of	 Germanicus	 for	 Corbulo;	 Tacitus’	 account	 of	 the	 Republic’s	collapse	into	the	principate	in	the	earliest	chapters	of	the	Annals	in	the	Italicus	episode)	 but	 also	 to	 other	 authors	 and	 periods	 from	Roman	history	 (Sallust’s	account	 of	 the	Catilinarian	 conspiracy	 for	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir,	 descriptions	 of	Rome’s	earliest	history	by	Livy	and	Sallust).	These	intratextual	and	intertextual	connections	across	space	and	time	further	Tacitus’	analysis	of	the	dynamics	of	power	and	resistance	in	general,	and	particularly	in	the	way	these	manifest	and	repeat.	 These	 political	 narratives	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 role	 of	 spaces	 in	limiting	and	enabling	both	this	power	and	the	resistance	it	provoked.	The	nexus																																																									289Pomponius	Secundus’	skirmish	with	the	Chatti	at	Ann.	12.27-8	is	unremarkable	apart	from	his	rescue	of	a	few	Varian	survivors.	
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of	 connections	 also	 shows	 the	 Tacitean	 text	 does	 not	 deal	 in	 either	 essential	categories	 of	 peoples	 and	 places	 or	 discourses	 asserting	 them	 (unless	ventriloquised).	
Florus	and	Sacrovir	The	rebellion	of	Florus	and	Sacrovir	is	reported	by	Tacitus	for	the	year	AD21	at	
Ann.	 3.40-47.	 Discussion	 of	 its	 northern	 element,	 led	 by	 Florus,	 warrants	inclusion	in	this	thesis	first	because	he	was	a	Trevir	and	secondly	because	from	a	 firmly	Gallic	 centre	he	aimed	 to	extend	his	 campaigns	northwards	 (whereas	his	 colleague	 Sacrovir	 went	 south).290	He	 thereby	 involved	 the	 Belgae	 in	 the	uprising	 and	 although	 both	 the	 Treveri	 and	 the	 Belgae	were	 administratively	classified	 as	 living	 in	 Gaul	 during	 the	 AD20s,	 they	would	 rise	 in	 AD69	 under	Civilis’	 German	 banner. 291 	Only	 in	 overly	 schematic	 historiographical	 or	ethnographical	narratives	did	Germany	start	cleanly	across	the	Rhine.292		
Discourse	The	 passage	which	 principally	 concerns	 us	 is	 the	 introductory	 chapter	 of	 the	Florus	episode:	
	
Eodem	anno	Galliarum	civitates	ob	magnitudinem	aeris	alieni	rebellionem	
coeptavere,	cuius	extimulator	acerrimus	inter	Treviros	Iulius	Florus,	apud	
Aeduos	Iulius	Sacrovir.	nobilitas	ambobus	et	maiorum	bona	facta	eoque	
Romana	civitas	olim	data,	cum	id	rarum	nec	nisi	virtuti	pretium	esset.	ii	
secretis	conloquiis,	ferocissimo	quoque	adsumpto	aut	quibus	ob	egestatem	
ac	metum	ex	flagitiis	maxima	peccandi	necessitudo,	componunt	Florus	
Belgas,	Sacrovir	propiores	Gallos	concire.	igitur	per	conciliabula	et	coetus	
seditiosa	disserebant	de	continuatione	tributorum,	gravitate	faenoris,	
saevitia	ac	superbia	praesidentium,	et	discordare	militem	audito	Germanici																																																									290Woodman	and	Martin	(1996,	327–28)	note	the	parallel	structure	of	the	two	different	strands	of	the	revolt	and	compare	it	to	the	similar	scheme	of	the	mutinies	of	Annals	1	as	identified	by	Bacha	(1906).	This	also	makes	it	possible	to	separate	the	two.	291The	Treveri	played	a	significant	role	in	the	Batavian	revolt	through	their	leader	Julius	Classicus	and	the	Belgae	are	mentioned	as	allies	of	Civilis	at	Hist.	4.76.	292Rives	(2002),	166	defended	Tacitus’	use	of	the	Rhine	as	a	suspiciously	neat	border	of	Germania	on	the	grounds	of	literary	convention,	though	Rives	(1999),	26–27	traces	the	beginning	of	this	convention	to	Caesar,	and	noting	that	it	continued	to	be	disputed	for	a	long	 time	 amongst	 (especially	 Greek)	 writers	 until	 Agrippa’s	 map	 during	 Augustus’	reign	‘set	the	standard	for	later	Roman	geographical	knowledge,	and	thereafter	we	find	fundamental	agreement	(…)’.	In	the	Histories,	however,	we	still	find	a	much	more	fluid	identity	 spectrum:	 see	 chapter	 two.	 And	 even	 the	 Germania	 admits	 the	 existence	 of	German	tribes	living	on	the	Gallic	bank	(Ger.	2.3	and	27.2,	28.4	and	19.1).		
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exitio.	egregium	resumendae	libertati	tempus,	si	ipsi	florentes	quam	inops	
Italia,	quam	inbellis	urbana	plebes,	nihil	validum	in	exercitibus	nisi	quod	
externum,	cogitarent.	
Ann.	3.40	‘That	same	year	the	communities	of	the	Gallic	provinces	began	a	revolt	because	of	the	size	of	their	debts.	The	keenest	rabble-rouser	was	Julius	Florus	among	the	Treveri;	with	the	Aedui	it	was	Julius	Sacrovir.	Both	had	noble	blood	and	a	family	history	of	good	service	and	for	this	reason	Roman	citizenship	had	been	granted	them	long	ago,	when	this	occurrence	was	still	rare	and	the	reward	for	honourable	conduct.	In	secret	conclaves	in	which	every	possible	hothead	had	been	included,	as	well	as	those	for	whom	this	opportunity	to	break	the	law	was	necessary,	either	because	of	their	poverty	or	because	of	fear	that	their	past	crimes	would	catch	up	with	them,	Florus	undertook	to	fire	up	the	Belgae	and	Sacrovir	the	closer	Gauls.	At	treasonous	meetings	in	public	places	they	repeatedly	speechified	about	the	relentlessness	of	the	tribute,	the	burden	of	interest,	the	cruelty	and	overbearing	attitude	of	those	governing	them.	They	added	that	the	legions’	acting	up	after	hearing	about	Germanicus’	death	offered	an	excellent	opportunity	for	retaking	their	freedom,	and	that	though	they	themselves	were	in	good	shape,	let	them	consider	how	helpless	Italy	was,	and	how	feeble	the	urban	plebs,	and	that	there	was	really	nothing	of	strength	in	the	army	unless	it	was	foreign	strength.’		It	 is	 immediately	obvious	 that	 the	 reasons	 for	 revolt	 advocated	by	Florus	and	Sacrovir	 in	 their	 speech	 to	 the	 disaffected	 are	 more	 varied	 and	 serious	 than	Tacitus’	 introduction	 of	 ob	 magnitudinem	 aeris	 alieni.293	They	 fall	 into	 two	categories:	the	first	relates	to	their	own	situation	in	the	form	of	the	economics	(the	 tribute	 they	 have	 to	 pay,	 de	 continuatione	 tributorum)	 and	 the	 politics	(proud	 and	 cruel	 imperial	 representatives,	 [de]	 saevitia	 ac	 superbia	
praesidentium)	of	subjection;	the	second	relates	to	Rome’s	situation	in	the	form	of	the	economics	and	politics	of	domination:	only	with	the	help	of	the	subjected	provincials	 can	Rome	maintain	 its	military	 superiority	 (imbellis	urbana	plebes,	
nihil	validum	in	exercitibus	nisi	quod	externum),	 and	only	when	Roman	politics	are	 stable	 can	 the	 military	 be	 relied	 on	 to	 keep	 its	 grip	 on	 the	 provinces	(discordare	militem	audito	Germanici	exitio).	The	 short	 speech	 is	 recorded	half	as	 a	 concise	 summary	 of	 topics	 (disserebant	 de…)	 and	 half	 in	 oratio	 obliqua	
																																																								293Hist.	4.26	also	contains	such	a	wide	gap	between	a	Tacitean	authorial	judgment	on	a	situation	and	the	explanations	for	it	advanced	by	his	ventriloquised	characters	in	the	text;	see	p.	34-9	where	I	discuss	the	Rhine	drought	during	the	Batavian	revolt.	
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(cogitarent	egregium	resumendae	libertati	tempus…)	but	still	manages	to	pack	in	conspicuous	references	to	other	German	passages.		My	 first	 aim	 is	 therefore	 to	 establish	 that	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir’s	 discourse	 as	reported	 by	 Tacitus	 bears	 significant	 resemblances	 (in	 content,	 phrasing	 or	both)	 to	 the	 complaints	 and	 feelings	 reported	by	Tacitus	 for	 the	mutineers	 of	AD14,	 to	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	 the	 politically	 engaged	 population	 of	 the	city	 of	 Rome	 in	 AD21,	 to	 the	 Frisian	 rebels	 of	 AD28,	 and	 to	 the	 Batavian-led	rebels	 of	 AD69-70.	 Chapter	 three	 already	 drew	 a	 parallel	 between	 the	mutineers’	reported	discontent	in	AD14	as	a	result	of	their	financial	and	bodily	exploitation	by	their	commanders294,	and	Civilis’	complaints	about	the	same	on	behalf	of	the	Batavi.295	To	these	complaints,	whose	subject	matter	falls	into	the	first	category	of	the	economics	of	subjection,	we	can	add	Florus	and	Sacrovir’s	complaints,	which	combine	financial	exploitation	(de	continuatione	tributorum)	with	 bodily	 exploitation	 (saevitia	 ac	 superbia	 praesidentium).	 The	 rebellious	Frisii	in	AD28	are	described	by	Tacitus	at	Ann.	4.72	as	having	broken	the	peace	
nostra	magis	avaritia	quam	obsequii	impatientes,	 ‘more	because	of	our	rapacity	than	 because	 they	 chafed	 under	 their	 obedience’,	 an	 unfair	 change	 in	 their	existing	tax	regime	(financial	exploitation)	having	led	to	their	having	to	sell	the	bodies	of	their	wives	and	children	into	slavery	(bodily	exploitation).296			
																																																								294Ann.	1.17	denis	in	diem	assibus	animam	et	corpus	aestimari:	hinc	vestem	arma	
tentoria,	hinc	saevitiam	centurionum	et	vacationes	munerum	redimi.	A	deduction	ad	
victum	from	their	stipend	was	official	practice	in	the	Roman	army	(Davies	1989,	189),	and	Goodyear	ad	loc.	mentions	papyrological	evidence	for	deductions	towards	
vestimenta,	though	Koestermann	ad	loc.	implies	that	food	is	absent	from	Tacitus’	enumeration	because	that	was	provided	by	the	state.	Either	way,	the	need	to	buy	off	gratuitous	violence	from	one’s	superiors	was	certainly	not	legal.	295Hist.	4.14	impubes	et	forma	conspicui	(et	est	plerisque	procera	pueritia)	ad	stuprum	
trahebantur	and	tradi	se	praefectis	centurionibusque:	quos	ubi	spoliis	et	sanguine	
expleverint,	mutari,	exquirique	novos	sinus	et	varia	praedandi	vocabula	(all	the	more	galling	because	the	Batavi	were	meant	to	be	free	of	tribute,	tributorum	expertis,	Hist.	4.17).	296Ann.	4.72	tributum	iis	Drusus	iusserat	modicum	pro	angustia	rerum,	ut	in	usus	militaris	
coria	boum	penderent,	non	intenta	cuiusquam	cura	quae	firmitudo,	quae	mensura,	donec	
Olennius	e	primipilaribus	regendis	Frisiis	impositus	terga	urorum	delegit	quorum	ad	
formam	acciperentur.	id	aliis	quoque	nationibus	arduum	apud	Germanos	difficilius	
tolerabatur,	quis	ingentium	beluarum	feraces	saltus,	modica	domi	armenta	sunt.	
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Certainly	there	are	differences	in	these	situations.	The	Frisii’s	tribute	had	been	set	by	 the	Elder	Drusus	 in	 the	 form	of	ox	hides	 in	recognition	of	 their	specific	circumstances,	the	Batavi	were	exempt	from	tribute	but	contributed	men	to	the	army,	and	the	everyday	lived	experience	of	Roman	legionaries	would	have	been	very	different	 from	that	of	subjected	provincials.	The	 issue	of	debt	 (aes	alieni)	occurs	in	the	Florus	and	Sacrovir	episode	only.	Nonetheless,	there	are	repeating	patterns	 across	 these	 very	 different	 situations.	Miles	 Lavan	 has	 recently	 read	the	recurrence	of	the	‘familiar	triad	of	greed,	cruelty	and	lust’	in	the	Frisian	and	the	Batavian	revolts	as	a	result	of	Tacitus’	inability,	as	a	product	of	his	time	and	his	 imperial	 context,	 to	 conduct	 sophisticated	 analyses	 with	 which	 modern	historians	of	the	ancient	world	can	advance	their	knowledge	about	what	really	caused	these	revolts,	and	differentiate	them.297	It	is	impossible	not	to	share	his	reservations	that			 ‘[o]ur	 ability	 to	 identify	 and	 understand	 past	 revolts	 is	 necessarily	constrained	 by	 our	 sources’	 operations	 of	 classification	 (what	 they	consider	 a	 revolt)	 and	 selection	 (their	 threshold	 for	 taking	 notice	 of	relevant	events)	and	the	conceptual	apparatus	they	deploy	to	explain	and	describe	episodes	of	revolt,	which	may	not	be	particularly	accurate	and	is	unlikely	to	be	disinterested’.298			However,	what	he	sees	as	flaws	in	the	texts	-	the	agenda-based	schematising	to	the	point	of	obscuring	what	really	happened	–	are	positive	assets	for	this	thesis’	project	in	attempting	to	bring	to	light	the	‘conceptual	apparatus’	which	Tacitus	brings	to	bear	on	his	representations	of	what	happens	in	Germany.	In	short,	the	recurrent	 similarities	 allow	 us	 to	 posit	 the	 positive	 rather	 than	 negative	hypothesis	 that	 Tacitus	 discerned	 a	 repeating	 pattern	 of	 revolts	 against	 the	imperial	 regime	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 first	 century	 AD,	 and	 that	 these	 revolts	were	 triggered	 by	 similar	 kinds	 of	 circumstances.	 Rather	 than	 concluding	simplistically	 that	 Rome	 should	 simply	 have	 taken	 better	 care	 to	 keep	 its	officials	 in	 line	 and	 remedy	 administrative	 failures,	 the	 Tacitean	 text	 raises	 a	more	 structural	 question	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	 imperial	 power:	what	 is	 it																																																									297Lavan	(2017),	20	follows	Guha	(1983)	in	acknowledging	the	inevitable	implication	of	elitist	discourse	on	revolts	in	the	colonial	power’s	distortions	of	representation,	even	when	the	writers	are	not	unsympathic.	298Lavan	(2017),	20.	
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about	 this	set-up	 that	kept	producing	 these	circumstances?	Low,	 in	discussing	the	connections	between	Florus	and	Sacrovir,	the	Thracians	of	Annals	4	and	the	Frisians	 of	 Ann.	 4.72-74,	 locates	 a	 possible	 answer	 in	 Rome’s	 fundamental	‘inability	 to	 understand	 and	 manage	 foreigners’,	 which	 she	 asserts	 is	proportionally	related	to	these	tribes’	possession	of	and	commitment	to	libertas.	This	in	turn	is	related	to	geographical	distance	from	Rome:	the	Thracians	more	committed	and	further	removed	than	Florus	and	Sacrovir’s	tribal	followers;	the	Frisii	still	more	than	the	Thracians.299	This	answer	is	valid	for	these	revolts	qua	provincial	uprisings,	but	cannot	account	for	a	pool	of	revolts	which,	as	I	argue,	includes	the	Roman	citizen-soldiers	of	the	Rhine	mutinies.		The	 Empire	 produced	 these	 circumstances	 regardless	 of	 the	 identity	 of	 the	subjected	 group:	 the	 alignment	 of	 Roman	 legionaries	with	 Frisians,	 Batavians	and	the	Gallo-Germans	of	the	west	bank	of	the	Rhine	breaks	through	the	Roman	versus	 non-Roman	 dichotomy	 implied	 in	 Low’s	 solution,	 as	 well	 as	 through	Lavan’s	 theory	 of	 a	 limiting	 imperial	 gaze.	 The	 mutineers’	 inclusion	 in	 the	matrix	makes	these	recurrent	features	into	an	indictment	not	of	colonial	power	under	 the	 Empire,	 which	 sets	 Romans	 against	 provincials,	 but	 of	 imperial	power,	 which	 sets	 the	 emperor	 and	 his	 delegated	 representatives	 (=	 the	imperial	 regime)	against	 ‘everyone	else’.	 The	 ‘parallel	between	 the	 rule	of	 the	Caesars	over	the	Romans	and	of	the	Romans	over	their	subjects’	was	noted	by	Liebeschuetz	 in	 a	 rather	 off-hand	 manner. 300 	I	 here	 advance	 a	 stronger	argument,	 that	they	were	not	analogous	but	 in	fact	the	same,	and	take	it	 to	 its	logical	 conclusion,	 that	 this	 erased	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 Romans	 and	their	subjects.	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction	to	the	present	work,	Lavan,	in	an	earlier	piece	concerned	with	the	empire’s	representation	of	 its	relationship	with	 its	 provincials,	 traced	 a	 gradual	 shift	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 oppositional	identity	politics	 from	citizen	vs	non-citizen	 to	 Italy	vs	everywhere	else301,	 and	finally,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Caracalla’s	 universal	 grant	 of	 citizenship	 in	 AD212,	 to	
																																																								299Low	(2013),	64-65,	219–26.	300Liebeschuetz	(1966),	138;	see	also	the	introduction	to	this	thesis,	p.	14ff	301Lavan	(2013),	59.	
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emperor	 vs	 everyone	 else.302	My	 reading	 of	 the	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir	 episode	further	strengthens	the	argument,	made	in	chapter	three,	that	the	change	ought	to	be	placed	in	AD14,	on	the	basis	that	Tacitus	ventriloquises	similar	discourses	about	 arbitrary	 imperial	 power	 on	 behalf	 of	 Roman	 mutineers	 as	 well	 as	Germans	throughout	the	entire	narrated	period	of	the	corpus	(AD14-AD70).			A	 second	 feature	which	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir’s	 reported	 discourse	 shares	with	some	of	these	other	passages	has	similar	consequences	for	the	positioning	of	all	these	 rebels,	 regardless	 of	 identity,	 on	 the	weaker	 side	 of	 the	 imperial	 power	divide.	 The	 Trevir	 and	 the	 Auduan	 declare	 the	 timing	 for	 the	 revolt	 to	 be	auspicious	 (egregium	 resumendae	 libertati	 tempus)	 firstly	 because	 Rome’s	soldiery	 is	restive	as	a	result	of	 the	death	of	 their	beloved	 former	commander	Germanicus	(discordare	militem	audito	Germanici	exitio)	and	secondly	because,	on	top	of	that,	they	are	not	very	fearsome	legions	anyway.	Inbellis	urbana	plebs	refers	to	the	urban	levies	of	the	last	years	of	Augustus’	reign	and	nihil	validum	in	
exercitibus	nisi	quod	externum	implies	that	they	see	the	rest	of	the	army	as	made	up	of	those	whose	loyalty	they	can	reasonably	question	on	the	grounds	of	only	recent	or	still	absent	Roman	citizenship.303			Both	lines	of	reasoning	parallel	the	mutineers’	as	well	as	Civilis’	rhetoric	on	the	timing	 of	 their	 uprisings.	 Firstly,	 the	 soldiers’	 response	 at	 the	 death	 of	Germanicus,	 as	 reported	by	Florus	and	Sacrovir,	 recalls	 their	behaviour	 seven	years	earlier	at	the	death	of	Augustus.304	In	considering	that	episode	in	chapter	three,	I	argued	that	the	death	of	the	imperial	ruler	opened	the	opportunity	for	these	 soldiers	 to	 renegotiate	 a	 political	 relationship	which	 they	 felt	 was	 very																																																									302Ibid.,	111.	303The	phrase	combines	the	sentiment	that	the	Roman	army’s	main	strength	lies	in	the	provincials	which	serve	in	it	in	such	large	numbers	with	the	implication	that	all	these	foreign	elements	will	turn	against	Rome	at	a	moment’s	notice.	Both	recur	as	part	of		Civilis’	inflammatory	rhetoric:	used	at	the	very	beginning	in	the	general	shape	of	
provinciarum	sanguine	provincias	vinci	(Hist.	4.17.14),	it	is	then	backed	up	by	examples	(aciem	cogitarent:	Batavo	equite	protritos	Aeduos	Arvernosque;	fuisse	inter	Verginii	
auxilia	Belgas,	vereque	reputantibus	Galliam	suismet	viribus	concidisse,	Hist.	4.17.14-17).	304Ann.	1.16	nullis	novis	causis	nisi	quod	mutatus	princeps	licentiam	turbarum	et	ex	civili	
bello	spem	praemiorum	ostendebat	and	Blaesus’	iustitium	occasioned	by	fine	Augusti	et	
initiis	Tiberii	auditis.	The	similarity	of	Florus	and	Sacrovir	discordare	militem	to	Ann.	1.16	eo	principio	lascivire	miles,	discordare…	is	noted	by	Martin	and	Woodman	ad	loc.	
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personal,	between	them	and	the	ruler	directly.	In	AD21,	in	contrast,	Germanicus	may	have	been	in	line	for	the	throne,	but	Tiberius	occupied	it.	No	power	vacuum	was	created	by	the	former’s	death	and	so	they	possessed	no	bargaining	power	over	a	nutantem	adhuc	principem	(as	Percennius	expresses	it	at	Ann.	1.16).	But	the	Florus	and	Sacrovir	episode,	through	its	re-use	of	discordare	militem,	makes	clear	 that	 these	 legions’	 relationship	 with	 Germanicus	 as	 dux	 paralleled	 that	relationship	with	Augustus	whose	loss	they	mourned	seven	years	earlier.	Their	love	of	Germanicus	was	made	clear	in	the	mutinies	narrative	(esp.	at	Ann.	1.33)	as	well	as	during	the	campaigns	of	Annals	2	(especially	during	his	incognito	visit	to	the	soldiers’	fires	at	Ann.	2.13).	Florus	and	Sacrovir’s	speech	suggests	that	the	uneasy	 process	 of	 adjustment	 to	 a	 new	 reality	 was	 hindering	 these	 legions’	ability	to	quickly	or	efficiently	take	the	field	against	the	Gallo-German	rebels.	To	the	 rebels,	 the	 value	 of	 imperial	 death	 then	 lies	 not	 in	 an	 opportunity	 to	renegotiate	their	own	political	relationship	with	Rome,	but	in	the	distraction	of	the	 legions.	 Civilis,	 almost	 fifty	 years	 later,	 also	 wanted	 to	 capitalise	 on	distraction	 caused	by	an	 imperial	death	and	a	 subsequent	power	vacuum.	His	speech	at	Hist.	4.14	references	three	different	factors	which	make	the	timing	for	rebellion	 opportune:	 the	 instability	 of	 the	 Roman	 state	 since	 the	 death	 of	 the	last	 Julio-Claudian	(numquam	magis	adflictam	rem	Romanam,	Hist.	4.14.18-19),	the	depleted	condition	of	the	armies	of	the	west	as	a	result	of	troop	movements	by	 Vitellius	 and	 Vespasian	 (nec	 aliud	 in	 hibernis	 quam	 praedam	 et	 senes:	
attollerent	 tantum	 oculos	 et	 inania	 legionum	 nomina	 ne	 pavescerent,	 Hist.	4.14.19-21)	 and	 the	 potential	 offered	 by	 the	 internal	 strife	 to	 re-label	 their	uprising,	if	unsuccessful,	as	pro-Flavian	(ne	Romanis	quidem	ingratum	id	bellum,	
cuius	ambiguam	fortunam	Vespasiano	imputaturos:	victoriae	rationem	non	reddi,	
Hist.	4.14.23-4).			The	similarity	of	all	these	considerations	show	that	all	these	different	categories	of	rebels	are	tied	to	the	stability	of	the	Roman	political	centre	as	a	determinant	of	 their	actions,	regardless	of	 their	citizenship,	ethnic	 identification	or	 feelings	about	the	Roman	Empire.	Within	that	repeating	pattern,	however,	there	is	again	local	difference	related	to	the	nature	of	the	relationship:	the	mutineers	possess	some	political	standing	as	citizens	as	well	as	real	military	might	to	back	up	their	
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political	demands	at	a	time	when	the	ruler	needs	their	support;	the	provincials	neither	 have	 that	 relationship	 nor	 the	 clout	 to	 enforce	 concessions	 from	 an	emperor	 firmly	 lodged	on	 the	 throne.	They	 simply	have	 to	 go	 for	broke	 at	 an	opportune	time,	when	their	oppressor’s	enforcers	are	distracted,	and	hope	for	the	 best.	 However,	 at	 the	 root,	 considerations	 of	 Rome’s	 political	 stability	inform	everyone’s	actions.		The	 only	 exception	 to	 this	 rule,	 where	 action	 is	 absent,	 reinforces	 the	 all-pervasive	influence	of	the	imperial	regime	on	those	subject	to	its	power.	Tacitus	describes	 the	 mood	 at	 Rome	 when	 news	 of	 the	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir	 revolt	(admittedly	exaggerated:	cuncta,	ut	mos	famae,	in	maius	credita)	 reaches	 them	(Ann.	3.44):	optumus	quisque	rei	publicae	cura	maerebat:	multi	odio	praesentium	
et	 cupidine	 mutationis	 suis	 quoque	 periculis	 laetabantur	 increpabantque	
Tiberium	 quod	 in	 tanto	 rerum	 motu	 libellis	 accusatorum	 insumeret	 operam,	‘every	 good	 citizen	 lamented	 the	 respublica’s	 sad	 condition,	 but	many,	 out	 of	hatred	for	the	current	regime	and	a	desire	for	change,	rejoiced	even	in	their	own	danger	and	attacked	Tiberius	because	despite	such	a	great	crisis	he	took	up	the	business	of	the	accusers’	incriminations’.	In	their	hatred	for	the	current	regime	and	their	desire	for	change,	the	unnamed	multi	are	identically	placed	to	Florus	and	Sacrovir’s	followers.	The	parallel	feelings	of	citizens	in	Rome	and	figures	on	the	 German	 periphery	 erase	 distinctions	 of	 geography	 and	 citizenship	 in	 a	collective	oppression	and	unhappiness.		The	difference	is	that	unlike	the	mutineers,	Florus,	Sacrovir,	Frisii	and	Batavi,	all	on	the	periphery,	 the	discontented	at	Rome	take	no	action	and	are	reduced	to	treasonous	mutterings	 (I	 read	 laetabantur	as	 public	 glee	 and	 approval	 rather	than	 harbouring	 secret	 hopes	 that	 the	 rebellion	 will	 deliver	 their	 objective).	Paradoxically,	 Tacitus	 suggests,	 through	 reference	 to	 the	 libelli,	 that	 any	 open	expression	of	such	desires	for	change	carried	the	same	risk	as	that	incurred	by	the	provincial	insurgents	who	were	trying	to	force	change.305	Rebellious	action																																																									305Martin	and	Woodman	ad	loc.	remarked	on	the	ambiguity	of	suis	periculis	as	able	to	signify	danger	from	Tiberius	as	well	as	from	a	successful	rebellion,	but	either	way	these	talkers-not-doers	would	suffer.	
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invites	a	military	response	from	the	regime,	rebellious	talk	invites	legal	action,	but	both	situations	end	with	the	 loss	of	 life	at	 the	hands	of	 the	regime.	 Just	as	the	mutinies	narrative	had	its	counterpart	at	Rome	in	the	accession	debate,	the	Florus	narrative	in	the	Rhineland	has	its	counterpart	at	Rome.	Events	at	Rome	indirectly	 but	 significantly	 affect	 the	management	 of	 the	 Gallo-German	 revolt.	And	though	the	actions	of	Florus	 in	Germany	do	not	 influence	action	at	Rome,	they	do	influence	discussions	at	Rome.	The	replication	of	the	rebels’	sentiments	in	the	sentiments	of	the	disgruntled	in	the	capital	further	undermine	the	idea	of	any	consensus	behind	Tiberian	rule	and	expose	the	realities	of	imperial	power.	Tiberius	was	not	deposed	as	a	result	of	either	Florus	and	Sacrovir’s	revolt	or	the	grumblings	 of	 the	 discontented	 like-minded	 at	 Rome.	 But	 in	 AD68	 the	 Gallic	revolt	 led	by	Julius	Vindex,	despite	 its	quelling	by	Verginius	Rufus,	did	prompt	action	 at	 Rome	 instead	 of	 just	 talk,	 leading	 to	 the	 murder	 of	 Nero.	 As	 Syme	noted	 long	 ago,	 Tacitus’	 narration	 of	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir	 historically	foreshadows	 this	 last	 and	 worst	 of	 the	 Gallic	 upheavals	 of	 the	 Julio-Claudian	principate,	 and	 likely	 did	 so	 in	 Tacitus’	 lost	 account	 of	 it.306	For	 Tacitus,	 this	particular	 dynamic	 between	 provinces	 and	 imperial	 centre	 was	 therefore	already	present	in	the	earliest	days	of	the	principate.	
Space	In	addition	 to	 the	 separation-and-yet-connection	between	 the	Empire’s	 centre	and	 periphery,	 the	 Florus	 narrative	 also	 reflects	 on	 the	 connection	 between	people	and	place,	with	place	viewed	not	as	a	function	of	location	but	of	ideology.		The	 rebellion’s	 movement	 from	 urban	 space	 to	 countryside	 develops	 a	dichotomy	 between	 urban	 space	 as	 a	 place	 to	 talk	 and	 be	 Roman	 and	 rural	space	as	 enabling	action	and	distance	 from	Romanity.	This	movement	 follows	the	spatial	and	emotional	patterns	established	 for	 the	Catilinarians	 in	Sallust’s	account	 of	 the	 conspiracy.	 In	 both	 cases	 the	 result	 evokes	 sympathy	 for	 the	enemies	 of	 Roman	 authority	 that	 get	 driven	 out	 of	 Roman	 space	 whilst	simultaneously	condemning	their	actions	against	the	state.			
																																																								306Syme	(1958),	458.		
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The	 rebellion’s	 genesis	 takes	 place	 in	 private	 space:	 ii	 secretis	 conloquiis	
componunt	 Florus	 Belgas,	 Sacrovir	 propiores	 Gallos	 concire.	 These	 meetings	parallel	 the	 secret	 conclave	of	 the	 four	 Julii	 of	 the	Batavian	 revolt	 in	Trier	 (in	
colonia	 Agrippinensi	 in	 domum	 privatam	 convenient,	 Hist.	 4.55.12-3)	 and	 the	gatherings	of	the	Catilinarian	conspirators	in	domestic	spaces	at	Rome	(BC	17.2-3	and	27.3).307	From	 there	 (igitur),	 Florus	and	Sacrovir	move	on	 to	hold	open	meetings	in	the	public	spaces	of	their	designated	territories	(Sacrovir	southern	Gaul,	 Florus	 northern	 Gaul)	 to	 preach	 rebellion	 per	 conciliabula	 et	 coetus.308	After	that,	Florus	moves	to	a	local	military	camp	housing	an	auxiliary	Treveran	
ala	equitum,	in	an	attempt	to	win	support:		
Interim	Florus	insistere	destinatis,	pellicere	alam	equitum,	quae	conscripta	e	
Treviris	 militia	 disciplinaque	 nostra	 habebatur,	 ut	 caesis	 negotiatoribus	
Romanis	 bellum	 inciperet;	 paucique	 equitum	 corrupti,	 plures	 in	 officio	
mansere.	
Ann.	3.42		‘In	 the	mean	 time,	Florus	put	 in	 train	what	had	been	decided,	namely	 to	entice	 a	 cavalry	wing,	which	 had	 been	 conscripted	 from	 the	 Treveri	 but	was	housed	under	Roman	conditions	of	discipline,	 into	triggering	war	by	murdering	Roman	 traders;	 a	 few	of	 the	 cavalrymen	were	 corrupted,	 but	more	remained	in	post.’		The	 cavalrymen	 are	 presented	 in	 the	 text	 as	 natives	 biding	 in	 a	 Roman	environment	 and	 under	 Roman	 conditions.	 Tacitus’	 Florus	 seems	 convinced	that	these	had	retained	their	native	German	loyalty	underneath,	but	in	thinking	so	he	makes	the	same	error	made	by	the	Tencteri	when	they	tried	to	join	forces	with	the	Agrippinenses:	the	Roman-style	buildings	and	habits	which	they	see	as	merely	 external	 trappings	 have	 in	 fact	 changed	 the	 people	 who	 adopted																																																									307BC	17.2-3	Ubi	satis	explorata	sunt,	quae	voluit,	in	unum	omnis	convocat,	quibus	
maxuma	necessitudo	et	plurumum	audaciae	inerat.	Eo	convenere	senatorii	ordinis	P.	
Lentulus…;	BC	27.3	intempesta	nocte	coniurationis	principes	convocat	per	M.	Porcium	
Laecam…	308OLD	‘conciliabulum’:	a	place	of	assembly,	meeting-place,	esp.	as	the	administrative	
centre	of	a	district.	b	a	meeting,	assembly.	Woodman	and	Martin	ad	loc.	suggest	that	because	coetus	definitely	means	meeting,	conciliabulum	here	should	be	read	as	the	meeting-place	rather	than	the	meeting	itself.	Koestermann	ad	loc.	concurs,	but	additionally	sees	a	contrast	between	conciliabula	as	open	and	public,	and	coetus,	which	he	interprets	as	secret,	private	meetings.	
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them.309	Civilis	 in	 the	 Batavian	 revolt	 also	 holds	 out	 the	 idea	 that	 all	 ethnic	troops	 in	 the	 Roman	 army	 should	 still	 be	 counted	 as	 German. 310 	The	misconceived	nature	of	Florus’	plan	and	its	central	idea	are	emphasised	by	the	juxtaposition	 of	 the	 ethnic	 marker	 conscripta	 e	 Treviris	 with	 the	 Roman	ideological	marker	disciplina	nostra.311	Tacitus’	use	of	nostra	instead	of	Romana	is	likely	significant,	as	Haynes’	study	of	the	possessive	pronoun	in	the	Histories	concluded	that:			 ‘Nos	and	its	variants	are	not	interchangeable	with	Romani	in	the	Histories;	they	 reflect	 ideological	 boundaries.	 They	 occur	 relatively	 infrequently,	excepting	those	found	in	oratio	recta,	and	the	preponderance	are	in	book	4,	 where	 the	 stakes	 for	 dividing	 “us”	 from	 “them”	 are	 highest.	 While	Tacitus	 frequently	 uses	 variants	 of	 Romani	 in	 the	 narrative,	 where	 he	wishes	 to	 signal	 an	 ideological	 distinction	 he	 uses	 the	 pronoun	 instead;	(…)’312		Shaped	 into	 different	 people	 by	 their	 Roman	 environment	 and	 service,	 the	majority	of	these	Treveran	cavalrymen	in	the	Annals	stay	true	to	Rome.	
	Florus,	 it	 seems,	 needs	 to	 get	 away	 from	 urban,	 ordered	 spaces	 imbued	with	Roman	 ideology	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 take	 the	 field	 against	Rome.	Hence	his	next	move,	 into	 the	 countryside:	aliud	vulgus	obaeratorum	aut	clientium	arma	
cepit;	 petebantque	 saltus	 quibus	 nomen	 Arduenna	 (Ann.	 3.42).	 The	 trope	 of	German	 forests	as	 largely	 inimical	 to	Rome	 is	 frequently	employed	 in	Tacitus,	whether	 dangerous	 and	 frightening	 in	 and	 of	 themselves 313 ,	 or	 because	Germans	use	 them	to	conspire	(as	Civilis	does)314	or	entrap	Romans.315	Such	a																																																									309See	chapters	one	and	two.	310Hist.	4.17.14-17:	ne	Vindicis	aciem	cogitarent:	Batavo	equite	protritos	Aeduos	
Arvernosque;	fuisse	inter	Verginii	auxilia	Belgas,	vereque	reputantibus	Galliam	suismet	
viribus	concidisse.	311See	chapter	three	for	the	mutinies	narrative’s	linking	of	a	relaxation	of	disciplina	within	the	camp	with	resistance	to	authority.	312Haynes	(2003),	161.	313As	in	Caecina’s	speech	to	his	panicked	and	fleeing	soldiers	at	Ann.	1.67	(quod	si	
fugerent,	pluris	silvas,	profundas	magis	paludes,	saevitiam	hostium	superesse)	and	as	places	which	harbour	non-Roman	strangeness	(hinc	veteranarum	cohortium	signa,	inde	
depromptae	silvis	lucisque	ferarum	imagines,	ut	cuique	genti	inire	proelium	mos	est,	
mixta	belli	civilis	externique	facie	obstupefecerant	obsessos,	Hist.	4.22.11-14).	314Hist.	4.14	Civilis	primores	gentis	et	promptissimos	vulgi	specie	epularum	sacrum	in	
nemus	vocatos,	ubi	(…)	iniurias	et	raptus	et	cetera	servitii	mala	enumerat.	
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location,	outside	the	bounds	of	civilisation,	is	therefore	suited	only	to	its	natives	or	to	those	who	have	turned	their	backs	on	the	civilised	world	for	other	reasons.	In	these	categories	do	we	find	Florus’	final	remaining	supporters	of	obaerati	and	
clientes,	debtors	and	retainers,	who	are	the	only	ones	to	accompany	him	to	do	battle.	Martin	and	Woodman	as	well	as	Koestermann	ad	loc.	note	that	these	two	categories	of	people	recall	the	followers	of	Orgetorix	at	Caes	BG	1.4.2,	who	help	him	 to	 escape	 the	 course	 of	 justice	 when	 his	 own	 tribe	 arraigns	 him	 for	ambitions	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 plans	 they	 had	 entrusted	 to	 him.	 The	association	is	therefore	one	of	lawlessness,	describing	Florus’	final	followers	as	‘lowlifes’:	only	this	kind	of	people	or	non-Romans	would	take	to	the	forests.		There	 are	 broad	 parallels	 between	 Tacitus’	 account	 of	 Florus’	 revolt	 and	 the	way	Sallust	reported,	over	a	century	earlier,	on	the	causality,	spatial	dynamics	and	 people	 involved	 in	 the	 Catilinarian	 conspiracy.	 Already	 prominent	 in	scholarship	 are	 the	 prominence	 of	 debt	 and	 poverty	 as	 drivers	 for	 both	revolts316,	 resulting	 in	 a	 similar	 following	of	 the	disaffected	who	 felt	 excluded	from	what	Rome	had	to	offer.317	Though	no	Roman	literature	evinces	sympathy	for	Catiline’s	decision	 to	make	war	on	 the	Roman	state,	no	counter-narratives	are	offered	by	Sallust	or	Cicero	either	to	deny	the	prevalence	and	seriousness	of	the	 levels	 of	 debt	 in	 the	 60s	 BC	 which	 motivated	 the	 conspiracy.	 The	conspirators’	 complaints	 have	 substance,	 and	 Catiline’s	 speeches	 are	 highly	emotionally	wrought	(for	examples,	see	n.	319,	as	well	as	BC	58).	This	creates	a																																																																																																																																																														315As	at	Ann.	1.63,	Arminius	colligi	suos	et	propinquare	silvis	monitos	vertit	repente:	mox	
signum	prorumpendi	dedit	iis	quos	per	saltus	occultaverat,	and	indeed	during	the	clades	
Variana.	316Noted	by	Martin	and	Woodman	ad	loc,	though	not	Koestermann.	Also	by	Lavan	(2017),	31	and	Low	(2013),	213,	though	the	latter	connects	the	similarities	to	the	mutinies	and	through	them	proleptically	to	the	Civil	War	of	AD69.	317The	superbia	of	Catiline’s	perceived	oppressors	is	implied	in	his	speech	to	the	assembled	conspirators,	and	the	expressed	feeling	of	being	‘shortchanged’	is	very	much	in	the	spirit	of	Florus	and	Civilis’,	and	indeed	the	other	revolters’,	complaints:	Nam	
postquam	res	publica	in	paucorum	potentium	ius	atque	dicionem	concessit,	semper	illis	
reges,	tetrarchae	vectigales	esse,	populi,	nationes	stipendia	pendere;	ceteri	omnes,	strenui,	
boni,	nobiles	atque	ignobiles,	vulgus	fuimus,	sine	gratia,	sine	auctoritate,	iis	obnoxii,	
quibus,	si	res	publica	valeret,	formidini	essemus.	Itaque	omnis	gratia,	potentia,	honos,	
divitiae	apud	illos	sunt	aut	ubi	illi	volunt;	nobis	reliquere	pericula,	repulsas,	iudicia,	
egestatem.	Quae	quousque	tandem	patiemini,	o	fortissumi	viri?	Nonne	emori	per	virtutem	
praestat	quam	vitam	miseram	atque	inhonestam,	ubi	alienae	superbiae	ludibrio	fueris,	
per	dedecus	amittere?	(BC	20.7-9).	
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moral	 ambivalence	 about	 rebels:	 depicted	 as	 oppressed	 citizens	 with	 just	complaints,	 they	are	also	condemned	for	their	employment	of	violence	against	the	state.	The	ambivalence	remains	throughout	the	narrative,	all	the	way	up	to	Catiline’s	 heroic	 and	 admirable	 final	 stand	 (strenui	militis	 et	 boni	 imperatoris	
officia	 simul	 exequebatur,	BC	60.5)	 and	 tragic	 end	 in	 which	 he	 chooses	 death	over	 renouncing	 his	 cause	 (Catilina	 vero	 longe	 a	 suis	 inter	 hostium	 cadavera	
repertus	 est,	 BC	 61.4).	 In	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir’s	 emphasis	 on	 the	 Gallic	communities’	 sad	 plight	 and	 Florus’	 similarly	 tragic	 but	 noble	 end	 (sua	manu	
cedidit),	 the	episode	re-works	 the	moral	ambivalence	of	 the	Catilinarian	story,	adding	further	force	to	the	sympathy	expressed	in	Rome	for	these	provincials’	desire	for	regime	change.		The	Catilinarian	conspiracy	and	Florus’	management	of	the	northern	half	of	the	revolt	share	the	spatial	evolution	from	conspiracy	in	urban	domestic	space	(BC	17.2-3	and	27.3,	see	n.	309)	to	countryside	battle	(BC	56.4	per	montis	iter,	57.5	
montibus	atque	copiis	hostium	sese	clausum,	and	59.2	planities	erat	inter	sinistros	
montis).	 The	 spatial	 dynamics	 of	 the	 Florus	 revolt,	 which	 equate	 Roman	urbanity	with	civilisation	and	countryside	with	relative	barbarity	and	end	with	an	 inconditam	multitudinem	 in	 the	Ardennes	 forest,	 are	prefigured	 in	 Sallust’s	description	of	the	mountain	army	of	debtors	with	which	Catiline	makes	his	last	stand.318	Non-Roman,	 ‘other’	 space	 is	 the	 last	 resort	 for	 those	 who	 feel	 the	Roman	world	has	excluded	them	completely	and	so	driven	them	out	spatially	as	well	as	metaphorically.319	
Roman	history	among	the	Cherusci		Autocratic	 power	 and	 resistance	 to	 it	 are	 also	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 story	 of	 the	Cheruscan	 king	 Italicus	 (Ann.	 11.16-17).	 Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 space,	 the	episode	brings	to	the	fore	the	complexities	of	 imperial	 identity	 in	the	figure	of	the	Roman-fostered	German	Italicus,	only	to	dismiss	these	as	secondary	to	the																																																									318BC	56.3	mentions	the	large	proportion	of	rebels	without	military	training	or	proper	armour,	57.1	the	desertion,	at	the	news	that	the	conspiracy	at	Rome	had	been	discovered,	of	a	large	proportion	even	of	those,	and	Catiline’s	contio	before	the	final	battle	re-emphasises	necessity	as	the	motive	of	all	that	had	been	done.	319The	note	sent	by	Catiline’s	general	Gaius	Manlius	to	Marcius	Rex,	deputed	to	watch	the	conspirators’	movements	once	they	had	left	the	city,	speaks	of	necessitudo,	BC	33.5.	
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illustration	 of	 how	 autocratic	 power	 is	 inherently	 corrupting.	 Italicus’	introduction	 into	the	narrative	stresses	not	only	both	sides	of	his	heritage	but	also	the	very	Roman-sounding	circumstances	which	led	up	to	his	investiture.			Tacitus	starts	as	follows:		
Eodem	 anno	 Cheruscorum	 gens	 regem	 Roma	 petivit,	 amissis	 per	 interna	
bella	 nobilibus	 et	 uno	 reliquo	 stirpis	 regiae,	 qui	 apud	 urbem	 habebatur	
nomine	 Italicus.	 paternum	 huic	 genus	 e	 Flavo	 fratre	 Arminii,	 mater	 ex	
Actumero	principe	Chattorum	erat;	ipse	forma	decorus	et	armis	equisque	in	
patrium	nostrumque	morem	exercitus.	
Ann.	11.16		‘In	the	same	year,	the	tribe	of	the	Cherusci	asked	Rome	for	a	king,	having	lost	 to	 internal	 strife	all	but	one	of	 their	nobles,	who	was	of	 royal	 stock,	and	was	being	held	 in	Rome,	 going	by	 the	name	of	 Italicus.	His	paternal	descent	was	from	Flavus,	brother	of	Arminius;	his	mother	had	been	born	to	Actumerus,	chief	of	the	Chatti;	he	himself	was	handsome	in	appearance	and	trained	in	both	his	native	and	our	way	of	fighting	and	riding.’		His	 background	 encompasses	 ties	 to	 the	 independent	 German	 nation	 of	 the	Chatti,	to	Rome’s	recent	nemesis	Arminius,	even	more	directly	to	one	of	Rome’s	staunchest	Cheruscan	supporters	Flavus,	and	to	the	city	of	Rome	itself.320	Both	his	identity	and	position	are	complex:	of	native	stock	(uno	reliquo	stirpis	regiae),	but	 with	 a	 long-standing	 association	 with	 Rome	 and	 comfortable	 in	 both	cultures	 (armis	 equisque	 in	 patrium	 nostrumque	 morem	 exercitus). 321 	The	narrative	 proceeds	 to	 explore	 the	 difficulties	 of	 this	 position	 in	 the	 specific	context	of	the	Cherusci	as	well	as	inviting	more	general	reflections	on	patterns	of	 power	 and	 resistance.	 Read	 through	 the	 narrowest	 lens	 of	 its	 immediate	circumstances,	 the	narrative	makes	 clear	 that	 Italicus’	hybridity	puts	him	 in	 a	position	 to	 appeal	 to	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 internally	 torn	 Cherusci.	 Tacitus	 had																																																									320Malloch	(2013)	ad	loc.	distinguishes	between	‘would-be	monarchs	of	foreign	peoples’	who	tended	to	be	resident	in	Rome,	and	‘foreign	monarchs	taking	refuge	or	being	detained	within	the	empire’,	who	were	settled	elsewhere,	giving	the	examples	of	Segestes	in	Gaul	or	Arminius’	wife	and	son	in	Ravenna	(both	Ann.	1.58).	Maroboduus,	interestingly,	is	offered	an	honoratam	sedem	in	Italia	by	Tiberius	without	further	specification	(Ann.	2.63),	and	Vannius	simply	a	tutum	perfugium	by	Claudius	(Ann.	12.29).	321Malloch	(2013)	ad	loc.	suggests	the	name	may	indicate	that	he	was	born	in	Italy.	
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already	 described	 the	 tribe	 as	 divided	 in	 Annals	 1	 and	 2,	 between	 the	 pro-Roman	 Flavus	 and	 anti-Roman	 Arminius.	 The	 persistence	 of	 those	 internal	divisions	 twenty-five	 years	 later	 (AD47)	 is	 confirmed	 by	 Tacitus	 through	 the	phrases	potentiam	eius	suspectantes	qui	factionibus	floruerant	 (Ann.	11.16)	and	
nec	 pauciores	 Italicum	 sequebantur	 (Ann.	 11.17).	 Italicus	 is	 presented	 as	sufficiently	 Romanised	 to	 be	 an	 example	 to	 the	 pro-Roman	 amongst	 the	Cherusci,	 but	 with	 sufficient	 native	 culture	 to	 satisfy	 the	 traditionalists.	However,	hybridity	can	be	exploited	and	turned	from	an	asset	 into	a	handicap	by	 those	with	bad	 intentions	and	a	good	grasp	of	 rhetoric.	 Issues	successively	raised	 as	 precluding	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 his	 rule	 over	 the	 Cherusci	 are	 his	birthplace	in	Rome	(neminem	isdem	in	terris	ortum	qui	principem	locum	impleat	
[?]),	 his	 father’s	 Roman	 military	 service	 which	 saw	 the	 latter	 pitted	 against	Arminius,	and	the	perceived	likelihood	that	Italicus	therefore	might	also	choose	to	fight	against	his	own	people	(si	paterna	Italico	mens	esset,	non	alium	infensius	
arma	 contra	 patriam	 ac	 deos	 penatis	 quam	 parentem	 eius	 exercuisse).	 Finally,	there	 are	 the	 consequences	of	 a	 foreign	upbringing.	 Infectum	alimonio	servitio	
cultu,	 omnibus	 externis	 is	 either	 puzzlingly	 obscure	 or	 plainly	 inappropriate,	given	 the	 text’s	 insistence	 in	 the	 introduction	 on	 the	 care	 taken	 by	 Rome	 to	educate	 Italicus	 in	 his	 native	 culture.	 The	 odd	 claim	 amounts	 to	 a	 denial	 of	hybridity	as	a	valid	state	and	the	equation	of	any	Roman	influence	with	a	loss	of	Germanness;	 in	 this,	 the	 anonymous	 detractors	 follow	 a	 line	 of	 reasoning	already	 set	 out	 by	 Arminius 322 	and	 the	 Tencteri. 323 	Since	 one	 prevalent	characteristic	of	Germanness	is	libertas,	both	Arminius	and	the	Tencteri	equate	the	state	of	the	new	Romans	Flavus	and	the	Agrippinenses,	who	are	not	allowed	to	be	hybrid,	with	servitium.	The	Cherusci	also	deny	Italicus	that	right.		Against	 adversaries	 seeking	 to	 undermine	 his	 native	 credentials,	 Italicus	advances	 two	 claims	 with	 important	 rhetorical	 antecedents	 in	 Roman	imperialism	and	in	Tacitus	specifically.	The	first	is	that	he	was	invited	onto	the																																																									322Flavus	aucta	stipendia,	torque	et	coronam	alique	militaria	dona	memorat,	inridente	
Arminio	vilia	servitii	pretia,	Ann.	2.9.	323muros	coloniae,	munimenta	servitii	(Hist.	4.64.11-12)	and	instituta	cultumque	patrium	
resumite,	abruptis	voluptatibus,	quibus	Romani	plus	adversus	subiectos	quam	armis	
valent	(Hist.	4.64.19-21).	
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Cheruscan	throne	(non	enim	inrupisse	ad	invitos	sed	accitum	memorabat),	which	Tacitus’	 factual	 introduction	eodem	anno	Cheruscorum	gens	regem	Roma	petivit	(Ann.	11.16)	does	not	 call	 into	doubt.	This	 claim	resembles	Rome’s	 traditional	defence	of	 its	Gallic	and	German	campaigns:	 that	Roman	 interference	 in	 these	areas	had	been	by	invitation.324	Petillius	Cerialis	invoked	it	in	his	speech	to	the	Treveri	 and	 Lingones	 during	 the	 Batavian	 revolt	 at	 Hist.	 4.73.7-9	 (terram	
vestram	ceterorumque	Gallorum	ingressi	sunt	duces	imperatoresque	Romani	nulla	
cupidine,	 sed	 maioribus	 vestris	 invocantibus,	 ‘Roman	 generals	 and	 emperors	came	into	your	lands	and	those	of	the	other	Gauls	not	through	greed,	but	with	your	 ancestors	 begging	 us	 to’).325	Italicus’	 defence	 also	 contains	 an	 echo	 of	Tacitean	 rhetoric:	 he	 rails	 that	 falso	 libertatis	 vocabulum	 obtendi	 ab	 iis	 qui	
privatim	 degeneres,	 in	 publicum	 exitiosi,	 nihil	 spei	 nisi	 per	 discordias	 habeant,	‘That	the	word	libertas	was	being	touted	by	those	who	were	privately	immoral,	disastrous	 to	 the	 public	 good,	 and	 had	 no	 hopes	 other	 than	 what	 could	 be	achieved	through	civil	war’.	Tacitus	as	narrator	explained	the	success	of	Civilis’	alliance	 at	Hist	4.25.17	 in	 terms	of	 exactly	 such	 a	 spurious	brandishing	of	 the	catchphrase	 libertas,	 claiming	 other	 tribes	 joined	 spe	 libertatis	 et,	 si	 exuissent	
servitium,	cupidine	imperitandi	rather	 than	 for	any	more	valid	reasons.	Shortly	after	this,	Tacitus’	Petillius	Cerialis	warned	the	defeated	but	still	restive	Treveri	and	 Lingones	 against	 such	 self-interest	 in	 the	 guise	 of	 freedom-fighting	 in	similar	 terms:	 ceterum	 libertas	 et	 speciosa	nomina	praetexuntur;	nec	quisquam	
alienum	 servitium	 et	 dominationem	 sibi	 concupivit	 ut	 non	 eadem	 ista	 vocabula	
usurparet,	‘of	course	freedom	and	other	empty	words	are	being	dangled	in	front	of	you;	no	one	has	ever	desired	the	slavery	of	others	and	tyranny	for	themselves																																																									324Fontanella	(2008),	215–16	notes	the	trope’s	initial	development	from	Cic.	ad	Q.	fr.	1.1.34.	Caesar	had	also	deployed	this	line	of	reasoning	in	Gaul,	using	it	to	rebuke	the	Aedui	under	Liscus’s	leadership:	praesertim	cum	magna	ex	parte	eorum	precibus	
adductus	bellum	susceperit,	multo	etiam	gravius	quod	sit	destitutus	queritur	(BG	1.16).	It	was	still	current	in	the	mid-second	century	AD,	when	we	find	Aelius	Aristides	recycling	it	in	his	Roman	Oration	celebrating	Roman	government	over	the	culturally	superior	Greeks;	cf.	Fontanella	above.	325Fontanella	(ibid.)	noted	Cerialis’	use	of	the	trope	in	this	footnote	without	making	explicit	claims	about	its	relation	to	Aristides’	stance.	A	notable	further	similarity	between	the	speeches,	however,	make	it	plausible	that	Aristides	borrowed	from	Tacitus:	Cerialis’	remarks	on	nothing	in	government	or	command	being	closed	off	from	provincials	(nihil	separatum	clausumve,	Hist.	4.74.7-8)	recur	in	sections	63	and	65	of	the	Roman	Oration.	
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who	 has	 not	 used	 these	 very	 words’	 (Hist.	 4.73.21-3).326	In	 short,	 the	 fresh	German	king,	 raised	at	Rome	and	crowned	with	Roman	support,	 is	employing	against	his	own	people	a	number	of	rhetorical	strategies	which	elsewhere	in	the	text	are	used	to	defuse	threats	to	Roman	authority.	In	answering	his	detractors	thus,	Italicus	is	proving	their	point.		Despite	 Italicus’	 introduction	 to	 the	 narrative	 as	 a	 hybrid,	 therefore,	 both	 the	Cherusci’s	accusations	and	his	response	to	them	–	despite	claiming	the	opposite	–	 position	 him	 as	 Roman.	 To	 this	 surprising	 unanimity,	 Tacitus	 adds	 Rome’s	view	on	Italicus	as	a	third	perspective	which	further	cements	him	as	a	Roman	rather	 than	 a	 hybrid	 or	 a	 German.	 When	 he	 was	 ready	 to	 leave	 Rome	 for	Germany,	Tacitus	reports	that		
Caesar	auctum	pecunia,	additis	 stipatoribus,	hortatur	gentile	decus	magno	
animo	 capessere:	 illum	 primum	 Romae	 ortum	 nec	 obsidem,	 sed	 civem	 ire	
externum	ad	imperium.	
Ann.	11.16		‘Caesar	 boosted	 his	 efforts	 with	 money,	 and	 attendants	 thrown	 in,	 and	encouraged	him	to	lay	claim	to	his	family’s	inheritance	with	good	courage,	because	he	was	the	first	to	be	born	at	Rome	and	go	forth	to	a	foreign	post	not	as	a	hostage	but	as	a	citizen.’		Through	 the	use	of	civis	and	 imperium,	 Tacitus	makes	 clear	 that	Claudius	was	sending	Italicus	away	on	a	Roman	errand:	a	Roman	civis	with	a	Roman	expense	account	 and	Roman	 entourage	 going	 to	 exercise	 imperium	over	 foreigners,	 as	Romans	do.	Tacitus	reports	that	he	discharged	his	office	fairly	(nullis	discordiis	
imbutus	pari	in	omnis	studio	ageret)	and	exercised	comitas	and	 temperantia.327	Both	 these	 qualities	 are	 associated	 particularly	 with	 Germanicus	 in	 the	
																																																								326On	Tacitus	and	libertas,	see	Liebeschuetz	reading	of	the	Agricola	(1966);	for	the	theme	in	the	first	hexad	of	the	Annals	as	well	as	a	general	overview,	see	Low	(2013),	24-8.	327Even	if	he	combined	these	political	qualities	with	the	personal	vices	of	vinolentia	and	
libidines,	described	as	grata	barbaris	in	line	with	traditional	depictions	of	drunken	Germans.	
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Annals328,	 but	 are	 notably	 absent	 from	Tacitus’	 portrayal	 of	 the	 reclusive	 and	suspicious	‘bad	emperor’	Tiberius.	When	Italicus	fails	to	pacify	the	tribe	because	his	 enemies	 considered	 his	 hybridity	 suspect,	 the	 narrative	 therefore	 shows	they	 have	 good	 grounds	 to	 believe	 so. 329 	Their	 fear	 that	 adimi	 veterem	
Germaniae	libertatem	et	Romanas	opes	insurgere	(Ann.	11.16)	prompts	 them	to	take	 action.	 In	 this	 first	 conflict,	 Italicus	wins	 a	military	 victory	 (magno	 inter	
barbaros	proelio	victor	rex,	Ann.	11.17)	but	 clearly	not	an	 ideological	one,	 as	a	second	 conflict	 follows,	 in	 which	 he	 is	 deposed,	 though	 afterwards	 restored:	
secunda	 fortuna	 ad	 superbiam	 prolapsus	 pulsusque	 ac	 rursus	 Langobardorum	
opibus	 refectus	per	 laeta	per	adversa	 res	Cheruscas	adflictabat,	 ‘after	 this	 good	fortune	 he	 lapsed	 gradually	 into	 arrogance	 and	 was	 expelled;	 restored	 again	with	the	help	of	the	Langobardi,	he	continued	to	vex	the	affairs	of	the	Cherusci	through	good	and	bad	 times	 for	a	 long	 time’	 (Ann.	11.17).330	High-handedness	(here	labelled	superbia)	is	therefore	still	a	factor	at	the	time	of	the	second,	more	successful	 conflict.	 The	 story	 of	 Italicus	 thus	 twice	 associates	 superbia	with	revolt,	and	connects	 the	suffering	Cherusci	with	 the	rebellious	Batavi,	Treveri,	Frisii	and	Roman	mutineers.	In	doing	so,	it	further	transcends	the	boundaries	of	geography	and	citizenship	when	 it	comes	 to	 the	effects	of	autocratic	 (whether	imperial	or	regal)	power.			
																																																								328Pelling	(2012),	283-4	notes	the	emphasis	on	Germanicus’	comitas.	Kelly	(2010),	231	characterises	this	as	a	virtue	specifically	associated	with	the	Roman	Republic,	alongside	
temperantia.	For	Kelly,	Germanicus	is	a	model	of	‘moderate	political	behaviour’	(p.	224,	231).	This	would	fits	with	the	mutineers’	(misguided)	view	that	Germanicus	shared	his	father	Drusus’s	suspected	Republican	leanings	(Ann.	1.33).	329The	narrative	is	rich	and	layered	enough	to	bypass	the	facile	explanation	that	Romans	thought	Germans	simply	incapable	of	refraining	from	squabbling	and	shaking	things	up.	That	trope	is	certainly	at	play	within	the	Tacitean	corpus	(e.g.	Petillius	Cerialis:	terram	vestram	ceterorumque	Gallorum	ingressi	sunt	duces	imperatoresque	
Romani	nulla	cupidine,	maioribus	vestris	invocantibus,	quos	discordiae	usque	ad	exitium	
fatigabant,	Hist.	4.73.7-10)	and	the	initial	sketch	of	the	Cherusci’s	circumstances	(Ann.	11.16)	relies	on	a	similar	framework	(amissis	per	interna	bella	nobilibus	et	uno	reliquo	
stirpis	regiae…	Italicus),	but	then	takes	it	in	a	different	direction.	330In	the	Suebian	Vannius’	case	Rome	is	explicitly	unwilling	to	assist	him	in	regaining	his	throne,	only	offering	a	safe	space	in	which	to	await	a	change	in	situation	(nec	
Claudius,	quamquam	saepe	oratus,	arma	certantibus	barbaris	interposuit,	tutum	Vannio	
perfugium	promittens,	si	pelleretur,	Ann.	12.29).	The	odium	accolarum	precludes	assistance	from	neighbours	such	as	Italicus	received	from	the	Langobardi.	
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Through	 the	 use	 of	 the	 terminology	 of	 regnum	and	 superbia	 in	 this	 particular	story,	 however,	 it	 also	makes	 a	 connection	 to	 Roman	 Republican	 revolutions.	The	first	of	 these	was	the	deposition	of	Rome’s	 last	king	Tarquinius	Superbus,	also	 ad	 superbiam	 prolapsus,	 after	 which	 the	 libertas-loving	 people	 of	 early	Rome	made	 regnum	give	way	 to	 the	 res	publica.	 This	 is	 the	 event	with	which	Tacitus	begins	his	Annals,	despite	 their	official	 title’s	delineation	of	 the	work’s	scope	as	ab	excessu	divi	Augusti	(manifestly	not	ab	urbe	condita):	Urbem	Romam	
a	principio	reges	habuere;	libertatem	et	consulatum	L.	Brutus	instituit	(Ann.	1.1).	Though	 literal	 superbia	 is	 absent	 here	 too,	 the	 mention	 of	 libertas	 means	something	 like	 regnum	 or	 superbia	 is	 clearly	 the	 implied	 antithesis.	 Readers	would	 have	 been	 aware	 of	 the	 Livian	 story	 of	 Superbus’	 deposition331,	 and	Sallust	does	use	superbia	in	the	introduction	to	the	Bellum	Catilinae	to	describe	this	 very	 same	 same	 transition	 from	 kingship	 to	 republic.332	In	 prompting	recollection	of	this	earlier	episode	in	Roman	history,	Italicus’	story	reminds	the	reader	that	imperial	Rome	has	failed	to	perpetuate	its	early	model	of	rising	up	in	response	to	superbia	in	a	way	that	Germany	is	still	able	to	(though	ultimately	they	fail	too,	as	I	mentioned	on	the	previous	page	and	will	discuss	further	at	the	end	of	 this	section).	 Italicus’	deposition	bears	out	Civilis’	claim	in	the	Histories	that	obedience	to	kings	is	fine	for	the	Orient	but	not	for	free	Germans,	untainted	by	Romanisation	(servirent	Syria	Asiaque	et	suetus	regibus	Oriens,	multos	adhuc	
in	Gallia	vivere	ante	tributa	genitos,	Hist.	4.17.20-1).	The	Germans	who	rightfully	depose	their	overly	arrogant	autocratic	ruler	thus	behave	as	Civilis	claims	free	Germans	historically	have	and	should	again.		The	second	key	transformational	moment	in	Roman	political	history	recalled	by	Italicus’	 story	 is	 the	 transition	of	Republic	 into	principate,	 called	 to	mind	here	precisely	because	of	the	process’	similarity	to	Italicus’	accession	to	the	throne.	Just	 as	 the	 Cherusci	 had	 lost	most	 of	 their	 nobles	 through	 internal	 strife	 and	then	 needed	 a	 king	 to	 set	 them	 right,	 so	 had	 and	 did	Rome	 after	 Antony	 and	Octavian’s	civil	war	was	over.	This	event,	too,	is	described	by	Tacitus	in	the	first																																																									331Livy	1.59-60.	332Post,	ubi	regium	imperium,	quod	initio	conservandae	libertatis	atque	augendae	rei	
publicae	fuerat,	in	superbiam	dominationemque	se	convortit,	BC	6.7.	
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chapter	 of	 the	 Annals:	 …	 Lepidi	 atque	 Antonii	 arma	 in	 Augustum	 cessere,	 qui	
cuncta	 discordiis	 civilibus	 fessa	 nomine	 principis	 sub	 imperium	 accepit,	 ‘…	 the	military	dominance	of	Lepidus	and	Antonius	submitted	to	Augustus,	who	took	into	his	care,	under	the	name	of	princeps,	everything	that	had	been	drained	by	civil	 discord’	 (Ann.	1.1).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 both	 the	 Cherusci	 and	 the	 Late	Roman	Republic,	 Tacitus	 admits	 the	 need	 for	 a	 breathing	 space	 under	 a	 stable	 ruler	over	 the	 instability	 and	 destruction	 caused	 by	 trying	 to	 preserve	 libertas.	 But	whereas	 the	 Cherusci	 can	 still	 rally	 enough	 resistance	 to	 oust	 –	 at	 least	temporarily	 –	 their	 leader	 when	 he	 oversteps	 the	 bounds,	 Rome	 under	 the	principate	takes	no	action	despite	increasing	despotism.		Instead	of	taking	up	arms	against	the	superbia	of	its	own	autocratic	leader,	the	principate	shifted	its	focus	to	putting	other	people	in	their	place,	in	a	continuous	series	 of	 conquests	 (Britain)	 and	 campaigns	 (Germany,	 Britain,	 Armenia)	despite	 Augustus	 and	 Tiberius’	 preference	 for	 policies	 of	 containment	 and	German	self-destruction.	Virgil	articulated	the	change	well	in	his	description	of	the	 Roman	 imperial	 mission	 as	 debellare	 superbos333 ,	 meaning	 only	 those	
outside	 the	 empire.	 For	 the	 superbia	of	 emperors,	 Tacitus’	 Cerialis	 prescribes	acquiescence	not	just	to	the	Treveri	and	Lingones,	but	also	to	the	Roman	reader,	by	 means	 of	 his	 reformulation	 of	 Tacitus’	 assertion	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
Annals	that	alternatives	were	no	longer	possible.	This	time	not	because	nobody	remembers	 what	 the	 Republic	 looked	 like	 (as	 claimed	 for	 the	 post-Actium	generation	at	Ann.	1.3),	but	because	humans	will	corrupt	even	the	most	optimal	of	 political	 configurations:	 quo	 modo	 sterilitatem	 aut	 nimios	 imbris	 et	 cetera	
naturae	mala,	 ita	 luxum	 vel	 avaritiam	dominantium	 tolerate.	 vitia	 erunt,	 donec	
homines,	 ‘in	 the	same	way	you	put	up	with	drought	and	excessive	rainfall	and	other	natural	disasters,	do	so	with	the	excesses	and	greed	of	those	who	rule	you.	There	will	be	vices	as	long	as	there	are	humans’	(Hist.	4.74.9-12).		Through	the	dual	strategies	of	Italicus’	engagement	with	the	rhetoric	of	Petillius	Cerialis	 in	 the	Histories	on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 evocation	 of	 circumstantial	parallels	between	the	Germans’	response	of	revolt	to	superbia	and	past	Roman																																																									333Virgil,	A.	6.851.	
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responses	 to	 the	 same	 scenario,	 Tacitus	 again	 asserts	 a	 universal	 pattern	 of	power	 and	 resistance.	 A	 corollary	 of	 this	 is	 the	 erasure	 of	 distinctions	 of	identity.	 The	 Italicus	 episode	 initially	 seems	 to	 set	 German	 libertas	 sharply	against	 Roman	 servitus,	only	 to	 abruptly	 collapse	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	two	 when	 Italicus	 is	 restored	 to	 the	 throne	 despite	 his	 bad	 behaviour	 and	successful	deposition.334	
Corbulo	in	Germany	
Optimising	the	imperialist	assemblage	The	other	half	of	the	Germanae	res	in	book	11	shifts	from	being	in	dialogue	with	the	Batavian	revolt	to	engaging	primarily	with	Tacitus’	account	of	Germanicus’	campaigns	 thirty	 years	 earlier. 335 	The	 portrayals	 of	 general,	 events	 and	landscape	are	all	almost	entirely	opposite.336			Corbulo’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 German	 landscape	 is	 defined	 by	 successful	ingress	 and	 egress	 from	Germany.	 He	 successfully	 brings	warships	 and	 other	craft	 inland	 via	 the	 Rhine	 and	 its	 tributaries:	 triremis	 alveo	 Rheni,	 ceteras	
navium,	 ut	 quaeque	 habiles,	 per	 aestuaria	 et	 fossas	 adegit,	 ‘he	 brought	 up	triremes	 through	 the	deep	channel	of	 the	Rhine	and	other	 types	of	 ships,	of	 a	suitable	kind,	through	shallows	and	canals’,	Ann.	11.18.	An	implied	contrast	with	Germanicus	 at	 Ann.	 2.8	 is	 inescapable:	 …usque	 ad	 Amisiam	 flumen	 secunda	
navigatione	pervehitur.	classis	Amisiae	ore	relicta	 laevo	amne,	erratumque	 in	eo	
quod	non	 subvexit	 aut	 transposuit	militem	dextras	 in	 terras	 iturum,	 ‘…	 until	 he																																																									334Similarly,	the	tribe	had,	twenty-five	years	earlier,	murdered	Arminius	for	overstepping	the	terms	of	his	leadership	(Arminius	abscedentibus	Romanis	et	pulso	
Maroboduo	regnum	adfectans	libertatem	popularium	adversam	habuit,	petitusque	armis	
cum	varia	fortuna	certaret,	dolo	propinquorum	cecidit,	Ann.	2.88),	only	to	end	up	exhausting	themselves	through	in-fighting	and	clamouring	for	a	new	ruler	and	thus	resuming	the	same	cycle.	And	the	internal	division	which	led	to	the	deposition	of	king	Maroboduus,	regis	nomen	invisum	apud	popularis	(Ann.	2.44),	by	the	Suebi	produced	the	situation	in	which	Rome	placed	them	under	the	guardianship	of	another	king,	Vannius	of	the	Quadi	(Ann.	2.63).	335The	disturbance’s	partial	cause	in	the	death	of	the	Roman	governor	(morte	Sanquinii	
alacres,	Ann.	11.18)	does	not	really	align	it	with	the	arguments	concerning	imperial	death	proposed	in	chapter	three:	the	Chauci	were	not	subjects	of	the	Roman	emperor	and	their	actions	here	are	clearly	motivated	by	opportunism,	not	the	desire	to	renegotiate	a	political	relationship,	cf.	Florus	and	Sacrovir’s	revolt,	p.	174-5.	336Malloch	(2013)	ad	loc.	sees	the	contrast	as	one	between	the	dynamism	of	Corbulo	and	the	bad	management	of	his	cause	by	Italicus.	
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came	to	the	river	Ems	via	a	favourable	journey.	The	fleet	was	left	tethered	to	the	left	bank	of	 the	Ems,	 and	 in	doing	 so	an	error	was	made	because	Germanicus	had	 not	 sailed	 up	 to	 or	 disembarked	 his	 soldiers	 onto	 the	 lands	 on	 the	 right	bank	where	they	were	going’.	Corbulo’s	departure	from	Germany	exceeds	even	this	easy	navigation	of	Germany’s	existing	access	routes.	His	cutting	of	a	canal	asserts	Roman	engineering’s	mastery	over	the	landscape’s	natural	state,	whilst	facilitating	avoidance	of	Ocean	(qua	incerta	Oceani	vitarentur,	Ann.	11.20)	as	one	aspect	of	 it	 they	cannot	control.	Germanicus,	we	may	recall,	was	picturesquely	shipwrecked	on	the	North	Sea	(Ann.	2.24).337			In	Tacitus’	account,	this	ease	of	moving	around	produces	correspondingly	more	convincing	 military	 successes.	 After	 his	 smooth	 journey	 into	 inner	 Germany,	Corbulo’s	 fleet	wins	 a	 battle	 against	 the	 barbarian	 fleet	 (luntribusque	hostium	
depressis),	 whereas	 Germanicus’	 erroneous	 landing	 forces	 him	 to	 waste	 time	building	bridges,	in	the	course	of	which	process	he	loses	some	badly-disciplined	troops	 to	 the	 river’s	 torrent.	 Corbulo	 also	 succeeds	 in	 expelling	 the	barbarian	rebel	leader	Gannascus	from	his	lair	(exturbato	Gannasco),	whereas	Germanicus	failed	 to	 achieve	 any	 definitive	 victory	 over	 Arminius,	 partly	 because	 of	 his	struggles	to	navigate	the	German	forests.	In	terms	of	the	troops’	response	to	the	landscape,	the	harsh	discipline	imposed	by	Corbulo	(veterem	ad	morem	reduxit,	
Ann.	11.18)	 increases	 the	 virtus	of	 his	 troops	 (Ann.	11.19)	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	‘unmanning’	 fear	 and	 mourning	 of	 Germanicus’	 soldiers	 at	 Teutoburg	 (Ann.	1.62)	 and	 the	 panicked	 flight	 of	 Caecina’s	 troops	 from	 their	 camp	when	 they	mistakenly	 believe	 they	 are	 under	 German	 attack	 (Ann.	 1.66).	 Germanicus’	troops	 feared	 the	 landscape	 of	memory	 and	 ruin	more	 than	 they	 feared	 their	commanding	officers,	but	those	commanded	by	Corbulo	are	fearful	only	of	their	his	 discipline	 (his	 actions	 are	 described	 as	 a	 terror,	Ann.	11.19).	 The	 imperial	general	Germanicus	and	his	 imperial	 soldiers	struggle;	 the	Republican	general	Corbulo	and	soldiers,	drilled	Republican-style,	hold	their	own.		The	 contrast	 between	 the	 two	 was	 noted	 in	 general	 terms	 by	 Ash,	 and	 the	retrospective	(negative)	impact	on	the	reader’s	view	of	Germanicus	as	a	general																																																									337per	omnis	illos	dies	noctesque	apud	scopulos	et	prominentis	oras.	
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acknowledged.338	However,	the	specificity	of	the	comparative	material	makes	it	possible	 to	 put	 all	 this	 into	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 assemblage	 of	 factors.	 Seen	through	 this	 lens,	 the	 narrative	 clearly	 suggests	 that	 Corbulo	 has	 a	 better	understanding	 than	Germanicus	of	how	 the	assemblage	of	 factors	 in	Germany	might	 impact	 his	 projects:	 what	 is	 manageable	 in	 the	 landscape,	 and	 what	aspects	 of	 it	 are	 beyond	 the	 power	 of	 Roman	 change;	 the	 importance	 of	 firm	troop	 discipline	 and	 high	 morale.	 He	 acts	 accordingly.	 For	 any	 other	 Roman	general	 active	 in	 Tacitus’	 account	 of	 German	 affairs,	 the	 local	 people	 and	 the	place	itself	conspire	in	creating	resistance	or	destruction	for	Rome.	For	Corbulo	people	and	place	are	optimised	in	as	far	as	possible	to	help	his	mission	succeed.	In	this	framework,	it	would	be	easy	to	conclude	that	Corbulo	is	simply	a	better	general	 than	 Germanicus.	 However,	 it	 seems	 more	 plausible	 that	 the	 almost	itemised	comparison	set	up	by	Tacitus	is	meant	to	illustrate	precisely	the	value	of	Germanicus’	campaigns	(and	 failures)	 in	shaping	Corbulo’s	approach	 fifteen	years	later.	Rome	has	puts	its	past	experience	to	good	use.	It	is	as	if	Corbulo	has	fed	 Germanicus’	 experiences	 into	 his	 matrix	 of	 factors	 and	 changed	 his	approach	accordingly	to	procure	a	different	outcome.		
Establishing	a	Republic	among	the	Frisii	Germanicus’	 campaigns	 could	 be	 no	 guide,	 however,	 for	 the	 second	 part	 of	Corbulo’s	mission,	the	cowing	of	the	rebellious	Frisii:		
et	 natio	 Frisiorum,	 post	 rebellionem	 clade	 L.	 Apronii	 coeptam	 infensa	 aut	
male	fida,	datis	obsidibus	consedit	apud	agros	a	Corbulone	descriptos:	idem	
senatum,	 magistratus,	 leges	 imposuit.	 ac	 ne	 iussa	 exuerent	 praesidium	
immunivit…	
Ann.	11.19		‘The	tribe	of	the	Frisii,	still	hostile	and	of	doubtful	loyalty	after	the	rebellion	begun	with	the	defeat	of	L.	Apronius,	settled	down	after	giving	hostages	in	territory	allocated	to	them	by	Corbulo:	he	imposed	a	senate,	magistrates	and	laws	on	them.	And	to	prevent	them	from	disobeying	his	commands,	he	strengthened	the	local	garrison...’		
																																																								338Ash	(2006),	360–61.	
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The	 passage,	 set	 in	 AD47,	 references	 the	 defeat	 of	 L.	 Apronius,	 in	 AD28,	 and	must	be	understood	in	light	of	it.	At	Annals	4.72-4,	Tacitus	gave	some	context	on	the	 Frisii’s	 relationship	with	 Rome	 as	well	 as	 the	 origins	 of	 this	 conflict	with	Apronius.	 Originally	 sympathetically	 assessed	 for	 tax	 (pro	 angustia	 rerum,	 ‘in	line	with	the	scarcity	of	their	resources’,	Ann.	4.72)	by	the	Elder	Drusus	in	12BC,	forty	 years	 later	 in	 AD28	 a	 high-ranking	primipilarius	among	 the	 Frisii	 called	Olennius	 increased	 their	 tax	 to	 a	 level	 which	 the	 tribe	 could	 not	 reasonably	sustain.339	Tacitus	 explicitly	 mentions	 the	 small	 size	 of	 Frisian	 cattle340,	 and	narrates	 how	 the	 tribe	 resorted	 to	 selling	 this	 cattle,	 their	 land,	 and	 finally	themselves	and	their	relatives	in	order	to	be	able	to	pay	the	new	tribute.	Then	they	rebel,	and	defeat	Apronius.	The	connection	between	excesses	of	the	Roman	imperial	 government	 and	 the	 violation	 of	 the	 free	 (even	 if	 not,	 in	 this	 case,	citizen)	body	in	this	passage	recalls	the	situations	of	the	abused	mutineers	and	raped	Batavi	particularly.			From	a	 spatial	 angle,	 however,	 the	 condensed	 tale	 in	Annals	4	 is	 a	 very	 short	version	of	Roman	rapacity	 leading	to	a	collapse	of	Roman	control	 in	a	specific	area	of	Germany.	Tacitus’	narrative	mentions	no	attempts	to	address	the	Frisii’s	concern,	 only	 Apronius’	 military	 repression.	 This	 heavy-handedness	 explains	the	tribe’s	continued	restiveness	in	AD47	when	Corbulo	arrives,	which	Tacitus	describes	as	post	rebellionem	clade	L.	Apronii	coeptam	infensa	aut	male	fida,	‘still	hostile	 and	 of	 doubtful	 loyalty	 after	 the	 rebellion	 begun	with	 the	 defeat	 of	 L.	Apronius’.	The	short	passage	in	Annals	11	then	narrates	how	Corbulo	attempts	to	 reassert	 Roman	 control	 over	 the	 Frisii	 by	 enforcing	 (imposuit)	 spatial	(consedit)	 and	 political	 (senatus	 magistratus	 leges)	 changes	 under	 threat	 of	violence	 (immunivit)	 rather	 than	 through	 exerting	 immediate	 and	 direct																																																									339During	this	intervening	period,	Germanicus	had	not	had	any	dealings	with	them,	beyond	his	lieutenant	Albinovanus	Pedo	taking	his	troops	through	their	territory	unmolested	on	his	way	elsewhere	(equitem	Pedo	praefectus	finibus	Frisiorum	ducit,	Ann.	1.60).	Their	faithful	status	as	Roman	allies	during	that	time	explains	why	they	were	not	amongst	those	tribes	obliterated	by	Germanicus.	Similarly,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	this	long-standing	entanglement	with	Rome,	despite	their	lapse	in	AD28,	explains	why	Corbulo	in	AD47	does	not	subject	them	to	a	Germanicus-style	genocide.	These	people	are,	for	better	or	for	worse,	part	of	the	Roman	Empire.	340id	aliis	quoque	nationibus	arduum	apud	Germanos	difficilius	tolerabatur,	quis	
ingentium	beluarum	feraces	saltus,	modica	domi	armenta	sunt,	Ann.	4.72.	
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violence,	 as	 Apronius	 did.	 The	 general	 is	 instituting	 a	 stable	 political	 system	along	 Roman	 Republican	 lines	 in	 an	 area	 empty	 of	 previous	 associations	 and	power	 structures	 (at	 least,	Tacitus	does	not	 explicitly	 say	 so,	 but	 it	 seems	 the	likeliest	 explanation	 for	 the	 spatial	 change	 which	 accompanies	 the	 societal	change).					The	passage	paints	a	picture	of	an	imperial	general,	in	a	Republican	tradition341,	setting	up	a	Republic	on	the	periphery	of	the	empire,	and	whom	Tacitus	records	as	 having	 expressed	 longing,	 upon	 his	 recall	 by	 Claudius,	 for	 the	 freedom	 of	action	granted	to	generals	of	the	Republic	(beatos	quondam	duces	Romanos,	Ann.	11.20).	 It	 is	 indeed	 the	 scope	 and	extent	 of	 his	 actions	 in	Germany	 (proactive,	
novam	vim,	 instead	of	 reactive	once	Gannascus	 is	 killed	 and	 the	Frisii	 settled)	which	compels	Claudius	to	recall	Corbulo	(Ann.	11.19),	as	Tiberius	had	recalled	Germanicus.	But	the	nature	of	his	actions	among	the	Frisii	is	exceptional	among	imperial	generals,	even	those	who	formed	part	of	the	dynasty.	As	we	saw	in	the	previous	 chapter,	 Germanicus’	 proactivity	 was	 focused	 on	 repression,	 to	 the	point	 of	 genocide,	 and	 resulted	 in	 trophies	 modelled	 after	 Augustus’	 at	 La	Turbie	both	in	proclaiming	this	repression	and	in	prominently	bearing	the	name	of	Augustus’	successor	Tiberius	(Ann.	2.18	and	2.22).	Corbulo	does	not	crush	the	Frisii	with	his	army	and	commemorate	the	feat	with	a	trophy,	but	tries	to	bring	into	 being	 among	 them	 a	 rule	 of	 law	 (leges)	 and	 collective	 decision-making	(senatus)	which	is	outdated	at	the	imperial	centre	in	the	politics	of	Rome,	which	monopolises	power	as	it	has	monopolised	military	glory.342			The	passage	suggests	that	Corbulo	thought	the	old	Roman	values,	upheld	almost	exclusively	 by	 himself	 alone	 among	 imperial	 Roman	 generals,	 might	 still	 be	present,	 or	 potentially	 achievable,	 on	 the	 periphery	 among	 free	 non-Romans.	Other	passages	 in	Tacitus	allow	similar	readings	of	barbarians	as	old	Romans.	
																																																								341Ann.	11.18	veteram	ad	morem	reduxit	refers	to	‘the	old-fashioned	ways’.	It	is	also	known	of	Corbulo	that	he	had	encouraged	his	posthumous	presentation	as	such	by	modeling	himself	in	his	memoirs	after	one	of	the	last	great	generals	of	the	Republic,	Lucullus;	see	Ash	(2006),	356.	342Triumphs	had	long	been	restricted	to	members	of	the	imperial	family	at	this	point;	Sidebottom	(2005),	319.	
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Katherine	Clarke	read	Calgacus’	Caledonians	in	the	Agricola	as	such343,	and	the	Batavi	 of	 the	 Histories	 or	 the	 Cherusci	 of	 Annals	 11	 also	 portray	 barbarians	choosing	 violent	 insurrection	 as	 the	 only	 appropriate	 response	 to	 tyranny,	whether	of	Romans	or	 their	own	countrymen.	All	 these	had	made	attempts	 to	push	back	against	unacceptable	threats	to	whatever	conception	of	libertas	they	felt	 they	 had	 left.	 The	 Frisii	 themselves	 had	 shown	 a	 decade	 earlier	 under	Olennius	that	they	would	not	indefinitely	tolerate	infractions	of	their	libertas;	in	this	 regard	at	 least,	 they	appear	 suitable	 candidates	 to	become	Corbulo’s	new	Roman	Republicans.	 Equipping	 them	 still	 further	 to	 take	 on	 this	 role,	 Tacitus	reported	 that	 even	 at	 the	 time	 of	 their	 rebellion	 in	 AD28	 they	 had	 not	 been	opposed	 to	 their	 involvement	 with	 the	 Roman	 Empire	 per	 se:	 pacem	 exuere,	
nostra	magis	avaritia	quam	obsequii	impatientes	(Ann.	4.72).			But	just	as	the	Caledonians	were	mistaken	in	thinking	themselves	too	remote	to	be	reeled	into	the	destructive	expansion	of	imperial	space,	and	the	supposedly	
libertas-loving	Cherusci	only	managed	to	oust	the	Romanised	Italicus	once	but	not	 twice	 before	 being	 enslaved	 by	 his	 autocratic	 rule,	 Corbulo’s	 Republican	experiment	with	the	Frisii	fails.	The	tribe	ups	sticks	in	AD58	during	the	reign	of	Nero	 (Ann.	13.54),	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 constraint	 of	 military	 force	 is	 removed.344	Their	abandonment	of	Corbulo’s	miniature	Republic	highlights	a	mismatch.	The	Republic	 cannot	 be	 brought	 into	 being	 under	 the	 empire,	 not	 even	 with	Germans	 since	 the	 imperial	 context	of	 its	 genesis,	 as	with	 Italicus’	 investiture,	infects	 the	 Republic.	 The	 maintenance	 of	 the	 Frisian	 Republic	 depended	 on	Corbulo’s	 threat	 of	 violence	 –	 ac	 ne	 iussa	 exuerent	 praesidium	 immunivit	 –	 a	practice	 which	 in	 itself	 looks	 suspiciously	 imperial.	 His	 military	 activity	 in	Germany	 followed	 this	 same	 pattern	 of	 initial	 Republican	 success	 where	(Germanicus’)	imperial	management	failed,	but	which	then	proves	to	be	short-																																																								343See	Clarke	(2001),	106-9,	including	the	creation	and	simultaneous	problematisation	of	this	image	by	Tacitus.	344Corbulo	himself	had	already	been	ordered	back	to	the	Gallic	bank	of	the	Rhine	(cis	
Rhenum,	Ann.	11.19)	by	Claudius	at	the	end	of	AD47.	By	AD58,	Tacitus	makes	clear,	local	generals	preferred	to	get	their	triumphs	through	peaceful	government	in	Germany	rather	than	through	military	action	(pervulgatis	triumphi	insignibus	maius	ex	
eo	decus	sperabant	si	pacem	continuavissent,	Ann.	13.53).	This	situation	gave	rise	to	a	rumour	that	they	were	actively	forbidden	from	engaging	in	battle	with	German	tribes,	and	on	the	basis	of	this	rumour	(eoque,	Ann.	13.54),	the	Frisii	leave.	
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lived	and	unsustainable:	Corbulo	conquers	Germany	no	more	than	Germanicus	did.		 	Having	 oscillated	 between	 libertas-loving	 Germans	 in	 Annals	 4	 and	 then	tentative	Republicans	in	Annals	11,	the	migrating	Frisii	in	their	final	appearance	in	Annals	13	look	most	like	the	Germans	of	the	Germania	as	discussed	in	chapter	six.	Tacitus	does	not	ventriloquise	a	native	perspective	on	the	attempted	change	of	 habitation.	 Their	 unexplained	 move	 instead	 resembles	 the	 world	 of	 the	
Germania	in	which	topographical	fixity	does	not	apply.	When	the	Frisii	are	first	mentioned	in	the	narrative	(Ann.	4.72)	they	are	 introduced	as	a	transrhenanus	
populus	 (residence	 across	 the	 Rhine	 being,	 by	 and	 large,	 a	 marker	 of	Germanness345).	 Their	 migration	 away	 from	 the	 Corbulonian	 settlement	 thus	shows	that	neither	their	subjection	to	Rome	nor	Corbulo’s	attempt	to	transform	them	 into	 Republican	 Romans	 have	 affected	 their	 essentially	 German	 nature.	The	 final	 part	 of	 their	 narrative	 deals	 with	 their	 subsequent	 occupation	 of	
agrosque	vacuos	et	militum	usui	sepositos	(Ann.	13.54),	their	appeal	to	Nero	to	be	allowed	 to	 stay,	 and	 their	 forcible	 removal	 when	 they	 refuse	 to	 leave	 as	instructed.	 The	 description	 of	 their	 brief	 sojourn	 is	 full	 of	 paradoxes	 that	undermine	the	idea	of	past,	present,	or	future	fixity	for	the	essentially	German	Frisii:	 first,	utque	patrium	solum	exercebant,	 ‘they	started	 to	 till	 the	soil	as	 if	 it	were	 that	 of	 their	 forefathers’	 mocks	 the	 ease	 with	 which	 they	 effect	 such	migrations;	secondly,	the	governor	Duvius	Avitus’	recommendation	for	them	to	return	 veteres	 in	 locos	 highlights	 the	 difficulty	 of	 sending	 the	 Frisii	 back	 to	where	 they	 came	 from	 (would	 that	 be	 the	 lands	 they	 settled	 under	 Corbulo’s	direction,	 or	 the	 territory	 before	 that?);	 finally,	 Avitus’	 alternative	recommendation	 to	 ask	 Caesar	 for	 a	 novam	 sedem	 is	 almost	 casual	 in	 its	suggestion	 that	 one	 more	 move	 could	 easily	 be	 accommodated	 by	 the	 tribe.	Framed	 as	 they	 are	 as	 perpetually	 fluid	 in	 their	 movements	 on	 the	 Empire’s	German	periphery,	the	Frisii’s	massacre	by	Rome	upon	their	refusal	to	leave	the	Roman	military	 lands	 they	 had	 occupied346	is	 then	 a	 variation	 on	 the	 identity																																																									345Chapter	six	shows	the	Germania	allows	some	exceptions	to	this	rule.	346Nero…	Frisios	decedere	agris	iussit.	Illis	aspernantibus	auxiliaris	eques	repente	
immissus	necessitate	attulit,	captis	caesisve	qui	pervicacius	restiterant,	Ann.	13.54.	
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theme	 foregrounded	 by	 Germanicus’	 massacre	 of	 the	 Marsi.	 In	 both	 cases,	Roman	identity	and	control	are	asserted	through	violence	over	a	fundamentally	different	(German)	subject	which	does	not	conform	to	the	imperial	map	and	the	imperialist	project.	
The	Ampsivarii’s	migration	If	 the	 Germania	 and	 the	 tale	 of	 the	 Frisii	 present	 a	 fluid	 Germany	 and	 ever-moving	 Germans	 as	 incomprehensible	 subjects	 to	 Rome,	 the	migration	 of	 the	Ampsivarii	 into	 the	 territory	 just	 vacated	by	 the	Frisii	 (Ann.	13.55-6)	 is	 about	the	 German	 Boiocalus’	 failure	 to	 understand	 the	 Roman	 world	 order	 of	emplacement	 and	 fixity.	 Though	 the	 sequence	 of	 events	 is	 identical	 to	 that	undergone	by	the	Frisii	(occupation,	order	to	leave,	appeal,	refusal,	destruction),	this	time	Tacitus	ventriloquises	–	through	Boiocalus	–	the	German	perspective	which	was	 lacking	 in	 the	Frisian	episode.	The	discussion	allows	Tacitus	 to	not	only	 reflect	 the	 complex	 layers	 of	 history	 and	 occupation	 in	 this	 overlapping	frontier	 zone	between	a	 fluid	Germany	and	Roman	military	 space,	 but	 also	 to	bring	out	the	irrelevance	of	either	logic	or	sentiment	in	the	face	of	power.		After	being	told,	as	the	Frisii	were,	to	remove	the	tribe	from	the	Roman	military	land	they	had	occupied,	 their	chief	Boiocalus	makes	an	 impassioned	speech	to	the	Roman	commander	Duvius	Avitus347:		
vinctum	 se	 rebellione	 Cherusca	 iussu	 Arminii	 referens,	 mox	 Tiberio	 et	
Germanico	ducibus	 stipendia	meruisse,	 et	 quinquaginta	annorum	obsequio	
id	 quoque	 adiungere,	 quod	 gentem	 suam	 dicioni	 nostrae	 subiceret.	 quo	
tantam	partem	campi	iacere,	in	quam	pecora	et	armenta	militum	aliquando	
transmitterentur?	servarent	sane	receptus	gregibus	 inter	hominum	famem,	
modo	 ne	 vastitatem	 et	 solitudinem	 mallent	 quam	 amicos	 populos.	
Chamavorum	 quondam	 ea	 arva,	 mox	 Tubantum	 et	 post	 Vsiporum	 fuisse.	
sicuti	 caelum	deis,	 ita	 terras	generi	mortalium	datas;	quaeque	vacuae,	 eas	
publicas	 esse.	 solum	 inde	 suspiciens	 et	 cetera	 sidera	 vocans	 quasi	 coram	
interrogabat	 vellentne	 contueri	 inane	 solum:	 potius	 mare	 superfunderent	
adversus	terrarum	ereptores.	
Ann.	13.55																																																										347	The	Oxford	Classical	Text	records	Dubius	rather	than	Duvius,	but	CIL	4.3340,		which	attestests	his	suffect	consulship	of	AD56,	has	Duvius.	
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‘relating	how	he	had	been	imprisoned	during	the	Cheruscan	rebellion	on	the	orders	of	Arminius,	had	then	accrued	years	of	service	under	the	generalship	of	Tiberius	and	Germanicus,	and	to	fifty	years	of	obedience	to	Rome	he	would	like	to	add	this,	that	he	could	place	his	people	under	our	jurisdiction.	To	what	purpose	did	such	a	parcel	of	land	lie	empty,	into	which	cattle	and	beasts	of	burden	would	occasionally	be	transferred?	By	all	means	let	them	reserve	room	for	the	herds	during	times	of	hunger	for	human	beings,	only	let	them	not	prefer	wasteland	and	emptiness	over	friendly	tribes.	These	fields	were	once	those	of	the	Chamavi,	then	of	the	Tubantes	and	after	that	the	Usipi.	Just	as	the	sky	was	given	to	the	gods,	so	the	earth	was	given	to	the	race	of	mortals;	lands	which	are	empty	are	public	property.	Then,	looking	up	to	the	sun	and	calling	on	the	other	stars	he	asked	them	as	if	face	to	face	whether	it	was	their	will	to	look	out	upon	unused	soil.	If	so,	they	should	pour	out	the	sea	over	these	lands,	to	thwart	anyone	who	might	otherwise	take	them!’		A	 major	 function	 of	 the	 episode	 and	 the	 speech	 is	 to	 jointly	 establish	 a	
Germania-like	 picture	 of	 a	 fluid	 Germany	 with	 no	 fixed	 boundaries	 and	continual	migration.	The	episode’s	 first	sentence	described	 the	 tribe	as	pulsi	a	
Chaucis,	 ‘driven	 from	 their	 homes	 by	 the	 Chauci’.	 In	 this	 speech	 Boiocalus	asserts	that	the	contested	lands	they	then	occupy	had	a	rich	history	of	changing	(German)	 occupation	 (Chamavorum	 quondam	 ea	 arva,	 mox	 Tubantum	 et	 post	
Vsiporum	fuisse).	The	reader	recollects	that	the	Frisii	had	occupied	these	lands	between	the	Usipi’s	departure	and	the	Ampsivarii’s	arrival,	and	may	have	read	the	 Germania	 with	 its	 stress	 on	 the	 fluidity	 of	 an	 ungraspable	 Germany.	Boiocalus’	 claim	 that	 change	 is	 normal	 in	 Germany,	 and	 therefore	 the	Ampsivarii’s	 occupation	 of	 this	 territory	 fitting,	 is	 therefore	 bolstered	 by	 the	Tacitean	 narrative	 outside	 the	 speech,	 even	 outside	 the	work.	 This	 consistent	representation	makes	Rome	 and	 its	 desire	 for	 fixing	 the	 territory	 under	 their	rule	 forever	 the	anomaly.	Boiocalus’	 speech	naïvely	aims	 to	convince	Rome	 to	fall	in	with	this	conception	of	a	German	space	which	they	want	to	treat	as	fixed.		Alongside	disputing	 the	ethics	of	Rome’s	possession	of	 the	 land,	Boiocalus	also	disputes	the	ethics	of	Rome’s	use	of	the	land.	He	sees	no	function	for	emptiness	–	which	he	stresses	repeatedly,	 successively	calling	 it	vastitas,	solitudo,	vacuae	
[terrae]	and	inane	solum	–	especially	in	the	face	of	his	people’s	urgent	need	for	shelter	 and	 food	 (ne	 vastitatem	 et	 solitudinem	mallent	 quam	 amicos	 populos).	Here	again	he	opposes	his	German	perspective,	which	asserts	a	natural	right	to	
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put	 to	 use	 fallow	 land	 (quaequae	 vacuae	 eas	 publicas	 esse),	 to	 the	 Roman	perspective,	which	considers	this	land	‘in	use’	once	it	is	claimed	by	Rome,	even	if	 it	 is	not	being	worked.	Boiocalus’	speech	does	not	acknowledge	the	value	to	Rome	of	a	clear	strip	of	territory	in	terms	of	security	and	surveillance,	as	well	as	the	 serious	 power	 projected	 by	 the	 ability	 to	 clear	 such	 territory	 and	 control	access	 to	 it.348	The	 emptiness	 of	 the	 land	 is	 as	 much	 a	 fortification,	 a	 spatial	measure	 of	 power,	 as	 a	 dug	 encampment.	 The	 rebel	 Calgacus	 in	 the	Agricola	perceived	 this	 clearly	when	he	 equated	 the	 solitudo	which	Rome	 creates	with	
pax.349	Boiocalus’	 blindness	 to	 this	 fact	 is	 markedly	 selective	 given	 his	 own	acknowledged	 implication	 in	 rolling	 out	Roman	military	 subjection	 elsewhere	(Tiberio,	Germanico	ducibus	stipendia	meruisse).			He	even	draws	on	this	past	complicity	 in	Roman	 imperialism	as	a	 justification	for	the	tribe’s	settlement	in	these	lands	reserved	for	military	(imperialistic)	use.	In	reminding	Rome	of	his	past	service	in	loyalty	in	the	same	speech	in	which	he	claims	 Roman	 territory,	 Boiocalus	 is	 essentially	 proposing	 an	 exchange	 to	Avitus	(of	land	for	past	service)	instead	of	deferring	fully	to	Rome’s	authority	in	deciding	how	to	dispose	of	their	territory.	His	mistake	lies	not	in	his	assumption	that	such	exchanges	could	be	made,	as	they	could	and	were350,	but	 in	thinking	that	 they	 could	 be	 enforced,	 or	 anticipated.	 This	 is	 a	 third	 way	 in	 which	 his	speech	 demonstrates	 this	 German’s	 failure	 to	 understand	 the	 Roman	perspective.		
																																																								348Potter	(1992),	273.	349Agr.	30.5:	Auferre	trucidare	rapere	falsis	nominibus	imperium,	atque	ubi	solitudinem	
faciunt,	pacem	appellant.	350Indeed,	a	personal	bargain	of	that	nature	is	offered	him	by	Avitus	(ipsi	Boiocalo	ob	
memoriam	amicitiae	daturum	agros,	Ann.	13.56).	At	Ann.	13.54	Verritus	and	Malorix	are	granted	citizenship	by	Nero,	and	at	Ann.	1.59	Segestes	accepts	settlement	for	himself	in	
vetere	provincia,	and	his	relatives	are	offered	incolumitatem.	Such	benefits	could	be	extended	to	entire	communities,	e.g.	Aphrodisias	in	the	province	of	Asia	for	its	resistance	of	Mithridates	in	88BC	and	Caesar’s	murderers,	or	the	Batavi’s	exemption	from	tax	in	favour	of	contributing	soldiers	and	arms	(Hist.	4.17.11	tributorum	expertis;	
Ger.	29.1	exempti	oneribus	et	conlationibus	et	tantum	in	usum	proeliorum	sepositi,	velut	
tela	atque	arma,	bellis	reservantur)	though	see	Haynes	(2013),	112-6	for	the	view	that	such	a	‘special’	arrangement	was	not	always	less	burdensome	than	paying	tribute.	
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Duvius	 Avitus	 in	 his	 response	 responds	 to	 none	 of	 these	 three	 arguments	concerning	the	essence	of	Germany,	the	ethics	of	specific	uses	of	the	land,	or	the	proper	reward	of	provincials’	service	to	Rome.	Instead,	he	asserts	only	power:			
patienda	meliorum	imperia;	 id	dis	quos	implorarent	placitum,	ut	arbitrium	
penes	 Romanos	 maneret	 quid	 darent	 quid	 adimerent,	 neque	 alios	 iudices	
quam	se	ipsos	paterentur.	
Ann.	13.56	‘That	government	by	one’s	betters	must	simply	be	tolerated;	that	it	had	pleased	the	gods	whom	they	were	beseeching	that	the	final	judgment	would	rest	with	the	Romans	as	to	what	they	could	give	or	take	away,	and	that	they	would	not	tolerate	any	other	arbiters	than	themselves.’		Duvius	Avitus’	absence	of	engagement	with	any	of	the	arguments	advanced	by	his	 rhetorical	 opponent	 prevents	 the	 exchange	 of	 speech	 from	 becoming	 a	rhetorical	agōn.351	In	such	a	point-by-point	exchange	between	equals,	 the	best	argument	would	win,	 and	 Boiocalus’	 side	 is	 articulated	with	 compelling	 logic	and	 powerful	 sentiment	 (indeed,	 even	 Avitus	 is	 emotionally	 affected:	 Et	
commotus	his	Avitus,	Ann.	13.56).	 The	Roman	 general’s	 refusal	 to	 engage	 thus	takes	the	issue	out	of	the	realm	of	ethics,	logic	or	emotion	and	frames	it	simply	as	 an	 issue	 of	 power.	 Like	 the	 senators	 at	 Rome	 treading	 carefully	 during	Tiberius’	accession	debate	whilst	 the	younger	Drusus	 is	already	on	his	way	 to	Pannonia	 in	 loco	principis,	 Boiocalus’	 exchange	with	Avitus	 serves	 to	highlight	the	futility	of	words	in	situations	where	the	power	balance	is	unequal.	The	truth	is	that	in	this	particular	area,	Rome	can	enforce	compliance	with	its	imperialist	emplacement	 and	 containment	 and	 therefore	 will.	 The	 land’s	 emptiness	 may	even	be	the	crucial	 factor	 in	their	ability	to	do	so,	 judging	by	the	practical	and	emotional	 difficulties	 posed	 by	 the	 German	 forests	 in	 other	 passages	 of	 the	
Annals	and	Histories,	and	the	fluidity	of	its	occupants	in	the	populated	Germany	of	 the	 Germania.	 The	 German	 Boiocalus’	 failure	 to	 understand	 the	 Roman	imperial	view	of	this	particular	land	dispute	but	also	the	realities	of	power	more	generally	 is	 as	 overwhelming	 here	 as	 Tacitus’	 incomprehension	 of	 Germany’s	fluidity	in	the	Germania.																																																									351Though	both	Boiocalus	and	Avitus	make	reference	to	the	gods	as	arbiters,	Haynes	(2003,	170-1)	notes	that	once	again	Boiocalus	misunderstands	the	Roman	position,	which	was	that	the	gods	had	outsourced	their	arbitrium	to	the	Romans.	
		 199	
Conclusion	Each	of	the	‘smaller’	German	revolts	and	conflicts	in	the	Annals	discussed	in	this	chapter	 contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 Tacitean	 historical	 and	 political	thought.	Depicting	the	deployment	of	 imperial	power	in	Germany	as	a	process	involving	people,	place	and	power,	his	narratives	show	how	Rome’s	power	can	be	occasionally	and	 temporarily	 constrained	and	resisted	on	 the	west	bank	of	the	Rhine,	but	ultimately	wins.		In	 section	 one,	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir’s	 discourse	 on	 Roman	 rapacity	 and	subsequent	revolt	connected	them	to	the	Batavian	rebels	and	Roman	mutineers	who	 suffer	 under	 the	 systematic	 oppression	 of	 imperial	 power.	 The	 spatial	dynamics	of	the	passage,	through	links	to	Sallust’s	Bellum	Catilinae,	develop	the	theme	of	how	spatial	structures	create,	uphold	and	enable	ideological	positions.	Such	 themes	 are	 also	 prominent	 in	 Tacitus’	 account	 of	 the	 Batavian	 revolt,	discussed	 in	 chapters	 one	 and	 two.	 Collectively,	 they	 show	 that	 power	 can	follow	resistance	even	into	these	rural	and	disordered	spaces,	and	overcome	it.	Florus	commits	suicide	in	the	Ardennes	forest.			Section	two	showed	that	the	fluctuating	and	complicated	fates	of	the	Romano-Cheruscan	 king	 Italicus	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	 a	hybrid	 ruler	 in	 a	 German	 kingdom.	 But	 they	 even	more	 strongly	 encourage	 a	Roman	 reading	 of	 his	 accession,	 deposition	 and	 reinvestiture.	 By	 replaying	Rome’s	own	evolution	from	one-time	defenders	of	libertas	to	ultimate	imperial	slaves	unable	 to	resist	regnum,	 the	 limits	of	resistance	more	than	the	 limits	of	power	are	revealed.	The	bad	ruler	Italicus	wins	the	day	and,	in	Tacitus’	words,	goes	on	to	plague	his	tribe	for	many	years	to	come.	Rather	than	mirroring	Rome	for	 allegorical	 purposes,	 however,	 the	 episode’s	 unfolding	 of	 the	 pattern	 of	tyranny	 inviting	pushback	shows	the	universal	nature	of	 this	dynamic,	as	well	as	the	inevitable	triumph	of	imperial	(or	regal)	autocratic	power.		Section	three	showed	Corbulo	mastering	the	same	landscapes	of	Germany	more	successfully	than	Germanicus	did	in	the	Annals.	With	such	pointed	contrasts	to	these	earlier	episodes,	it	suggests	that	his	predecessor’s	work	enabled	Corbulo	
		 200	
to	deploy	a	more	Germano-centric	approach	to	conquest.	Within	the	theoretical	framework	of	the	assemblage	of	factors	which	govern	events	–	a	concept	which	grants	 landscape	 its	 own	 agency	 –	 Corbulo	 has	 profited	 from	 Germanicus’	experiences	 and	 is	 thus	 more	 easily	 able	 to	 eliminate	 or	 mitigate	 different	factors.	The	brief	interlude	in	which	he	settles	the	Frisii	in	new	territory	under	a	form	 of	 Republican	 government,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 suggests	 he	 is	more	 of	 a	Republican	than	an	imperial	general.	The	Frisii	abandon	their	Republic,	showing	that	 this	 form	 of	 government	 cannot	 be	 brought	 back	 into	 being	 under	 the	principate,	not	even	among	foreigners	on	the	empire’s	periphery.	Similarly,	the	Republican	 general	 Corbulo	 successfully	 completes	 individual	 projects	 in	Germany,	but	no	more	manages	to	pacify	 the	region	than	the	 imperial	general	Germanicus	did.		Finally,	 section	 four	 showcased	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 misunderstanding,	 in	 the	Romanised	 Boiocalus’	 blindness	 to	 the	 realities	 of	 imperial	 power	 when	 it	comes	to	his	own	tribe,	despite	his	past	complicity	with	Rome	in	imposing	such	realities	of	power	on	other	tribes.			None	of	these	facets	show	flattering	portraits	of	how	empire	works,	but	all	show	the	 same	 crushing	 mechanics	 in	 operation,	 in	 different	 contexts,	 in	 different	periods,	 at	 different	 speeds.	 The	 smaller	 episodes	 provide	 us	 with	 further	quantitative	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 theory	 that	 Tacitus	 did	 not	 see	 the	 big	upheavals	of	the	Rhine	mutinies	or	the	Batavian	revolt	as	unique	in	kind,	only	in	size.	 In	providing	a	multitude	of	examples	showing	that	the	same	processes	of	power	and	resistance	took	place	on	either	side	of	the	Roman	frontier	–	for	the	‘outsider’	Cherusci	and	Ampsivarii	as	well	as	for	the	mutineers	and	the	Frisii	–	this	 chapter	 also	 argues	 against	 reading	 Tacitus	 as	 asserting	 any	 kind	 of	essentialising	 discourse	 concerning	 peoples	 and	 places.	 Neither	 citizenship	(mutineers)	 nor	 distance	 (Cherusci,	 Frisii)	 are	 any	 protection	 against	 the	endlessly	replicated	brutalities	of	Roman	imperial	power.	
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6	 Germania		
Introduction	The	 work	 which	 we	 commonly	 abbreviate	 as	 the	 Germania 352 	is	 a	 rare	monograph	 in	 a	 recognised	 tradition	 of	 ancient	 ethnography.	 Ethnography	commonly	 found	 expression	 in	 digressions	 across	 all	 genres,	 from	 poetry	 to	historiography,	 and	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 genre	 in	 and	 of	 itself.353	However,	certain	 categories	 of	 description	were	 commonly	 associated	with	 this	 type	 of	enquiry,	 such	 as	 geography,	 climate,	 agricultural	 produce,	 habitation	 and	cultural	habits	of	different	peoples.	All	these	are	present	in	the	Tacitean	text.		Nevertheless,	 scholars	 have	 argued	 plausibly	 for	 several	 Tacitean	 deviations	from	 the	 norm	 (or	 innovations)	within	 the	work,	which	 indicate	 the	 author’s	desire	 to	 go	 beyond	 mere	 factual	 instruction	 on	 a	 fascinating	 foreign	 land.	O’Gorman	 read	 the	 virtuous	 Germans	 in	 it	 as	 a	 mirror	 for	 Roman	 corrupt	morality,	 and	 its	 construction	 and	 transmission	 of	 details	 as	 a	 Roman	 act	 of	appropriation	 (only	 partially	 successful)	 of	 this	 territory.	 Timpe	 developed	similar	 interpretations	 of	 the	monograph	 as	 a	 record	 of	 both	 Roman	 foil	 and	Roman	moral	failure.	Thomas	discussed	how	the	deceptively	innocent	historical	digressions	 within	 the	 work	 warn	 that	 the	 internal	 stability	 of	 the	 empire	 is	closely	 tied	to	 the	success	of	German	conquest.	Most	recently,	Tan	highlighted	how	the	Germania’s	geographical	journey	through	Germany	persistently	closes																																																									352Rives	 (1999),	 99	 points	 out	 that	we	 cannot	 be	 entirely	 certain	 that	 the	 commonly	accepted	title	De	origine	et	situ	Germanorum	was	the	one	given	to	it	by	Tacitus,	though	the	MS	tradition	is	fairly	uniform	in	adopting	it.	353See	 Almagor	 and	 Skinner	 (2015),	 2–3	 for	 a	 brief	 discussion	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	defining	the	term.	Woolf	(2015),	134–35	asserts	forcefully	that	‘ethnography	was	not	a	discipline’	and	hence	talks	about	ethnographical	 ‘discourse’	and	 ‘enquiry’,	and	argued	against	 ‘extreme	 culturally	 constructionist	 readings	 of	 ancient	 ethnography’	 in	 an	earlier	piece	(Woolf	2009,	210–15);	Timpe	(2007),	421	talks	about	a	 ‘formal	tradition	of	ethnography	 in	antiquity’	but	does	not	argue	 for	an	 independent	genre,	noting	 the	
Germania’s	unique	status	as	a	monograph	devoted	to	the	purpose	amidst	a	sea	of	much	more	 common	ethnographical	excursus	 in	 historiographical	works.	O’Gorman	 (1993),	136	follows	him,	talking	of	a	‘survey	of	the	country	as	a	whole,	following	the	tradition	of	ethnographical	 and	 geographical	 writing’	 but	 other	 recent	 works	 such	 as	 Thomas	(2009),	61	and	Rives	(2012),	48	talk	of	ethnography	as	a	formal	genre.	
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it	 off	 to	 both	 intellectual	 comprehension	 and	 future	 imperialism,	 instead	 of	laying	it	open	to	them	as	the	ethnographical	mode	of	enquiry	and	exposition	is	supposedly	meant	to	do.			This	brief	overview	illustrates	the	two	dominant	modes	of	interpretation	within	the	 scholarship:	Germania	as	 a	 commentary	 on	Tacitus’	 contemporary	Roman	society	 and	Germania	as	 a	 commentary	 on	 late	 first	 century,	 but	 also	 earlier,	Roman	imperialism.	Under	the	latter	umbrella,	the	scholarship	unites	positions	that	 see	 in	 the	 text	 a	 judgment	 on	 past	 activity	 and	 policy	 as	 well	 as	 a	recommendation	 for	 Rome’s	 future	 approach	 to	 the	 conquest	 –	 or	 not	 –	 of	Germany	 under	 Trajan.	 Many	 viewpoints	 acknowledge	 the	 presence	 of	 both	strands	 in	 the	 work	 simultaneously.	 That	 the	 author’s	 primary	 interest	 must	have	 lain	 elsewhere	 than	 with	 a	 straightforward	 elucidation	 of	 its	 ostensible	subject	is	supported	by	the	presence	of	demonstrable	inaccuracies	which	must	have	 been	 willfully	 included	 by	 Tacitus	 given	 his	 education	 and	 the	 glaring	extent	of	some	of	the	fallacies.354	Finally,	the	booklet’s	diminutive	size	(forty-six	chapters)	 compared	 to	 the	 twenty	 books	 of	 the	 Elder	 Pliny’s	Bella	Germaniae	also	suggests	as	much,	given	that	Tacitus	freely	acknowledges	drawing	on	this	much	more	extensive	work	in	the	Annals.355		The	 following	 chapter,	 in	 keeping	 with	 this	 thesis’	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	between	 people,	 the	 places	 they	 find	 themselves	 in,	 and	 power,	 will	 work	largely	within	 the	 framework	of	 the	second	mode.	 I	 argue	 that	 several	 textual																																																									354Tan	 (2014),	183–88	and	193	on	 the	Helvetii	 and	Boii's	migration	at	 the	end	of	 the	second	century	BC,	which	would	certainly	have	been	known	to	Tacitus.	Morgan	(1983),	100	and	103	remarks	in	general	terms	on	the	omission	of	material	definitely	known	in	Tacitus’	day,	as	does	Timpe	(2007,	427).	Rives	(2002),	173	has	been	the	lone	voice	in	the	desert,	 seeing	 ‘strong	evidence	 that	 the	Germania	[also]	 reflects	 its	 contemporary	context	 in	 sometimes	 striking	 ways’.	 Deliberate	 departure	 from	 known	 or	 accepted	truths	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 proving	 a	 point	 occurred	 in	 other	 ethnographical	 work	 too:	Sallmann	(1987,	116–17)	notes	a	similarly	partisan	discrepancy	between	Pliny’s	report	on	the	Chauci	as	a	misera	gens	(NH	16.2)	and	the	contemporary	tradition	on	the	Chauci	in	other	authors,	including	Tacitus’	Germania	35.	355See	Ann.	1.69	tradit	C.	Plinius	Germanicorum	bellorum	scriptor,	stetisse	apud	
principium	ponti	laudes	et	grates	reversis	legionibus	habentem	[Agrippinam].	The	relationship	of	Pliny’s	work	to	the	Germania	is	less	clear	and	more	disputed:	Dorey	(1969),	13	discusses	examples	of	the	relationship	but	also	its	limits;	Rives	(2012),	49	dismisses	the	idea	of	any	significant	relationship.	
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strategies	 in	 the	Germania	conspire	 to	represent	 the	 impossibility	of	 imposing	an	 imperial	 geography	 on	 Germany,	 both	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 secure	 physical	conquest	and	of	intellectual	containment.	The	three	main	strategies	colluding	to	depict	 this	 are	 the	 pervasive	 attestations	 of	 migrations	 within	 the	 work	 –	 a	thematic	strand	which	has	not	received	much	attention	in	the	scholarship356	–,	the	 work’s	 erratic	 engagement	 with	 the	 past	 (Rome’s,	 Germany’s,	 and	 their	intersection),	 and	 the	 suppression	 of	 accounts	 of	 Rome’s	 partial	 success	 at	imposing	an	imperialist	geography	on	parts	of	Germany.		
Germans	do	not	stay	put	Conquering	Germany	would	 require	 the	 subjugation	 of	 its	 population	 and	 the	mastery	of	its	landscape,	and	then	keeping	the	conquered	people	tethered	to	the	conquered	land	in	accordance	with	the	conqueror’s	will.	The	Germans’	constant	moving	about	in	the	text	contributes	to	the	text’s	construction	of	Germany	as	a	place	where	the	process	of	imposing	an	imperial	spatial	order	is	impossible.			Although	Tacitus	only	draws	attention	to	migrations	on	one	occasion	and	only	in	 one	 direction	 (Ger.	 27.2’s	 …	 quaeque	 nationes	 e	 Germania	 in	 Gallias	
commigraverint	expediam),	the	work	in	fact	sets	up	four	different	categories	of	migrations.	 The	 first	 migrations	 occur	 as	 early	 as	 the	 second	 chapter.	 This	begins	with	 Tacitus	 asserting	 autochthony	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Germans,	 because	Germany’s	geography	prohibits	easy	access	for	anyone	not	already	from	there.	But	within	this	framework	of	autochthony	migration	did	occur:		
Ipsos	 Germanos	 indigenas	 crediderim	 minimeque	 aliarum	 gentium	
adventibus	 et	 hospitiis	 mixtos,	 quia	 nec	 terra	 olim,	 sed	 classibus	
advehebantur	 qui	 mutare	 sedes	 quaerebant,	 et	 inmensus	 ultra	 utque	 sic	
dixerim	adversus	Oceanus	raris	ab	orbe	nostro	navibus	aditur.	
Ger.	2.1																																																									356Though	many	outline	the	work’s	dual	structure	and	summarise	the	purport	of	both	halves,	 the	 third	 of	 Tacitus’	 advertised	 aims	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 part	 two,	 quaeque	
nationes	 e	 Germania	 in	 Gallias	 commigraverint	 [expediam],	 is	 often	 entirely	 omitted	from	 the	 summary;	 see	 O’Gorman	 (1993),	 136	 and	 Thomas	 (2009),	 60	 despite	reproducing	the	quotation	of	which	this	forms	a	part	in	full	on	p.	62.	Sallmann	(1987),	124	comments	on	the	difficult	‘classification	of	those	tribes	who,	since	Caesar's	epoch,	engaged	in	restless	raids	and	wanderings	in	the	Rhine-lands’	but	without	reference	to	any	classical	texts.	
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	‘I	tend	to	believe	the	Germans	indigenous	and	barely	affected	in	their	ethnic	make-up	by	either	invasions	or	cordial	relations	with	other	peoples,	because	back	in	the	day	those	who	sought	to	change	their	habitation	did	not	approach	it	over	land	but	by	means	of	ships,	and	the	immeasurable	and	hostile,	as	I	have	said,	Ocean	beyond	it	is	only	rarely	sailed	by	vessels	from	our	shores.’		As	 the	Germania	 proceeds,	 further	 examples	 of	 internal	migration	 are	 added.	After	 introducing	the	Boii	as	Gallic	 immigrants	to	Germany,	Tacitus	goes	on	to	mention	 that	 the	place	where	 they	settled	and	to	which	 they	gave	 their	name,	Boihaemum,	 is	no	 longer	occupied	by	them	(mutatis	cultoribus,	Ger.	28.2).	The	name	 of	 the	 new	 tribe	 is	 not	 given357,	 so	we	 cannot	 speculate	 on	where	 they	came	from.	The	new	destination	of	the	Boii	is	also	lacking,	but	inscriptions	from	the	second	century	AD	attest	to	the	their	presence	in	the	Agri	Decumates.358	The	
Germania	 classifies	 this	 territory	 as	 part	 of	 Germany	 (though	 it	 refuses	 to	categorise	 as	 Germans	 the	 Gallic	 immigrants	whom	 it	 acknowledges	 as	 living	there	 in	 the	 first	 century	 AD)359 ,	 making	 the	 Boii’s	 migration	 a	 case	 of	movement	internal	to	Germany.		A	little	later	on,	at	Ger.	33.1,	Tacitus	describes	yet	another	such	internal	German	migration,	of	the	Chamavi	and	Angrivarii	into	what	was	 formerly	 the	 territory	 of	 the	Bructeri	 (Iuxta	Tencteros	Bructeri	olim	
occurrebant;	nunc	Chamavos	et	Angrivarios	immigrasse	narratur).			
Ger.	 2,	 which	 started	 with	 migration,	 also	 ends	 with	 migration;	 this	 time,	however,	from	Germany	into	Gaul	instead	of	internally.	He	describes	the	Tungri	as	qui	primi	Rhenum	transgressi	Gallos	expulerint,	 ‘[they]	who	 first	 crossed	 the	Rhine	 and	 expelled	 the	 Gauls’	 (Ger.	 2.3).	 Further	 examples	 in	 this	 second	category	 are	 everyone	 from	 Ger.	 28.4	 to	 29.2	 (Treveri,	 Nervii,	 Vangiones,	Triboci,	 Nemetes,	 Ubii,	 Batavi	 and	 Mattiaci)	 and	 the	 Cimbri’s	 exodus	 from																																																									357Noted	 by	 Tan	 (2014),	 193	 as	 further	 proof	 of	 Tacitus’	 desire	 to	 obscure	 Roman	understanding	of	Germany	instead	of	elucidating	it.	358Hind	(1984),	187.	359Given	that	the	Boii	are	mentioned	as	Gauls	who	managed	to	make	a	life	in	Germany	because	 of	 their	 fierceness	 (the	 section	 in	 which	 they	 appear	 begins	 with	 Validiores	
olim	Gallorum	res	 fuisse	summus	auctorum	divus	 Iulius	tradit,	eoque	credibile	est	etiam	
Gallos	 in	 Germaniam	 transgressos,	 Ger.	 28.1),	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 Tacitus	 had	 them	 in	mind	when	he	denigrated	the	lazy	Gallic	occupants	of	the	Agri	Decumates	a	little	 later	(levissimus	quisque	Gallorum,	Ger.	29.3).	
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(probably)	 Jutland360	all	 the	way	down	to	Provence	which	 is	alluded	 to	at	Ger.	37.1.		But	Ger.	28,	 full	of	examples	of	German	migration	 into	Gaul,	also	establishes	a	third	category,	of	those	who	had	moved	in	the	opposite	direction,	from	Gaul	into	Germany:			 …	 credibile	 est	 etiam	 Gallos	 in	 Germaniam	 transgressos:	 quantulum	 enim	
amnis	 obstabat	 quo	 minus,	 ut	 quaeque	 gens	 evaluerat,	 occuparet	
permutaretque	sedes	promiscuas	adhuc	et	nulla	regnorum	potentia	divisas?	
Igitur	 inter	 Hercyniam	 silvam	 Rhenumque	 et	 Moenum	 amnes	 Helvetii,	
ulteriora	Boii,	Gallica	utraque	gens,	tenuere.	
Ger.	28.1-2	
	‘…	 it	 is	 plausible,	 even,	 that	 Gauls	 crossed	 over	 into	 Germany;	 how	insignificant,	after	all,	 is	the	river	which	stands	in	the	way,	allowing	each	tribe,	as	it	grew,	to	occupy	and	leave	again	new	lands	which	were	still	held	in	 common	 at	 the	 time	 and	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 sequestered	 by	 any	kingdoms?	 So	 the	 Helvetii	 hold	 the	 territory	 in	 between	 the	 Hercynian	forest	 and	 the	 rivers	Rhine	and	Main,	 and	 the	Boii	 the	 further	 stretches;	both	are	Gallic	tribes.’			Immediately	after	 this,	 the	 conjunction	 sed	appears	 to	 raise	a	difficulty	within	this	category	of	migrants	from	Gaul	into	Germany:		
sed	utrum	Aravisci	 in	Pannoniam	ab	Osis	[Germanorum	natione]	an	Osi	ab	
Araviscis	in	Germaniam	commigraverint…	incertum	est	
Ger.	18.3		‘But	whether	the	Aravisci	had	migrated	into	Pannonia	away	from	the	Osi,	a	German	tribe,	or	the	Osi	into	Germania	from	the	Aravisci…	is	uncertain’																																																										360Eundem	Germaniae	sinum	proximi	Oceano	Cimbri	tenant,	with	sinus	here	meaning,	as	at	Ger.	1.1,	the	land	that	shapes	a	gulf,	analogous	to	the	looping	that	shapes	the	fold	in	a	garment,	such	a	fold	being	the	primary	meaning	of	sinus	(OLD	sinus	1,	hence	a	gulf	too,	OLD	11).	For	 the	 identification	with	 Jutland,	 see	Benario	 (1999)	and	Rives	 (1999)	ad	
loc.,	 though	Lund	1988	ad	loc.	argues	 for	a	different	 (unknown)	bay	on	 the	basis	 that	Tacitus	 would	 not	 have	 known	 of	 Jutland’s	 existence,	 which	 is	 not	 mentioned	 in	classical	literature	until	Ptolemy	in	the	2nd	century.	
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But	 in	wondering	 about	 the	 precise	 direction	 of	 the	migration,	 Tacitus	 in	 fact	establishes	a	fourth	category,	of	those	who	had	moved	in	or	out	of	Germany	to	and	 from	 somewhere	 that	was	not	 Gaul.	Whatever	 the	 answer,	 Pannonia	 and	Germany	 are	 the	 only	 two	 parameters	 mentioned.	 Then	 Tacitus	 returns	 to	 a	further	 example	 of	 the	 third	 category,	 Gallic	 migration	 into	 Germany,	 by	unnamed	 peoples	 into	 the	 transrhenane	 and	 transdanubian	 Agri	 Decumates	(Ger.	29.3):		
Non	 numeraverim	 inter	 Germaniae	 populos,	 quamquam	 trans	 Rhenum	
Danuviumque	 consederint,	 eos	 qui	 Decumates	 agros	 exercent.	 levissimus	
quisque	 Gallorum	 et	 inopia	 audax	 dubiae	 possessionis	 solum	 occupavere;	
mox	 limite	 acto	 promotisque	 praesidiis	 sinus	 imperii	 et	 pars	 provinciae	
habentur.		‘I	would	not	count	among	the	peoples	of	Germany	those	who	till	the	Agri	
Decumates,	 even	 though	 they	have	 settled	 across	 the	Rhine	 and	Danube.	All	 the	 laziest	 Gauls,	 and	 those	most	 reckless	 through	 hunger,	 occupied	land	 under	 a	 doubtful	 right	 of	 possession;	 then	 when	 the	 border	 was	drawn	 and	 the	 fortifications	 brought	 forward	 they	 were	 accepted	 as	included	in	the	empire	and	a	part	of	the	province.’		Many	of	the	migrations	discussed	above	are	shown	by	the	text	to	have	produced	knock-on	effects	of	 further	migration.	The	unnamed	Gauls	of	Ger.	2.3,	expelled	by	 the	 Tungri	 (Gallos	 expulerint),	 were	 not	 killed.	 They	 may	 therefore	 have	moved	 further	 south	within	 Gaul.	 Lund	 in	 his	 commentary	 identified	 another	likely	 such	 relocation	 in	 the	 text’s	 description	 of	 the	 Agri	 Decumates’	 Gallic	occupants.	He	 reads	occupavere	as	 a	 quasi	 legal	 term	derived	 from	 the	 actual	legal	 term	occupaticius	ager,	 of	which	 the	definition	 implies	 that	 the	 land	had	been	 voluntarily	 abandoned	 by	 the	 previous	 occupants	 prior	 to	 the	 new	occupation.361	If	Lund’s	inference	is	correct,	then	the	previous	occupants	of	the	German	 Agri	 Decumates	 had	 already	 migrated	 elsewhere	 (presumably	
																																																								361Lund	 (1985),	 343–44.	 Occupaticius	 ager	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 second	 century	 AD	grammarian	Festus	as		
Occupaticius	<ager>	.	.	.	<desertus>		
a	cultoribus	fre	.	.	.	<occupa->		
ri	coeptus	(181.41-3,	PHI	Latin	Texts	 (online),	 ‘Sexti	Pompei	Festi	De	Verborum	Significatu	Quae	
Supersunt	cum	Pauli	Epitome’,	ed.	W.	M.	Lindsay,	1913).	
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elsewhere	 in	 Germany)	 before	 the	 lazy	 Gauls	 mentioned	 in	 the	 Germania	arrived.362	
What	is	Germany,	then?	The	impression	created	is	that	the	Germans	in	the	Germania	are	constantly	on	the	move.	 On	 only	 two	 occasions	 are	 reasons	 given	 for	 the	migration:	 seditio	
domestica	 (Ger.	29.1)	 for	 the	 Batavi	 and	 inopia	 for	 the	 occupants	 of	 the	 Agri	
Decumates	who	came	from	Gaul	(Ger.	29.3).363	Leaving	obscure	the	undoubtedly	rational	motivations	 for	 the	 great	majority	 of	 tribal	migrations	 constructs	 the	internal	makeup	of	Germany	as	a	disorderly	mess:	constantly	changing,	but	with	no	 pattern	 behind	 the	 changes.	 The	 first	 way	 in	 which	 this	 messy	 internal	makeup	 prevents	 the	 imposition	 of	 a	 Roman	 imperial	 geography	 upon	 the	Germans	 is	 that	 it	 implies	 they	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 find.	 If	 they	 cannot	 be	trusted	to	stay	in	one	place,	targeted	action	becomes	difficult.	Defining	conquest	also	 becomes	 challenging	 when	 tribes	 are	 not	 easily	 linked	 to	 particular	territories:	 what	 would	 it	 mean	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 pacification	 of	 any	 part	 or	people	 of	Germany	had	been	 completed?	The	Britons	 of	 Calgacus,	 in	 contrast,	were	easy	to	find	and	easy	to	conquer:	not	only	had	they	all	assembled	in	one	place	 for	 their	 battle	 with	 Rome	 at	 Mons	 Graupius 364 ,	 but	 Tacitus’																																																									362On	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 Lund	 proposes	 the	 emendation	desertos	 instead	 of	 the	 (in	 his	view)	 corrupt	 decumates,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 is	 nowhere	 else	 attested	 and,	 if	 an	existing	 legal	term,	sits	oddly	within	the	work	(presumably	more	oddly	than	the	verb	
occupare,	which	 was	 common	 parlance	 as	 well	 as	 used	 in	 the	 legal	 sphere).	 In	 his	commentary,	he	makes	the	same	case	largely	on	the	basis	of	analogies	with	other	texts	in	which	it	is	clearer	that	the	territory	of	which	possession	is	taken	had	been	empty	or	abandoned,	 including	Hist.	4.12.1	 Batavi	…	 seditione	 domestica	 pulsi	 extrema	Gallicae	
orae	vacua	cultoribus	simulque	insulam	iuxta	sitam	occupavere.	363In	contrast,	Tacitus	makes	Petillius	Cerialis	in	the	Histories	motivate	migration	in	this	direction	 as	 always	 prompted	 by	 inopia,	 given	 the	 German	 landscape’s	 infertility:	
eadem	 semper	 causa	 Germanis	 transcendendi	 in	 Gallias,	 libido	 atque	 avaritia	 et	
mutandae	sedis	amor,	ut	relictis	paludibus	et	solitudinibus	suis	fecundissimum	hoc	solum	
vosque	ipsos	possiderent,	Hist.	4.73.17-20.	His	characterisation	of	the	landscape	here	fits	some	 of	 the	 disparaging	 Tacitean	 sententiae	about	 the	 German	 soil	 in	 the	Germania,	though	 this	 judgment	 is	 not	 consistently	 applied	 throughout	 the	 latter	 work:	 for	example,	despite	terra…	satis	ferax,	frugiferarum	arborum	inpatiens	(Ger.	5.1),	agrestia	
poma	are	mentioned	at	Ger.	23.	In	fact,	that	same	passage	explicitly	acknowledges	that	the	Germans’	 food	may	be	simple,	but	explicitly	denies	 that	 there	 is	not	enough	of	 it:	
sine	 blandimentis	 expellunt	 famem.	 Inopia	 cannot	 even	 implicitly	 be	 read	 into	 the	reasons	for	the	Germania’s	migrations.	364 tandemque	 docti	 commune	 periculum	 concordia	 propulsandum,	 legationibus	 et	
foederibus	omnium	civitatium	vires	exciverant,	Agr.	29.3-4.	
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ventriloquised	Calgacus	stressed	the	fact	that	Scotland	was	also	the	place	where	Britain	 ran	 out	 of	 land365:	 there	 was	 nowhere	 else	 for	 these	 peoples	 to	 go,	whether	for	their	own	purposes	or	to	avoid	the	Romans.	This	is	not	the	case	for	the	Germania’s	Germany,	which	combines	remoteness	with	vastness	instead	of	with	 boundaries	 and	 limits.	 Conquest	 requires	 fixity	 and	 precision,	 which	accounts	 for	 the	 great	 pains	 Caesar	 took	 to	 map	 out	 for	 his	 readers	 the	geography	of	Gaul	and	the	positioning	of	its	tribes	within	that.	The	Germania’s	occasional	anachronistic	mislocation	of	 tribes,	as	 for	 the	Boii366,	 illustrates	 the	impossibility	 of	 assuming	 that	 tribes	 would	 continue	 to	 be	 where	 they	 were	when	 intelligence	 was	 first	 received.	 The	 Germania’s	 frequent	 movement	 of	tribes	 underpins	 the	 tale	 of	 the	 Frisii	 in	 the	Annals,	written	much	 later.	 Their	abandonment	 of	 Corbulo’s	 Roman	 Republic	 in	 Frisia	 is	 left	 unmotivated	 by	Tacitus,	 but	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Germania	makes	 complete	 sense	 as	 a	reversal	 to	 their	 essential	 German	 nature	 as	 wanderers	 from	 the	 moment	 at	which	the	removal	of	the	threat	of	Roman	force	(which	keeps	them	emplaced)	makes	this	possible.			A	related	difficulty	inherent	in	these	incessant	migrations	is	the	threat	that	the	Germans	may	not	be	confined	across	the	Rhine	forever.	The	Histories	indirectly	acknowledge	how	much	of	a	concern	such	potential	crossings	were	to	Rome,	in	reporting	 the	 care	 Rome	 took	 to	 first	 forbid	 and	 then	 carefully	 monitor	 the	transrhenane	 Tencteri’s	 interactions	with	 their	 Ubian	 cousins	 on	 the	western	Rhine	bank	during	the	Batavian	revolt.367	These	crossings	did	not	need	to	have	the	 potential	 to	 overthrow	 the	 Roman	 Empire	 in	 order	 to	 be	 inconvenient:	invasions	 used	 up	 resources	 and	 time,	 and	 did	 ideological	 damage	 to	perceptions	of	Rome	and	its	power	by	threatening	Rome’s	 full	control	over	 its	territory.	Moreover,	the	possibility	of	Rhine	crossings	revealed	the	porousness	of	this	supposedly	rigid	boundary	between	the	Empire	and	Germany.																																																										365nullae	ultra	terrae,	Agr.	30.1;	terrarum	extremos	recessus,	Agr.	30.3.	366See	note	355.	367nam	 ad	 hunc	 diem	 flumina	 ac	 terram	 et	 caelum	 quodam	 modo	 ipsum	 clauserant	
Romani	ut	conloquia	congressusque	nostros	arcerent,	vel,	quod	contumeliosius	est	viris	ad	
arma	 natis,	 inermes	 ac	 prope	 nudi	 sub	 custode	 et	 pretio	 coiremus,	Hist.	4.64.6-10.	 See	chapter	one	for	a	discussion	of	the	spatial	implications	of	this	part	of	the	speech.	
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One	 consequence	of	 the	Germania’s	 characterisation	of	Germany	 as	 a	 place	 of	flux	 is	 to	 set	 two	 geographical	 systems	 against	 one	 another:	 the	 unplanned,	unexplained	and	messy	nature	of	 the	text’s	representation	of	 these	migrations	offers	 a	 conception	 of	 Germania	 as	 disordered	 space	 in	 contrast	 to	 ordered	Roman	imperial	space.	Germany’s	representation	of	internal	disorder	thus	calls	into	question	the	work’s	own	mission	as	an	ordered	Roman	overview	of	a	space	called	 Germany.	 Although	 the	work’s	 title	de	origine	et	 situ	Germanorum	does	not	quite	claim	to	discuss	the	space,	only	the	people,	its	first	word	is	Germania	and	 its	 first	 chapter	 a	 geophysical	 description	 of	 the	 territory	 for	 which	 that	word	posits	a	unity.	The	work’s	subsequent	exposition	of	a	systemic	disconnect	between	different	kinds	of	Germani	and	their	situs	raises	the	question	of	what,	precisely,	 unites	or	 constitutes	 either	 the	people	or	 the	 space.	 In	 terms	of	 the	area’s	 spatial	 dynamics,	 Tacitus	 cannot	 get	 beyond	 a	 description	 of	 fluidity	 of	people	and	of	space.	
A	different	history,	a	different	people,	a	different	space	This	disorder	is	present	despite	Tacitus’	efforts	in	almost	the	entire	first	half	of	the	work	(up	to	Ger.	27.1)	to	posit	a	communal	identity	for	a	first	level	category	of	Germani	with	shared	mores	which	contains	all	the	second	level	subtribes	with	their	 idiosyncracies	 which	 are	 described	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 work.	 But	instead	 of	 bringing	 into	 being	 and	 then	 sustaining	 a	 unified	 space,	 the	 unity	posited	 for	 the	Germani	 by	Tacitus	 lacks	 the	 historical	 dimension	 required	 to	give	 it	 power	 through	 the	 ages,	 and	 has	 produced	 the	 amorphous	 space	described	above.	This	 section	will	examine	precisely	how	practices	of	German	history	 as	 described	 by	 Tacitus	 are	 insufficient	 for	 producing	 the	 sort	 of	national	German	identity	to	go	hand	in	hand	with	a	coherent	national	German	space.		Tacitus	clearly	acknowledges	that	the	Germani	keep	(certain)	memories	of	the	past	 alive:	 Celebrant	 carminibus	 antiquis,	 quod	 unum	 apud	 illos	 memoriae	 et	
annalium	genus	est,	Tuistonem	deum	terra	editum,	‘they	celebrate	in	song,	which	is	their	equivalent	of	memory	and	annals,	the	god	Tuisto	born	from	the	earth’,	
Ger.	2.2.	 But	 within	 this	 translatio	 Romana	 of	 these	 carmina	 as	 memory	 and	
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annales,	it	is	clear	that	German	memory	and	history	fall	far	short	of	the	Roman	standard.	Hardly	any	of	 the	stuff	of	annalistic	history	(the	battles,	 the	 treaties,	the	 kings)	 is	 recorded	 by	 Tacitus	 for	 the	 Germans	 in	 this	 passage	 which	explicitly	 deals	 with	 history,	 and	 the	 lack	 persists	 across	 the	 work.	 In	 the	military	 sphere,	 only	 the	 Bructeri’s	 destruction	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 an	 alliance	 of	neighbours	 is	 mentioned	 (Ger.	 33.1),	 and	 that	 was	 a	 very	 recent	 occurrence	indeed.368	As	 for	 kings	 and	 their	 lineage,	 only	Maroboduus	 for	 the	Marcomani	and	 an	 otherwise	 unknown	 Tudrus	 for	 the	 Quadi	 are	mentioned	 at	Ger.	42.2,	with	no	contextualisation	of	Tudrus.	By	not	possessing	a	continuous	record	of	such	events	and	genealogies	into	the	present,	the	Germans	of	the	Germania	are	shown	to	lack	a	national	history	capable	of	creating	an	identity	with	the	power	to	 last	 through	 the	ages.	The	carmina	which	serve	 the	Germans	as	history	are	ahistorical	 by	 the	 standards	of	Roman	historical	 practice,	which	 in	 its	 earliest	form	 derived	 from	 simple	 listings	 of	 past	 events	 in	 the	 form	 of	 Fasti	 or	‘calendars’	long	before	Ennius	wrote	the	first	historical	‘work’	called	Annales	in	the	early	2nd	century	BC.369			The	only	communal	identity	granted	the	Germans	in	the	Germania	derives	from	their	reported	shared	descent	from	the	three	sons	of	their	god	Mannus	(in	turn	the	son	of	their	Urvater	Tuisto):			
Celebrant	 carminibus	 antiquiis,	 quod	 unum	 apud	 illos	 memoriae	 et	
annalium	 genus	 est,	 Tuistonem	 deum	 terra	 editum.	 ei	 filium	 Mannum,	
originem	 gentis	 conditoremque,	 Manno	 tris	 filios	 adsignant,	 e	 quorum	
nominibus	 proximi	 Oceano	 Ingaevones,	medii	 Hermiones,	 ceteri	 Istaevones	
vocentur.		
Ger.	2.2		‘They	celebrate	in	ancient	songs,	which	are	their	equivalent	of	memory	and	annals,	the	god	Tuisto,	born	from	the	earth.	He	had	a	son	Mannus,	the																																																									368Datable	to	AD97	on	the	basis	of	Pliny	Ep.	2.7.2:	Nam	Spurinna	Bructerum	regem	vi	et	
armis	induxit	in	regnum,	ostentatoque	bello	ferocissimam	gentem,	quod	est	
pulcherrimum	victoriae	genus,	terrore	perdomuit.	Rives	(1999)	ad	loc.	interprets	the	genocide	mentioned	in	the	Germania	as	the	catalyst	for	this	Roman	intervention	and	victory	under	Spurinna’s	leadership.	369OCD	4th	ed.	‘fasti’	suggests	the	official	publication	of	such	a	listing	in	304BC	had	probably	been	preceded	by	continuous	elaboration	since	the	5th	century	BC.	
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point	of	origin	and	founder	of	their	race,	and	to	Mannus	they	allocate	three	sons,	after	whose	names	those	closest	to	the	Ocean	are	called	Ingaevones,	the	middle	people	Hermiones,	and	the	rest	Istaevones.’		The	 first	 important	aspect	of	 this	 legend	 is	 that	even	 though	a	 single	origin	 is	here	proposed	(Tuisto	and	through	him	Mannus),	there	is	division	almost	from	the	start	(Mannus’	three	sons).	And	though	Tacitus	assigns	to	each	of	the	three	parts	 a	 –	 very	 roughly	 indicated	 –	 specific	 territory	 (proximi	 Oceano,	 medii,	
ceteri),	and	is	thus	suggesting	a	level	of	fixity,	the	subsequent	migrations	make	it	clear	 that	 these	 original	 divisions	 and	 groups	 were	 not	 permanent	 and	fragmented	further.	The	absence	of	a	record	accounting	for	this	fragmentation	is	one	of	Tacitus’	main	strategies	in	undermining	his	own	construct	of	a	first	level	group	of	Germani	with	a	communal	identity	to	unite	its	different	subtribes.370		Another	 such	 strategy	 is	 his	 immediate	 introduction	 of	 disagreement	 on	 the	specifics	 of	 even	 this	 first	 step	 after	 reporting	 the	 joint	 descent	 from	 Tuisto,	Mannus	and	the	sons	of	Mannus:	quidam,	ut	in	licentia	vetustatis,	pluris	deo	ortos	
pluresque	 gentis	 appellationes,	 Marsos	 Gambrivios	 Suebos	 Vandilios,	 adfirmant,	
eaque	vera	et	antiqua	nomina,	‘some,	as	can	happen	in	cases	where	long	distance	in	 time	creates	 leeway,	 assert	 that	more	 sons	were	born	 to	 the	god	and	more	names	of	tribes	(the	Marsi,	Gambrivi,	Suebi	and	Vandili),	and	that	these	are	true	and	ancient	names’	(Ger.	2.2).	In	addition	to	the	reported	disagreement	on	what	immediately	before	seemed	certain,	the	discrepancy	is	not	addressed,	and	there	are	no	attempts	to	connect	either	of	the	stories	with	the	Tungri,	who	make	their	entry	 into	 the	 narrative	 immediately	 afterwards,	 nor	 with	 the	 Germania’s	subsequent	 focus	 on	 reporting	 the	 ‘current’	 state	 of	 Germany	 and	 all	 its	constituent	 tribes. 371 	The	 result	 is	 a	 muddle,	 and	 the	 muddle	 is	 neither	acknowledged,	 let	 alone	 resolved.	Exactly	 that	part	of	 the	 ‘story’	which	would	constitute	a	German	identity	into	the	present	day	(of	Tacitus)	is	missing:	it	may	be	that	they	had	one,	of	course,	and	that	Tacitus	did	not	know	it,	or	knew	but	did	not	 report	 it.	 But	 Tacitus	 occasionally	 confesses	 to	 aporia,	 for	 example	 with																																																									370Compare	with	Livy	5.33ff,	which	provides	a	genealogy	for	the	Gauls	of	his	own	era	which	connects	past	and	present	and	Gallic	history	and	Roman	history	in	exactly	the	way	Tacitus	in	the	Germania	does	not;	see	Woolf	(2009),	214.	371Noted	by	Morgan	(1983),	108–9.	
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regard	to	the	existence	of	ancient	Greek	monuments	on	the	border	of	Germany	and	 Raetia372,	 yet	 he	 does	 not	 do	 so	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Germany’s	 prehistory.	 His	silence	 on	 the	 matter	 creates	 an	 anti-history	 which	 leaves	 the	 disorder	 and	movement	within	 Germany	 as	 beyond	 reconstruction.	 The	 absence	 of	 a	 story	covering	the	 intervening	period	means	that	 the	relation	between	the	 ‘modern’	Germans	and	their	mythical	ancestors	remains	unclear.			The	 visits	 of	 Hercules	 (Ger.	3.1)373	and	 Ulixes	 (Ger.	3.2)374	which	 occur	 in	 the	chapter	 following	 the	story	of	Mannus	do	not	 constitute	 that	missing	 link,	but	belong	 to	 the	 same	 prehistory.	 They	 are	 mythical,	 undatable,	 uncertain,	impermanent	 and	 with	 no	 discernible	 effect	 either	 on	 the	 Germans	 or	 on	Germany.	 Hercules	 is	 not	 granted	 his	 traditional	 role	 of	 founder	 of	 cities	 and	father	of	children.	Instead,	some	of	these	characteristics	are	imputed	to	Ulixes	in	the	Germania.375	But	 the	suggestion	 that	he	may	have	played	some	part	 in	 the	origins	of	the	German	people376	is	forestalled	by	Tacitus’	introduction	of	quidam	
opinantur	and	 his	 conclusion	 of	neque	confirmare	neque	refellere	 in	animo	est.	Ulixes’	 physical	 effects	 on	 the	 space	of	Germany	 (the	 founding	of	 the	 city,	 the	altar	 found,	 the	 tumuli	and	monumenta	supposedly	 still	 standing,	Ger.	3.2)	 are	called	 into	 doubt	 by	 the	 same	 two	 mechanisms.	 In	 any	 case,	 Asciburgium,	described	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 location	 (in	ripa	Rheni	 situm	hodieque	 incolitur)	had	become,	at	the	time	Tacitus	wrote	the	Germania,	a	Roman	camp	(mentioned	at	Hist.	4.33.4-5).377	In	 as	 far	 as	 Asciburgium	 can	 be	 invoked	 to	 say	 anything	about	Germany	or	its	history,	therefore,	it	attests	both	the	insubstantiality	of	the																																																									372quae	neque	confirmare	argumentis	neque	refellere	in	animo	est:	ex	ingenio	suo	quisque	
demat	vel	addat	fidem,	‘which	I	do	not	propose	to	either	confirm	with	proof	or	refute:	let	each	either	withhold	or	grant	his	acceptance	as	he	sees	fit’,	Ger.	3.2-3.	373Fuisse	apud	eos	et	Herculem	memorant…	374ceterum	et	Ulixem	quidam	opinantur	longo	illo	et	fabuloso	errore	in	hunc	Oceanum	
delatum	adisse	Germaniae	terras…	375O’Gorman	(1993),	145-6.	376Rives	(1999)	ad	loc:	 ‘Tacitus’	account	here	suggests	 that	some	earlier	scholars	may	have	 argued	 that	Ulysses	not	only	 visited	Germania	but	 also	played	 some	part	 in	 the	origin	of	the	Germanic	people’;	also	noted	at	Morgan	(1983),	105.	377Rives	 ad	 loc.	 notes	 for	 this	 passage	 that	 the	 Asciburgium	 founded	 by	 Ulixes	 was	probably	conflated	wrongly	on	the	Peutinger	map	with	the	Rhineland	military	camp	of	that	name	through	reading	into	the	latter	‘a	false	etymology	that	derived	the	name	from	the	Greek	askos,	‘skin	bag’,	and	purgos,	‘tower,	fortification’,	referring	to	Aeolus’	bag	of	the	winds	(Od.	10.19	etc.)’.	
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events	 reported	 as	 part	 of	 Germany’s	 mythical	 pre-history,	 and	 the	entanglement	of	Germany’s	‘modern’	history	with	Rome.		The	 representation	 of	 Germans	 as	 a	 fragmented	 people	 with	 a	 disconnected	history	occupying	a	fluid	space	contrasts	heavily	with	the	early	story	of	Rome,	which	 began	 with	 division	 and	 wandering	 but	 moved	 increasingly	 towards	unity	and	fixity	–	the	reverse	of	Germany’s	process	in	the	Germania’s	account	of	the	sons	of	Mannus.	The	Germania	 is	understandably	silent	on	the	topic	of	the	prehistorical	wanderings	which	 led	 to	 the	 founding	 of	 Rome,	 but	 accounts	 of	them	are	prevalent	enough	in	other	works	of	Roman	historiography	to	suggest	that	 such	migration	was	a	 recognised	and	often	utilised	 trope	 in	Rome’s	early	history,	of	which	Tacitus	would	have	been	aware.	Sallust’s	Letter	of	Mithridates	has	the	ventriloquised	eastern	king	describe	the	Romans	as	convenas	olim	sine	
patria,	parentibus	(‘once	 tramps	without	a	homeland	or	ancestors’,	Sall.	Hist.	4	fr.	 60.17),	 a	 description	 echoed	 in	 the	 illa	 conluvie	 convenarum	 (Hist.	 Phil.	38.7.1)	of	Justin’s		second	century	AD	record	of	the	same	speech	by	Mithridates.	The	 phrase	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 been	 Pompeius	 Trogus’,	 whose	 work	 Justin	epitomised	and	who	was	Livy’s	contemporary.	It	occurs	twice	in	the	early	books	of	 Livy	 (illa	 pastorum	 convenarumque	 plebs,	 transfuga	 ex	 suis	 populis,	 2.1;	
maiores	 nostri,	 convenae	 pastoresque,	 5.53).	 Within	 this	 established	 tradition,	Sallust’s	 connection	 between	 wandering	 and	 being	 sine	 parentibus	 is	particularly	 interesting	 in	 its	 suggestion	 that	 the	 early	 Romans	 wandered	around	in	exactly	those	circumstances	Tacitus	attributes	to	the	Germans	of	the	
Germania:	 in	 possession	 of	 a	 past	 (obviously)	 and	 of	 ancestors	 (mentioned	explicitly)	 but	 not	 of	 an	 ancestral	 history	 to	 assert	 a	 connection	 between	 the	united	past	and	the	fragmented	present.		Rome	 connected	 its	wandering	 past	 to	 its	 present	 by	 accounting	 in	 detail	 not	only	 for	 the	pre-migration	past	but	 for	 the	wanderings	themselves.	The	Livian	tradition	on	Rome’s	early	pre-history	had	offered	a	violent	version	of	the	tale	of	the	wanderer	 Aeneas,	 in	 which	 he	 beats	 the	 original	 inhabitants	 of	 Italy	 into	submission,	alongside	a	milder	one,	in	which	king	Latinus	is	so	impressed	with	Aeneas’	 tale	 and	 character	 that	 he	makes	 a	 peaceful	 alliance	with	 the	 Trojan	
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settlers	(1.5-9).	Important	is	that	he	follows	up	these	disputed	first	events	with	a	continuous	chain	of	subsequent	events,	all	the	while	tracing	the	genealogy	of	Aeneas	 into	 the	 future	 as	 Rome	 grew	 and	 incorporated	 other	 neighbouring	communities.	 Livy’s	 history	 is	 a	 story	 of	moving	 from	 exile	 and	wandering	 to	fixity	and	the	accretion	of	different	tribes	around	a	stable	Roman	core	to	create	the	Romans	to	whose	exploits	the	rest	of	the	work	is	dedicated,	all	the	way	up	to	the	 Livian	 present	 day.	 Roman	 history’s	 evolution	 from	 homelessness	 to	settledness	 may	 be	 violent	 and	 morally	 ambivalent 378 ,	 but	 it	 is	 fully	documented,	without	gaps.		Virgil’s	approach	to	Roman	history	in	the	Aeneid	solves	the	problem	of	bridging	the	gap	between	Rome’s	mythical	pre-history	and	the	present	day	in	a	different	way.	In	the	Aeneid,	the	Roman	past	stretches	far	into	the	future,	preventing	the	fragmentation	 which	 might	 result	 from	 the	 unifying	 power	 of	 shared	 origins	diluting	as	time	goes	by	(a	process	which	the	Tacitean	account	of	the	Germani’s	shared	origins	but	fragmented	present	suggests	occurred	in	Germania).	Though	the	work	 stops	well	 short,	 chronologically,	 of	 connecting	 the	mythical	 past	 to	Virgil’s	contemporary	Augustan	Rome379,	ending	as	 it	does	with	Turnus’	death	at	the	hands	of	Aeneas,	it	avoids	disconnecting	past	and	present	by	the	frequent	divine	assurance	 in	 the	work	of	Rome’s	destiny	as	 ruler	of	 the	Mediterranean	(achieved	in	Virgil’s	‘present’):	from	the	authorial	introduction	multa	quoque	et	
bellō	 passūs,	 dum	 conderet	 urbem/inferretque	 deōs	 Latiō,	 genus	 unde	
Latīnum/Albānīque	 patrēs,	 atque	 altae	 moenia	 Rōmae	 (‘having	 suffered	 many	tribulations	 and	 also	 in	 war,	 until	 he	 founds	 a	 city/and	 brings	 his	 gods	 into																																																									378Neither	Livy	nor	Virgil’s	accounts	hide	the	violence,	but	they	counterbalance	it	with	absorption	 of	 neighbouring	 tribes	 –	 not	 all	 were	 killed	 or	 robbed	 into	 submission.	Sallust’s	Mithridates	(Hist.	4	fr.	60.17),	as	an	enemy	of	Rome,	understandably	connects	Rome’s	early	wanderings	solely	with	 the	 theft	of	other	people’s	property	 instead	of	a	process	 of	 growth	 and	 incorporation:	 [An	 ignoras]	 Neque	 quicquam	 a	 principio	 nisi	
raptum	 habere	 [Romanos],	 domum,	 coniuges,	 agros,	 imperium?	 Justin’s	 epitome	 of	Trogus	also	stresses	the	violence	of	these	early	stages	(Hist.	Phil.	43.1.10-13	and	43.3.1-2).	379Even	so,	there	are	two	passages	where	Virgil	does	provide	specifics	concerning	the	intervening	‘history’:	both	the	procession	of	early,	Republican	and	Augustan	Romans	witnessed	by	Aenaes	in	the	underworld	(A.	6.756-853)	and	the	events	and	people	on	the	shield	of	Aeneas	(A.	8.625-728)	feature	the	‘Great	Romans’	which	connect	the	mythical	then	with	the	Virgilian	now.	
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Latium,	 from	where	 the	Latin	 tribe	will	 spring/and	 the	Alban	 fathers,	 and	 the	walls	 of	 high	 Rome’,	 A.	 1.5-7)	 to	 the	 very	 end,	 when	 Juno	 makes	 her	recommendation	 to	 Jupiter	 that	 sit	 Latium,	 sint	 Albani	 per	 saecula	 reges/sit	
Romana	potens	Itala	virtute	propago	(‘let	 it	be	Latium,	 let	there	be	Alban	kings	through	 the	 ages/let	 there	 be	 a	 Roman	 shoot	 strong	 with	 Italian	 virtue’,	
A.12.826-7).380	The	future	is	already	taken	care	of	in	these	accounts	of	the	past.	Once	this	divine	mission	was	canonised	in	the	literature	of	the	Augustan	age,	it	rationalised	 and	 systematised	 the	 past	 in	 a	 way	 which	 could	 then	 sustain	Roman	identity	into	the	future.		To	 summarise,	 Livy	 constitutes	 a	 communal	 identity	 for	 his	 early	 Romans	through	 the	 fully	 traceable	 (!)	 genealogy	 of	 the	 earliest	 kings	 and	 the	 Roman	state’s	equally	fully	documented	merging	with	other	tribes.	Virgil	constitutes	it	around	Rome’s	divine	mission,	 articulated	 to	 them	 in	 their	 earliest	prehistory	and	 supposedly	 borne	 in	mind	 by	 them,	 as	 they	 grew,	 ever	 since.	 Virgil	 also,	following	Livy’s	most	brutal	version	of	the	Aeneas	legend,	made	him	a	founding	father	steeped	in	violence	against	the	original	 inhabitants	of	Italy	but	followed	this	antagonism	with	reconciliation,	starting	the	process	of	incorporating	other	tribes	 into	the	Roman	fold.	This	 ‘history’	therefore	helped	to	create	a	common	identity	 which	 could	 harbour	 large	 variations	 in	 local	 populations	 and	 local	histories	 without	 damaging	 the	 Roman	 core.	 Though	 Tacitus	 posits	 a	 similar	core	identity	for	the	Germani,	he	denies	them	a	narrative	which	connects	this	to	the	subtribes	he	mentions.	 In	both	cases,	Virgil	and	Livy,	an	originally	diverse	group	 reconstituted	 itself	 around	 a	 shared	 Roman	 identity	 and	 thereby	reconstituted	 a	 shared	 Roman	 space.	 The	 construction	 of	 a	 narrative	 of	 time	allowed	 the	 building	 of	 a	 narrative	 of	 space	 and	 identity.	 The	 truth	 of	 such	claims	does	not	matter	–	 the	Romans	were	 likely	unclear	on	when	the	 tipping	point	 occurred	 between	 their	 myths	 and	 their	 history381	–	 but	 their	 value	 in	
																																																								380There	 are	 several	 assertions	 of	 the	 general	 destiny	 in	 between,	 particularly	 in	 the	crucial	book	4	when	Aeneas	is	tempted	to	tarry	with	Dido	(Jupiter’s	errand	to	Mercury	at	 A.	4.227-31,	 Mercury’s	 paraphrase	 to	 Aeneas	 at	 A.	4.267	 and	 275-6,	 and	 Aeneas’	explanation	to	Dido	at	A.	4.345-6	and	355).	381Luce	(1998,	xvi)	notes	that	‘Livy	is	keenly	aware	of	the	unreliability	of	the	material	for	this	early	period.	In	the	preface	to	book	6	he	says	that	almost	all	written	records	–	
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constituting	a	communal	identity	is	clear,	and	this	both	the	Romans	in	general	and	Tacitus	 in	the	Germania	clearly	realised.	The	early	homelessness	of	Rome,	temporary	because	 they	know	their	history	and	 their	 future,	 is	 therefore	very	different	to	that	of	the	Germans	in	the	Germania.			The	difference	 is,	 then,	not	one	of	mythic	origins	or	 the	presence	of	a	myth	of	origins	 to	 give	unity	 to	 the	people,	 but	 lies	 in	 the	 absence	of	 the	processes	of	historical	 formation	 that	 fill	 the	 many	 books	 of	 Livy.	 There	 is	 an	 absence	 of	historical	 development	 which	 leaves	 the	 Germans	 in	 a	 state	 of	 mythic	 non-history,	 a	 permanent	 state	 of	 no	 change.	 This	 distortion	 then	 supports	 itself:	what	is	there	to	describe,	if	there	is	no	development?	The	Germani’s	amorphous	mythic	space,	a	space	of	flux	and	change	to	which	we	can	compare	the	Homeric	Mediterranean	 roamed	 by	 Odysseus,	 inevitably	 produces	 an	 inability	 to	constitute	 space	 and	 to	 undergo	 the	 long	 historical	 processes	 of	 identity	formation.	In	this	sense,	the	Germani	remain	a	non-people	living	in	a	non-space.	The	 close	 relationship	 between	 classical	 geography	 and	 history	 in	 tracing	communities	 in	space	and	time	 finds	 its	counter	 in	Germany	since	 the	various	Germanic	tribes	and	hence	Germany	itself	cannot	be	constituted	in	either	space	or	time.		The	 ahistorical	 characterisation	 of	 Germany	 is	 aided	 by	 the	 chronological	vagueness	 regarding	 the	 timing	 of	 most	 of	 its	 migrations.	 Only	 the	 Cimbri’s	exodus	is	datable	on	the	basis	of	the	text,	its	ablative	absolute	Caecilio	Metello	ac	
Papirio	 Carbone	 consulibus	 placing	 it	 in	 113BC	 in	 the	 customary	 manner	 of	establishing	 chronology	 in	 Roman	 annalistic	 history.	 In	 all	 other	 reported	instances	 of	migration	 that	 are	 granted	 a	 temporal	 indicator	 in	 the	Germania,	Tacitus	uses	olim	(‘back	in	the	day’,	and	in	context	perhaps	even	something	like	‘once	upon	a	 time’).	 It	 is	 applied	 to	 the	 first	 ever	mention	of	migration	 in	 the	context	of	autochthony	at	Ger.	2.1,	to	the	crossing	of	the	Gallic	Boii	and	Helvetii	into	 Germany	 at	 Ger.	 28.1,	 to	 the	 crossing	 of	 the	 Ubii	 at	 Ger.	 28.4,	 to	 the	occupation	and	then	exodus	of	the	Bructeri	from	their	territory	at	Ger.	33.1,	and																																																																																																																																																														'the	only	reliable	guardian	of	the	remembrance	of	past	events'	–	were	destroyed	in	the	Gallic	Sack	of	Rome	in	390	BC.’	
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to	 the	Boii’s	 forced	expulsion	at	Ger.	42.1	at	 the	hands	of	 the	Marcomani.	The	Helvetii	 actually	 left	 the	 area	 in	 Germany	 in	which	 the	Germania	places	 them	(inter	 Hercyniam	 silvam	 Rhenumque	 et	 Moenum	 amnes,	 28.2)	 in	 the	 late	 2nd	century	BC.382	The	Ubii	were	settled	on	the	west	bank	of	the	Rhine	in	38BC,	by	Agrippa.383 	The	 Bructeri’s	 destruction	 and	 settlement	 of	 their	 territory	 by	Chamavi	and	Angrivarii	took	place	in	AD97,	only	shortly	before	the	publication	of	the	Germania.384	The	Marcomani’s	expulsion	of	the	Boii	may	have	occurred	as	part	of	 their	 growth	 into	one	of	Tausend’s	Großstämme	 (‘super-tribes’)	 in	 the	course	 of	 the	 late	 first	 century	 BC.385	Tacitus	would	 have	 been	 aware	 of	 such	movements,	as	demonstrated	by	the	overlap	between	the	Marcomani’s	reported	activities	 here	 in	 the	Germania	 and	 those	 he	 reports	 in	 the	Annals,	 where	 he	describes	 Arminius’	 war	 with	 Maroboduus	 in	 AD17	 as	 a	 Cheruscis	 contra	
augendae	 dominationi	 certaretur,	 ‘the	 Cherusci	 were	 fighting	 against	 their	increasing	 hegemony’	 (Ann.	 2.46).	 The	 reference	 is	 compatible	 with	Marcomanic/Suebian	territorial	expansion	through	displacing	other	peoples.	All	other	migrations	(Tungri,	Batavi,	Osi,	Aravisci)	are	not	located	in	time	at	all.	The	absence	of	clear	chronological	markers,	even	in	cases	where	Tacitus	would	have	possessed	 such	 information,	 collapses	 his	 picture	 of	 Germany	 further	 into	 an	impression	 of	 timelessness	 and	 its	 state	 of	 internal	 flux	 into	 a	 permanent	feature	of	this	part	of	the	world.	
Roman	history:	present	but	absent	The	only	 intrusions	of	 ‘factual’	history	into	the	text	are	related	to	contact	with	Rome,	 but	 several	 strategies	 are	 applied	 to	 the	 presentation	 of	 this	 material	which	misrepresent,	 to	Rome’s	detriment,	 the	effects	of	Roman	 imperialism	in	the	area.		
																																																								382Tan	(2014),	193.	383Tausend	(2006),	395.	384See	n.	370.	385Tausend	 (2006),	 395-6	 and	 400-1,	 though	he	 again	 ignores	Tacitus’	 claim	 that	 the	Marcomani	expelled	the	Boii:	 ‘Der	überwiegende	Teil	der	am	Main	ansässigen	Sueben	(d.	 h.	Markomannen	und	Quaden)	 zogen	 jedoch	unter	 der	 Führung	des	Marbod	nach	Böhmen,	wo	nach	der	Abwanderung	der	vormals	dort	sitzenden	keltischen	Boier	wohl	keine	groβe	Besiedelungsdichte	vorhanden	war.’	
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The	 first	of	 these	strategies	relates	 to	 the	elision	of	Roman	 involvement	–	and	therefore	power	–	entirely	from	certain	German	events	in	which	they	very	much	played	a	part.	The	prime	examples	in	this	category	are	the	Batavi’s	accession	to	empire	 (Ger.	29.1)	and	 the	similar	accession	of	 the	 lazy	Gauls	who	 inhabit	 the	Agri	 Decumates	 (Ger.	 29.3).	 The	 text	 does	 not	 mention	 that	 the	 Batavi’s	ethnogenesis	 as	 a	 people,	 and	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 insula	 Batavorum	 as	‘theirs’,	were	profoundly	tied	 in	with	the	consequences	of	Roman	imperialism.	Slofstra	 and	Roymans	 argued	 convincingly	 that	 the	 tribe	originated	 through	a	merger,	 encouraged	by	Rome,	of	 this	Chattian	 subgroup	with	 the	 remnants	of	the	Eburones,	previously	wiped	out	by	Caesar.386	Yet	the	Germania	simply	reads	
Batavi…	pars	Romani	 imperii	 fierent,	 ‘they	 became	 part	 of	 the	 Roman	 Empire’	(Ger.	 29.1).	 The	 same	 effect	 is	 produced	 by	 Ger.	 29.3’s	 tale	 of	 the	 Gallic	occupants	of	the	Agri	Decumates:			
levissimus	 quisque	 Gallorum	 et	 inopia	 audax	 dubiae	 possessionis	 solum	
occupavere;	 mox	 limite	 acto	 promotisque	 praesidiis	 sinus	 imperii	 et	 pars	
provinciae	habentur.		‘the	 laziest	 Gauls,	 and	 those	 most	 reckless	 through	 poverty,	 occupied	ground	under	 a	 doubtful	 right	 of	 possession;	 then	when	 the	 border	was	drawn	and	the	legions	brought	forward	they	were	considered	as	belonging	to	the	empire	and	a	part	of	the	province.’		Tacitus	 stresses	 the	 unsuitability	 of	 these	 people	 as	 both	 budding	 Roman	citizens	and	taxable	provincials.	Yet	the	newly	extended	Roman	province,	in	the	
Germania’s	 phrasing,	 arranges	 itself	 around	 them,	 incorporating	 their	 fragile	claim	on	the	land	instead	of	dismissing	it	and	displacing	them.	Like	the	Batavi	in	
																																																								386Slofstra	(2002),	24;	Roymans	(2004),	23–26.	This	would	make	Tacitus’	assertion	in	the	Histories	concerning	the	ethnogenesis	of	the	Batavi	(that	they	moved	into	extrema	
Gallicae	orae	vacua	cultoribus	–	Hist.	4.14.7-8	–	as	well	as	the	island)	wrong.	Roymans	found	inconclusive	evidence	to	posit	a	discontinuity	in	the	material	culture	of	the	area	(which	 would	 be	 required	 to	 established	 the	 new	 lands’	 emptiness	 beyond	 doubt).	Curiously,	 Schön	 (2006),	 169	 and	 Tausend	 (2006),	 395	 place	 the	 Ubii	 in	 the	 former	territory	 of	 the	 Eburones,	 instead	 of	 the	 Batavi,	 but	 cite	 none	 of	 this	 archaeological	work	from	the	Netherlands,	already	available	then,	which	disproves	their	case.	Tausend	(2006)	gives	other	examples	of	Roman-influenced	ethnogeneses	or	settlements,	such	as	the	Chatti’s	settlement	 in	 the	 transrhenane	territory	occupied	by	the	Ubii	before	 they	crossed	into	Gaul	under	Agrippa	(p.	395).	
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the	 Germania’s	 representation,	 they	 became	 a	 part	 of	 the	 Roman	 Empire	 by	virtue	of	their	location,	unresisted.			The	second	strategy	 is	 to	acknowledge	Roman	 involvement	 in	certain	German	events	 but	 to	 elide	 information	 which	 would	 reveal	 Rome’s	 power	 as	 an	imperialist	 state.	 The	 prime	 example	 here	 is	 the	 Germania’s	 mention	 of	 the	Cimbri’s	first	clash	with	Rome	in	113BC	during	their	long	migration:			
sescentesimum	et	quadragesimum	annum	urbs	nostra	agebat,	cum	primum	
Cimbrorum	 audita	 sunt	 arma,	 Caecilio	 Metello	 et	 Papirio	 Carbone	
consulibus.	 ex	 quo	 si	 ad	 alterum	 imperatoris	 Traiani	 consulatum	
computemus,	 ducenti	 ferme	 et	 decem	 anni	 colliguntur:	 tam	 diu	 Germania	
vincitur.	
Ger.	37.1-2	‘Our	city	had	already	existed	for	six	hundred	and	forty	years	by	the	time	it	first	 heard	 the	 clashing	 of	 the	 Cimbri’s	 arms,	 during	 the	 consulship	 of	Caecilius	Metellus	and	Papirius	Carbo.	Which,	if	we	count	from	there	until	the	second	consulship	of	the	emperor	Trajan,	means	almost	two	hundred	and	ten	years:	 for	all	this	time	has	Germany	been	in	the	process	of	being	conquered.’		The	 confrontation	 did	 result	 in	 a	 Roman	 defeat	 and	 the	 suicide	 of	 consul	 C.	Papirius	Carbo	in	113BC.	But	Rome	ultimately	managed	to	‘fix’	the	Cimbri	on	the	imperial	map	by	exterminating	them	a	decade	later.387	Tacitus	does	not	mention	this	final	outcome.	The	half-story	of	the	Cimbri	leaves	the	reader	hanging	at	the	point	 where	 Rome	 was	 proved	 incapable	 of	 guarding	 the	 integrity	 of	 its	territory	against	irruptions	into	it	from	the	ever-wandering	Germans.	Even	the	claim	 of	 two	 hundred	 and	 ten	 years	 of	 failing	 to	 conquer	 Germany	misrepresents	 the	 truth,	 given	 that	Tacitus	 conflates	military	 encounters	with	German	 tribes	 with	 military	 encounters	 on	 German	 soil,	 and	 so	 arrives	 at	 a	longer	period	of	supposed	failed	conquest	of	Germany:	the	Cimbri	were	beaten	in	the	south	of	France,	not	in	Germany.	Rome	did	not	get	to	the	Rhineland	until	Caesar’s	 campaigns	 in	 the	 50s	 BC,	 when	 he	 built	 two	 bridges,	 and	 serious	transrhenane	excursions	did	not	occur	until	38BC	when	Agrippa	was	governor	of	Gaul.																																																										387In	103	and	101BC,	under	the	generalship	of	C.	Marius.	
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	Only	in	the	settlement	of	the	Ubii	are	the	Romans	accorded	their	proper	role	as	an	 imperialist	 power	 which	 can	 command	 others	 to	 stay	 or	 go,	 and	 has	 the	power	to	keep	them	emplaced:	transgressi	olim	et	experimento	fidei	super	ipsam	
Rheni	 ripam	 conlocati	 ut	 arcerent,	 non	ut	 custodirentur,	 ‘[they]	 crossed	 over	 a	long	time	ago	and	in	recognition	of	their	loyalty	were	settled	on	the	very	bank	of	the	 Rhine	 so	 that	 they	 could	 be	 a	 guardian,	 not	 in	 order	 to	 be	 guarded	themselves’	(Ger.	28.4).	But	their	settlement	 is	on	the	nearer	side	of	 the	Rhine	and	 therefore	 removed	 from	 the	 conventional	 geographical	 conception	 of	Germany	 with	 which	 the	 Germania	 itself	 proclaims	 to	 work,	 which	 saw	 it	 as	lying	wholly	on	the	further	side	of	the	Rhine.	Thus	not	even	this	is	a	marker	of	Roman	success.	If	anything,	ut	arcerent	highlights	again	the	persistent	threat	of	further	migrations	from	across	the	Rhine.	Finally,	the	exceptional	nature	of	this	single	 feat	 of	 imperialist	 ‘fixing’	 of	 otherwise	 perpetually	wandering	 Germans	makes	Rome’s	overall	achievements	in	Germania,	as	presented	in	the	Germania,	look	unimpressive.		In	 short,	 all	 four	 occasions	 of	 German	 migrations	 involving	 Rome	 (Cimbri,	Batavi,	Agri	Decumates,	Ubii)	are	presented	as	trials	of	Roman	strength	against	the	 consequences	 of	 Germany’s	 internal	 turmoil,	 and	what	 at	 first	 seems	 like	Roman	success	is	subtly	undermined	in	each	case	to	resemble	accommodation	of	a	difficult	reality	more	than	it	resembles	victory.	When	the	migrations	in	the	text	which	 involve	Rome	are	placed	 in	 their	 correct	 context,	 however,	 they	 in	fact	 show	 a	 clear	 correlation	 between	 Roman	 expansion	 –	 in	 Gaul	 in	 the	 1st	century	BC	and	on	the	borders	of	Germany	in	the	1st	century	AD	–	and	Roman	emplacement	of	migrating	Germanic	peoples	like	the	Ubii	and	the	Batavi	in	the	frontier	zone.	Finally,	some	of	the	internal	German	migrations	of	the	text	–	the	Osi,	 the	 Aravisci,	 the	 original	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 Agri	 Decumates	 –	 follow	 the	governing	 principle	 of	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 text388	in	 occurring	 increasingly	
																																																								388The	 order	 of	 the	 text	 equating	 increasing	 difference	with	 increasing	 distance	 from	whatever	 the	 author	 is	 positing	 as	 the	 ‘centre’	 and	 ‘norm’	 is	 one	 of	 the	 traditional	features	 of	 ancient	 paradoxography,	 to	 which	 both	 Germania	 (see	 Tan	 (2014)	 and	Woolf	 (2015))	 and	 the	Agricola	adhere;	 though	 the	 latter	 less	 straightforwardly.	 See	
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further	 inland,	 increasingly	 further	 away	 from	 the	Roman	 sphere	 of	 influence	(actual	and	desired).	They	are	also	either	left	undated	(Osi	and	Aravisci)	or	they	occurred	before	Roman	activity	in	those	areas	commenced	(which	for	the	Agri	
Decumates	 was	 not	 until	 the	 Flavian	 period).	 These,	 therefore,	 cannot	 be	chalked	up	to	a	Roman	failure	of	containment	of	 the	Germans,	despite	Tacitus	shaping	the	text	of	the	Germania	to	convey	that	impression.		The	 Germania’s	 presentation	 of	 such	 ‘vignettes’,	 brief	 and	 outcomes-based,	contrast	starkly	with	the	processes	of	conquest	narrated	in	Tacitus’	later	works.	Chapter	 one	 examined	 how	 Tacitus	 shows	 Roman	 imperialism’s	 difficulties	during	 the	 Batavian	 Revolt	 with	 mastering	 the	 landscape	 and	 the	 people	 of	Germany.	Chapter	four	discusses	how	Tacitus	narrates	Germanicus’	campaigns	in	Germany	and	his	 struggles	 to	 impose	ordered	Roman	 space	 along	 the	way.	Chapter	 five	 analyses	 how	 Tacitus	 describes	 Corbulo’s	 enactment	 of	 Roman	imperial	 geography	 in	 Germany	 via	 the	 displacement	 or	 emplacement	 of	peoples	 and	 the	 management	 of	 spaces:	 he	 expels	 the	 Canninefatian	 rebel	Gannascus	from	his	lair	(exturbato	Gannasco,	Ann.	11.18)	and	resettles	the	Frisii	(natio	Frisiorum…	consedit	apud	agros	a	Corbulone	descriptos,	Ann.	11.19).	Later	on,	during	Nero’s	reign,	Tacitus	makes	agrosque	vacuos	et	militum	usui	sepositos	in	 transrhenane	 Germany	 the	 focus	 of	 two	 different	 episodes;	 lands	 whose	description	 Potter	 rightly	 interpreted	 as	 signifying	 active	maintenance	 by	 the	local	 commander	Duvius	Avitus	 and	his	 army.389	Furthermore,	 the	 text	makes	clear,	through	Avitus’	recommendation	to	petition	the	emperor	for	leave	to	stay	and	Nero’s	refusal	to	allow	it	(Ann.	13.56),	that	Rome	in	the	Annals	saw	itself	as	having	the	right	to	dispose	over	these	lands	and	their	use,	and	used	that	right.	A	large	part	of	 imperial	Rome’s	conception	of	 itself	was	its	desire	to	arrange	the	world	 and	 its	 concurrent	 ability	 to	 do	 so.	 In	 the	 Germania,	 much	 of	 Rome’s	achievement	 in	 terms	of	 emplacement	 is	 left	unmentioned	and,	where	Roman	involvement	 in	 German	 ethnogenesis	 or	 the	 course	 of	 German	 migrations	 is	mentioned,	it	is	deliberately	misrepresented	as	bordering	on	failure.																																																																																																																																																														Clarke	 (2001),	 95–99	 for	 the	 ancient	 geographical	 framework	 and	 the	 Agricola’s	seeming	conformity,	before	proceeding	to	break	that	down.	389Potter	(1992),	273–74.	
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	The	 third	 and	 final	 textual	 strategy	 which	 demonstrates	 the	 impossibility	 of	imposing	an	imperial	geography	on	Germany	is	the	subtle	undermining	of	what	
is	ostensibly	mentioned	as	Roman	achievement	in	this	sphere.	Several	reports	of	successes	 are	 contradicted	 by	 the	 reader’s	 awareness	 of	 the	 recent	 historical	context	which	scholars	have	noted	is	absent	from	the	Germania.390	For	example,	the	Batavi’s	military	usefulness	(Ger.	29.1)	and	obsequium	to	Rome,	which	they	supposedly	share	with	the	Mattiaci	(Ger.	29.2),	would	have	rung	hollow	in	light	of	readers’	awareness	of	the	Batavian	revolt,	which	occurred	almost	thirty	years	before	 the	work’s	publication	and	effectively	ended	the	Batavi’s	special	status.	This,	 as	 Syme	 pointed	 out,	 the	 Germania	 does	 not	 mention.391	Even	 hollower	than	the	Batavi’s	great	worth	to	Rome	would	have	rung	the	suggestion	that	the	Quadi	and	Marcomani	relied	on	Rome	to	maintain	their	hegemony	in	the	region	(vis	et	potentia	regibus	ex	auctoritate	Romana,	 ‘the	 kings	 derive	 their	 strength	and	authority	from	Rome’s	position’,	Ger.	42.2).	Dio	tells	us	that	Domitian	was	in	fact	 defeated	 by	 these	 tribes	 in	 the	mid-80s	 AD	when	 he	 intended	 to	 punish	them	for	not	helping	him	against	Decebalus	(67.7.1-2).		In	a	number	of	other	cases,	the	spatial	dynamics	reported	as	part	of	statements	of	 Roman	 superiority	 undermine	 the	 value	 of	 what	 is	 being	 said.	 How	much	does	the	Mattiaci’s	obsequium	mean	when	it	is	stressed	that,	living	on	the	right	bank	 (described	 as	 sua	ripa,	 ‘their	own	bank’),	 they	 remain	physically	 distinct	from	the	Roman	Empire	on	the	left	bank?392	A	similar	ambiguity	concerning	the	precise	distribution	of	power	is	created	in	the	description	of	the	Hermunduri:																																																										390This	need	not	entirely	invalidate	Dorey’s	argument	(1969,	13)	‘that	[Tacitus]	made	full	use	of	new	information	that	had	come	to	hand	during	the	twenty	years	since	the	publication	of	Pliny's	work.	Such	new	sources	would	include	reports	of	merchants	engaged	in	the	amber	trade	with	the	Baltic	that	developed	after	Nero's	reign,	and	information	about	Germany	collected	and	circulated	at	Rome	in	connection	with	Domitian's	campaign	against	the	Chatti	and	his	subsequent	triumph.’	391Syme	(1958),	127.	392Though	Rome	made	an	undeniable	spatial	impact	on	the	transrhenane	modern	area	around	 Baden-Württemberg	 thanks	 to	 Drusus’,	 Germanicus’	 and	 Corbulo’s	 military	campaigns,	 in	 the	AD	90s	when	Tacitus	was	writing,	 the	 area	was	 still	 very	 far	 from	becoming	a	formal	province	of	the	Empire,	hence	Tacitus’	is	able	to	refer	to	the	Mattiaci	as	having	sua	ripa.	See	Wilson	(2006)	for	an	overview	of	scholarship	on	the	area.	
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…Hermundurorum	 civitas,	 fida	 Romanis:	 eoque	 solis	 Germanorum	 non	 in	
ripa	 commercium,	 sed	 penitus	 atque	 in	 splendidissima	 Raetiae	 provinciae	
colonia.	 passim	 et	 sine	 custode	 transeunt,	 et,	 cum	 ceteris	 gentibus	 arma	
modo	 castraque	 nostra	 ostendamus,	 his	 domos	 villasque	 patefecimus	 non	
concupiscentibus.	
Ger.	41.1		‘…	 the	 community	 of	 the	 Hermunduri,	 faithful	 to	 the	 Romans;	 for	 this	reason	to	them	alone	of	all	the	Germans	is	trade	allowed	not	on	the	river	bank	 but	 far	 inland,	 in	 the	most	magnificent	 coloniae	of	 the	 province	 of	Raetia.	 They	 have	 free	 passage	 everywhere	 and	 without	 guards;	 and	although	to	other	nations	we	only	show	our	weapons	and	our	army	camps,	to	the	Hermunduri	we	open	up	our	townhouses	and	villas,	as	they	have	no	wish	to	possess	them.’		Through	presenting	them	as	‘tame’	enough	to	be	allowed	free	movement	within	the	 Roman	 provincia	 of	 Raetia,	 Tacitus	 also	 cements	 the	 tribe’s	 position	 as	firmly	outside	of	the	boundaries	of	the	Roman	Empire.	Rome	has	not	exported	–	not	 managed	 to	 export?	 –	 its	 spatial	 arrangements	 to	 the	 community	 of	 the	Hermunduri;	 instead,	 the	German	 tribe	 has	 the	 freedom	of	 the	Roman	 towns.	The	 interaction	 of	 people,	 place	 and	 power	 in	 this	 case	 is	 a	 far	 cry	 from	 the	control	 imposed	 by	 Rome	 on	 the	 Tencteri’s	 and	 Ubii’s	 interaction	 in	 the	
Histories.	Tacitus	also	presents	the	Hermunduri’s	relationship	with	Rome	as	one	of	trade,	which	implies	a	level	of	equality,	instead	of	tribute,	which	would	imply	subservience.	Rome	is	not	entirely	absent	in	this	Tacitean	narrative,	even	from	innermost	Germany,	but	its	involvement	is	a	far	cry	from	the	imperialist	‘fixing’	of	the	later	books	of	the	Annals.	
Germania	and	narratology	But	of	course	writing	is	also	an	act	of	power,	as	a	form	of	what	Foucault	called	the	 ‘ordered	 representation	 of	 a	 subject’. 393 	Imperial	 geographies	 are	metaphorically	 enacted	 by	 soldiers	 on	 a	 real	 land	 and	 real	 people	 but	 also	literally	enacted	into	geography	as	a	field	of	knowledge	by	modes	of	intellectual	representation:	 understanding	 a	 subject	 amounts	 to	 an	 intellectual	emplacement	of	 it,	as	expressed	 in	Anderson’s	 ‘totalizing	classificatory	grid’	of																																																									393Foucault	(1991),	‘Docile	bodies’,	135-169,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	exertion	of	power	through	the	spatial	distribution	of	bodies	through	timetables,	reports,	prescribed	actions	in	specially	designed	spaces,	etc.	
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the	colonial	state:	 ‘the	effect…	was	always	 to	be	able	 to	say	of	anything	that	 it	was	this,	not	that;	it	belonged	here,	not	there’.394	Said	saw	the	West’s	discourse	of	Orientalism	as	exercising	this	same	power	over	the	Orient:	‘(…)	dealing	with	it	 by	 making	 statements	 about	 it,	 authorizing	 views	 of	 it,	 describing	 it,	 by	teaching	it,	settling	it,	ruling	over	it:	in	short,	Orientalism	as	a	Western	style	for	dominating,	 restructuring,	and	having	authority	over	 the	Orient’.395	Rives	 read	the	 Germania	 within	 such	 a	 framework,	 ‘as	 in	 itself	 an	 enactment	 of	 Roman	control	 over	 them	 [the	Germans],	 intellectually	 if	 not	physically.	By	 rendering	them	 the	 objects	 of	 Roman	 knowledge,	 [Tacitus]	 subjects	 them	 to	 a	 more	effective	Roman	dominance	than	Domitian	had	ever	been	able	to	achieve.	In	this	respect	Germania	also	 functions	 as	 a	 writer’s	 demonstration	 that	 where	 the	Roman	 sword	 had	 failed,	 the	 Roman	 pen	 could	 succeed’.396	In	 my	 view,	 the	frequent	migrations	 in	 the	Germania	 are	one	of	 several	 factors	 to	prevent	 the	text	 from	 being	 an	 ordered	 representation	 of	 Germany	 as	 a	 subject	 of	knowledge	 which	 could	 facilitate	 and	 complement	 physical	 control.	 The	difficulty	 of	 achieving	 even	 intellectual	 conquest	 amidst	 Germany’s	 absent	 or	constantly	 changing	 boundaries	 is	 illustrated	 neatly	 by	 Tacitus’	 frequent	mention	of	such	movements	of	entire	peoples	outside	the	sole	context	in	which	he	 indicates	 he	 will	 speak	 about	 them	 (Ger.	 27.2),	 and	 only	 then	 in	 a	 very	particular	 way	 (from	 Germany	 into	 Gaul):	 his	 Germans	 are	 metaphorically	overrunning	the	text.	The	subject	is	represented,	but	not	in	the	orderly	manner	required	to	contain	it.397			Tan	 laid	 bare	 another	 spatial	 strategy	 preventing	 the	 imposition	 of	 a	 Roman	imperial	 geography	 on	 Germany,	 either	 physically	 or	 intellectually.	 Tacitus’	journey	 through	 Germania,	 though	 structured	 hodologically	 as	 befits	 an																																																									394Anderson	(2006),	184.	395Said	(2003),	3,	explicitly	acknowledges	his	indebtedness	to	Foucault’s	work	on	discourse	in	Discipline	and	Punish	(see	n.	395)	and	The	Archaeology	of	Knowledge	(1972)	in	developing	his	view	of	Orientalism.	396Rives	(2012),	53-4.	397Certain	strands	of	modern	postcolonial	fiction	display	stylistic	features	which	similarly	evade,	undermine	or	protest	against	the	established	order	by	being	outside	of	rational	control:	the	magic	which	intrudes	into	the	otherwise	realistic	and	recognisable	setting	of	magical	realism	novels,	for	instance.	Cf.	Castle	(2001),	xviii	and	Slemon	(2001)	in	the	same	collection.	
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itinerary	 moving	 from	 place	 to	 place 398 ,	 eschews	 the	 place	 names	 and	indications	 of	 distance	 which	 make	 itineraries	 useful. 399 	As	 a	 seeming	alternative,	Tacitus	offers	us	the	names	of	tribes	and	relative	spatial	indicators	such	as	iuxta,	ultra	etc.	to	show	how	their	territories	relate	to	one	another,	but	again	undercuts	the	usefulness	of	this	relative	spatial	perception:		 ‘Although	the	use	of	 these	terms	is	a	completely	normal	way	to	establish	spatial	relations	in	Latin	text,	their	success	depends	on	the	security	of	the	objects	used	as	reference	points	—	the	spatial	relata.	(…)	Tacitus’	account	does	 not	 clearly	 establish	 the	 location	 of	 relata,	 or	 of	 the	 viewer.	 (…)	Spatially	relative	language	can	be	used	with	much	more	precision	than	is	demonstrated	 here;	 the	 ‘failure’	 of	 the	 text	 to	 communicate	 is	 not	 the	result	of	a	poverty	of	spatial	language,	but	of	Tacitus’	refusal	to	provide	a	supporting	structure	which	would	render	it	functional.’400		Though	not	 reliant	on	Germany’s	 constant	 internal	movement	 for	 its	purpose,	this	 tactic	 also	 renders	 Germany	 mentally	 incomprehensible	 and	 thereby	physically	 unconquerable.	All	 these	 representational	 strategies	 run	 counter	 to	the	optimism	and	knowledge	that	speak	from	the	previous	140	years	of	Roman	activity	 in	 Germany	 and	 documentation	 of	 Germany:	 as	 Tan	 notes,	 Caesar	records	 a	 very	 specific	 measurement	 for	 the	 Hercynian	 forest	 as	 taking	 nine	days	 to	 traverse.401	A	 century	 later,	 the	 Elder	 Pliny	 published	 twenty	 books	filled	 with	 knowledge	 about	 Germany.	 This	 was	 only	 twenty	 years	 before	Tacitus	 published	 the	Germania.	 Vagueness	 was	 clearly	 not	 the	 only	 possible	Roman	approach	to	Germany.		I	end	this	chapter	by	a	theoretical	reflection	on	the	Germania’s	internal	textual	dynamics	 informed	 by	 Victoria	 Pagán’s	 discussion	 of	 Roman	 conspiracy	narratives. 402 The	 Germania,	 despite	 its	 varied	 foci	 and	 representational	strategies,	is	also	a	text	which	purports	to	lift	the	veil	of	ignorance	from	an	alien																																																									398See	also	Morgan	(1983),	114.	399Tan	(2014),	194–95.	In	this,	Tacitus	may	have	taken	his	lead	from	Caesar’s	Germany,	which	in	Krebs’	view	is	presented	‘as	an	infinite	extension	without	any	interior	patterns	except	for	infinite	forests’;	Krebs	(2006),	112;	also	119-24.	400Tan	(2014),	196.	Rives	(2011),	166-7	describes	the	relational	approach	as	the	norm	in	classical	antiquity	but	does	not	mention	obstruction.	401Tan	(2014),	191	citing	Caes.	BG	6.25.	402See	Pagán	(2004),	5–10	especially.	
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and	unknown	place.	It	is	in	a	comparison	of	methods	and	symbolic	function	that	the	peculiarity	of	Tacitus’	account	of	Germania	as	a	supposedly	instructive	text	most	clearly	manifests	itself.	Pagán	notes	that	in	order	to	achieve	their	purpose	of	 elucidation,	 historians	 writing	 conspiracy	 narratives	 make	 the	 effort	 to	‘construct	a	continuous	chain	of	causality	of	an	event	that	is	shrouded	in	secrecy	and	 silence.’403	What	was	previously	 hidden	 is	 now	 laid	 bare.	 In	 contrast,	 this	chapter	 makes	 clear	 throughout	 that	 Tacitus’	 methodology	 relies	 heavily	 on	misrepresentation,	suppression	and	narrative	obstruction	to	obscure	continuity	and	chronology	in	Germany.	The	work	does	not	connect	German	prehistory	to	the	modern	history	Tacitus	describes	by	means	of	such	a	chain	of	causality.404	Tacitus’	text	illuminates	the	extent	to	which	Germany	is	not	a	subject	which	can	be	illuminated.	What	was	hidden	is	actually	still	(largely)	hidden.	The	medium	(the	 text’s	 obstructive	 nature)	 expresses	 part	 of	 the	 message	 (Germany’s	obstructive	 nature)	 –	 whatever	 the	 actual	 words	 literally	 say	 about	 Germany	and	its	peoples.			This	brings	us	to	a	comparison	of	the	main	function	of	such	texts	of	revelation,	as	a	containment	of	risk.	In	a	modified	version	of	Foucault’s	statement	about	the	relationship	between	ordered	representation	and	control,	we	could	say	that	by	making	the	threatening	unknown	known,	conspiracy	narratives	assert	a	form	of	power	 and	 enact	 a	 final	 endgame	 victory	 over	 it.	 According	 to	 Pagán,	 they	operate	 as	 ‘palliatives’	 intended	 to	 reassure	 readers,	 through	 their	 textual	illumination	 of	 the	 secret,	 that	 the	 threat	 depicted	 will	 never	 return	 because	everyone	has	now	been	 informed	of	 the	 facts	as	well	as	 the	need	 for	vigilance	against	 similar	 events.	 Tacitus’	 text,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 neither	 literally	 nor	metaphorically	contains	the	Germans’	movements	in	Germany	across	the	Rhine.	Representing	 Germany	 and	 the	 Germans	 in	 this	way	 justifies	 Rome’s	military	presence	 on	 the	 west	 bank,	 to	 guard	 against	 irruptions,	 and	 simultaneously	
																																																								403Pagán	(2004),	5.	404Another	feature	of	conspiracy	narratives	which	the	Germania	shares	is	the	‘irreconcilability	of	sources	on	several	counts’	even	where	a	subject	is	accounted	for;	see	Pagán	(2004),	7	for	the	Catilinarian	conspiracy.	The	Germania’s	prehistory	is	called	into	doubt	by	Tacitus,	as	we	saw,	partly	on	the	basis	of	conflicting	sources.		
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shows	that	the	order	and	emplacement	which	she	had	managed	to	impose	west	of	the	river	cannot	be	replicated	east	of	the	river.	
Conclusion		In	 conclusion,	 this	 chapter	 argues	 that	 the	persistent	movement	of	Germany’s	people	 in	 Tacitus’	Germania	 is	 a	 defining	 feature	 of	 the	work	 and	 the	 land	 it	represents.	 The	 essence	 of	 Germany	 in	 this	work	 is	 fluidity,	meaning	 that	 the	logic	of	Roman	imperial	geography	cannot	be	applied	to	it.	These	people	cannot	be	pinned	down	either	physically	or	intellectually.			Tacitus	 hints	 at	 an	 explanation	 for	 the	 disunity	 of	 Germany’s	 tribes	 and	 the	fluidity	 of	 their	 space	 in	 his	 account	 of	 their	 origines.	 It	 is	 both	 muddled	 –	leaving	a	large	gap	unexplained	between	the	original	three	tribes	from	the	sons	of	Mannus	 and	 the	multitude	of	German	 tribes	which	Tacitus	describes	 –	 and	presented	as	uncertain	and	contested.	This	contrasts	with	Roman	history,	which	traced	a	genealogy	of	the	state	through	an	intervening	period	between	Rome’s	mythical	 prehistory	 of	 exile	 and	migration	 and	 the	 contemporary	 period.	 The	Roman	ability	to	‘make’	imperial	spaces,	which	I	have	traced	in	Livy	and	Virgil,	contrasts	with	 a	Germania	 of	 flux	 and	 shifting	 peoples,	 boundaries	 and	 lands.	The	 constitutive	power	of	 a	 historical	 narrative	 for	 a	 group	 identity	 is	 closely	tied	to	the	production	of	coherent	space.	The	Germans,	whose	carmina	antiqua	are	 incomplete	and	contested	as	historical	records,	do	not	constitute	a	unified	group	and	move	through	a	non-determined	space.	Their	ungraspable	fluidity	is	further	 aided	 by	 the	 chronological	 vagueness	 with	 which	 Tacitus	 narrates	several	events	from	Germany’s	past,	situating	them	only	by	means	of	the	adverb	
olim	when	he	could	have	dated	them	very	precisely.		Tacitus	could	have	made	Roman	history	fill	at	least	part	of	the	German	history	gap	from	the	moment	where	the	frequent	clash	of	the	two	spaces	and	peoples	made	 this	 possible.	 Instead,	 he	 collapses	 even	 Rome’s	 history	 with	 Germany	(Germany’s	 Roman	 history)	 into	 timelessness	 through	 emphasising	 and	exaggerating	–	by	means	of	some	rhetorical	slight	of	hand	-	the	long	duration	of	the	period	of	attempted	and	supposedly	failed	conquest.	Within	this	period,	the	
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text	does	touch	on	Roman	activity	in	Germany	but	devalues	it	in	different	ways.	Many	 outright	 Roman	 successes	 in	 Germany	 are	 elided	 from	 the	 narrative	entirely;	 certain	achievements	are	presented	so	as	 to	create	 the	 impression	of	having	come	about	despite	Rome’s	passive	reactivity	rather	than	because	of	its	proactivity;	 and	 proof	 of	 its	 far-reaching	 informal	 influence	 into	 even	 the	innermost	parts	of	Germany	is	reframed	as	failure	to	conquer.		Some	of	 the	 spatial	 themes	 in	 the	Germania	prefigure	 later	 reworkings	 in	 the	
Annals,	 such	 as	 the	 migrations	 by	 the	 Frisii	 and	 Ampsivarii	 which	 were	discussed	 in	 the	previous	chapter.	Pinning	down	how	their	 location	related	 to	people’s	 identity,	as	well	as	 to	 their	 relationship	with	 the	Roman	Empire,	was	clearly	of	interest	to	Tacitus.	The	Germania	also	displays	a	concern	with	fixity	as	a	 prerequisite	 for	 rolling	 out	 imperialism	 and	 establishing	 post-pacification	society. 405 	In	 the	 Histories	 and	 Annals,	 this	 concern	 evolves	 into	 an	 even	narrower	focus	on	 imperial	Rome’s	unlimited	power	as	the	ultimate	arbiter	of	people’s	 placement	 and	 distribution	 in	 German	 space	 as	 well	 as	 in	 other	domains	and	hierarchies,	such	as	legal	status,	class,	taxation	and	the	army.406		Finally,	the	Germania	as	text	adds	to	the	impression	of	German	unmanageability	by	means	of	 the	migrating	Germans	within	 it	disrespecting	 the	bounds	set	 for	them	 by	 the	 text	 –	 this	 merely	 mirrors	 the	 absence	 of	 boundaries	 within	Germany.	 Thus	 it	 becomes	 a	 perfect	 adjunct	 to	 the	 strategy	 of	 geographical	obscuration	 instead	 of	 illumination	which	 Tan	 already	 observed	 in	 the	work.	Though	authorial	intention	is	impossible	to	divine	retrospectively,	 it	 is	hard	to																																																									405With	regard	to	the	latter	two	points	of	connection	to	Tacitus’	other	works,	I	am	therefore	of	the	view	that	Rives’	assertion	(2012,	58)	of	a	Tacitean	‘interest	in	Rome’s	relations	with	its	northern	neighbors’	across	them	all	is	too	vague,	and	that	of	‘endorsement	of	Roman	imperialism’	too	strong.	406Chapter	one	discusses	Rome’s	desire	to	manage	both	the	people	and	the	land	of	Batavia	in	the	Histories;	chapter	two	deals	with	the	changes	wrought	in	the	economic	constitution	of	identities	in	the	Rhineland	by	the	advent	of	Roman	imperialism;	chapter	three	analysed	the	Rhine	mutinies	as	proof	that	Roman	legionaries	under	the	principate	displayed	similar	concerns	to	the	Batavi	about	their	position	and	powerlessness	with	regard	to	the	Roman	autocratic	régime;	chapter	four	depicts	the	German	landscape’s	unsuitability	to	Roman	pacification	and	order	by	means	of	Germanicus’	soldiers’	fear	and	his	own	destructiveness;	and	chapter	five	a	mixture	of	most	of	the	above.	
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see	how	the	text	could	be	read	as	facilitating,	encouraging	or	even	representing	any	kind	of	conquest	of	this	strange	and	volatile	land.		
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7	 Conclusion	This	 thesis	 has	 made	 clear	 that	 two	 themes	 run	 consistently	 through	 the	German	passages	of	the	Tacitean	corpus.	The	first	is	the	collective	oppression	of	imperial	subjects,	regardless	of	their	status,	showing	that	imperial	power	under	the	 principate	 worked	 in	 similar	 ways	 to	 produce	 similar	 results	 in	 different	regions,	among	different	ethnic	or	political	groups,	and	among	different	status	groups.	 Tacitus	 foregrounds	 such	 common	 patterns	 without	 losing	 the	specificity	of	different	events	such	as	Roman	mutinies	or	provincial	revolts.	The	second	 theme	 is	 the	 steady	 depiction	 of	 the	 Rhineland	 and	 transrhenane	Germany	 as	 places	 in	 which	 Rome	 can	 achieve	 feats	 of	 conquest	 only	 with	difficulty	 and	 temporarily.	 Their	 alien	 (wet	 and	 forested)	 and	 ever-changing	nature,	and	that	of	its	peoples,	preclude	Roman	physical	and	mental	access	and	the	transformation	of	the	territory	into	a	Roman	province	in	which	both	space	and	people	are	controlled	and	transformed	permanently.			The	 theme	 of	 imperial	 oppression	 is	 a	 background	 issue	 in	 the	 first	 two	chapters,	 but	 is	 introduced	 and	 explored	 more	 fully	 in	 chapter	 three	 on	 the	mutinies	on	the	Rhine	and	in	Pannonia,	as	the	earliest	res	Germanae	reported	in	the	Tacitean	corpus.	Tacitus’	account	highlights	how	these	mutinies	originated	in	 Rome’s	 flawed	 political	 relationship	 with	 the	 mutineers,	 which	 became	critical	and	no	longer	containable	after	the	death	of	Augustus.	This	chapter	then	further	showed	that	the	Tacitean	text	 frames	the	mutineers’	complaints	as	the	political	 equivalent,	 by	 citizens,	 of	 the	provincial	 Batavi’s	 discourses	 asserting	their	 suffering	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 an	 overbearing	 exploitative	 imperial	 Roman	government.	Both	these	episodes	are	concerned	with	the	relationship	between	Roman	imperial	power	and	its	subjects407,	and	the	replication	of	complaints	and	situations	 from	 one	 to	 the	 other	 suggests	 a	 view	 of	 the	 principate	 in	 which	everyone	 subject	 to	 the	 emperor	 and	his	 delegates	was	 relegated	 to	 a	 similar	
																																																								407My	reading	therefore	diverges	from	that	of	Lavan	(2013),	in	which	slavery	is	a	metaphor	applied	to	provincials	by	Romans.	
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inferior	status	of	de	facto	slavery	 in	which	their	physical	 integrity	 is	subject	to	arbitrary	but	systematic	violence	for	which	there	is	no	practical,	legal	redress.			The	 parallels	 developed	 between	 the	Batavi	 and	 the	mutineers	 show	 that	 the	workings	 of	 imperial	 power	 and	 this	 subjugation	 of	 free	 individuals	 to	 its	operation	do	not	 respect	distinctions	of	 citizenship	or	origins.	There	 is	not,	 in	these	 accounts,	 one	 law	 for	 the	 Romans	 and	 another	 for	 the	 provincials.	 The	result	 is	 to	 erode	 identity	 distinctions,	 certainly	 those	 in	 which	 modern	understandings	 of	 Roman	 imperial	 history	 have	 conventionally	 been	 framed	(Roman	 –	 provincial	 –	 barbarian).	 The	 dynamic	 establishes	 two	 very	 distant	poles	of	identity	and	power,	the	imperial	centre	one	the	one	hand	(the	emperor,	his	 family,	 and	 their	 representatives	 in	 government	 and	 the	 military)	 and	everyone	else	on	the	other,	whether	citizen	or	provincial.		To	this	shared	depiction	of	the	brutal	power	wielded	by	the	one-man	system	as	well	 as	 its	 blowing	 up	 of	 traditional	 Roman-versus-other	 distinctions,	 the	communal	German	setting	appears	almost	 incidental.	These	German	residents	do	not	experience	this	relegation	of	status	because	they	are	in	the	Rhineland,	but	because	 the	 operations	 and	 inherent	 corruption	 of	 the	 imperial	 political	 (and	economic)	 structure	have	 effects	 in	Germany.	This	 opens	up	 the	possibility	 of	gaging	 whether	 (or	 how	 far)	 this	 power	 dynamic	 extends	 to,	 firstly,	 other	German	passages	 from	 the	Tacitean	 corpus,	 and	 secondly,	 depictions	 of	 other	areas	 and	 groups	 of	 people	 across	 the	 Empire	 in	 this	 group	 of	 texts.	 In	 the	former	 case,	 chapter	 five	 of	 this	 thesis	 demonstrates	 that	 both	 issues,	 the	brutality	 of	 Roman	 imperial	 power	 and	 the	 effacing	 of	 distinctions	 between	identity	 groups	 in	 favour	 of	 shared	 oppression,	 are	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 several	shorter	 episodes	 set	 in	 Germany.	 Annals	3’s	 account	 of	 Florus	 and	 Sacrovir’s	revolt	 of	 AD21	 contains	 discourses	 on	 Roman	 rapacity	 as	 part	 of	 the	 revolt’s	beginnings,	just	as	in	the	accounts	of	the	mutinies	and	Batavian	revolt.	The	story	of	 the	Roman	official	Olennius’	maltreatment	of	 the	Frisii	 in	Annals	4	connects	the	excesses	of	 the	Roman	imperial	government	with	the	violation	of	 the	non-slave	 body,	 and	 recalls	 the	maimed	mutineers	 and	 raped	Batavi	 in	 particular.	The	Ampsivarii	in	Annals	13,	despite	their	chief	Boiocalus’	long	service	to	Rome	
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and	 consequent	 expectation	 of	 reciprocal	 consideration,	 are	 treated	 no	differently	 to	 these	 other	 tribes.	 These	 smaller	 German	 narratives	 in	 the	Tacitean	 corpus,	 therefore,	 further	 support	 a	 reading	 of	 the	 text	 as	 indicating	that	 to	 imperial	 Rome	 no	 differences	 of	 status	 or	 situation	 between	 imperial	subjects	were	any	longer	relevant.		A	 discussion	 of	 other	 areas	 of	 the	 Empire	 and	 the	 groups	 of	 people	within	 it	would	have	fallen	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	but	even	a	cursory	reading	of	some	 of	 them	 suggests	 they	 uphold	 the	 pattern	 outlined	 above.	 The	 British	queen	Boudicca’s	story	in	Annals	14,	for	example,	contains	(as	well	as	new	and	idiosyncratic	 ones)	 several	 of	 the	 familiar	 elements	 from	 this	 thesis:	 the	violation	of	the	non-slave	body,	a	Roman	procurator’s	rapacity,	and	consequent	revolt.	 The	 beginning	 of	 the	 Thracian	 revolt	 at	 Annals	 4.46	 is	 explained	 by	Tacitus	 in	terms	of	a	dilectus	refused	and	complaints	about	burdens	framed	in	terms	 of	 servitium.	 The	 Thracians’	 situation	 resembles	 that	 of	 the	 Batavi	 in	several	other	respects	which,	whether	historically	accurate	or	not408,	reinforce	further	the	parallels	about	provincials’	lived	experience	within	the	Empire	or	its	sphere	of	influence.	The	African	Tacfarinas’	rebellion	against	Rome	is	presented	as	a	conflict	between	neighbours	for	plunder	in	its	early	stages,	but	just	before	his	 final	 defeat	 libertas	makes	 an	 appearance	 here	 also	 (Ann.	4.24),	 alongside	the	 idea	 of	 Rome	 as	 antithetical	 to	whatever	 he	 is	 using	 the	 concept	 to	mean	(which	 is	not	clarified	by	Tacitus,	and	he	offers	very	 little	ground	on	which	 to	construct	a	hypothesis).	Though	further	work	can	usefully	be	undertaken	in	this	area,	 this	 preliminary	 survey	 suggests	 that	 Tacitean	 accounts	 of	 Roman	encounters	with	non-Germans	elsewhere	will	uphold	the	conclusions	reached	in	the	present	study	on	the	basis	of	the	German	passages.	Imperial	power	is	shown	to	work	similarly	and	 to	be	perceived	similarly,	even	 if	 the	 landscape	 in	 these	passages	is	different	(the	desert	of	Africa,	the	mountains	of	Thrace).		
																																																								408Both	tribes	are	led	in	battle	by	their	own	leaders,	reject	a	dilectus	and	act	up	at	least	partly	because	they	fear	that	under	Rome’s	rule	their	group	will	be	mixed	in	with	other	nationalities	and	dragged	to	opposite	ends	of	the	earth;	see	Brunt	(1960),	501.	
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Tacitus’	 narrative	 detects	 and	 represents	 certain	 patterns	 in	 the	 workings	 of	Roman	 power	 across	 different	 specific	 circumstances.	 It	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 see	whether	the	paradigms	we	can	perceive	in	the	account	influence	or	distort	the	narrative.	Two	ways	of	 reading	 this	material	are	possible:	we	can	believe	 that	Tacitus	 applies	 a	 certain	 set	 of	 literary	 and	 intellectual	 tropes	 to	 his	understanding	 of	 resistance	 to	 Rome	 or	 that	 Tacitus’	 understanding	 of	 the	political	 structures	 was	 such	 that	 he	 perceived	 certain	 repetitive	 elements	within	the	dynamics	of	Roman	imperial	history.	More	 literary	approaches	that	have	become	common	in	the	analysis	of	Latin	historiography	would	tend	to	the	former	interpretation.	The	analysis	in	this	thesis	would	tend	to	the	latter.	One	of	the	primary	differences	between	Tacitean	history	and	 its	modern	descendants	is	 that	 the	 political	 interpretations	 of	 these	 events	 are	 embedded	 within	 the	specifics	 of	 the	 varying	 narratives.	 A	 repetition	 in	 narrative	 pattern	 between	two	 different	 events	 need	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 literary	 trope	 or	 an	 imaginative	borrowing	 to	 fill	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 narrative,	 but	 as	 a	manifestation	 of	 a	 perceived	regularity	in	the	historical	process,	even	if	Tacitus	never	theorises	that	process.	Even	though	the	Annals	are	written	in	annalistic	form,	Tacitus	does	not	seem	to	regard	 history	 as	 ‘one	 thing	 after	 another’	 but	 as	 a	working	 out	 of	 particular	social	and	political	relationships.	It	is	this	pattern	that	we	see	in	the	repetition	of	trials	in	the	Tiberian	books,	for	instance,	and	it	is	through	the	repeated	nature	of	events	that	the	general	conclusions	of	the	reader	are	reached.		One	might	object	 that	even	 in	 the	Tacitean	accounts,	 the	revolts	and	uprisings	that	I	have	traced	in	this	study	are	exceptional.	Tacitus	must	have	been	aware	of	the	 long	 periods	 of	 peace	 in	 the	 German	 lands	 between	 these	 accounts	 of	violence.	We	 cannot	 doubt	 that	 Roman	 rule	was	 enthusiastically	 embraced	 in	many	parts	of	 the	Empire409,	 as	 it	was	by	 the	Agrippinenses,	 formerly	Ubii,	 in	
																																																								409The	subject	of	Ando	(2000)	and	also	touched	upon	in	Woolf	(2000).	I	do	not	share	Master’s	optimistic	reading	(2016)	of	the	Batavian	revolt	in	Tacitus,	analogous	to	the	Social	War,	as	the	convulsion	necessary	to	force	a	change	in	Roman	behaviour	towards	this	group	which	would	then	reconcile	them	to	their	heavy	human	(rather	than	financial)	contribution	to	the	Roman	Empire;	my	skepticism	derives	in	part	from	the	limits	of	the	argument.	In	my	view,	Tacitus’	description	of	the	problem	is	not	transactional	in	nature;	moreover,	a	better	remunerated	share	in	the	Empire	would	do	
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Histories	4	 (see	 chapter	 two).	At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	perfectly	possible	 that	 in	many	cases	peace	and	the	material	benefits	brought	by	Roman	rule	were	valued	despite	a	concomitant	awareness	of	political	and	other	forms	of	oppression	and	corruption.		I	started	this	conclusion	with	the	earliest	German	event	narrated	in	the	Tacitean	corpus,	 and	 traced	 its	 thematic	 concerns	 in	 several	 other	 German	 episodes	discussed	in	this	thesis.	At	the	other	chronological	end,	the	Histories	contain	the	latest	 recorded	 res	Germanae,	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	Batavian	 revolt.410	As	well	 as	being	 concerned	 with	 imperial	 power	 in	 a	 manner	 which	 transcends	 the	specifics	of	 its	German	setting,	 as	we	have	 seen,	 the	Tacitean	account	devotes	attention	 to	 Germany	 as	 a	 place.	 Chapter	 one	 discusses	 the	 spatial	representation	of	Germany	by	Tacitus	in	detail,	analysing	how	Tacitus	carefully	shaped	and	continually	brings	to	the	fore	the	wetscapes	in	which	the	revolt	took	place.	 This	 enables	 him	 to	 explore	 different	 modes	 of	 interaction	 between	peoples	 and	 places,	 and	 how	 they	 affect	 the	 power	 balance	 of	 imperialist	aggression	 and	 resistance	 to	 it.	 This	 chapter	 is	 therefore	 in	 a	 general	 sense	about	 how	 Tacitus	 depicts	 place	 as	 a	 central	 determinant	 of	 relationships	between	 people	 and	 power.	 Specifically,	 his	 concern	 is	with	 how	 the	 riverine	and	swampy	nature	of	the	Rhineland	shaped	these	relationships	to	be	symbiotic	and	productive	in	the	native	Germans’	case	–	not	least	thanks	to	a	semi-divine	agency	 of	 the	 river	 Rhine	 which	 repeatedly	 damages	 Rome’s	 progress	 –	 and	hostile	and	obstructive	for	the	occupying	Romans.			In	view	of	this	dynamic,	in	which	gains	made	in	Germany	by	Rome	are	difficult	and	often	temporary,	chapter	two	discusses	how	this	failure	to	fully	master	this	wetland	landscape	was	countered	by	Petillius	Cerialis’	rhetorical	offence	on	the	participants	of	the	Batavian	revolt	in	Histories	4	and	5.	His	tactic	uses	the	guise	of	 identity	 politics	 to	 split	 the	 Gallo-German	 alliance	 into	 competing	 groups	which	 rely	on	pragmatic	 considerations	 to	determine	what	 action	 to	 take	 and																																																																																																																																																														nothing	to	remedy	the	systemic	nature	of	the	problem	as	outlined	by	Tacitus	and	traced	in	this	thesis.	410The	Germania	makes	opaque	reference	to	some	later	events	but	these	are	not	of	Roman	making,	such	as	the	Bructeri’s	genocide	in	AD97	by	their	neighbours	(Ger.	33.1).	
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what	 identity	 to	adopt.	Though	Tacitus	does	not	describe	 in	 the	Histories	how	identity	was	 constituted	 in	 the	Rhineland	 or	 how	 the	 territory	was	 politically	and	economically	organised	before	the	advent	of	Rome,	the	speeches,	especially	when	 voicing	 resistance	 such	 as	 that	 of	 the	 Tencteri,	 attest	 how	 Rome’s	appearance	 in	 the	 Rhineland	 effected	 a	 change	 in	 both	 these	 mechanisms,	resulting	 in	 the	 primacy	 of	 these	 other	 considerations	 over	 the	 ideological	aspects	 of	 identity.	 Under	 Rome,	 groups	 –	 whether	 along	 the	 same	 lines	 as	before	or	new	ones	–	were	in	competition	with	each	other	for	goods	and	status	provided	 by	 Rome,	 and	 it	 is	 their	 individually	 negotiated	 position	which	 sets	them	apart	qua	group,	rendering	previous	ties	such	as	pan-German	relatedness	less	 important.	 The	 competitive	 mechanism	 described	 amounts	 to	 a	 form	 of	largely	 non-military	 Roman	 control	 over	 the	 Rhineland.	 In	 spite	 of	 military	setbacks	caused	by	Rome’s	difficult	negotiation	of	the	landscape,	Rome	retained	an	ability	to	separate	groups	as	a	means	of	achieving	control,	at	least	to	the	west	of	 the	 Rhine.	 I	 say	 ‘largely	 non-military’	 because,	 even	 though	 there	 are	skirmishes,	there	were	no	large-scale	battles	or	massive	losses	suffered	by	the	rebels	–	not	until	the	very	end	when	Cerialis	destroyed	the	Batavi’s	island	with	its	homesteads,	 and	at	 this	point	most	of	 the	work	 in	dismantling	 the	alliance	has	been	done.	For	most	of	the	tribes,	it	is	the	threat	of	violence	at	a	point	where	they	 have	 just	 suffered	 defeat	 in	 a	 relatively	 small	 skirmish	 that	 impels	 the	rebels	to	undergo	the	change	of	heart	which	sees	them	revaluate	the	economic	benefits	of	the	status	quo.	Through	his	skilful	exploitation	of	all	this	to	separate	the	 constituent	 groups	 of	 the	Gallo-German	 rebel	 alliance,	 the	Roman	 general	Petillius	Cerialis,	often	discussed	in	scholarship	and	partly	portrayed	by	Tacitus	as	 incompetent,	 shows	himself	 to	be	an	efficient	commander	 in	managing	and	ending	the	revolt	after	all.		Germany	 as	 an	 obstructive	 landscape	 returns	 in	 the	 Annals,	 where	 the	unpredictable	 force	 of	 nature	 of	 the	 Histories	 is	 reworked	 into	 an	 equally	destructive	but	much	slower	agent	of	decay	as	a	different	way	of	showing	up	the	importance	between	peoples	and	places	 in	Rome’s	 imperialist	 conquest	of	 the	Rhineland.	 The	 German	 passages	 of	 Annals	 1	 and	 2	 are	 built	 on	 the	 same	foundations	 throughout:	 Germany	 as	 a	 complex	 space,	 structured	 both	
		 236	
horizontally	(by	means	of	competing	Roman	and	German	spaces)	and	vertically	(by	means	of	layered	spaces),	of	which	the	constitution	is	perpetually	contested,	perpetually	shifting,	and	perpetually	eluding	Roman	grasp.	Even	though	the	text	shows	 that	 Roman	 violent	 power	 can	 leave	 marks	 in	 the	 landscape,	 it	 also	shows	that	these	marks,	over	time,	are	obliterated	by	the	landscape.	There	is	no	middle	ground	between	violent	repression	which	destroys	both	such	resistant	people	and	resistant	places,	as	Germanicus	does,	and	full	co-option	of	Germans	so	 that	 they	 collude	 in	 the	 transformation	 of	 themselves	 and	 their	 landscape	into	Roman	subjects.	Germanicus	does	not	offer	the	Germans	co-option,	perhaps	in	 recognition	 that	 in	 this	 Germany	 in	 this	 part	 of	 the	 Tacitean	 text	 such	 co-option	cannot	be	achieved.	His	bloody	expeditions	and	trophies	do	therefore	not	amount	 to	 a	 conquest	 of	 Germany	 that	 results	 in	 a	 province,	 and	 are	 even	interspersed	with	 failures	 on	 a	 scale	 as	 grand	 as	 that	 of	 the	 victories.	 Several	decades	later,	Corbulo	at	first	seems	to	do	better	than	Germanicus.	His	victories	would	seem	to	herald	the	beginnings	of	a	possible	integration	of	Germany	into	Roman	imperial	structures,	in	particular	with	his	establishing	of	German	states	such	as	the	Frisii’s	quasi-Republic.	But	ultimately,	his	efforts	too	cannot	improve	on	 the	 Germanicus	 intervention,	 despite	 achieving	 more	 impressive	 victories	and	longer	journeys	into	the	German	interior.		The	contrast,	familiar	from	the	Histories,	between	Germans	travelling	easily	and	swiftly	 through	 their	 distinctive	 landscape	 (here,	 across	 the	 Rhine,	 more	forested	 than	 riverine)	 and	 Romans	 who	 struggle	 to	 master	 it	 recurs	 in	 the	Germanicus	 campaigns	 of	 the	 Annals,	 but	 foregrounds	 identity	 even	 more	clearly.	 The	 alienness	 of	 the	 Germans,	 their	 landscape,	 and	 their	 culture	 is	stressed	through	Germanicus’	lack	of	interest	in	comprehending	Germany.	This	contrasts	 markedly	 with	 his	 intellectual	 curiosity	 and	 historical	 awareness	when	encountering	 the	remnants	of	Egypt’s	 (bygone)	empire,	 to	which	he	can	relate,	and	his	trip	to	Greece.	His	soldiers	respond	with	fear	to	their	sustained	confrontation	 with	 the	 alien	 German	 landscape	 and	 people.	 Both	 those	encamped	 on	 the	 Roman	 west	 bank,	 fairly	 safe	 from	 German	 irruptions,	 and	those	campaigning	on	the	east	bank,	in	a	more	fragile	position	after	the	muddy	defeat	 which	 cost	 them	 their	 tools,	 rush	 to	 the	 unfounded	 conclusion	 that	
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further	 confrontation	 with	 Germany	 is	 imminent,	 and	 threaten	 to	 abandon	discipline,	duty,	and	safety	to	escape	it.	At	this	point,	Tacitus	dramatically	shows	how	 only	 the	 interposition	 of	 the	 Roman	 aristocratic	 body,	 Caecina’s	 and	Agrippina’s,	 between	 the	 soldiers	 and	 their	 desired	 escape	 is	 able	 to	 avert	disaster	 for	 Rome.	 A	 similar	 breakdown	 of	 discipline,	 though	 even	 more	explicitly	 explained	 as	 the	 result	 of	 abandoned	 labor,	 lay	 at	 the	 root	 of	 the	mutinies	 (as	 chapter	 three	 showed)	 and	 provided	 the	 impetus	 for	 the	 first	‘Germanicus	campaign’	in	Annals	1,	against	the	Marsi.	This	expedition’s	status	as	a	deliberate	reinstatement	of	 labor	to	restore	 lost	discipline	means	it	deserves	separate	treatment	from	the	other	campaigns	of	Annals	1	and	2.	It	is	not	about	a	tightly	welded	unit	of	disciplined	Romans	going	out	to	impose	their	rule	(values,	structures,	…)	on	the	Germans,	but	about	recently	undisciplined	Romans	going	out	to	impose	Roman	rule	back	on	themselves.	The	Marsi	simply	happen	to	be	a	convenient	 target.	 As	 if	 to	 illustrate	 the	 difference	 in	 purpose	 of	 this	 episode,	Tacitus’	 account	 shows	 the	 usually	 challenging	 German	 landscape	working	 in	Rome’s	favour	during	the	Mari	expedition.	Identity	and	landscape	are	central	to	it,	as	in	the	rest	of	Annals	1	and	2,	but	people,	place,	and	power	are	configured	very	differently.		I	 finish	 this	 conclusion,	 as	 I	 finished	 this	 thesis,	 with	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	
Germania.	Its	position	as	final	book-end	instead	of	springboard	seemingly	goes	against	its	status	as	one	of	Tacitus’	earliest	compositions.	The	Germania	is	not	a	historical	work.	 In	 fact,	 its	nature	as	(the	results	of)	an	ethnographical	 inquiry	makes	 it	more	 liable	 to	 essentialisation	 and	 schematisation	 of	 both	 the	 place	and	 the	 people.	 Though	 my	 reading	 ‘backwards’	 to	 the	 Germania	 from	 the	identity	and	spatial	patterns	of	 the	Histories	and	Annals	does	not	argue	 for	an	early	German	template	in	the	Germania	to	which	Tacitus	then	adhered	rigidly	in	the	 later	works,	 it	 does	 find	 the	 seeds	 of	many	 of	 these	 later	 concerns.	 In	 its	most	 straightforward	 aspect,	 the	 Germania	 is	 dominated	 by	 ever-moving	Germans	 who	 cannot	 be	 fixed	 on	 a	 map	 and	 so	 defy	 both	 physical	 and	intellectual	 mastery	 by	 Rome.	 The	 perpetual	 shifting	 of	 its	 internal	 tribal	constitution	prevents	and	discourages	conquest	as	much	as	the	obscurity	of	its	internal	geography	(long	noted	by	other	scholars)	does.	Both	themes	also	occur	
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in	Germanicus’	 frustrating	pursuits	of	Arminius	 through	 trackless	 forests.	The	
Germania’s	 preoccupation	 with	 emplacement	 (or	 fixity	 in	 space)	 as	 a	prerequisite	 and	 characteristic	 of	 successful	 Roman	 imperialism	 recurs	 in	Tacitus’	 account	 of	 Corbulo’s	 first	 settlement	 of	 the	 Frisii	 as	 well	 as	 in	 their	subsequent	migration	and	eviction	by	Rome	 from	their	newly	chosen	 lands	 (a	cycle	which	 is	 enacted	 a	 second	 time	 by	 the	 Ampsivarii).	 Germanicus’	 lack	 of	interest	in	understanding	Germany	or	its	history	in	the	Annals,	yet	his	 interest	in	the	history	of	other	‘civilised’	Mediterranean	cultures	such	as	Egypt,	are	not	motivated	 in	 the	Annals.	 In	 chapter	 four,	 I	 offered	my	own	hypothesis	 for	 the	divergence	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 Annals’	 depiction	 of	 Germany	 as	 difficult	 for	Romans	to	negotiate	and	conquer,	more	threatening	because	of	it,	and	therefore	more	easily	neutralised	 through	destruction	than	through	understanding.	This	understanding	 is	 further	 enriched	 by	 reading	 the	 Germania’s	 depiction	 of	Germans	 as	 people	 almost	 without	 history:	 without	 both	 the	 historical	development	 undergone	 by	 Rome	 since	 its	 –	 equally	 mythical	 –	 earliest	beginnings	and	the	historical	practice	which	commemorates	it,	thereby	enabling	an	 empire	 to	 grow	 which	 expanded	 territorially	 but	 retained	 a	 single	 stable	identity.	The	Germania,	as	are	the	other	works,	is	therefore	ambivalent	in	tone	about	the	Roman	Empire:	though	the	Germans	are	clearly	portrayed	as	inferior	to	Romans	in	this	and	other	aspects411,	the	obstructive,	fragmented	and	shifting	space	 created	 by	 this	 incoherent	 people	 at	 the	 same	 time	 ensures	 it	 remains	outside	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 Empire’s	 corrupting	 dynamics.	 Finally,	 the	‘ungraspability’	of	the	ever-moving	Germans	in	the	Germania	recalls,	 though	is	different	 from,	 the	 Histories’	 depiction	 of	 German	 identities	 as	 supremely	malleable	under	the	influence	of	Rome’s	economic	and	military	pressure.			In	 what	 is	 perhaps	 an	 uninspiring	 conclusion,	 therefore,	 Tacitus’	 Germany	unites	a	variety	of	different	 functions.	As	others	have	argued,	Germany	can	be	read	as	a	mirror	to	Rome.412	But	my	thesis	has	also	shown	that	for	Tacitus	it	was	a	theatre	in	which	features	of	Roman	imperialism	and	power	were	manifested.																																																									411Though	not	all,	as	demonstrated	by	the	admiration	with	which	Tacitus’	writes	on	the	Germans’	marital	ethics	(Ger.	18-9).	412E.g.	Low	(2013)	on	the	Annals,	Keitel	(1993)	on	the	Histories	and	O’Gorman	(1993)	and	Timpe	(2007)	on	the	Germania.	
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It	 is	a	place	of	conquest,	not	 firmly	shaped	and	tamed	 into	a	province,	yet	not	one	 in	 which	 the	 virtues	 of	 old	 Rome	 can	 be	 played	 with	 away	 from	 the	corruption	 of	 the	 new	 imperial	 Rome	 of	 the	 principate:	 the	 imperial	 prince	Germanicus	fails	to	conquer	or	annex	it,	the	Roman-fostered	Italicus	introduces	a	 quasi	 principate	 to	 plague	 the	 Cherusci	 in	 Germany’s	 interior,	 the	 Rhine	legions	 repeatedly	 abandon	 Republican	 standards	 of	 discipline	 while	 their	commanders	 treat	 them	 like	slaves.	 It	 is	a	place	 for	which	Tacitus	 is	driven	 to	explore	the	mechanics	of	Roman	imperialism:	the	attempted	transformation	of	landscapes,	the	occasional	co-option	of	communities	such	as	the	Agrippinenses	but	also	the	suppression	of	the	free,	such	as	the	Batavi,	in	its	corrupt	regime.	It	is	a	place	of	difference	and	resistance	where	place	resists	Roman	power,	as	 in	the	Batavian	revolt	and	Germanicus	campaigns,	and	Roman	comprehension,	as	in	the	Germania.	For	these	reasons,	it	is	ultimately	unable	to	be	brought	within	the	Roman	sphere,	and	as	a	result	 is	subject	to	often	extreme	Roman	violence.	Destruction	 is	 the	 nearest	 Rome	 can	 get	 to	 any	 real	 form	 of	 control	 over	Germany.	 Ultimately,	 therefore,	 Tacitus’	 treatment	 is	 not	 of	 Germany	 as	 an	abstraction,	 but	 a	 detailed	 engagement	 with	 Germany,	 the	 workings	 of	imperialism,	 and	 its	 place	 in	 Roman	 history.
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